The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00226-MR
DOMINIC STROUD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
SAINT T. TAPP, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Saint T. Tapp and
Christopher Stidham’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 42].
I. BACKGROUND
The incarcerated Plaintiff Dominic Stroud1 proceeding pro se, filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The unverified Complaint [Doc. 1] and
Amended Complaint [Doc. 10] passed initial review on a claim that the
Defendants used excessive force against him. [Docs. 9, 14]. The Plaintiff
appears to seek injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
[Doc. 10 at 5].
1The Plaintiff is serving a sentence of between 6 years and 8 years, 3 months for two
counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon (principal, conspiracy). [Doc. 44-4: MSJ Ex
at 1-2].
Defendants Tapp and Stidham filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting materials. [Doc. 42: MSJ; Doc. 44: MSJ Ex; Doc.
45: Video Recordings]. Thereafter, the Court entered an Order in accordance
with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of
the requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and
of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 47:
Roseboro Order]. The Plaintiff filed a Letter opposing summary judgment
that is construed as his Response to the Defendants’ Motion.2 [Doc. 51: MSJ
Response]. The Defendants did not reply, and the time to do so has expired.
Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this
determination, the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh
the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150 (2000). Instead, it “must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from
2 The Plaintiff also filed a Letter in which he appeared to seek leave to engage in further
discovery, which was denied. [Docs. 48, 50].
the facts in the non-movant’s favor.” Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgt., Inc.,
259 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2001).
“[T]here is no burden upon ‘the party moving for summary judgment to
produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’
Rather, ‘the burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing” –
that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 608
(4th Cir. 2006) abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34
(2010) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)) (internal emphasis omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 n.3 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 56(c)). The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations
or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a proper
summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …,
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in the record. See id.;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the nonmoving party must present
sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818
(4th Cir. 1995). “‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As noted, the Plaintiff has not submitted his own forecast of evidence
in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Regardless, the
forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff shows the
following.
On July 16, 2019 at approximately 2:50 p.m., Unit Manager Tapp and
Officers Stidham and Truax3 had a discussion with the Plaintiff about
photographs that had been confiscated from him during a cell search. [Doc.
44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶¶ 2, 6-8; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 6]. The Plaintiff
became argumentative and started yelling and cursing at Tapp, so Tapp
ended the conversation. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 9; Doc. 44-6: Stidham
Decl at ¶ 7]. Officer Truax then ordered the Plaintiff to lock down in his cell.
3 Officer Chris Truax is not presently a Defendant in this action.
[Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 10 Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 8]. The Plaintiff
replied that he was not going to lock down until his photographs were
returned. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 11; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 9].
Officers Truax and Stidham repeatedly ordered the Plaintiff to lock down, but
the Plaintiff continued to refuse and remained “argumentative and
threatening.” [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 12; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶
10]. Pursuant to Marion CI’s Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”),
Officer Stidham administered pepper spray to the Plaintiff’s face following
the Plaintiff’s “defiance, threats, and refusal to obey orders.” [Doc. 44-2:
Tapp Decl at ¶ 13; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶¶ 11-12].
Immediately after Officer Stidham administered the pepper spray, the
Plaintiff rushed toward Truax, Stidham, and Tapp, and “began throwing
punches at [them] with closed fists, and took all of [the officers] to the floor.”
[Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 14; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶¶ 13-14]. The
Plaintiff landed on top of Stidham and continued striking him with punches to
the head, neck, and upper body. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶¶ 15-16; Doc.
44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶¶ 13-15]. The Plaintiff continued to strike Officer
Stidham in the head with a closed fist despite oral orders from Tapp and
Truax to stop. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 17; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶
15]. Unit Manager Tapp was unable to stop the attack and believed that the
Plaintiff was “trying to kill” Stidham, so Tapp got off of the Plaintiff, yelled
“taser, taser, taser,” and deployed his conducted energy weapon (“CEW”) in
an effort to gain the Plaintiff’s compliance and save Stidham. [Doc. 44-2:
Tapp Decl at ¶¶ 18-21].
