Hoots v. Miller

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00060-MR

JACOB HOOTS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

SHERIFF OF BUNCOMBE COUNTY, )

et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Second

Amended Complaint [Doc. 15]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

[Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred while he was

a pretrial detainee at the Buncombe County Detention Facility (BCDF).1

[Doc. 1]. The Complaint was dismissed on initial review, and the Plaintiff

was granted the opportunity to amend. [Doc. 9]. He attempted to amend in

1 The Plaintiff is presently housed at the Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC).

[See Doc. 15 at 4].

a piecemeal fashion, which was denied, and he was given another

opportunity to amend. [See Docs. 10, 11, 14]. The Second Amended

Complaint is now before the Court for initial review. [Doc. 15].

The Plaintiff again names as Defendants in their individual and official

capacities: Quentin Miller, the Buncombe County sheriff; and FNU Johnson,

and FNU Halub, BCDF detention officers; and he has added as new

Defendants: Lisa LNU, a BCDF nurse, and John Doe, a detective. He

asserts claims for the violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, and for defamation under North Carolina law. [Doc. 15 at 3,

5]. As injury, the Plaintiff claims that he was “assaulted numerous times;”

that he was denied reasonably adequate medical attention; that his character

was defamed; he suffered PTSD; that he was falsely arrested and

imprisoned; that he “lost a lot of weight;” that he has difficulty obtaining

employment;2 and that he is still seeing “a mental health person” because

the incidents were “so traumatic.” [Id. at 5, 13]. He seeks punitive and

compensatory damages and whatever other relief the Court feels he

deserves. [Id. at 5, 13].

2 It is unclear how the Plaintiff could be experiencing any difficulty in obtaining

employment, as he is presently incarcerated.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Second Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions

seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Parties

The Second Amended Complaint contains allegations that are not

directed to any Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (requiring defendants

to be named in the caption); Shine v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Dep’t,

No. 3:17-cv-306-FDW, 2018 WL 2943456 (W.D.N.C. June 12, 2018)

(dismissing as nullities the allegations against individuals not named as

defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a)). The allegations

directed at non-parties are dismissed.

The Plaintiff again purports to sue the Defendants in their individual

and official capacities. [Doc. 15 at 3-4]. He “feel[s] that [Sheriff Miller]

received [Plaintiff’s] grievances and that’s why they were unattended too

[sic],” and that Miller is responsible “solely because he’s the sheriff….” [Id. at

13]. The Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell3 claim for the reasons discussed

on the Order on initial review of the Complaint. [Doc. 9 at 6-7]. His

speculative allegations that Defendant Miller received his grievances are

insufficient to state a claim, as is his attempt to rely on the theory of

3 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of NY, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

respondeat superior. Accordingly, the claims asserted against the

Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed.

B. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious

Prosecution

The Plaintiff claims that he was arrested on a “cold” rape case on May

15, 2020; that “a detective”4 at BCDF told him that his DNA was a match for

the rape case; that the Plaintiff told the detective that witnesses could

account for his whereabouts at the relevant time, but the detective “didn’t

take that into consideration;” that the Plaintiff “remained incarcerated over

the rape that [he] didn’t commit or have anything too [sic] do with” for two

years; and that he “was later deemed not too [sic] have committed [the

rape].” [Doc. 15 at 13].

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure

in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend.

IV. An arrest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and such a seizure

is reasonable only if based on probable cause. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d

392, 398 (4th Cir. 2003); see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)

(“False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the

latter”). Probable cause to justify an arrest means “facts and circumstances

4 This appears to be a reference to the Defendant John Doe detective.

within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person,

or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that

the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Whether probable cause

exists must be determined “in the light of all of the surrounding

circumstances.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). To

state a cognizable § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege that

law enforcement officers arrested him without probable cause. See

Pleasants v. Town of Louisa, 524 F. App’x 891, 897 (4th Cir. 2013). Damages

for a false arrest claim covers the time of the detention up until issuance of

process or arraignment. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994).

