McCoy v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-416-DCK

KAMI YVETTE McCOY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER

v. )

)

KILO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Plaintiff’s “Motion For Summary

Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (Document No. 12) and

“Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document No. 14). The parties have consented

to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and these motions are ripe for

disposition. After careful consideration of the written arguments, the administrative record, and

applicable authority, the undersigned will direct that Plaintiff’s “Motion For Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” be denied; that “Defendant’s Motion

For Summary Judgment” be granted; and that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kami McCoy (“Plaintiff”), through counsel, seeks judicial review of an

unfavorable administrative decision on her application for disability benefits. (Document No. 1).

On or about September 10, 2019 and September 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed renewed applications for

a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405, and for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383, alleging an inability to work due to a disabling condition beginning August

15, 2018. (Transcript of the Record of Proceedings (“Tr.”) 173).

Plaintiff previously applied for disability benefits on June 1, 2015. (Tr. 224). The denial

of those applications was affirmed by Administrative Law Judge Susan Poulos on August 14,

2018. (Tr. 224-35). The appeal of that decision to this Court was denied by the Honorable Graham

C. Mullen. See McCoy v. Saul, 3:19-CV-484-GCM, 2021 WL 1187093 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 29,

2021).

The Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denied

Plaintiff’s latest applications initially on or about February 28, 2020, and again after

reconsideration on or about May 1, 2020. (Tr. 173, 301, 310, 315, 320). In its “Notice of

Reconsideration,” the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) included the following explanation

of its decision:

The medical evidence shows that your condition is not severe

enough to be considered disabling. You are able to think, act in your

own interest, communicate, handle your own affairs, and adjust to

ordinary emotional stresses without significant difficulties.

We do not have sufficient vocational information to determine

whether you can perform any of your past relevant work. However,

based on the evidence in file, we have determined that you can adjust

to other work. It has been decided, therefore, that you are not

disabled according to the Social Security Act.

(Tr. 310, 315).

Plaintiff filed a timely written request for a hearing on or about June 16, 2020. (Tr. 173,

325-26). On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a telephonic hearing before

Administrative Law Judge Paul Goodson (the “ALJ”). (Tr. 173, 190-220). In addition, James

Cowart, a vocational expert (“VE”), and Chad F. Brown, Plaintiff’s attorney, appeared at the

hearing. Id.

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on January 5, 2021, denying Plaintiff’s claim. (Tr.

170-84). On or about March 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision,

which was denied by the Appeals Council on June 16, 2021. (Tr. 1-4, 166). The ALJ decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s review

request. (Tr. 1).

Plaintiff’s “Complaint” seeking a reversal of the ALJ’s determination was filed in this

Court on August 12, 2021. (Document No. 1). The parties consented to Magistrate Judge

jurisdiction on November 18, 2021, and this case was reassigned to the undersigned as presiding

judge on November 24, 2021. (Document No. 11).

Plaintiff’s “Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure” (Document No. 12) and “Plaintiff’s Memorandum In Support Of Motion for

Summary Judgment” (Document No. 13) were filed January 10, 2022; and the “Defendant’s

Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document No. 14) and “Memorandum Of Law In Support Of

The Commissioner’s Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document No. 15) were filed February 4,

2022. Plaintiff timely filed a reply brief on February 17, 2022. (Document No. 16).

The pending motions are now ripe for review and disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court’s review

of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision; and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.

1990).

The Fourth Circuit has made clear that it is not for a reviewing court to re-weigh the

evidence or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner – so long as that decision is

supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also, Smith v.

Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir.

2012). “Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘more than a scintilla and [it] must do more than

create a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d

1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. at 401).

Ultimately, it is the duty of the Commissioner, not the courts, to make findings of fact and

to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599

(4th Cir. 1979) (“This court does not find facts or try the case de novo when reviewing disability

determinations.”); Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that

it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistences in the

medical evidence, and that it is the claimant who bears the risk of nonpersuasion.”). Indeed, so

long as the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even

if the reviewing court disagrees with the final outcome. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841

(4th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

The question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was under a “disability” as that term of

art is defined for Social Security purposes, at any time between August 15, 2018, and the date of

the ALJ decision.1 (Tr. 174). To establish entitlement to benefits, Plaintiff has the burden of

1 Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301, the term “disability” is defined as an: inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

proving disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 146 n.5 (1987).

