Norman v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00149-MR

DASHA CLARK NORMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

WAYNE BROWN,1 ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 6].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, who is presently serving a sentence of between

seven and one-half years and ten years for offenses including violation of a

protective order, habitual misdemeanor assault, and obstructing justice, filed

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that

allegedly occurred in Transylvania County.2 [Doc. 1]. He names as the sole

1 The Plaintiff misspells the Defendant’s first name as “Wayn.” The clerk will be instructed

to correct the Defendant’s name in the Court’s record.

2 The Plaintiff has filed two copies of the Complaint, one of which is on a § 1983 form and

the other of which appears to be a handwritten copy. The citations to the Complaint that

are contained in this Order refer to the version of the Complaint that is on a § 1983 form,

as the fully handwritten copy is less legible. [Doc. 1 at 6-10].

Defendant Wayne Brown, a Transylvania County magistrate. He claims that

Defendant Brown violated his equal protection and due process rights as

follows:

I was arrested for a crime I did not commit. I made bond and

while still bleeding from head, neck, and shoulders from stab

wounds inflicted by my girlfriend who came to my residents and

brutally assaulted me. I tried to press charges and Wayn Brown

refused to charge [her] with a crime (March, April 2019).

[Id. at 7] (errors uncorrected).

As injury, he claims:

Due to Magistrate Wayn Brown’s refusal to allow me use of the

legal system, my story was never heard. I was later indicted on

a hand full of factitious charges brought by the state only I was

assaulted in the jail and badly injured. My reputation further

damaged. I was forced into an Alford plea for 90-120 months.

The DA said if I didn’t take that she garanteed 52 years so I

signed. For fear my record was against me. It was self defense

in my own home.

[Id. at 8] (errors uncorrected). He seeks damages. [Id. at 10].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

The Plaintiff purports to name as the sole Defendant a Transylvania

County magistrate. However, judicial opfficers are immune from suit under

the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

359 (1996) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts

even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave

procedural errors.”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976) (stating

that judicial “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a

malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it

is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with

independence and without fear of consequences”) (internal quotations

omitted).

Even if Defendant Brown were not immune from suit, these claims

would fail initial review. The Plaintiff claims that his due process and equal

protection rights were violated in that he was not allowed to insist that his

alleged attacker be criminally charged. However, “in American jurisprudence

…, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution

or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

(1973); Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 494 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[n]o citizen

has an enforceable right to institute a criminal prosecution.”) Therefore,

Defendant Brown’s refusal to charge the Plaintiff’s alleged attacker did not

implicate any of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Brown v.

Rowan Cnty. Det. Ctr., 2012 WL 5338574 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2012) (“an

inmate does not state a constitutional claim by alleging that he was denied

the right to press criminal charges); Harris v. Salley, 339 F. App’x 281 (4th

Cir. 2009) (prisoner lacked equal protection right to have criminal

proceedings instituted against § 1983 defendants).

To the extent that the Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated by

way of his own criminal prosecution and conviction, this claim appears to be

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).3 In Heck, the United

States Supreme Court held as follows:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction and

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §

1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

3 Further, to the extent that the Plaintiff suggests that someone other than Defendant

Brown is liable for his criminal charges and/or conviction, his allegations are nullities. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Perez v.

Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A

plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders any action

against the purported defendant a legal nullity”).

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

Success on the Plaintiff’s present claims that he was not given the

opportunity to fully defend his criminal case, and that he was forced to enter

an Alford4 plea, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence in the underlying criminal matter. See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d

391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (an Alford plea is the procedural equivalent of a guilty

plea). The Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that his conviction has been

reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his present challenge to his

own criminal prosecution and conviction appear to be barred by Heck.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Defendant

and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his

Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order

and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural

requirements and will supersede his previous filings. Piecemeal amendment

will not be allowed. Should Plaintiff fail to timely file an Amended Complaint

4 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

in accordance with this Order, this action will be dismissed without prejudice

and without further notice to Plaintiff.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ili).

2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails

to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this Order and

within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed

without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to correct the Court record by

substituting Wayne Brown for “Wayn Brown;” and to mail the Plaintiff a blank

§ 1983 prisoner complaint form and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 27, 2022

Ct ey

Chief United States District Judge AS