The CEW slowed the Plaintiff’s attack so that Officer Stidham was able
to get out from under the Plaintiff, who continued struggling and refused to
give officers his hands so he could be placed in mechanical wrist restraints.
[Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶¶ 22-23; Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶¶ 16-17].
The Plaintiff began making sounds with his throat that indicated he was going
to try to spit on Officers Truax and Stidham, and he attempted to bite them
while they were trying to restrain him. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶¶ 18-
19]. Upon hearing that the Plaintiff was trying to bite and spit, Tapp gave
another short burst of the CEW to gain the Plaintiff’s compliance. [Doc. 44-
2: Tapp Decl at ¶¶ 24-25]. Unit Manager Tapp’s use of the CEW was
appropriate under the SOP because it was used to control or deter a violent,
threatening, or aggressive offender, and to defend officers from assault.
[Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 26].
After the additional burst of CEW, Officers Stidham and Truax were
able to place the Plaintiff’s wrists in mechanical restraints. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp
Decl at ¶ 27]. The Plaintiff was escorted to restrictive housing by other
officers for decontamination. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 28; Doc. 44-6:
Stidham Decl at ¶ 21]. Officer Stidham was examined by medical and was
taken to an outside hospital for treatment. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 22].
Unit Manager Tapp’s use of CEW “was meant solely to regain control
of the situation and was not meant to injure or otherwise harm Plaintiff.”
[Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 30]. Unit Manager Tapp was required to use CEW
due to Plaintiff’s “failure to obey orders to stop Officer Stidham and then to
stop biting and submit to restraints;” Tapp used the CEW in a good faith effort
to restore discipline and order. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶ 30]. He did not
use the CEW with the intent to be cruel or evil. [Doc. 44-2: Tapp Decl at ¶
31].
Officer Stidham did not use any force on the Plaintiff after he was
placed in wrist restraints. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 23]. The use of
pepper spray was meant only to regain control of the situation and was not
meant to injure or otherwise harm him. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 24].
The Plaintiff’s failure to obey orders to lock down required that Stidham use
pepper spray, and he did so in a good faith effort to restore discipline and
order. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 24]. Officer Stidham’s intentions in using
pepper spray was not to be cruel or evil. [Doc. 44-6: Stidham Decl at ¶ 25].
The Plaintiff received infractions on July 16, 2019 for disobeying an
order, profane language, and “assault staff w/ weapon.” [Doc. 44-4: MSJ Ex
at 6]. His infraction history includes several other incidents of disobeying
orders, as well as one prior infraction for being an active rioter. [Id.].
The Defendants have submitted video files containing footage from the
prison dayroom [Ex. C129] and the adjoining hallway [Ex. C126] that show
the following events:
2:49:46 Stidham stands in the hallway, facing the doorway to the
dayroom, next to Truax [Ex. C126]
2:49:49 Truax and Tapp, who is just inside the dayroom, speak to
the Plaintiff who is standing farther inside the dayroom;
Truax points into the housing unit [Ex. C129]
2:49:51 Plaintiff speaks and Truax points into the housing unit
again [Ex. C129]
2:49:54 Plaintiff continues speaking and Truax points into the
housing unit a third time [Ex. C129]
2:49:58 Plaintiff continues speaking; Stidham raises his arm
through the doorway and sprays Plaintiff’s face with OC
spray [Exs. C126, C129]
2:49:59 Plaintiff holds up a hand to block the spray, then runs
towards Stidham and Truax, swinging his arm [Exs. C126,
C129]
2:50:00 Tapp grabs Plaintiff’s shoulder and neck as Plaintiff
continues through the door into the hallway, swinging his
arms at Truax and Stidham who retreat; the Plaintiff and all
three officers fall to the hallway floor [Exs. C126, C129]
2:50:01 Plaintiff lands on top of Stidham, with Tapp on top of
Plaintiff, and Truax next to them [Ex. C126]
2:50:03 Plaintiff grabs Stidham and repeatedly punches his face
and head; Tapp tries to restrain Plaintiff’s arm; Truax
attempts to control Plaintiff’s legs [Ex. C126]
2:50:05 Tapp aims his taser at Plaintiff’s back as Plaintiff continues
punching Stidham [Ex. C126]
2:50:08 Tapp deploys the taser into Plaintiff’s back; Plaintiff stills
[Ex. C126]
2:50:12 Stidham moves out from underneath Plaintiff, who is face-
down on the floor; Truax and Stidham bring Plaintiff’s arms
behind his back [Ex. C126]
2:50:17 Truax kneels over Plaintiff’s legs and Stidham kneels next
to Plaintiff as they attempt to secure Plaintiff’s hands [Ex.
