Griffin v. Hollar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

5:19-cv-00049-MR

MATTHEW JAMES GRIFFIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

FNU HOLLAR, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 80], Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File a

Response in Expanse of the Page Limitation” [Doc. 88], and Plaintiff’s

“Second Motion for a 15 Day Extension of Time Within Which to File

Responsive documents in Opposition to Summary Judgment” [Doc. 91].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Matthew James Griffin (“Plaintiff”) is a vision-impaired

inmate of the state of New Mexico currently incarcerated at the Penitentiary

of New Mexico in Sante Fe, New Mexico. He filed this action on April 30,

2019, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims he alleges arose while

he was incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution in Taylorsville,

North Carolina. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights and that they violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”)

by refusing to transfer Plaintiff to a handicapped cell with handrails and an

unobstructed nightlight. [Id.; see Doc. 10]. Plaintiff alleges that he was

injured in a fall he suffered due to these violations. [Id. at ¶ 56]. He sues

Defendants in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff filed

various exhibits with his Complaint, including some Medical Duty Status

records. [Doc. 1-1 at 4, 8, 10]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and

injunctive relief, punitive damages, and the recovery of costs and fees, if

any.1 [Doc. 1 at 23].

On April 21, 2021, Defendants moved for summary judgment. [Doc.

80]. Defendants submitted only a memorandum in support of their motion

and pointed to the factual and legal insufficiencies of Plaintiff’s Complaint as

grounds for summary judgment. [See id.]. Thereafter, the Court entered an

order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975),

advising Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary

judgment motions and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted

1 Because Plaintiff has been transferred to a different correctional facility, his claim for

injunctive relief is moot and will be dismissed. See Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281,

286-87 (4th Cir. 2007).

to the Court. [Doc. 82]. After seeking multiple extensions of time to respond2

[Docs. 84, 88], Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’

summary judgment motion3 [Doc. 89]. Plaintiff submitted a brief, a

“Statement of Fact,” his own Declaration, and various records, including his

own medical records. [Docs. 89-1 to 89-31].

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this

determination, the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh

the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

150 (2000). Instead, it “must consider the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from

the facts in the non-movant’s favor.” Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgt., Inc.,

259 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2001).

2 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s second motion for additional time to respond to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. 91], which is pending before the Court

now.

3 Plaintiff also moved for leave to file a response exceeding the 25-page limit set forth in

Local Civil Rule 7.1(d). [Doc. 88]. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for the reasons

set forth therein.

“[T]here is no burden upon ‘the party moving for summary judgment to

produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’

Rather, ‘the burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing” –

that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 608

(4th Cir. 2006) abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct.

1175 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

325 (1986)) (internal emphasis omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 n.3 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 56(c)). The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations

or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a proper

summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …,

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in the record. See id.;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the nonmoving party must present

sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818

(4th Cir. 1995). “‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As noted, Defendants do not submit their own forecast of evidence in

support of their summary judgment motion, but instead point to the factual

and legal deficiencies of Plaintiff’s sworn Complaint. Regardless, the

relevant forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff is as

follows.

Plaintiff is a handicapped prisoner of the State of New Mexico. [Doc.

1 at ¶ 29]. He has a vision impairment diagnosed as strabismus with large

angle alternating exotropia. [Id. at ¶ 31]. In layman’s terms, Plaintiff eyes

alternately point outward to a significant degree. It is the opposite of crossed

eyes. This impairment causes Plaintiff to experience double vision,

uncontrolled eye movements (nystagmus), eye fatigue, and loss of all depth

perception. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s vision impairment substantially limits his ability

to ambulate safely, read, work, drive, navigate uneven terrain, climb stairs,

safely perform manual tasks involving eye-hand coordination, and see and

perceive his surroundings correctly. [Id. at ¶ 32]. Plaintiff is disabled within

the meaning of the ADA and the Rehab Act. [Id. at ¶ 34].

Defendants Hollar, Massagee, Hensley, Walker, Delozier, Strohl,

Mandeville, Copeland, Lowery, and Johnson were all prison officials at

Alexander at the relevant times. [Doc. 89-3 at ¶¶ 53-54, 57, 58-59, 62-65].

Defendants Gamewell, Folly, Lail, Putt, Greene, and Eggleston were nurses

at Alexander at the relevant times. [Id. at ¶¶ 36, 56, 60-61, 66-67].

