when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”
How later courts described this case
- when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”
- “it is now well established that the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners,’ and the Due Process Clause affords a prisoner no greater substantive protection ‘than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 5:22-cv-00016-MR
JOEL HOWIE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se
Complaint. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 7].
The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 addressing an incident that allegedly occurred at the Alexander
Correctional Institution.2 He names as Defendants: the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) and “Alexander Correctional
1 The Court also liberally construes the Complaint as raising a claim of gross negligence
under North Carolina law.
2 Although the Plaintiff refers to himself as a pretrial detainee, he was a convicted and
sentenced state prisoner at that time. See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/view
offender.do?method=view&offenderID=0194532&searchOffenderId=0194532&searchD
OBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1; Fed. R. Evid. 201. The
Plaintiff filed this action from the Neuse Correctional Institution, where he is still housed.
Institution (Dental Hygentist) [sic].” [Doc. 1 at 3]. He asserts violation of his
“Due process right’s [sic] also, 8th and 14th Amendment Rights Entity
Constituting gross negligence Equal Protection human rights.” [Id. at 5]. He
alleges verbatim:
The dental Hygentist (female) did in fact test positive for the
deadly COVID-19 virus on July 29th, 2021, at Alexander
Correctional facility owned and operated by the State of North
Carolina. To which: North Carolina Department of Public Safety
did in fact cause great harm to me by spreading a deadly COVID-
19 virus on July 29th 2021. Due to me having a dentist appt. on
July 29th 2021 at Alexander Correctional facility. I contracted
COVID-19 from female dental hygentist on July 29th 2021.
Caused gross negligence, reckless misconduct by North
Carolina Department of Public Safety (Alexander Correctional
Inst.) Dental Hygentist giving me a deadly virus called COVID-
19.
[Id.].
As injury, he states verbatim:
I suffered by being put in harms way, nearly being dead. I was
injured in a mental state as well by mental anguish, pain &
suffering by contracting COVID-19 virus. This caused medical
treatment nearly costing my life. I really thought I was going to
die. I suffered a great deal of injury by contracting COVID-19
with negligence by said and suffering from flu like system being
quaritine at weeks at a time. Taking medicen’s trying everything
in my power not to die. My injury’s are severe to the point of no
return. Deliberate indifference medical neglect not receiving
adequate medical treatment being vulnerable to death then the
mental anguish by thinking, I just might die from COVID-19. My
injury was in great mesures. Harmful effects from all said
isolation and prison not following proper protocols from medical
personnel. My injury was contracting a deadly virus called
COVID-19 almost costing me my life.
[Id. at 7]. He seeks $250,000 in damages, any additional relief the Court
deems just and proper, and a jury trial. [Id. at 1, 8].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §
1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress
from governmental entities, officers, or employees).
In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set
forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
The Plaintiff attempts to name as Defendants the NCDPS and
Alexander CI. However, “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, NCDPS and its facilities are not
“persons” under § 1983. See Fox v. Harwood, No. 1:09-cv-160-MU-02, 2009
WL 1117890 at *1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2009). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s
claims against NCDPS and Alexander CI are dismissed with prejudice.
Liberally construing the Complaint, it appears that the Plaintiff is also
attempting to name as a Defendant a Jane Doe dental hygienist. The Clerk
of Court will be instructed to add her to the docket as a separate Defendant.
First, the Plaintiff asserts that Jane Doe was deliberately indifferent to
his health and safety by treating him the same day she tested positive for
COVID-19, and infecting him with the virus. To prevail on an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must show: (1) “serious
or significant physical or emotional injury” resulting from a prison official’s
conduct; and (2) the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,”
which in this context is deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994). A prison official is “deliberately indifferent to a substantial
risk of harm to a [prisoner] when that [official] ‘knows and disregards’ the
risk.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “It is not enough to prove that the official
should have known of the risk; instead, ‘the official must both be aware of
the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
harm exists, and he should draw the inference.’” Kartman v. Markle, 582 F.