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is properly understood as

a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates

certain elements of the common law tort. Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,

261 (4th Cir. 2000). To state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must

allege that the defendant caused a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal

process, unsupported by probable cause, and the criminal proceedings

terminated in plaintiffs’ favor. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir.

2012). To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for

purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff need only show that his

prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332,

1335 (2022).

Here, the Plaintiff expresses disagreement with his arrest and the merit

of the criminal charges, but he fails to plausibly allege that any Defendant

arrested him, held him, or charged him without probable cause. The

Plaintiff’s challenge to the adequacy of the John Doe detective’s

investigation of the rape does not support a § 1983 claim. See generally

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196

(1989) (“The Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to

governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,

liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive

the individual.”)); see, e.g., Savage v. Cnty. of Stafford, Va., 754 F.Supp.2d

809 (E.D. Va. 2010) (deputy sheriff’s alleged failure to document and

investigate arrestee’s alibi did not violate due process). Accordingly, the

Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

D. Failure to Protect

The Plaintiff contends that Defendants Johnson, Halub, and Nurse Lisa

made “callous [and] unprofessional comments” about his case in front of

other inmates including that he “was a rapist,” “didn’t deserve to live,” and he

was “less than a man”; that these comments “put[] [him] in danger” and were

the “only” reason he was “subjected too [sic] numerous assaults by other

inmates…” and “constant fighting” [Doc. 15 at 13]. The Plaintiff “feel[s] this

was done in fact to cause [him] harm….” [Id.].

“A failure-to-protect claim brought by a pretrial detainee constitutes a

due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” McFadden v. Butler, No. TDC-16-0437, 2018 WL 1394021, at

*4 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2018) (citing Smith v. Sangam on Ct y. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

715 F.3d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 2013)). “Due process rights of a pretrial detainee

are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to the

convicted prisoner.” Id. (citing Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir.

1992) (citations omitted)). “Thus, the standards for a Fourteenth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim are the same as those for a comparable

claim brought by a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment.”5 Id.

(citations omitted). To show deliberate indifference under the Eighth

5 In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held

that a pretrial detainee bringing an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment is no longer required to satisfy the analogous subjective component that

governs the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims of convicted prisoners. However,

neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has extended Kingsley beyond the

excessive force context to a pretrial detainee’s deliberate indifference claims. See Mays

v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300-02 (4th Cir. 2021).

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official had actual

knowledge of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety. Danser v. Stansberry,

772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014). In other words, the prison official “must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Further, the deprivation alleged must

be “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. at 835 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); see Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720,

723 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must allege a serious or significant physical

or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.”) (quoting Odom

v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003)).

Taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor, the Plaintiff has minimally stated a claim for failure to

protect against Defendants Johnson, Hallub, and Nurse Lisa. These claims

have passed initial review.

E. Due Process Violation

The Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants Johnson, Hallub, and

Nurse Lisa deprived him of due process in that their comments resulted in

“significant atypical hardships” such as his “property getting destroyed or

stolen etc.” [Doc. 15 at 13].

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no

person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. Amend XIV. The first inquiry in any due process challenge

is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property

or liberty that was accomplished by state action. Tigrett v. The Rector and

Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 2002); Stone v. Univ.

of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1988). Where a state

employee’s random, unauthorized act deprives an individual of property,

either negligently or intentionally, the individual is relegated to his state post-

deprivation process, so long as the State provides an adequate post-

deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); see Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C.App. 65, 67, 218

S.E.2d 181, 182 (1975) (under North Carolina law, an action for conversion

will lie against a public official who wrongfully deprives an owner of his

property by an unauthorized act); Wilkins v. Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6 (4th Cir.

1983) (due process satisfied where North Carolina tort law provides an

adequate avenue for relief for state prisoner). The Parratt-Hudson doctrine

does not apply, however, to deprivations that are a “result of some

established state procedure.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.

422, 435-36 (1982).