On or about October 9, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to the custody

of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) through the

Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) or the Western Interstate Corrections

Compact (WICC). [Doc. 1 at ¶ 29; Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 16]. In December 2015,

Plaintiff was transferred to Alexander and housed in an ADA-compliant cell

consistent with the instructions of NCDPS healthcare providers. [Id. at ¶ 35;

Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 22].

On March 26, 2018, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Berry, an

ophthalmologist, for Plaintiff’s annual eye exam. [Doc. 89-17 at 2]. Dr. Berry

noted that Plaintiff has “full visual fields,” but no depth perception due to his

exotropia. [Id. at 3]. Dr. Berry recommended that, for Plaintiff’s safety, he

be housed in a ground floor handicapped cell, be given a bottom bunk, and

not have to use stairs. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 36; Doc. 89-17 at 3]. Dr. Berry also wrote

that Plaintiff would “benefit from a night light.” [Id.; Doc. 89-17 at 3].

On June 12, 2018, Plaintiff was evaluated by Marta Kalinski, M.D., at

Main Medical at Alexander to evaluate his special needs. [Id. at ¶ 37; Doc.

89-18 at 2]. Dr. Kalinski reported that Plaintiff requested to have a

handicapped cell with handrails and a nightlight. Dr. Kalinski also noted that

Plaintiff had an elevated risk of falls and other accidental body injury due to

his eye condition and that, during a recent stay at Central Prison, Plaintiff

was housed in a non-handicapped cell and suffered a right shoulder injury

from a fall. [Doc. 89-18 at 2].

The record for this encounter also documents Plaintiff’s history of

recurrent bilateral shoulder dislocation and poorly controlled chronic pain

syndrome related to a lower back injury and bilateral shoulder injury. [Id. at

3]. Dr. Kalinski recorded, “[d]ue to vision impairment, [Plaintiff] needs to have

changes placed into Medical Duty Status including handicapped cell, no

climbing, falls prevention, bottom bunk, no stairs, no work around hot or

sharp objects, avoidance of uneven terrain, [and] no driving.” [Id. at 2].

Plaintiff’s Medical Duty Status was updated the next day. [See Doc

89-19 at 2]. It provided, among other things, that Plaintiff be subject to “falls

prevention” and restricted to the bottom bunk and a handicapped cell. [Doc.

89-19]. A handicapped cell has an accessible toilet with rear and side grab

bars. [Doc. 89-24]. The Medical Duty Status also showed that Plaintiff “may

have” a nightlight in his possession. [Doc. 89-19].

On August 15, 2018, Defendant Gamewell, a nurse at Alexander,

documented a routine medication renewal for Plaintiff. [Doc. 89-27]. The

renewal reflected Plaintiff’s prescription for Gabapentin, which was for

Plaintiff’s shoulder, lower back, and right knee pain, as well as Plaintiff’s

sciatica. [Doc. 89-27]. Plaintiff was directed to take one 300 mg capsule

three times daily. [Doc. 89-27].

On October 14, 2018, Defendant Gamewell updated Plaintiff’s Medical

Duty Status. [See Doc. 89-23 at 2]. This Medical Duty Status maintained

the order for a bottom bunk, handicapped cell, and falls prevention, but did

not include the authorization for Plaintiff to have a nightlight in his

possession, even though Plaintiff was provided with a nightlight.4 [Id. at 2;

Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 41].

4 While Plaintiff attests that Defendant Gamewell “deleted night light from the Medical Duty

Status” [Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 36], there are no other medical records before the Court giving

context to this change or otherwise explaining why Plaintiff’s Medical Duty Status was

updated at that time. Moreover, Plaintiff included only very select medical records in his

forecast of evidence. As such, the forecast of evidence does not raise a substantial

inference that Defendant Gamewell deleted the nightlight authorization, only that it was

changed sometime between June 13, 2018 and October 14, 2018. Nonetheless, for the

purpose of this motion, the Court will give the Plaintiff the benefit of a very generous

inference and treat this as evidence of the fact Plaintiff asserts.

On November 8, 2018, Defendant Hollar transferred Plaintiff from a

handicapped cell with handrails and a functioning nightlight in regular

population to a non-handicapped cell with an obstructed nightlight in

segregation. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 42, 44; Doc. 89-3 at ¶¶ 41, 53]. Plaintiff showed

Defendant Hollar the June 13, 2018 and October 9, 2018 Medical Duty

Status reports, which required a handicapped cell and falls prevention. [Id.

at ¶ 43; Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 53]. Defendant Hollar refused to move Plaintiff to a

handicapped cell, although at least two handicapped cells were being used

by non-handicapped inmates and were, therefore, presumably available to

Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45-46]. Defendant Hollar also refused to contact the

Officer-in-Charge (“OIC”), who would have had the authority to immediately

transfer Plaintiff to a handicapped cell. [Doc. 89-3 at ¶ 53; see Doc. 89-3 at

¶¶ 54-67].