App’x 151, 153 (2014) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A showing of
negligence does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
The Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and speculative to state an
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Jane Doe dental hygienist for
deliberate indifference. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Doe tested
positive the same day that she saw him for treatment, but he does not allege
that she tested positive before she treated the Plaintiff. Nor does he allege
that Defendant Doe knew that she was infected, drew the inference that
treating him would expose him to a substantial risk of harm, and intentionally
disregarded that risk and treated him. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s contention
that he actually caught COVID-19 from Jane Doe that day is purely
speculative. Accordingly, this claim is insufficient to state a deliberate
indifference claim at this time, and it will be dismissed without prejudice.
The Plaintiff also appears to assert that he received insufficient medical
care for his COVID-19 infection. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that
“the defendants actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious
injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee's
serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,
575-76 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care
provider’s actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). The Plaintiff
does not allege that Defendant Jane Doe was responsible for treating his
COVID-19 infection and the Plaintiff has not named any other defendant who
was allegedly responsible for that deficient care. Moreover, his conclusory
allegations are too vague to proceed. Accordingly, to the extent that the
Plaintiff intended to assert a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical for his COVID-19 treatment, it is dismissed without prejudice.
The Plaintiff next attempts to assert a § 1983 due process claim. To
prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate
that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by governmental action.
Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners are
afforded some due process rights while incarcerated, those liberty interests
are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Moreover,
changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in
conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the
denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate [and
which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v.
Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594
(4th Cir. 1994) (“The federal constitution itself vests no liberty interest in
inmates in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status ‘[a]s
long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement ... is within the
sentence imposed ... and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.’”)
(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). The Plaintiff has failed
to assert any facts from which the Court can glean a plausible claim that
Defendant Jane Doe dental hygienist violated the Plaintiff’s procedural due
process rights. His vague allusion to quarantine is not attributed to Jane Doe
and, even so, he has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that such
imposed an atypical or significant hardship. Moreover, to the extent that the
Plaintiff intended to assert a substantive due process claim against
Defendant Jane Doe, it is subsumed by his Eighth Amendment claim. See
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 768 (4th Cir. 1996) (“it is now well
established that the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary source of
substantive protection to convicted prisoners,’ and the Due Process Clause
affords a prisoner no greater substantive protection ‘than does the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.’”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
327 (1986)). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s due process claim is dismissed without
prejudice.
The Plaintiff also attempts to assert an equal protection claim. To
establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff first must demonstrate that
he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated,
and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). In
doing so, the plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual
allegations that establish an improper [discriminatory] motive.” Williams v.
Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Trulock v. Freeh, 275
F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001)). The Plaintiff fails to support his equal
protection claim with any factual allegations whatsoever. Accordingly, it is
dismissed without prejudice.
Finally, the Plaintiff appears to assert a claim under North Carolina law
for gross negligence.3
Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their
adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related to claims ... within
[federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a
court must find that “[t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact” where a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a district court dismisses all claims
independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily
dismiss[es] all related state claims.” Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594,
595 (2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A district court may also dismiss
3 The Plaintiff also alleges “reckless misconduct” but the Court is unable to glean any
cognizable claim from that allegation. [Doc. 1 at 5].
the related state claims if there is a good reason to decline jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2), and (4). And without a § 1983 claim, the Court
will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an alleged violation of North
Carolina law. See Artis, 138 S.Ct. at 595 (when a district court dismisses all
claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it
“ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
No federal claim has passed initial review and, accordingly, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of the Plaintiffs claims
under North Carolina law at this time. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant.
The § 1983 claims against NCDPS and the Alexander CI are dismissed with
prejudice, and the remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. The
Clerk will be instructed to add Jane Doe dental hygienist to the Court’s docket
as a separate Defendant.
The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his
Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order
and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural
requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will
not be allowed. Should the Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in
accordance with this Order, this action will be dismissed without prejudice
and without further notice to the Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The § 1983 claims against NCDPS and Alexander Cl are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his
Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff
fails to amend the Complaint in the instant case in accordance with
this Order and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will
be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to the
Plaintiff.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to add Jane Doe dental
hygienist as a Defendant in the Court’s docket, and to mail the Plaintiff a
blank § 1983 prisoner complaint form and a copy of this Order.
Signed: March 17, 2022
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ie ee
Chief United States District Judge AS
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