Rumple v. Saul

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. 5:21-cv-00086-FDW

CHRISTOPHER RUMPLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY , )

)

Defendant. )

)

)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Claimant Christopher Rumple’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, (Doc. Nos. 12, 13), and Defendant Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Kilolo Kijakazi’s (“Commissioner”) Motion for Summary

Judgment and Memorandum in Support, (Doc. Nos. 14, 15). Claimant, through counsel, seeks

judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision that he was not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act. Having reviewed and considered the written arguments,

administrative record, and applicable authority, and for the reasons set forth below, Claimant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the

Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. In so ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the Commissioner’s Motion to File a

Supplemental Brief, (Doc. No. 16).

I. BACKGROUND

Inn June 2018, Claimant filed a claim for a period of disability and disability insurance

benefits under title II, and supplemental security income under title XVI, of the Act. (Tr. 12).

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Claimant’s alleged onset date is January 1, 2013. Id. Claimant’s claims were denied initially and

on reconsideration. Id. The ALJ held a hearing in September 2020. On November 12, 2020, the

ALJ decided Claimant was not disabled within the meaning of the Act from January 1, 2013,

through the date of his decision. (Tr. 12-26).

In particular, the ALJ found at step one that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since January 1, 2013, and at step two that Claimant had the following severe impairments:

bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. (Tr. 15). The ALJ found at step three that Claimant had

“moderate limitations” in “interacting with others;” “concentrating, persisting or maintaining

pace;” and “adapting or managing oneself.” (Tr. 15-16). The ALJ concluded that these mental

impairments did not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “extreme” limitation, and that

none of Claimant’s impairments, nor any combination thereof, met or equaled one of the

conditions in the Listing of Impairments at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (Tr. 15-17). Before

proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Claimant had the RFC to perform a full range of work

at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations:

he can perform simple, routine work; frequently interact with public, co-workers,

and supervisors; sustain periods of concentration and persistence for periods of two

hours at a time; and can work at a lowstress job, defined as one that requires only

occasional work-related decisions and only occasional changes in the work setting.

(Tr. 17).

The ALJ found at step four that Claimant, aged 26 years old, did not have any past relevant

work, (Tr. 24), and at step five that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy

that Claimant could have performed. (Tr. 25). Thus, the ALJ decided that Claimant was not

disabled within the meaning of the Act from January 1, 2013, through the date of the decision. Id.

On April 7, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review, making the ALJ’s

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November 2020 decision the Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 1). Claimant has exhausted all

administrative remedies and now appeals to this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of

a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.

1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The district court

does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343,

345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v.

Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). The court must uphold the decision of the

Commissioner, even in instances where the reviewing court would have come to a different

conclusion, so long as the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Lester

v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).

The Fourth Circuit has defined “substantial evidence” as being “more than a scintilla and

do[ing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Smith

v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401); see

also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056–57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that it is the

responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical

evidence.”)

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“In order to establish entitlement to benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a

medically determinable impairment that precludes returning to past relevant work and adjustment

to other work.” Flesher v. Berryhill, 697 F. App’x 212, (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 404.1520(g)). In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner uses a

five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Pursuant to this process, the Commissioner asks, in

sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe

impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4)

could return to his past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); see also Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017)

(citing Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears

the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step

five. See Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2016).

“If the claimant fails to demonstrate she has a disability that meets or medically equals a

listed impairment at step three, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) before proceeding to step four, which is ‘the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her

physical and mental] limitations [that affect h[er] ability to work].’” Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861–62

(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1)). In Lewis, the Fourth Circuit explained the

considerations applied before moving to step four:

[The RFC] determination requires the ALJ to “first identify the individual’s

functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on

a function-by-function basis, including the functions listed in the regulations.”

Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (internal quotations omitted); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996

WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). Once the function-by-function analysis is

complete, an ALJ may define the claimant’s RFC “in terms of the exertional levels

of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL

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374184, at *1. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967 (defining “sedentary,

light, medium, heavy, and very heavy” exertional requirements of work).

When assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must examine “all of [the claimant's]

medically determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware,” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1525(a)(2), 416.925(a)(2), “including those not labeled severe at step two.”

Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. In addition, he must “consider all [the claimant’s]

symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [her] symptoms can reasonably

be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence,”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). “When the medical signs or laboratory

findings show that [the claimant has] a medically determinable impairment(s) that

could reasonably be expected to produce [her] symptoms, such as pain, [the ALJ]

must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms so

that [the ALJ] can determine how [her] symptoms limit [her] capacity for work.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1).

Lewis, 858 F.3d at 862.

Proceeding to step four, the burden remains with the claimant to show he or she is unable

to perform past work. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. If the claimant meets their burden as to past work,

the ALJ proceeds to step five.

“At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the claimant can perform other work that ‘exists in significant

numbers in the national economy,’ considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work experience.” [Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (quoting

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c)(2), 416.1429)]. “The Commissioner

typically offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert

responding to a hypothetical that incorporates the claimant’s limitations.”

Monroe, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c)(2), 416.1429). If

the Commissioner meets this burden in step five, the claimant is deemed not disabled and the

benefits application is denied. Id.

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III. ANALYSIS

Claimant argues two errors on appeal: 1) the ALJ’s RFC is incomplete, unexplained, and

not supported by substantial evidence; and 2) the SSA’s structure unconditionally violated

separation of powers.