Over the next three days, Plaintiff showed his Medical Duty Status

reports to Defendants Massagee, Hensley, Walker, Delozier, Strohl,

Mandeville, Copeland, Lowery, Folly, Lail, Putt, Greene, Eggleston, and

Johnson, requesting a handicapped cell with an unobstructed nightlight and

handrails. [Id. at ¶¶ 54-67]. Each Defendant refused Plaintiff’s request and

refused to contact the OIC. [Id.].

On November 11, 2018, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Plaintiff fell in the

non-handicapped cell where he remained, injuring his right foot, right knee,

left hip, back, and right shoulder. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 56]. Plaintiff alleges that the

fall was caused by the lack of handrails and unobstructed nightlight. [Id. at

¶ 64]. He sought medical treatment for his injuries. [See id. at ¶ 57; Doc.

89-3 at ¶¶ 71-72]. Plaintiff, however, has neither alleged nor forecast

evidence regarding the circumstances of the fall or any specific injury he

suffered to his foot, knee, hip, back, or shoulder.

On December 3, 2018, Defendant Gamewell documented another

routine medication renewal for Plaintiff. [Doc. 89-28]. The renewal reflected

Plaintiff’s prescription for Gabapentin, which had been increased from 300

mg three times per day to 600 mg three time per day since the previous

medication renewal in the record. [Id.; see Doc. 89-3 at ¶¶ 73-74]. Other

than this temporally correlated increase in dosage of Plaintiff’s pain

medication, there is no forecast of evidence of any treatment received by

Plaintiff for his alleged fall-related injuries.

On May 3, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Warren Correctional

Institution in Manson, North Carolina. [Doc. 89-29]. Plaintiff’s medical

transfer summary reflects Plaintiff’s bottom bunk, handicapped cell

restriction, but there is no authorization for Plaintiff to possess a nightlight.

[Doc. 89-29]. Plaintiff has since been transferred back to New Mexico and

remains incarcerated there.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s official

capacity claims, Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs, Defendants have qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment individual capacity claims, and Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehab

Act claims against Defendants in their individual capacities fail as a matter

of law. [Doc. 81].

A. Sovereign Immunity

A suit against a state official in his official capacity is construed as

against the state itself. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989). It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.;

see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Moreover,

the Eleventh Amendment generally bars lawsuits by citizens against non-

consenting states brought either in state or federal courts. See Alden v.

Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).

Although Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, it

has not chosen to do so for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v.

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979). Likewise, North Carolina has not waived

its sovereign immunity by consenting to be sued in federal court for claims

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally, Mary’s House, Inc. v. North

Carolina, 976 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 barred by sovereign immunity of North Carolina). As such,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s official capacity

claims against them.

B. Deliberate Indifference

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the

inmate. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the

detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need

for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s

actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the

treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to

shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v.

Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Allegations that might be sufficient

to support negligence and medical malpractice claims do not, without more,

rise to the level of a cognizable § 1983 claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference

is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”).

To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must

know of and consciously or intentionally disregard “an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);

Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). A prison official,

however, is not liable if he knew the underlying facts but believed, even if

unsoundly, that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or

nonexistent. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue for trial here. The forecast of

evidence, construed in Plaintiff’s favor, shows that Defendant Gamewell

removed the authorization for Plaintiff to have a nightlight in his possession.

The forecast of evidence also shows that Plaintiff showed the other

Defendants his Medical Duty Status, which restricted him to a handicapped

cell with falls prevention, and that they refused to transfer Plaintiff to a

handicapped cell or to contact the OIC to effect such transfer.

Under this forecast of evidence, Plaintiff has failed to establish that

Defendants had the requisite state of mind to establish “deliberate

indifference” under the law. Deliberate indifference describes a state of mind

more blameworthy than negligence, requiring (1) that a defendant have been

personally aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

Plaintiff would suffer a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that the

defendant had actually drawn the inference and recognized the existence of

such a risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Further, a prison official is not liable if

he knew the underlying facts but believed, even if unsoundly, that the risk to

which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent. Id. at 837.

