Perez v. Huneycutt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:22-cv-00076-MR

OSCAR PEREZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FNU HUNEYCUTT, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint [Doc. 1]. Also pending is the Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Class

Action Certification [Doc. 7].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the

Alexander Correctional Institution, where he is presently incarcerated. [Doc.

1]. He names as Defendants: FNU Huneycutt, the warden; FNU Dye and

FNU Duncan, assistant wardens; and John Doe, the captain of Green Unit.

[Id. at 1]. He alleges that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

need to exercise, which they denied him without due process and, as a result

he has gained 12-15 pounds; he developed high blood pressure and high

cholesterol; he has experienced increased anxiety and depression; he has

constant headaches; and his life expectancy has decreased. [Id. at 3, 7-8].

He seeks compensatory, nominal and punitive damages, a declaratory

judgment, injunctive relief, and a jury trial. [Id. at 9].

The Plaintiff has also filed a Motion asking the Court to certify as a

class “all inmates confined at Alexander Correctional Institution, past,

current, and future, who have a mental health Code 3 diagnosis, high blood

pressure, high cholesterol, overweight, diabetes, and cardiac issues.” [Doc.

7 at 1].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Despite the Plaintiff’s payment of the filing fee, the Court must conduct

an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Conditions of Confinement

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Huneycutt made a “direct order” not

to allow outdoor exercise; that Defendants Dye and Duncan made decisions

about inmates’ exercise schedule, which was very restricted; that Duncan

reviewed grievances “about inmates not being given the opportunity to

properly exercise,” and failed to correct the situation; and that Defendant

John Doe would have known that inmates were not given the opportunity to

exercise had he reviewed video and logs. [Doc. 1 at 3-5]. As a result of the

foregoing, the Plaintiff claims that he was only able to exercise for 10-15

hours during all of 2021, and that his ability to exercise improved somewhat

in 2022 but is still very limited. [Id. at 3-6]. He claims that his physical and

mental health have deteriorated as a result of the Defendants’ deliberate

indifference. [Id. at 7-9].

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of

punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Williams v.

Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “Prison conditions may be harsh

and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640,

642 (7th Cir. 1997). Rather, extreme deprivations are required, and “only

those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities

are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294, 298 (1991) (internal quotation omitted)). Further, a plaintiff must allege

and prove facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and

disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation. See

Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As

such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought

under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). However, a supervisor can be liable where (1) he knew that his

subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and

unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed

“deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive

practices;” and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between his

inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true for the purposes of initial

review and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Plaintiff has

made sufficient allegations to allow a claim against Defendants Huneycutt,

Dye, and Duncan for exposing him to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement to proceed to discovery. However, the Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendants John Doe appears to be based on respondeat superior and is

dismissed.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants are deliberately indifferent to

his serious mental health and medical needs by restricting his movement,

exercise, and outdoor recreation. [Doc. 1 at 3]. He claims that he is a Code

3 mental health inmate who takes medication, and that the conditions at

Alexander CI have increased his anxiety and depression. [Id. at 6]. He

further claims that the inability to exercise has caused him to gain weight,

that he now has high cholesterol and blood pressure, that he experiences

daily headaches, and that all this has decreased his life expectancy.

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants “are aware that they have a very

high percentage of mental health inmates and chronic ill inmates at the

facility.” [Id. at 6].

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A serious psychological impairment can qualify as [a

serious] medical need.” Buffington v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 913 F.2d 113,

120 (4th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff

must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the inmate.

Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants actually

knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee

or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need for

medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir.

2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s actions

constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment

must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn,

896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). To establish a deliberate indifference claim

against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that the non-medical

personnel failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately

interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were

indifferent to prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854.

Moreover, because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel,

they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical

personnel concerning the course of treatment that the medical personnel

deem necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. Id.

The Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the Defendants, who

are all non-medical personnel, were subjectively aware of the Plaintiff’s

serious mental health and/or physical health need to which they were

deliberately indifferent. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed without

prejudice.

C. Due Process

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants violated his constitutional

rights “[b]y creating practices that deprived the Plaintiff of life expectancy

without due process.” [Doc. 1 at 3].

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first

demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by

governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997).

Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while incarcerated,

those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while

not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Moreover, changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine,

changes in conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation),

and the denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate

[and which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v.

Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991).

Assuming arguendo that the conditions at issue are adequately harsh

and atypical, the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that a law or

procedure created a liberty interest in their avoidance, or that any Defendant

failed to provide him with the required process before those conditions were

imposed. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (“harsh and

atypical confinement conditions in and of themselves [do not] give rise to a

liberty interest in their avoidance”). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s due process

claim is dismissed without prejudice.

D. Motion for Class Certification

Finally, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion asking the Court to certify a class

of past, present, and future inmates at Alexander CI. [Doc. 7].

As a pro se inmate, the Plaintiff is not qualified to prosecute a class

action or assert a claim on behalf of others. See Myers v. Loudoun Cnty.

Pub. Schls., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“An individual unquestionably

has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court. The right to litigate for

oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others”);

Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625 (4th Cir. 1981) (prisoner’s suit is

“confined to redress for violations of his own personal rights and not one by

him as knight-errant for all prisoners.”); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405,

1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“it is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is

unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action.”).

Accordingly, his Motion asking the Court to certify a class is denied.1

1 For this reason, too, the allegations in the Complaint that refer to inmates other than the

Plaintiff are dismissed. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 6 (referring to other inmates’ health needs

and suicidal thoughts)].

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Huneycutt,

Dye, and Duncan for subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement

have passed initial review. The remaining claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his

Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order

and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural

requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will

not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in

accordance with this Order, the matter will proceed only on the claims

described in this Order.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] passes initial review against Defendants

Huneycutt, Dye, and Duncan for subjecting the Plaintiff to inhumane

conditions of confinement.

2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend the

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff

fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will proceed only on the

claims as set forth in this Order.

4. The Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Class Action Certification [Doc. 7]

is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank

§ 1983 prisoner complaint form, an Opt-In/ Opt-Out form pursuant to the

Standing Order in Misc. Case No. 3:19-mc-00060-FDW, and a copy of this

Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 16, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS

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