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation

process for determining if a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The five steps are:

(1) whether claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity -

if yes, not disabled;

(2) whether claimant has a severe medically determinable

physical or mental impairment, or combination of

impairments that meet the duration requirement in §

404.1509 - if no, not disabled;

(3) whether claimant has an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the

listings in appendix 1, and meets the duration requirement -

if yes, disabled;

(4) whether claimant has the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform her/his past relevant work - if yes, not

disabled; and

(5) whether considering claimant’s RFC, age, education, and

work experience he/she can make an adjustment to other

work - if yes, not disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v).

The burden of production and proof rests with the claimant during the first four steps; if

claimant is able to carry this burden, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to

show that work the claimant could perform is available in the national economy. Pass, 65 F.3d at

1203. In this case, the ALJ determined at the fifth step that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 183-

84).

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A)).

First, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity

since August 15, 2018, the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 175). At the second step, the ALJ

found that “diabetes, depression, general anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress syndrome,

hypertension, and hallux rigidus” were severe impairments.2 (Tr. 176). At the third step, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr.

176).

Next, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and found that she retained the capacity to perform

light work activity,

except the claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. The

claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and have

occasional exposure to hazards. The claimant can occasionally push

and pull using foot control with the bilateral lower extremities. The

claimant can perform unskilled work in 2 hour segments and

perform nonproduction pace work (meaning non-

automated/conveyor pacing). The claimant can have occasional

interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. The

claimant can have no more than infrequent workplace changes, no

teamwork/tandem work for task completion, no conflict resolution

or crisis management. The claimant also requires 2 additional

restroom breaks of 5 minutes each in each half of the workday.

(Tr. 178-79). In making this finding, the ALJ specifically stated that he “considered all symptoms

and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective

medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1529 and 416.929

and SSR 16-3p.” (Tr. 179).

2 The determination at the second step as to whether an impairment is “severe” under the regulations is a

de minimis test, intended to weed out clearly unmeritorious claims at an early stage. See Bowen v. Yuckert,

482 U.S. 137 (1987).

At the fourth step, the ALJ held that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as

a Billing Clerk, Patient Service Coordinator, Customer Service Representative, Day Care Worker,

and Receptionist. (Tr. 182). At the fifth and final step, the ALJ concluded based on the testimony

of the VE and “considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity” that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform. (Tr. 183). Specifically, the VE testified that according to the factors given by the ALJ,

occupations Plaintiff could perform included a Laundry Worker, a Coin Machine Collector, and

an Ironer. Id. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a “disability,” as defined

by the Social Security Act, at any time between August 15, 2018, and the date of his decision,

January 5, 2021. (Tr. 184).

Plaintiff on appeal to this Court makes the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ’s

consideration of Plaintiff’s mental impairments is not logically explained or supported by

substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ failed to adequately explain the weight given to Dr. Christo’s

medical opinion. (Document No. 13, p. 3). The undersigned will discuss each of these contentions

in turn.

A. Mental Impairments

In the first assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her

mental impairments. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he ALJ’s findings that Ms. McCoy’s

mental impairments are not as severe as alleged are neither logically explained nor supported by

substantial evidence.” (Document No. 13, p. 4).

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. McCoy does not regularly receive

psychiatric care and therefore would improve if she did so is not supported by substantial evidence

and conflicts with the evidence of the record.” Id. Plaintiff contends that “[t]he record shows that

Ms. McCoy attended extensive mental health treatment and therapy sessions” and that “[t]he ALJ

fails to explain how this extensive treatment does not represent ‘seeking consistent psychiatric

care.’” (Document No. 13, p. 5) (quoting Tr. 180). Plaintiff cites many medical visits and

psychiatric assessments documented in the record between April 19, 2016, and April 22, 2021,

including six therapy appointments. (Document No. 13, pp. 5-8) (citing Tr. 17, 19, 35, 86, 100,

120, 180, 796, 809-14, 820-21, 823-24, 835, 839-40, 1254, 1257-59, 1266-67, 1272, 1279, 1283,

1286, 1290, 1297, 1306). Plaintiff also cites evidence of visits to the emergency room “for mental

health impairment related symptoms” three times between November 2018 and September 2019,

as well as hearing testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. (Document No. 13, pp. 8-9)

(citing Tr. 201-03, 209-11, 213, 580, 661, 618).

