Wright v. Hamilton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00296-MR

KAYIE SHAUNE D. WRIGHT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

)

THOMAS A. HAMILTON, )

)

Defendant. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 28] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. 33].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff Kayie Shaune D. Wright, proceeding pro se, brings this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Eight Amendment

rights while incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution (“Marion”) in

Marion, North Carolina, based on the use of excessive force by Defendant

Thomas Hamilton, the Unit Manager of E-Unit at Marion. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff

alleges that, on June 5, 2019, Defendant Hamilton sprayed him with pepper

spray without reason. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff does not state whether he purports

to sue Defendant in his individual or official capacity or both. [See Doc. 1].

The Complaint survived this Court’s initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A and Plaintiff proceeded with his claim. [Doc. 9]. On

September 23, 2021, Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 28]. Defendant

argues he is entitled to summary judgment because sovereign immunity bars

any official capacity claim, because he did not use excessive force on

Plaintiff, and because Defendant is shielded from liability by qualified

immunity. [Doc. 29]. In support of his summary judgment motion, Defendant

submitted a memorandum, his own Declaration, Plaintiff’s North Carolina

Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) Offender Information Sheet, a

summary of Plaintiff’s infraction history, Incident and Disciplinary Reports,

and video footage of the incident.1 [Doc. 29, 29-1 to 29-6; see Docs. 30, 31,

35].

The next day, the Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro

v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the

requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of

1 Defendant manually filed the video footage pursuant to the Court’s Order at Docket No.

35. [See also Docs. 30, 31]. The Court will hereinafter reference this footage as “Doc.

35.”

the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 32].

Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion.2 He submitted his own

Declaration; Defendant’s Declaration; Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s

discovery requests, including Disciplinary and Incident Reports and many

related witness statements, NCDPS and Marion Use of Force Policies; and

hundreds of pages of Plaintiff’s medical records.3

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

2 Plaintiff’s response purported to be both his own motion for summary judgment and a

response to Defendant’s motion. [See Doc. 33]. Plaintiff, however, sought no extension

of the then expired dispositive motions’ deadline when filing his motion and the Court,

therefore, will summarily deny it. Moreover, even if timely filed, it would be denied on the

merits.

3 The discovery documents submitted by Plaintiff consist of 1,125 pages, most of which

are Plaintiff’s seemingly irrelevant medical records. Plaintiff makes no specific reference

to any of these documents and, while the Court has generally reviewed them, it will not

scour them for genuine issues of fact where Plaintiff has provided the Court with no

direction. [See Doc. 33-7].

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th

Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). That is, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule

56(c), the opponent must do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts…. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The forecast of evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-movant,

is as follows.

Since 2012, Plaintiff has been incarcerated on a conviction for second

degree murder. [Doc. 29-2 at 1]. Since then, Plaintiff has been charged with

at least 155 infractions while in prison, including 42 charges of disobeying an

order, eight charges of assaulting staff with a weapon, seven charges of

“assaulting staff/throwing liquid,” and two charges of threatening staff. [Doc.

29-3]. At least some of these infractions for assaulting staff by “throwing

liquids” appear to relate to Plaintiff’s proclivity for spitting on correctional staff.

[See Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 9: Hamilton Dec.]. Defendant Hamilton is and was at the

relevant times an Assistant Unit Manager at Marion. [Id. at ¶ 2].

The use of force by correctional staff at Marion is governed by the

NCDPS and Marion Use of Force Policies (collectively, “Use of Force Policy”

or “Policy”). [See Doc. 33-7 at 26-58]. The Policy provides that, “[t]he use

of force shall be permissible only to the extent reasonably necessary to meet

or accomplish a proper correctional objective.” [Id. at 27, 43]. Thus,

“reasonable force is authorized in order to prevent an escape or to ensure

compliance with a lawful order or to protect property….” [Id. at 27, 43-44].

“An officer should attempt non-forcible methods of offender control, but only

to the extent reasonably possible under the circumstances as they appear to

that officer.” [Id. at 27, 44]. However, an officer “shall not use force against

an offender who has abandoned his resistance or who is effectively

restrained.” [Id. at 28, 44].

On June 5, 2019, at approximately 7:39 a.m., Officer John Amburgey

and Sergeant Christopher Curtis went to Plaintiff’s cell to place him in full

restraints to see a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). [Id. at 964]. Plaintiff

was secured in restraints behind his back through his cell’s trap door.

Plaintiff then stepped back away from his cell door and it was opened.