As to Defendant Gamewell, the forecast of evidence shows, at best,

that she removed the nightlight authorization. However, the forecast of

evidence does not show that a nightlight was ever even ordered for Plaintiff

in the first place, only that he would benefit from one. There is, therefore, no

forecast of evidence of an excessive risk known by Defendant Gamewell in

removing the authorization, let alone that she consciously or intentionally

disregarded such risk. The forecast of evidence is decidedly insufficient to

go to a jury against Defendant Gamewell. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that he

was provided a nightlight. When he was moved to a segregation unit,

Plaintiff was still provided a nightlight, albeit an obstructed one. Plaintiff

presents no forecast of evidence as to how the obstruction of the nightlight

made any difference.

The forecast of evidence in this case also fails to satisfy these elements

as to the other Defendants’ state of mind. At best for Plaintiff, the forecast

of evidence shows that Plaintiff’s Medical Duty Status restricted him to a

handicapped cell with falls prevention and that Plaintiff flagged down every

prison official and nurse he encountered and showed them his Medical Duty

Status and asked that he be transferred to a handicapped cell. Even

assuming facts existed from which one might infer a substantial risk of

serious harm to Plaintiff by housing him in a non-handicapped cell, no

reasonable jury could find from the forecast of evidence here that any

Defendant actually drew such an inference and recognized that risk. While

Defendants may very well have been negligent in their refusal to act, no

reasonable jury could find that these Defendants were deliberately indifferent

under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

As such, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for

trial against any Defendant on this claim. Summary judgment is, therefore,

appropriate.

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Because Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that Defendants violated

a constitutional right in the first place, Defendants are also entitled qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. The Court, therefore,

grants summary judgment for Defendants on this ground as well.

D. ADA and Rehab Act

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall,

by reasons of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42

U.S.C. § 12132. To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a

plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded

from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services,

programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.

Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

States are obligated to make “reasonable modifications” to enable the

disabled person to receive the services or participate in programs or

activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The duty of reasonable accommodation,

however, must also take into account whether the institution’s actions are

related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 89 (1987); Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 2005)

(noting that courts have applied Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims).

The Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual

with a disability … shall, solely by reason of [his] disability, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). The analysis under the Rehab Act is generally the same

as under the ADA. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205,

214 (4th Cir. 2002). Claims under the Rehab Act, however, require a

showing of discrimination “solely by reason of” disability, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a),

while under the ADA, a plaintiff must only show discrimination “by reason of”

disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As such, the causation standards are

“significantly dissimilar.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason

Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 n.17 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In addition,

to sustain a claim under the Rehab Act, a plaintiff must also show that the

program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance. Thomas

v. The Salvation Army Southern Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 641 (4th Cir. 2016).

Neither the Rehab Act nor Title II of the ADA, however, provide for

individual capacity suits against state officials. See Barnes v. Young, 565

Fed. App’x 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (quoting Garcia v.

S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting

cases)); see Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (there is no

ADA retaliation claim against defendants in their individual capacities);

Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed. App’x 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Neither the

ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act authorizes suits for monetary damages

against Defendants in their individual capacities.”) (citation omitted). Such a

suit, therefore, may only be brought against a defendant in an official

capacity. Id.

Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence regarding this claim fails on many

grounds. As addressed supra, Plaintiff presents no forecast as to how the

obstructed nightlight was an insufficient accommodation. Likewise, Plaintiff

has presented no forecast as to how the lighting or lack of other handicapped

amenities caused any injury. In fact, Plaintiff presents no forecast

whatsoever as to how his fall occurred or how there is any connection

between the facilities and the fall. Moreover, other than a vague,

unsupported claim of injury to his right foot, right knee, left hip, back, and

right shoulder, Plaintiff presents no forecast of injury or any treatment he

received for such injuries. He merely states that the dosage of his pain

medication was increased a month after his fall. This is insufficient to raise

an inference of a connection between the two.

In addition, the placement of Plaintiff in a non-handicapped cell arose

from Plaintiff being transferred to a segregation unit. Plaintiff presents no

evidence, in fact Plaintiff makes no claim, that his placement in segregation

was unwarranted. As such, Plaintiff’s transfer fulfilled a legitimate

penological interest. Plaintiff has forecast no evidence to overcome this

hurdle. Plaintiff's claims under the ADA and the Rehab Acct, therefore, fail as

a matter of law. The Court, therefore, will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to these claims.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, for the reasons stated herein, the Court grants summary

judgment for all Defendants.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 80] is GRANTED and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motions [Docs. 88, 91] are

GRANTED.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 10, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS

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