Carmichael v. Murphy

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00116-MR

QUAMAINE DESHAWN )

CARMICHAEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FNU MURPHY, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Amended

Complaint [Doc. 10]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 7].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) addressing

incidents that allegedly occurred at the Marion Correctional Institution. The

Complaint was dismissed on initial review and the Plaintiff was granted the

opportunity to amend. [Docs. 1, 9]. The Amended Complaint is now before

the Court on initial review.

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff names as Defendants: Dr.

Murphy, a mental health administrator; at Marion C.I.; and H. Corpening,

Marion C.I.’s warden.

The Plaintiff alleges that he is diagnosed with severe anxiety and

depression. [Doc. 10-1 at 3]. The Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant

Murphy was assigned as the Plaintiff’s psychologist when he was transferred

to Marion C.I. in late 2017 or early 2018 for participation in the Rehabilitative

Diversion Unit (“RDU”) program. The Plaintiff appears to allege that he had

already been suffering from severe anxiety and depression when he was

transferred to Marion C.I. Upon screening the Plaintiff, Defendant Murphy

recommended that the Plaintiff receive a mental health appraisal. The

Plaintiff was then approved for a consultation with psychiatrist Jeffrey

Lorberbaum,1 who prescribed psychotropic medication. [Doc. 10-1 at 2].

This resulted in an increase in the Plaintiff’s “clinical status and/or

classification….” [Doc. 10-1 at 2].

The Plaintiff alleges that he had been held in solitary confinement for

the three years before his transfer to Marion C.I. and that the majority of the

1 The Plaintiff has not named Dr. Lorberbaum as a Defendant in this case.

RDU program consists of being “locked behind a door.”2 [Doc. 10-1 at 3].

The Plaintiff described these circumstances to Defendant Murphy

extensively, continuously consulted with Murphy to seek a solution, and filed

a grievance about conditions at Marion C.I. that he perceived to worsen his

mental disabilities. [Doc. 10-1 at 3]. The Plaintiff further alleges that the RDU

program is not structured to treat mental illness and that his diagnosis

“conflicted with his will to think properly, sleep, communicate in relatable

fashion, etc.” [Doc. 10-1 at 4]. The Plaintiff appears to allege that he

conveyed this information to Defendant Murphy, which Murphy

acknowledged by recommending that the Plaintiff continue to see Dr.

Lorberbaum and have medication prescribed “to treat the Disabilities which

were getting worse….”3 [Doc. 10-1 at 4].

The Plaintiff alleges that he was “excluded from the benefits of a public

entity” between January 15, 2018 and September 2018, when he completed

the RDU. [Doc. 10-1 at 4]. That is, he claims that he was unable to

participate in the Therapeutic Diversion Unit (“TDU”), a program for special

2 The Plaintiff alleges that he was in solitary confinement at Polk C.I., then was in intensive

control at Warren C.I. and Central Prison before being transferred to Marion C.I.

3 The Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lorberbaum renewed his prescription for hydroxyzine 75

mg on April 13, 2018 and additionally prescribed fluoxetine 10 mg which was increased

to 20 mg on July 18, 2018.

needs inmates who are transitioning from control status to general

population, while he was in Marion C.I’s RDU.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Corpening “allowed the actions of

Murphy to persist within the institution after ample notification was made.”

[Doc. 10-1 at 6].

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ failure to make reasonable

accommodations for his disabilities caused his condition to worsen. He

seeks $300,000 in compensatory damages. [Doc. 10 at 5].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions

seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, it appears that the

Plaintiff is attempting to state § 1983 claims under the Eighth Amendment

for deliberate indifference to a serious psychological need and inhumane

conditions of confinement,4 and under Title II of the ADA. These claims will

be addressed in turn.

A. § 1983 Claims

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that “involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

4 The Plaintiff does not appear to reassert the other § 1983 claims that he raised in the

Complaint. Even if he had done so, they would be dismissed for the same reasons that

the Complaint failed to pass initial review.

103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “It not

only outlaws excessive sentences but also protects inmates from inhumane

treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d

756, 761 (4th Cir.1996). Prison official must provide sentenced prisoners with

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the[ir] safety….” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994). To

establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must

prove two elements: (1) “the deprivation of [a] basic human need was

objectively sufficiently serious,” and (2) “subjectively the officials act[ed] with

a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)

(quotation omitted)). To be sufficiently serious, the deprivation must pose “a

serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the

challenged conditions,” or “a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting

from ... exposure to the challenged conditions.” De’lonta v. Angelone, 330

F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

This constitutional guarantee encompasses a right to medical care for

serious medical needs, including psychological needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 103-04. To state a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show that

he had serious medical or psychological needs and that the defendant acted

with deliberate indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau

of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d

225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). A “serious medical need” is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s

attention.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To

constitute deliberate indifference, “the treatment [a prisoner receives] must

be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn,

896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511

U.S. at 825. However, mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the

Eighth Amendment. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852.

First, the Plaintiff appears to allege that the conditions in the RDU

program constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, Plaintiff has

failed to describe any conditions of the RDU that are sufficiently serious to

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Nor has Plaintiff alleged

that the Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind. While he alleges

that he conveyed his unhappiness with the conditions of RDU to the

Defendants, he fails to plausibly allege that either of them knew that the

conditions exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm or that the

Defendants deliberately disregarded the same. Therefore, this claim will be

dismissed.

Second, the Plaintiff appears to allege that the Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to serious psychological conditions, i.e., severe

anxiety and depression. However, the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege

that any deliberate indifference occurred. The Plaintiff concedes that he

received mental health treatment while he was in the RDU: he was screened

by Defendant Murphy upon entering Marion C.I.; psychiatric consultation

was approved; and psychotropic medications were prescribed. Although the

Plaintiff feels that RDU was unsuitable and exacerbated his conditions, his

preference for another program such as the TDU does not form the basis of

a deliberate indifference claim. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th

Cir. 1985) (a “[d]isagreement[ ] between an inmate and a physician over the

inmate's proper medical care,” and we consistently have found such

disagreements to fall short of showing deliberate indifference). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to a serious psychological need

will be dismissed.

B. ADA

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied

the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which

he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or

discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Constantine v. George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,

467 (4th Cir. 1999). States are obligated to make “reasonable modifications”

to enable the disabled person to receive the services or participate in

programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

The Plaintiff alleges that he has been diagnosed with severe anxiety

and depression. However, he has failed to allege that he is qualified to

participate in the TDU or any other program from which he was excluded, or

that such exclusion was due to his alleged disability.5 The Plaintiff has thus

failed to state a plausible ADA violation and this claim will be dismissed.

5 The Plaintiff states that he requires discovery to prove that he was eligible for the TDU

program. [Doc. 10-1 at 6]. Even if he were able to demonstrate that he qualified for the

TDU, however, this claim would still fail because he has not alleged that his exclusion

from the TDU was by reason of his disability.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed as frivolous and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is

dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 17, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge “AES

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