Pickens v. Hendricks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00030-MR

BRANDON PICKENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OF

STEVEN HENDRICKS, et al., ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Steven

Hendricks’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief

May be Granted [Doc. 25].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, addressing incidents that allegedly occurred during a

January 20, 2018 traffic stop. The Complaint passed initial review on several

claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Hendricks

for obtaining a warrant for a body cavity search of the Plaintiff based on a

warrant application that Hendricks knew to contain false and misleading

information. [Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 13 at 9-10].

Defendant Hendricks filed the instant Motion to Dismiss arguing that

the Plaintiff failed to state a claim and, alternatively, that qualified immunity

applies. [Doc. 25]. The Court notified the Plaintiff of the opportunity to

respond to Defendant’s Motion and cautioned him that the failure to do so

may result in the Defendant being granted the relief that he seeks by way of

the Motions to Dismiss. [Doc. 26]. The Plaintiff filed a Response [Doc. 30],

and Defendant Hendricks filed a Reply [Doc. 31]. The Plaintiff then filed a

Surreply [Doc. 32], which is not an authorized filing pursuant to the Court’s

Local Civil Rules, and will be stricken.1 See LCvR 7.1(e). The Motion to

Dismiss is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The central issue for resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the

complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588

F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 2009). In considering such a motion, the court accepts

the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construes them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,

Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192. When

considering a motion to dismiss, the Court is obligated to construe a pro se

1 Even if the Court were to consider the Surreply, it would not change the outcome of this

proceeding.

complaint liberally, “however inartfully pleaded[.]” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of

Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

Although the Court accepts well-pled facts as true, the Court is not

required to assume the truth of “bare legal conclusions.” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc.,

658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011). “The mere recital of elements of a cause

of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to survive

a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d

435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012).

The claims need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must

contain sufficient factual allegations to suggest the required elements of a

cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);

see also Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256. Namely, the complaint is

required to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Consumeraffairs.com, 591

F.3d at 255. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); see also Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. The mere

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient for a claim to

survive a motion to dismiss. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256;

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 193. Ultimately, the well-pled factual allegations

must move a plaintiff’s claim from possible to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570; Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing the well-pled factual allegations in the Complaint as true, the

following is a recitation of the relevant facts.

On January 20, 2018, Defendant May allegedly received a tip from a

concerned citizen regarding a parked vehicle at an address where the

Plaintiff was visiting as a guest. Defendant May ran the parked vehicle’s

registration and determined that it belonged to the Plaintiff. A deputy or

deputies then looked into the Plaintiff’s criminal history, learned that he had

prior drug offenses, and set up surveillance on the residence. That

afternoon, the Plaintiff and a passenger left the residence in Plaintiff’s

vehicle, traveling towards Asheville. Defendant Lambert and/or other

deputies followed the vehicle and stopped it in a convenience store parking

lot. During that stop, the Plaintiff was cavity-searched in a gas station

bathroom “pursuant to a search warrant that was based upon deceit by law

enforcement.” [Doc. 1 at 4]. Specifically:

The cavity search was conducted based on [a] search

warrant obtained by Steven Hendricks (a law enforcement officer

working in conjunction with the Deputies via phone and or other

electronic communications) and which was based upon

statements made to him via telephone by Deputy May and/or

other Deputies.

The factual allegations in the application for the search

warrant contained false and misleading statements. The

Defendants knew the statements were false when they were

made and knew these statements would be sworn to in order to

obtain a search warrant allowing a “strip search.”

That the factual allegations contained in the application for

a search warrant, as sworn to by Defendant Hendricks and

attributed to Defendant May, were taken from a template which

these Deputies used repeatedly, making the same specific

allegations as they had done in previous cases.

That the Deputies used a template, or a copy and paste

type form, as to the specific factual allegations used to secure a

search warrant knowing the allegations to be false and

misleading. That upon information and belief, there exists a

pattern of these Deputies to use such tactics to circumvent the

constitutional rights of citizens.

[Doc. 1 at 4] (paragraph numbers omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim

A police officer violates the Fourth Amendment “if, in order to obtain a

warrant, he deliberately or ‘with reckless disregard for the truth’ makes

material false statements or omits material facts.” Miller v. Prince George’s

Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978)).

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Hendricks was not on the scene

of the traffic stop, and that he wrote up the warrant application based on

information he received from fellow officers, and upon which he was legally

authorized to rely. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965)

(“Observations of fellow officers … engaged in common investigation are

plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.”).

The Complaint alleges in a conclusory manner that Defendant Hendricks

knew that the warrant application included false and misleading information.

However, no factual allegations support this conclusory statement. Indeed,

in opposing Defendant Hendricks’ Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff argues that

“[t]here is a possibility that Steven Hendricks was dishonest during the

incident relating to the Complaint in the above-actioned case.”2 [Doc. 30]

(emphasis added). The Plaintiff’s speculation about Defendant Hendricks’

dishonesty fails to state a claim that Hendricks deliberately or recklessly

included false material statements in the warrant application, in violation of

the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Defendant Hendricks has demonstrated

that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim against him and dismissal is warranted.

2 The Plaintiff’s arguments that he was previously convicted of a cocaine offense as a

result of Hendricks’ past police work, that Hendricks knowingly provided false information

to obtain a search warrant in the cocaine case, and that he can prove that Hendricks is

not credible, are irrelevant to the instant discussion regarding the sufficiency of the

Complaint. [Doc. 30 at 1-2].

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “shields police officers who commit constitutional

violations from liability when, based on clearly established law, they could

reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Estate of Jones by Jones

v. City of Martinsburg, W. Va., 961 F.3d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal

citation omitted). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the

courts conduct a two-step inquiry, in either order: “(1) whether a

constitutional violation occurred; and (2) whether the right was clearly

established at the time of the violation….” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855

F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017).

Defendant Hendricks argues in the alternative that he is entitled to

qualified immunity because the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it was

objectively unreasonable for him to rely on information from his fellow officers

in completing the warrant application. The Plaintiff has not attempted to

rebut Defendant Hendricks’ qualified immunity argument, and the Court finds

it to be persuasive. Accordingly, Defendant Hendricks is likewise entitled to

dismissal based on qualified immunity.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Hendricks’ Motion to Dismiss

is granted, and the Plaintiff’s Surreply is stricken as an unauthorized filing.

The Clerk will be instructed to terminate Officer Hendricks as a Defendant in

this case.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant Steven Hendricks’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted [Doc. 25] is GRANTED

and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to him.

Plaintiffs Surreply [Doc. 32] is STRICKEN pursuant to LCvR

7.1(e).

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate Steven Hendricks as a

Defendant in this case and to mail the Plaintiff a copy of the docket sheet, as

well as a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 25, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge Ale