Valdez-Bey v. Castalone

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00333-MR

PAUL VALDEZ-BEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

KEVIN CASTELIN, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 40], Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgement [sic],” and on Plaintiff’s motions for

extension of time to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

[Docs. 42, 44].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 3, 2019, Plaintiff Paul Valdez-Bey (“Plaintiff”),

proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the

violation of his civil rights. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s unverified Complaint, in which

he named FNU Castalone, FNU Patton, and FNU Sims,1 all identified as

1 Defendant Castalone’s true full name is Kevin Castelin; Defendant Patton’s true full

name is William Patton; and Defendant Sims true full name is Gregory Sims. [Docs. 40-

Officers at the Buncombe County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”),

as Defendants, survived initial review as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

and his claim fairly arising under the First Amendment and the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc et seq. In short, Plaintiff alleges that he was on a kosher diet and

served a diabetic food tray by Defendants Patton and Sims. After Plaintiff

refused to eat the diabetic tray, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Castelin and

Patton used excessive force on him. [Doc. 1]. On February 2, 2021, the

Court entered a Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan, setting the

discovery deadline for June 2, 2021 and the dispositive motions deadline for

July 3, 2021. [Doc. 30]. No discovery motions were filed in this case by any

party.

On June 3, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

[Doc. 40]. Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted

because Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, because Defendants did not

use excessive force on Plaintiff, and because qualified immunity bars

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. [Id.]. In support of their summary

judgment motion, Defendants submitted a brief, numerous affidavits, various

13, 40-15, 40-17]. The Court will instruct the Clerk to update the docket in this matter

accordingly.

Detention Center records relating to Plaintiff, and an incident report. [Docs.

40-1 to 40-19].

Thereafter, the Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v.

Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements

for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in

which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 41]. The Plaintiff was

specifically advised that he “may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of

allegations in his pleadings to defeat a summary judgment motion.” [Id. at

2]. Rather, he must support his assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” [Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a))]. The Court further advised that:

An affidavit is a written statement under oath; that is,

a statement prepared in writing and sworn before a

notary public. An unsworn statement, made and

signed under the penalty of perjury, may also be

submitted. Affidavits or statements must be

presented by Plaintiff to this Court no later than

fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order and

must be filed in duplicate.

[Id. at 3-4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4))].

After filing two motions for more time to respond [Docs. 42, 44], which

the Court will grant, Plaintiff filed a six-page memorandum that, although

notarized, is not in the form of an affidavit or signed under penalty of perjury,

[See Doc. 43]. As noted, Plaintiff’s Complaint was not verified or otherwise

submitted under penalty of perjury and, therefore, cannot be considered for

its evidentiary value here. See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498-99

(4th Cir. 2021) (holding that a district court is to consider verified prisoner

complaints as affidavits on summary judgment “when the allegations

contained therein are based on personal knowledge”). Thus, in terms of

evidentiary forecast, the Defendants’ is unrefuted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need

not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or

arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt. Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 174,

180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence

from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md.,

48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendants’ uncontroverted forecast of evidence shows the following.

At the relevant times, Defendants Castelin, Patton, and Sims worked

as detention officers for the Buncombe County Sheriff. [Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 2:

Castelin Aff.; Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 2: Patton Aff.; Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 2: Sims Aff.]. On

November 28, 2018, while he was a detainee at the Detention Center,

Plaintiff was placed on a kosher diet. [Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 5: Littrell Aff.; see Docs.

40-3, 40-4]. On December 12, 2018, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to two counts of

being a felon in possession of a firearm in the Superior Court of Buncombe

County. [Doc. 40-4].

On December 17, 2018, in accordance with his kosher diet plan,

Plaintiff was to receive a kosher meal at 11:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. [Doc. 40-

2 at ¶ 9; Doc. 40-5 at 1, 3]. That day, Defendant Sims was on meal service,

which means ensuring all inmates in the housing unit receive their meals.

[Doc. 40-17 at ¶ 4]. According to the 4:00 p.m. meal plan, Plaintiff was to be

provided a grilled cheese sandwich, green beans, pasta, vegan Jello, and,

and a veggie patty. [Id. at ¶ 6]. At approximately 4:10 p.m., Plaintiff

approached Defendant Sims and complained that there was paper in his

noodles. Plaintiff asked to get another meal tray or the hamburger helper off

a regular meal tray. [Id. at ¶ 7]. As Plaintiff was not allowed to have separate

food items from different trays, Defendant Sims called the kitchen and

requested another meal tray for Plaintiff. [Doc. 40-17 at ¶ 8].

When Defendant Sims saw Defendant Patton carrying the tray for

Plaintiff, Defendant Sims called Plaintiff to get his new tray at the station.2

[Id. at ¶¶ 9-10]. When Plaintiff walked up to get his tray, he wanted the grilled

cheese sandwich from another tray. [Id. at ¶ 11]. Plaintiff was given the

option of either taking the second tray or not, but he was not allowed to take

items off other trays. [Id. at ¶ 12]. Plaintiff started to argue and threw his

hands around his body “like a child.” Plaintiff yelled that he was not going to

eat the food on the second tray. [Id. at ¶ 13]. Detention officers commanded

Plaintiff multiple times to go to his cell. He refused and said, “fuck y’all, take

me to 4 west.” [Id. at ¶ 14]. At this time, another inmate, Carlos Burton

2 In their brief, Defendants tacitly concede that the second meal tray was diabetic, not

kosher. [Doc. 40-1 at 9-11].

started yelling. All inmates were then ordered to their cells. [Id. at ¶¶ 15-16].

Defendant Sims then placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and Defendant Patton

called for assistance over the radio. [Id. at ¶¶ 17-18; Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 11].