A. Constitutionality of Commissioner’s Decision

As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes the Commissioner’s decision was not

constitutionally defective. The Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that unconstitutional

tenure protection for the head of an agency, without more, voids any agency action. See Collins v.

Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1787 (2021). Specifically, the Supreme Court explained, “the

unlawfulness of [a] removal provision does not strip [a federal official] of the power to undertake

the other responsibilities of his office.” Id. at 1788 n.23. After Collins, “courts across the country

have uniformly concluded that the allegedly unconstitutional nature of § 902(a)(3) does not require

remand” absent some causal nexus to the ALJ’s decision not to find a particular claimant disabled.

Katrina R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2:21-CV-4276, 2022 WL 190055, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21,

2022) (collecting cases); see also Juliana Jolean A. v. Kijakazi, 5:20-CV-1268, 2022 WL 595361,

at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2022) (collecting cases). Claimant's apparent argument—that an

unconstitutional delegation of authority from the Commissioner to the ALJ demonstrates harm—

lacks merit under Collins. See Harris v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1853, 2022 WL 2987928, at *3 (4th Cir.

July 28, 2022) (rejecting constitutional claim where the claimant failed to demonstrate actual

harm).

Here, Claimant argues that the SSA’s structure is unconstitutional resulting in the denial

of a constitutionally valid adjudication. Claimant, however, offers no evidence to show his case

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would have been decided differently but for the removal restriction. Claimant theorizes a general

harm rather than one “particularized to Claimant,” Kaufmann, 32 F.4th at 850, and courts have

found such generalized harms to be insufficient under Collins. Willis v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-

60-M, 2022 WL 4242523, at *15 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2022) (collecting cases), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Willis v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-00060-M, 2022 WL 4238060

(E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2022). Accordingly, Claimant has failed to show a causal nexus between the

removal restriction and the denial of his application for disability benefits. Therefore, Claimant’s

constitutional arguments fail.

B. ALJ’s RFC Assessment

Next, Claimant argues the ALJ’s RFC assessment fails to account for his deficits in

concentration, persistence, and pace; difficulty interacting with others; and limitation to

performing one to two step instructions. The ALJ’s decision discusses significant evidentiary

support for the RFC assessment, including the persuasive opinions of state agency consultants and

the opinions of Drs. Harrison, Nelson, and Russell. However, the Court finds the ALJ failed to

fully explain his RFC assessment, specifically as it relates to Claimant’s moderate limitation for

interacting with others and the decision to not include a limitation for one-to-two step instructions.

Remand may be appropriate where “inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate

meaningful review[.]” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

For this Court to meaningfully review an ALJ's RFC assessment, the ALJ “must include a narrative

discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d

632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The ALJ “must both identify evidence that supports

his conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.”

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Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphases and alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, the court is “left to guess about how the ALJ

arrived at his conclusions” and cannot meaningfully review them. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637.

Here, remand is appropriate so that the ALJ can fully explain Claimant’s ability to

“frequently” interact with others despite a moderate limitation in this area and explain why a

limitation for the one-to-two step instructions is not included despite finding persuasive the State

agency psychological consultants’ opinions recommending it.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court explicitly notes that in ordering remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), the Court does not take a position on the merits of Claimant’s application for disability

benefits nor does the Court express any opinion on whether the ALJ’s ultimate decision that

Claimant was not disable is correct or incorrect. The Court finds the ALJ’s decision deficient for

the reasons stated herein, and consequently, that decision as written cannot stand. See, e.g.,

Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ALJ's decision must stand or fall with

the reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision[.]” (citations omitted)).

Although the Court has summarily addressed some of Claimant’s other assignments of

error here,1 the Court notes that remand provides the opportunity for the ALJ to modify any prior

1 The Court is not required to address all assignments of error when remanding a case. See Brown v. Colvin, 639 F.

App’x 921, 923 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining to address all of a claimant's issues raised once the court decided to remand

on one issue). The Fourth Circuit, on occasion, will address additional assignments of error notwithstanding an order

to remand, and in the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court has summarily done so here. See Patterson v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[n]ormally, our opinion would end here, and we

would not go beyond ordering the ALJ to apply the regulation that it failed to observe;” but then summarily directing

the ALJ to provide a more detailed explanation as to other errors “in the interests of judicial efficiency . . . .”); Bird,

699 F.3d at 343 (citing Sharpe v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 495 F.3d 125, 134 n. 16 (4th Cir. 2007)

(providing instructions for ALJ to follow on remand regarding issues not dispositive on appeal); Gordon v. Schweiker,

725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Since the case must be reconsidered by the Secretary, we do provide some

guidance as to a matter very likely to arise at the hearing which will occur.”)).

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basis for the prior decision in the new decision issued upon remand. “Under § 405(g), ‘each final

decision of the Secretary [is] reviewable by a separate piece of litigation,’ and a sentence-four

remand order ‘terminate[s] the civil action’ seeking judicial review of the Secretary's final

decision.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 299 (1993) (quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496

US. 617, 624-25 (1990)).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc.

No. 12), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; the Commissioner’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 14), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; and the

ALJ’s determination is VACATED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Motion to File a Supplemental

Brief, (Doc. No. 16), is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 22, 2022

Frank D. Whitney

United States District Judge * ey