C126]
2:50:25 Additional officers begin to arrive [Ex. C126]
2:50:27 Plaintiff appears to struggle as Stidham and Truax continue
attempting to restrain Plaintiff’s hands [Ex. C126]
2:51:04 Stidham stands and is replaced by another officer [Ex.
C126]
2:52:32 Taser prongs are removed from Plaintiff’s back by another
individual [Ex. C126]
2:52:47 Plaintiff is brought to his feet and escorted away by other
officers [Ex. C126]
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
satisfy both an objective component (that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious) and a subjective component (that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind). Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must
consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury
inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Stidham sprayed him with pepper
spray as the Plaintiff was turning to return to his cell, even though Defendant
Tapp had told him to “stand down.” [Doc. 10-1 at 1; see Doc. 10 at 5]. The
Plaintiff claims that he was “blinded and disoriented” by the OC spray and
feared “retaliation & life threatening assaults” by staff, so he began
“swing[ing] wildly” at Stidham and Truax in “self defense.” [Doc. 10-1 at 1].
The Plaintiff claims that, after the Plaintiff and all three officers went to the
floor, Tapp tased the Plaintiff, who “immediately” submitted to cuffs and foot
restraints. [Id.]. The Plaintiff further claims that, while he was face-down in
full restraints, either Stidham or Truax said “you won’t hit me boy,” grabbed
a handful of the Plaintiff’s hair, and banged the Plaintiff’s face repeatedly on
the concrete floor. [Id.]. He claims that Tapp then tased the Plaintiff again;
a boot stomped the back of his head; and the taser barbs were “snatched”
out of his body. [Id.]. He claims that Stidham, Tapp, and Truax then
“drag[ged] the Plaintiff to the segregation unit. [Id.]. However, as previously
discussed, the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Amended Complaint, and summary
judgment Response are unverified, and the Plaintiff has not forecast any
evidence in support of his claims.
The forecast of evidence demonstrates that no excessive force was
used during the incident. The Defendants have submitted video footage and
declarations that demonstrate that the Plaintiff was not innocently headed to
his cell when the incident occurred. Rather, he was standing in the dayroom,
continuing to argue with the officers, and ignoring repeated directives to go
to his cell when Defendant Stidham sprayed him with pepper spray. The
spray was brief and objectively reasonable to obtain the Plaintiff’s
compliance with repeated verbal orders. The video footage shows that the
Plaintiff then attacked the officers by charging them and striking them,
tackling them to the ground, and continuing to repeatedly punch Stidham’s
head and face with a closed fist until Defendant Tapp deployed his taser.
The Plaintiff’s claims that an officer grabbed him by the hair, banged his face
into the floor, stomped the back of his head, snatched the taser barbs out of
his back, and that Truax, Tapp and Stidham escorted him to restrictive
housing, are refuted by the video footage and by Tapp’s and Stidham’s
declarations. The forecast of evidence also demonstrates that no force was
used beyond that which was reasonably necessary to gain the Plaintiff’s
compliance and end his violent attack. The Plaintiff’s unsupported
allegations that the Defendants (or any other officers) used excessive force
during this incident are “so utterly discredited by the record that no
reasonable jury could have believed him.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
The Court concludes, after carefully reviewing the Plaintiff’s allegations
and the forecast of evidence, that his excessive force claim is frivolous and
malicious. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915A(b)(1).
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably
believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.
ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Because the Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that
Defendants Tapp and Stidham violated a constitutional right, the Court
grants them summary judgment on this ground as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim is frivolous and malicious.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 42] is
GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s claim is frivolous and malicious
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: September 7, 2022
Martifi Reidinger ey
Chief United States District Judge AES
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