Plaintiff states that “the ALJ fails to explain how his conclusion that ‘as the claimant does

not regularly receive treatment for any mental impairment symptoms, it is reasonable to conclude

that the claimant would have improved functionality if she chose to do so’ is supported by and

based on the administrative record.” (Document No. 13, pp. 10-11) (quoting Tr. 181). Rather,

Plaintiff argues, “[t]he ALJ bases his conclusion almost exclusively on an absence of evidence

without addressing the substantial conflicting evidence of record.” (Document No. 13, p. 11)

(citing Tr. 180-81). Further, Plaintiff argues, “[t]here is only an ‘absence of evidence’ in the ALJ’s

analysis because he chose to ignore extensive evidence that contradicts his conclusions.” Id.

Plaintiff contends that “[f]ailing to consider extensive conflicting evidence requires remand.” Id.

(citing Patterson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 662-63 (4th Cir. 2017).

In response, Defendant first notes that Plaintiff was previously denied benefits for a period

from January 13, 2015, through August 14, 2018. (Document No. 15, p. 5); see also (Tr. 181,

224-35). Defendant further notes that Plaintiff has not presented “any evidentiary circumstance”

explaining her alleged disability as of August 15, 2018. (Document No. 15, p. 5).

Addressing the first assignment of error, Defendant argues that “an ALJ is not required to

discuss each piece of evidence.” Id. (citing Reid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865-66

(4th Cir. 2014). Defendant contends that “the ALJ’s RFC represents a thorough analysis of

plaintiff’s capabilities based upon a complete examination of the record.” (Document No. 15, p.

6) (citing Tr. 178-79).

Defendant refers to the ALJ’s treatment of State agency psychological medical consultants’

evaluations as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental

impairments. (Document No. 15, pp. 7-8) (citing Tr. 181). Defendant notes that “[t]he ALJ found

generally persuasive” the opinions of Drs. Kendra McCarty, Keith Noles, and Chad Ritterspach—

opinions which indicated that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were mild or moderate. (Document

No. 15, p. 7) (citing Tr. 181, 253-54, 278, 283, 797).

Defendant asserts that “[t]he support of SA reviewing and examining consultants alone

makes the ALJ’s RFC supported by substantial evidence in this.” (Document No. 15, p. 8) (citing

Lusk v. Astrue, No. 1:11 cv-196-MR, 2013 WL 498797, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2013) (expert

opinions of agency reviewing physicians may amount to substantial evidence where they represent

a reasonable reading of the relevant evidence).

Defendant goes on to argue that “[w]hen it comes to RFC, [P]laintiff still bears the burden

of production and proof during the first four steps of the disability inquiry; the burden only shifts

to the Commissioner at the fifth step.” (Document No. 15, p. 8) (citing Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d

1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). Defendant contends that “[i]t is the claimant’s burden to establish

how any medically determinable impairments negatively affect functioning.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1512(c), 416.912(c); Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004); Plummer v.

Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-00006, 2011 WL 7938431, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011)). Defendant

argues that Plaintiff “has failed to meet that burden.” Id.

In reply, Plaintiff argues that “the Commissioner failed to explain why the ALJ’s decision

does not address a substantial portion of the record, including conflicting evidence, and does not

explain how the ALJ positively met his burden to do so in the Decision.” (Document No. 16, p. 1).

The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. The

ALJ has specifically noted Plaintiff’s mental impairments and references her lack of “suicidal

ideations, hallucinations, or severe psychiatric symptoms.” (Tr. 180) (citing Tr. 613, 1253). The

ALJ states that “[e]ven without taking prescribed medications or seeking consistent psychiatric

care, the claimant did not exhibit severe mental functional loss.” Id. (citing Tr. 795-843, 1253-

1311). The ALJ goes on to state that “[w]hen the claimant engaged in mental health treatment,

records show an improvement in her ability to function by her own subjective estimation.” Id.

