to establish injury in fact plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to show she suffered a concrete harm
How later courts described this case
- to establish injury in fact plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to show she suffered a concrete harm
- “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.”
- recognizing the court’s “duty to construe removal jurisdiction strictly and resolve doubts in favor of remand”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:21-CV-00120-KDB-DSC
NICKIE MULLINS,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
MONARCH RECOVERY
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on its own motion. In this action Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (the
“FDCPA”), the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, N.C.G.S. § 75-50, et seq. (the “NCDCA”),
the North Carolina Collection Agency Act, N.C.G.S. § 58-70, et seq., and the North Carolina
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, et seq. when it used a third party
mail vendor to prepare and mail three debt collection letters to her between June and October 2020.
Plaintiff initially filed her putative class action in North Carolina’s Caldwell County Superior
Court, and Defendant timely removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b)
based on the alleged federal statutory violation. However, the notice of removal does not discuss
or state any facts establishing that the parties have met the Court’s Article III standing
requirements. See Doc. No. 1. Indeed, Plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court on March
8, 2022, on the grounds of lack of standing, but then withdrew that motion. See Doc. Nos. 14-16.
Even where, as is apparently the circumstance here, the parties agree to have their dispute
decided in federal court, the Court has an independent obligation to hear only those cases within
its limited jurisdiction. In any case removed from state court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[I]t is the defendant who carries the burden of alleging in his notice of removal
and, if challenged, demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction over the matter.” Strawn v. AT & T
Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008). “[R]emoval statutes must be construed narrowly,
and any doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remanding the case to
state court.” Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Palisades
Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the court’s “duty to
construe removal jurisdiction strictly and resolve doubts in favor of remand”).
Federal courts are limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to deciding actual
“cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III § 2. If a plaintiff lacks standing, then there is no
case or controversy, and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims. Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional
understanding of a case or controversy.”). “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in
the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 341; TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204
(2021) (to establish injury in fact plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to show she suffered a
concrete harm).
Recently, in at least five cases in North Carolina federal courts involving nearly identical
factual allegations and legal claims and the same plaintiff’s counsel as this case, the courts found,
pursuant to Spokeo and TransUnion, that the parties failed to establish an allegation of concrete
harm and thus lacked the Article III standing necessary to support federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See Brown v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 1:21-CV-595, 2022 WL 377001, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 8, 2022); Asbury v. Credit Corp Sols., Inc., No. 1:21-CV-650, 2022 WL 377011, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2022); Hatchett v. Fin. Bus. & Consumer Sols., Inc., No. 1:21-CV-622, 2022
WL 377002, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2022); Ghazaly v. First Nat'l Collection Bureau, Inc., No.
5:21-CV-362-FL, 2022 WL 2610431, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2022); Dunn v. Enhanced Recovery
Co., LLC, No. 21-CV-665, 2022 WL 2483577, at *3 (M.D.N.C. July 6, 2022). Based on this
substantial and persuasive authority, the Court questions why this action should not similarly be
remanded to state court based on a lack of standing.
Accordingly, the parties are ordered to, on or before October 7, 2022, either stipulate to the
remand of this action back to the North Carolina Caldwell County Superior court or show cause
why the parties have Article II standing sufficient to support federal subject matter jurisdiction.
In the absence of a timely stipulation or a showing of good cause, the Court will remand this action
to state court for the reasons fully stated in the authorities cited above.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: September 22,
Kenneth D. Bell Cy,
United States District Judge i f