Monroe-Williams v. Clawson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:22-cv-00027-MR

NICHOLAS MONROE-WILLIAMS,1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FNU CLAWSON, ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

19832 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North

1 According to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s (NCDPS) website, the

Plaintiff’s name is Nicholas M. Williams. See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/view

offender.do?method=view&offenderID=1562264&searchOffenderId=1562264&searchD

OBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last visited March 11,

2022); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

2 The Plaintiff cites Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

for the basis of this lawsuit, but it is liberally construed as an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 because the Defendant is an employee of NCDPS, and not of the federal

government. See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pled, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (instructing courts to

construe pro se documents liberally).

Carolina addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Alexander

Correctional Institution, where he is still incarcerated. The Eastern District

Court granted the Plaintiff’s Application to proceed in forma pauperis on

November 22, 2021. [Doc. 8]. On March 11, 2022, the Eastern District Court

transferred the action to this Court, where venue is proper, without having

reviewed the Complaint for frivolity. [Doc. 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b),

1404(a), 1406(a))]. The Complaint is now before the Court for initial review.

The Plaintiff names as the sole Defendant in his official and individual

capacities FNU Clawson, a sergeant on restrictive housing at Alexander CI.

[Doc. 1 at 3]. The Plaintiff alleges as follows verbatim:

On 8-22-21 at approximately 8:34 pm I fell in the shower

and hurt my back twenty minutes later Serg Clawson and four

other CO’s came to the shower and seen me on the floor. Serg

Clawson and four other CO’s laughed and tossed soap on me

while I was laying on the floor ten minutes later three CO’s came

in the shower and put me in full restraints. Now that I’m in full

restraints Serg Clawson kicked me on the side of my face with

full force (the side of my face, my lip was bleeding my right side

of my face was swole for a whole week) and said “you wanted

the serg I’m here now I’ll teach you not to do this on my shift” he

busted my lip wide open I was bleeding so bad they turn the cold

shower on me while I was in full restraints. When Serg Clawson

was leaving out he said “this’ll show you not to fuck with me on

my shift.” I’m mental health level 3 I suffer from anxiety. Since

that event I been have nightmares about that night and every

time his shift works I’m scare and fear for my life. I have waitness

that heard Serg Clawson say what he said. His intent was

“maliciously” and “sadistically” to cause harm. He had no need

for force which is “legitimate penological purpose” and my Eighth

Amendment right’s was violated.

[Doc. 1 at 4-5]. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and a jury trial.

[Doc. 1 at 1, 6].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

The body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who

are not named as defendants in the caption as required by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). These allegations cannot proceed

and are dismissed. See, e.g., Shine v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Dep’t,

No. 3:17-cv-306-FDW, 2018 WL 2943456 (W.D.N.C. June 12, 2018)

(dismissing as nullities the allegations against individuals not named as

defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a)).

The Plaintiff purports to sue the Defendant, who is a state official, in

his individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against a state official

in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a

suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting

in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v.

Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019).

Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages

against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger

v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, the Plaintiff’s claims

against the Defendant in his official capacity does not survive initial review

and will be dismissed.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must

satisfy both an objective component – that the harm inflicted was sufficiently

serious – and a subjective component – that the prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761

(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must

consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship

between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury

inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. A supervisor can

be liable where (1) he knew that his subordinate “was engaged in conduct

that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his

response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the

alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link”

between her inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d

791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and

construing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that the

Plaintiff has stated a claim for the use of excessive force against Defendant

Clawson that is sufficient to pass initial review.3

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint has passed initial review against Defendant

Clawson for the use of excessive force in his individual capacity. The claims

against Defendant Clawson in his official capacity are dismissed with

prejudice. To the extent that the Plaintiff attempted to assert additional

claims, they are dismissed without prejudice.

3 It does not appear that the Plaintiff is seeking to assert claims of deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need or retaliation. However, even if he intended to do so, those

claims would be dismissed. The Plaintiff has not alleged that he had an objectively

serious medical need to which Defendant Clawson was subjectively deliberately

indifferent. See Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001)

(deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendant actually knew of and

disregarded a serious need for medical care). Nor do the conclusory allegations

sufficiently allege that Defendant Clawson took an adverse action that was causally

related to the Plaintiff’s exercise of a protected First Amendment activity. See Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (bare or conclusory allegations of retaliation are

insufficient).

In light of the Court's determination that this case passes initial review

in accordance with this Order, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to

commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule

4.3 for Defendant Clawson, who is alleged to be a current or former

employee of NCDPS.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

(1) The Complaint [Doc. 1] has passed initial review against

Defendant Clawson for the use of excessive force in his

individual capacity.

(2) The Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Clawson in his official

capacity are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(3) To the extent that the Plaintiff attempted to state any additional

claims, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(4) The Clerk of Court shall commence the procedure for waiver of

service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Defendant

Clawson, who is alleged to be a current or former employee of

NCDPS.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff an Opt-In/ Opt-Out

form pursuant to the Standing Order in Misc. Case No. 3:19-mc-00060-FDW

and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 16, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge MS