(citing Tr. 1253-1311). The ALJ also reviewed the medical opinions of multiple examiners with

respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairments and compared their relative persuasiveness. (Tr. 181)

(citing Tr. 244-69, 272-99, 789-98, 1312).

The ALJ explains his RFC calculations with respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairments as

follows:

The claimant’s mental impairments also indicate that nonexertional

limitations to the light level are appropriate. The claimant can

perform unskilled work in 2 hour segments and perform

nonproduction pace work (meaning non-automated/conveyor

pacing) as she has moderate limitations in an ability to concentrate,

persist, or remain on pace. The claimant can have occasional

interaction with the public, coworkers and supervisors as she has

moderate limitations in this area. For the same reason, she should

not engage in work that requires teamwork or tandem work. In an

effort to prevent exacerbation of her mental impairment symptoms,

the undersigned finds the claimant can have no more than infrequent

workplace changes, no conflict resolution or crisis management.

The claimant also requires 2 additional restroom breaks of 5 minutes

each in each half of the workday to accommodate both the

claimant’s physical impairment symptoms and to provide respite for

her concentrating, persisting, or remaining on pace limitations.

(Tr. 180).

The undersigned notes that this Court is not permitted to re-weigh the evidence with respect

to Plaintiff’s impairments, so long as the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See

Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). The undersigned further notes that

substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

Although Plaintiff presents a cogent argument in support of her first assignment of error,

the undersigned must respectfully decline to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ’s decision is

thorough, and more than adequately satisfies requirements set forth above under the standard of

review.

B. Medical Opinion

Next, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to explain adequately the basis for discounting

Dr. Christo’s medical opinion.” (Document No. 13, p. 12) (citing Tr. 1312). The medical opinion

cited by Plaintiff is a letter dated April 11, 2019, that simply states:

It is my medical opinion that Kami McCoy is unable to work at this

time due to severe recurring Depression and PTSD. If you have any

questions or concerns, please don’t hesitate to call.

(Tr. 1312).

Plaintiff notes that “Dr. Christo is Ms. McCoy’s treating psychiatrist and is familiar with

her psychiatric condition and symptoms.” (Document No. 13, p. 12). Plaintiff contends that “[i]n

finding that the evidence of record does not support a medical opinion, the ALJ must specify

evidence contradicting the opinion and explain why the evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion.”

(Document No. 13, p. 14) (citing Arakas v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 106 (4th Cir.

2020)).

Plaintiff argues that, in evaluating medical opinions, “it must be apparent from the decision

that the ALJ considered the source’s relationship with the Claimant, the source’s medical

specialization, and any other relevant factors.” (Document No. 3, p. 16) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5); Dowling v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2021);

Lindsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 4472211, slip op. at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2021)).

Plaintiff contends that, in this case, “the ALJ failed to consider expressly how Dr. Christo’s own

longitudinal treatment history of the claimant supported Dr. Christo’s opinion that she is unable to

work due to depression and PTSD.” (Document No. 13, p. 16). Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ

here does not make it apparent that each factor was considered, or provide a logical explanation to

demonstrate how the evidence was weighed in assessing the supportability and consistency of a

physician’s opinion.” (Document No. 13, p. 17).

Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ must identify and delineate specific evidence that supports

his conclusion that the medical source opinion is either supported and consistent or is unsupported

and inconsistent” and that the ALJ “failed to specify what specific evidence in the record the ALJ

believed conflicted with Dr. Christo’s opinion.” (Document No. 13, p. 16).

Plaintiff further contends that “[t]he ALJ’s assessment of supportability is limited to one

sentence,” an analysis which “on its face is insufficient….” Id. (citing Lindsey, 2021 WL 4472211,

at *3). Plaintiff also argues that “the ALJ seemingly misunderstands the true issue to be resolved

by the Administration…whether the medical record as a whole supports the medical source

statement.” Id.

In addition, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ provides no analysis at all of the consistency

of Dr. Christo’s opinion with the evidence of record.” (Document No. 13, p. 17). Plaintiff

contends that, “[a]s in his faulty assessment of supportability, the ALJ relies on summary

conclusions rather than analysis, leaving the basis of his findings unclear and therefore not

supported by substantial evidence.” (Document No. 13, p. 18).

Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ’s failure to adequately evaluate Dr. Christo’s one-sentence

“letter of support is harmful.” (Document No. 13, p. 18); see also (Tr. 1312).

In response, Defendant asserts that “[t]he ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Christo’s conclusory

to whom it may concern one sentence April 11, 2019, opinion.” (Document No. 15, p. 8).

Defendant references the medical examining and reviewing consultants’ assessments as evidence

conflicting with Dr. Christo’s evaluation that supports the ALJ’s RFC. (Document No. 15, p. 9).

Defendant notes that the ALJ explains “the ultimate issue of disability is an issue reserved to the

Commissioner….‘Disability’ is a term of art….It is not a medical term.” Id. (citing Tr. 182).

Defendant also notes that “it is the duty of the ALJ reviewing a case, and not the responsibility of

the courts, to resolve any conflicts in the evidence….” Id.

In reply, Plaintiff again cites Lindsey in arguing that “[a]n ALJ has a duty to consider the

supportability and consistency of a medical opinion and to explain how the opinion was evaluated

against these factors in a manner that is sufficiently clear for review.” (Document No. 16, p. 3).

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to address, much less resolve, evidence in the record that

conflicts with his conclusions.” (Document No. 16, p. 4).

The undersigned finds that the ALJ sufficiently explained his treatment of the medical

opinions, including Dr. Christo’s. The SSA regulations state that the agency “will explain how

[it] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions

or prior administrative medical findings….” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The regulation goes

on to state that the agency “may, but [is] not required to, explain how [it] considered [the other

factors] of this section, as appropriate, when we articulate how we consider medical opinions and

prior administrative findings in your case record.” Id. The statute defines supportability by stating

that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by

a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s)

will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). The statute defines consistency by stating that “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

Here, the ALJ discusses the medical opinions of State Agency psychological consultants

and consultative examiner Chad Ritterspach with respect to Ms. McCoy’s mental impairments.

(Tr. 181). The ALJ references their opinions that “the claimant has mild to moderate limitations

in the relevant mental functional domains.” Id. Earlier in his decision, the ALJ states:

Treatment records also indicate the claimant experienced mental

health symptoms that affected her ability to function, albeit not to

the severity level alleged by the claimant. The claimant is noted to

have some difficulties with anxiety, but reported no suicidal

ideations, hallucinations, or severe psychiatric symptoms (B2F|44;

B13F|1). Even without taking prescribed medications or seeking

consistent psychiatric care, the claimant did not exhibit severe

mental functional loss (B4F; B5F; B13F). When the claimant

engaged in mental health treatment, records show an improvement

in her ability to function by her own subjective estimation (B13F).

(Tr. 180) (citing Tr. 613, 795-843, 1253-1311).

In his decision, the ALJ also directly addresses the medical opinion cited by Plaintiff as

follows:

The medical source statement of Michael Christo, M.D. is

unpersuasive (B14F). The claimant’s medical provider provided no

additional information as to why he felt the claimant was unable to

return to work. Further, disability is an issue reserved to the

Commissioner pursuant to 20 CFR 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

There is no indication that the definition of disability alluded to in

this document in consistent with that of this Agency. Further, his

medical opinion is inconsistent with other evidence in the record.

(Tr. 181) (citing Tr. 1312).

The undersigned finds that this explanation is sufficient to conclude that Dr. Christo’s

opinion stating Plaintiff “is unable to work” is unsupported by the record as a whole and

inconsistent with the other evidence in the record to which the ALJ cites in his decision. The

undersigned finds that ultimately, the ALJ appears to have considered the explanation (or lack

thereof) offered by “[t]he claimant’s medical provider” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c in terms

of supportability and consistency to determine its persuasiveness.

IV. CONCLUSION

The undersigned finds that there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and thus substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Johnson v. Barnhart,

434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). As such, the undersigned will direct that the Commissioner’s

decision be affirmed.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: Plaintiffs “Motion For Summary Judgment...”

(Document No. 12) is DENIED; the “Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document

No. 14) is GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s determination is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: June 29, 2022

Darke.