Officer Amburgey took a couple steps inside the cell and Plaintiff kicked

Amburgey in the throat, knocking him backwards and causing his glasses to

fall off and to the ground, damaging them. [Id. at 964, 973-74]. Officer

Amburgey quickly composed himself and he and Sergeant Curtis secured

Plaintiff against his bunk. [Id. at 964]. Officer Amburgey wrapped his arms

around Plaintiff’s upper arms and torso and used his body weight to hold

Plaintiff. Sergeant Curtis put his left hand on Plaintiff’s chest and used his

right hand to control Plaintiff’s left arm. Once Plaintiff was secured, Officer

Amburgey and Sergeant Curtis turned Plaintiff to his stomach to prevent him

from spitting on and otherwise further assaulting them. [Id. at 964, 973, 974].

Officer Colton Bridges responded to a call for assistance and assisted in

placing Plaintiff in full restraints, which included a leg chain. [Id. at 964, 975;

Doc. 35]. At approximately 7:43 a.m., Plaintiff was moved to the Upper E-

Unit A-wing shower. [Id. at 964; see Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 7, Doc. 33-7 at 975, Doc.

35]. Plaintiff’s in-cell property was removed and inventoried because of

Plaintiff’s assaultive behavior. [Id. at 976, 979]. During the property removal,

Officers found two broken food trays from the kitchen. [Id.].

At approximately 8:54 a.m., Defendant Hamilton, along with Officer

Bridges and Sergeant John Stiles, escorted Plaintiff, who was in full

restraints, from the Upper E-Unit A Wing shower to a small cell with video

surveillance for observation. [Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 7; Doc. 33-4 at 10; Doc. 33-7 at

964, 980; Doc. 35]. Plaintiff, who was escorted by two officers, and

Defendant Hamilton entered the cell. A fourth, otherwise unidentified, officer

appeared at the cell’s doorway during the video but never fully enters the

cell. [Doc. 35]. Once in the cell, Defendant Hamilton ordered Plaintiff to face

the wall with the bunk running along it. [Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 9]. Given Plaintiff’s

history of spitting on and assaulting staff, Defendant Hamilton told Plaintiff

that if he turned toward staff, Defendant would use pepper spray on Plaintiff.

[Id. at ¶¶ 9-10]. One officer left the cell, leaving the second officer and

Defendant Hamilton in the cell, each holding one of Plaintiff’s arms. [Doc.

35]. Next, the second officer moved to leave the cell and Defendant Hamilton

shifted to hold Plaintiff’s left arm with his right hand. [Doc. 35; see Doc. 33-

2 at ¶ 4]. Plaintiff, still restrained, was told that he would remain in that cell

for observation. [Doc. 33-2 at ¶ 5]. Plaintiff attests that he, therefore,

“continued to be calm.” [Id.]. Finally, as the second officer and Defendant

Hamilton started to back out of the cell, Plaintiff turned toward them and away

from the wall. [Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 11; Doc. 35]. At this point, the video shows a

front view of the Plaintiff and only the back of Defendant’s head. Defendant

then gave Plaintiff several direct orders to face the bunk. Plaintiff, however,

refused to comply. [Id.]. Approximately four seconds after Plaintiff turned

toward Defendant Hamilton and after Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with his

orders, Defendant Hamilton administered a three-second burst of pepper

spray to Plaintiff’s facial area, pursuant to Use of Force Policy, to gain

Plaintiff’s compliance and to prevent further assault on correctional staff.4

[Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 12; see Doc. 33-7 at 29]. Defendant Hamilton then regained

an escorting grip on Plaintiff and quickly removed him from the cell. [Doc.

29-4 at ¶ 12; Doc. 35]. Two other officers immediately escorted Plaintiff to

the shower for decontamination. [Id. at ¶ 13].

Pursuant to policy, the use of force was reported, and an investigation

was undertaken. [Id. at ¶ 14]. Defendant, Plaintiff, and several other prison

officials prepared witness statements related both to the use of force incident

and to Plaintiff’s assault on Officer Amburgey earlier that morning. [Id.; Doc.

33-7 at 973-97]. The investigation concluded that the force used was

justified and necessary to maintain control of Plaintiff and to gain compliance.

4 Plaintiff attests as follows relative to these events: “In my mind there’s no way he’s going

to leave out this cell (in which all staff were outside of the cell) and tell me to stand still

while my hands behind my back. So just off of me not reacting how he (Thomas Hamilton)

wanted he pulled his mace can out and sprayed me, just to appear superior in employees

present due to the allegations of disrupted behavior prior. He asked ‘what are you looking

at!’ no orders!” [Doc. 33-2 at ¶ 5 (errors uncorrected)].

[Doc. 29-4 at ¶ 14]. Defendant Hamilton was, therefore, not disciplined as a

result of the incident. [Id. at ¶ 15]. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was found

guilty of disobeying orders. [Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. 29-5 at 3-4]. Plaintiff was also

found guilty of several other infractions for his conduct earlier that day. [Doc.

29-3 at 2].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity

A suit against a state official in his official capacity is construed as

against the state itself. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989). It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.;

see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Moreover,

the Eleventh Amendment generally bars lawsuits by citizens against non-

consenting states brought either in state or federal courts. See Alden v.

Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).

Although Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, it

has not chosen to do so for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v.

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979). Likewise, North Carolina has not waived

its sovereign immunity by consenting to be sued in federal court for claims

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally, Mary’s House, Inc. v. North

Carolina, 976 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 barred by sovereign immunity of North Carolina). As such, Defendant

is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff sought to name

Defendant Hamilton in his official capacity.

B. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must

satisfy both an objective component – that the harm inflicted was sufficiently

serious – and a subjective component – that the prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761

(4th Cir. 1996).

This subjective standard requires proof of malicious or sadistic action

by a prison official in order to make out an excessive force claim. This is

because prison “[o]fficials are entitled to use appropriate force to quell prison

disturbances.” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. “Because officials must act ‘in

haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,’

deliberate indifference is not a sufficiently rigorous standard.” Id. (citing

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). “Rather, in these circumstances, in order to make

out an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that officials

applied force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Moreover, “[c]orrectional officers do not have to be under physical

attack to justify the use of force; they can also use appropriate force ‘to

preserve internal order by compelling compliance with prison rules and

procedures.’” Shiheed v. Harding, 802 Fed. App’x 765, 767 (4th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019)). “And we

owe officers wide-ranging deference in their determinations that force is

required to induce compliance with policies important to institutional

security.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112).

The use of mace, tear gas, or other chemical agents “’in quantities

greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of inflicting pain’” is generally

recognized as a constitutional violation. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 240

(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams, 77 F.3d at 763). Pepper spray, however,

is not “per se a cruel and unusual punishment,” McCargo v. Mister, 462

F.Supp. 813, 818 (D. Md. 1978), and can be used to “control a recalcitrant

inmate” without violating the Eighth Amendment. Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.

An Eighth Amendment violation may be found when a chemical agent is used

without prior verbal command or after a prisoner has been subdued or

becomes compliant with an officer’s instructions. Pevia v. Shearin, No. ELH-

13-2912, 2015 WL 629001, at *10 (D.Md. Feb. 10, 2015) (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hamilton violated Plaintiff’s

rights under the Eighth Amendment by pepper spraying Plaintiff while he was

restrained. Plaintiff attests that he simply (and subjectively) did not believe

that Defendant Hamilton would actually use pepper spray on Plaintiff if he

turned around, contrary to Defendant Hamilton’s order, because Plaintiff was

restrained, and the officers were already outside of the cell. [See Doc. 33-2

at ¶ 5]. Then, Plaintiff vaguely states, “no orders!” without any further

explanation. [Doc. 33-2 at ¶ 5]. Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to create

a genuine issue for trial.

The uncontroverted forecast of evidence shows that Plaintiff had

violently assaulted another correctional officer while Plaintiff while his arms

were restrained behind his back just over an hour earlier that morning; that

Plaintiff had a long and documented history of assaulting staff, particularly

by spitting on staff; and that Defendant Hamilton warned Plaintiff that he

would use pepper spray if Plaintiff turned toward him. The video shows that,

contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, Defendant Hamilton and a second officer

remained in the cell when Plaintiff turned around; and that even after Plaintiff

turned toward Defendant Hamilton, Hamilton repeated the order to turn back

toward the bunk several times before using a short, three-second burst of

pepper spray on Plaintiff.

Correctional officers do not violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment

rights by using pepper spray to preserve internal order by ensuring

compliance with lawful orders. See Shiheed, 802 Fed. App’x at 767. The

forecast of evidence plainly shows that Defendant Hamilton employed

pepper spray because of Plaintiff’s extensive assaultive history, including a

serious assault that morning, and refusal to follow Defendant’s commands

to turn back toward the bunk so that he and another officer might safely leave

the cell. Correctional officers do not have to sit back and wait to be assaulted

by prisoners before using force. Shiheed, 802 Fed. App’x at 767. They may,

as Defendant Hamilton did here, also use force to gain compliance with

lawful orders and to preserve order, especially in an readily dynamic situation

involving a prisoner with Plaintiff’s history.

As such, the Court finds that no reasonable jury, based on the forecast

of evidence here, could find that the use of force on Plaintiff violated his rights

under the Eighth Amendment. See Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., 475 U.S.

at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that

Defendant violated a constitutional right, Defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim. As such, summary

judgment for Defendant would also be proper on this ground. Moreover,

even if there were some ambiguity as to what Defendant said (as the video

clearly shows Defendant speaking the command), based on the totality of

the circumstances facing Defendant he has qualified immunity from any

liability that may otherwise arise from this split-second decision to self-

protect.

The Court, therefore, will grant Defendant's motion for summary

judgment and dismiss this matter with prejudice.

Vil. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant Hamilton’s motion for

summary judgment will be granted.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant Hamilton’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 28] is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 33] is DENIED.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: February 14, 2022

Martitf Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS

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