Here, the Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim because the

Defendants’ actions appear to have been random and unauthorized and, as

such, the Plaintiff has an adequate state remedy for any resulting property

deprivation. Therefore, the due process claim is dismissed.

F. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

The Plaintiff claims that Nurse Lisa would not provide him with

“reasonable adequate medical care” after some of the assaults by other

inmates, and that “sometimes [his] sick calls wouldn’t even get processed

because she would never call [him] to be seen….” [Doc. 15 at 13].

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.6 Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the

inmate. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the

detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need

6 See note 5, supra.

for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir.

2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s actions

constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment

must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn,

896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511

U.S. at 825.

Allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical

malpractice claims do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable §

1983 claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695

(4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing

of mere negligence will not meet it.”). To be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment, a prison official must know of and consciously or intentionally

disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a

prison doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no

constitutional issue is raised absent evidence of abuse, intentional

mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.” Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp.

757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).

The Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a

deliberate indifference claim. He has failed to plausibly allege that he had a

sufficiently serious medical need, or that the lack of adequate care was due

to any Defendant’s deliberate indifference, rather than negligence or

mistake. Accordingly, the claims for deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need are dismissed without prejudice.

F. North Carolina Defamation

The Plaintiff claims that he suffered defamation of character in that the

news reported that the Plaintiff was arrested for his involvement in the rape

case [Doc. 15 at 13, 15] and that Defendants Johnson, Halub, Nurse Lisa

made comments about his rape charge in front of other inmates as set forth

in Section D, supra.

Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their

adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related to claims ... within

[federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or

controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a

court must find that “[t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact” where a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to

try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a district court dismisses all claims

independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily

dismiss[es] all related state claims.” Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594,

595 (2018); see § 1367(c)(3). A district court may also dismiss the related

state claims if there is a good reason to decline jurisdiction. See § 1367(c)(1),

(2), and (4).

Under North Carolina law, a statement is defamatory if it tends “to

prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of

livelihood.” Donovan v. Fiumara, 114 N.C.App. 524, 526, 442 S.E.2d 572,

574 (1994). The statement must also be false. Id. at 528, 442 S.E.2d at

574. A defamatory statement that charges a plaintiff with committing an

infamous crime, impeaches his or her trade or business, or accuses him or

her of having a “loathsome disease” is actionable per se and the plaintiff

does not have to allege or prove malice or special damages; they are

presumed. Id. at 527-8, 442 S.E.2d at 574-75. For other defamatory

statements, malice and special damages must be alleged and proven. Id.

In pleading a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must recount the

allegedly defamatory statement either verbatim or at least with enough

specificity to allow the court to decide if the statement is defamatory. Morrow

v. Kings Dep’t Stores, Inc., 57 N.C.App. 13, 21, 290 S.E.2d 732, 737 (1982).

Here, the Plaintiff fails to attribute the news reports to any Defendant,

nor does he identify any false statements contained in those reports. The

Court, therefore, will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

defamation claim with regard to the news reports.

However, the defamation claim against Defendants Johnson, Halub,

and Nurse Lisa is minimally sufficient to state a plausible claim, and arises

out of the same incidents as the § 1983 failure to protect claim that has

passed initial review. Accordingly, the Court will exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the defamation claim against Defendants Johnson, Halub,

and Nurse Lisa at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Second Amended Complaint has passed initial review

against Defendants Johnson, Halub, and Nurse Lisa for failure to protect,

and the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the defamation

claim against them. The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 15] has passed initial

review against Defendants Johnson, Halub, and Nurse Lisa for

failure to protect, and the Court will exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs North Carolina defamation claim

against them.

2. The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

3. The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail three blank

summons forms to Plaintiff, which the Plaintiff shall fill then return

to the Court for service of process on the Defendants. The

Plaintiff is required to provide the necessary information for the

U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on Defendants. When the

Court receives the completed summonses from Plaintiff, the

Clerk shall direct the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service upon

Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: October 1, 2022

Martiff Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

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