The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:22-cv-00369-MR
MELVIN LEE LUCKEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
GLEN JENKINS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 8].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Melvin Lee Luckey (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State
of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Albemarle Correctional Institution
in Badin, North Carolina. He filed this action, which he purports to bring
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, on August 8, 2022, against
the following Defendants: Glen Jenkins and T.J. Goforth, identified as
Detectives with the Monroe Police Department (MPD); Brandon Blackmon
and Jasmine Cruze, identified as “State Bureau Agents;” and the City of
Monroe. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, as follows.
On November 10, 2010, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Plaintiff was
awakened by a voice on a megaphone directing Plaintiff to come outside with
his hands up. Plaintiff went outside and was met by SWAT and MPD officers
outside his home in Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiff was approached and
grabbed by MPD officers. Defendant Jenkins searched and arrested Plaintiff
without cause and without a warrant. [Doc. 1 at 13]. Defendant Jenkins and
other officers then searched Plaintiff’s home, also without cause and without
a warrant. Plaintiff “declared to all state officials present that day” that he did
not commit a crime. Defendants Cruze and Goforth looked on and did
nothing. Defendants Goforth, Blackmon, Cruze, and Jenkins all conversed
at the scene and Goforth, Blackmon, and Cruze worked in concert and
condoned Defendant Jenkin’s actions, making no attempts to control him or
help the Plaintiff. [Id.].
Plaintiff then makes various vague, largely nonsensical allegations
regarding Blackmon, Goforth, and Jenkins’ involvement in the investigation
and prosecution of Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that Jenkins and Blackmon
admitted to certain irregularities and purported misconduct in May 2013,
presumably during Plaintiff’s criminal trial. [See id. at 14-15]. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendant Cruze “admitted” to what appears to be innocent
involvement in the investigation. [See id. at 16]. On or about June 4, 2013,
Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 85 years “without
consent, without cause and without a crime committed and without a
warrant.” [Id. at 16].
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Monroe was negligent for not
properly training its employees, that it ratifies the acts of its employees who
engage in “a long train of abuses which is a custom, policy, and practice to
violate clearly established law,” and that it promotes its policy by not
reprimanding its officers. [Id. at 21].
Plaintiff claims his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the alleged conduct. [See id. at
5]. Plaintiff also alleges that he is bringing his claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1985, 1986, and 1988, but makes no further reference to these provisions.
[See id.].
For injuries, Plaintiff claims he has suffered defamation of character,
mental and emotional injuries and distress, and legal fees. [Id. at 17]. For
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive, relief,
attorney’s fees, and other miscellaneous relief. [Id. at 22].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). It appears
here that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim
for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction
or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,
the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.
Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Here, given the nature
of the allegations in the Complaint, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would
necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction or sentence in the
underlying criminal matter. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that a
conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his
Complaint appears to be barred by Heck. The Court, therefore, will allow
Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to show that it is not Heck-barred.
The Court notes, however, that it appears any claim Plaintiff may have,
if not Heck-barred, is nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations, in any
event. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his Complaint, Plaintiff must explain why
his claims are not barred in the first instance.
B. Sections 1985, 1986, and 1988
Plaintiff also purports to bring his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985,
1986, and 1988. To state a claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege
“concrete facts” showing that defendants entered a conspiracy which
deprived the plaintiff of his civil rights. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
196-97 (4th Cir. 2009). Courts reject “section 1985 claims whenever the
purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the
absence of concrete supporting facts.” Williams, at *5 (quoting Simmons v.
Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit has “rarely, if
ever, found that a plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to establish a section
1985 conspiracy.” Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377. To allege a conspiracy, a
party must show that two or more persons acted in concert to commit an
unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means. See id. at 1376.
Further, “a party must show an agreement or meeting of the minds between
parties to inflict a wrong or injury upon another that results in damage.”
Williams, at *5 (citations omitted). A plaintiff must also show harm resulting
from the alleged conspiracy. Id. (citations omitted).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has plainly failed to allege a
conspiracy to deprive his civil rights. Plaintiff makes only a vague reference
to Defendants “working in concert” and nothing more. [See Doc. 1 at 13].
Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1986 and 1988 similarly fail. Section 1986
creates liability in an individual “who, having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are
about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such act be
committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Without allegations of an act or acts having
been committed under § 1985, there is no claim under § 1986. Section 1988
relates to the conduct of proceedings and availability of attorney and expert
fees for certain civil rights violations and creates no independent cause of
action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims under these provisions for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 1988 will
be dismissed on initial review for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief.
It appears that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by Heck.
The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) to amend his Complaint, if he so
chooses, to show that Heck does not apply, to show that his Complaint is not
time-barred, and to otherwise properly state a claim for relief. Should Plaintiff
fail to timely amend his Complaint, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)
days in which to amend the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Order. If Plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order
and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1985, 1986, and 1988 will be DISMISSED on initial review for Plaintiff’s
failure to state a claim for relief.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank Section
1983 form Signed: September 2, 2022
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Martifi Reidinger Rey
Chief United States District Judge alley