Defendants Castelin and Patton waited for the responding officers and a

sergeant to arrive. [Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 11]. Sergeant Zabloudil, Defendant

Castelin and Officers Rogers, Kelly, and McCoy responded to the call. [Id.

at ¶ 12; Doc. 40-17 at ¶ 19]. Sergeant Zabloudil was briefed on the incident

and decided that Plaintiff and Burton would be sent to Housing Unit 4 West.

[Doc. 40-12 at ¶ 12]. At that time, Plaintiff asked Sergeant Zabloudil if he

could have another food tray, which was refused. [Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 12].

Defendant Patton, Defendant Castelin, and Officer Rogers began

escorting Plaintiff to 4 West. [Id. at ¶ 13; Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 7; see Doc. 40-15

at ¶ 15]. As they were walking to 4 West, Plaintiff tried to pull away from

Defendant Patton, who was holding Plaintiff’s right arm in an escort position.

[Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 7; Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 14]. Defendant Castelin immediately took

control of Plaintiff’s left arm. [Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 8]. When Plaintiff and the

officers made it to the sally port on Housing Unit 6 East, Plaintiff became

more aggressive and started to kick at the officers. [Id. at ¶ 9]. Officer

Rogers took control of Plaintiff’s legs and brought him to the floor in the prone

position.3 [Id. at ¶ 15]. Defendant Patton secured Plaintiff’s right side, and

Defendant Castelin Plaintiff’s left side, with “soft hands” while Plaintiff was

on the ground.4 Defendant Patton did not put his knee on Plaintiff’s head.

[Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 10]. Plaintiff sustained a small cut on his chin

that began to bleed. [Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 11]. Officers kept Plaintiff on the

ground in the prone position until Plaintiff calmed down and agreed to comply

with the officers’ orders. [Id. at ¶ 12]. Once Plaintiff complied, Defendant

Patton helped Plaintiff to his feet and Defendant Patton and Rogers

continued to escort him to 4 West.5 [Id. at ¶ 13]. Defendant Patton asked

Plaintiff several times if he needed medical assistance, to which Plaintiff

responded, “What do you think?” [Doc. 40-15 at ¶ 17].

In transit, Plaintiff threatened Officer Rogers and Defendant Patton. [Id.

at ¶ 19]. They arrived at Plaintiff’s cell and Plaintiff refused to put his hands

3 Plaintiff did not mention Officer Rogers in his Complaint in this matter. [See Doc. 1]. In

his response to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff claims for the first

time that Officer Rogers, along with Defendant Castelin, while in the sally port and out of

the view of the cameras, began to shove Plaintiff around “unprovoked and without cause,”

which ended in Plaintiff being lifted off the ground and driven face first into the ground.

[Doc. 43 at 4-5]. As stated previously, however, there is not forecast of evidence before

the Court to support such argument.

4 “Soft hands” are control techniques that are unlikely to cause connective tissue damage,

lacerations of the skin, or broken bones but should cause compliant. [Doc. 40-1 at 12 n.

2].

5 Defendant Castelin remained at Housing Unit 6 East to assist in escorting Burton to 4

West, which occurred without incident. [Doc. 40-13 at ¶ 14].

on the wall and continued to make threats. Officer Rogers and Defendant

Patton decided to put Plaintiff in a prone position on the floor halfway under

his bunk. [Doc. 40-15 at ¶¶ 20-21]. Plaintiff complied with commands as

Officer Rogers and Defendant Patton exited the cell. [Id. at ¶ 22].

Medical assistance was called for Plaintiff and he was seen by Nurse

Jan Jacobson. [Doc. 40-8]. Jacobson noted a laceration to Plaintiff’s chin

and that she cleaned a “small [amount] of blood” from Plaintiff’s chin. [Id.].

Plaintiff was not actively bleeding when Jacobson left the unit. [Id.]. Plaintiff

did not request any sick calls or make any medical complaints after this

incident. [Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 18]. On the day of the incident, Sergeant Zabloudil;

Officers Kelly and Rogers; and Defendants Castelin, Patton, and Sims

prepared witness statements. [See Docs. 40-6, 40-7, 40-16, 40-19]. The

next day, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that Defendants Patton and Sims

served Plaintiff a diabetic food tray while Plaintiff was on a kosher diet and

that Defendants Castelin and Patton used excessive force him. [Id. at ¶ 21].

Lieutenant Littrell responded to Plaintiff’s grievance. Littrell determined that

the officers’ conduct was justified based on Plaintiff’s resistance and

attempts to kick officers. [Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 24].

On January 31, 2019, the Detention and Courts Division Use of Force

Committee reviewed the use of force incidents occurring between December

3, 2018 through January 31, 2019, including the subject incident. [Doc. 40-

12]. The Committee also determined the use of force on Plaintiff to be

reasonable based on the circumstances. [Id. at 2].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. First Amendment and RLUIPA

To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to show that he held a sincere religious belief,

and that the official action or regulation substantially burdened his exercise

of that belief.6 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). A prison

policy that substantially burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion

withstands a First Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

RLUIPA provides, in part: “No government shall impose a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)

6 Although not shown by Plaintiff, the Court assumes here that Plaintiff’s request for a

kosher diet was related to his religion.

is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized

persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are

therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation

for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).

An isolated incident, however, does not place a substantial burden on

an inmate’s exercise of his religion. Bynum v. Poole, No. 1:15CV960, 2017

WL 5466702, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (granting summary judgment

for defendant prison official on plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA

claims based on cancellation of a single religious service) (citation omitted);

see also Brown v. Graham, 470 Fed. App’x 11, 15 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding

that failure to provide prisoner plaintiff a kosher meal on a single occasion is

not a substantial burden under the RLUIPA); Wofford v. Austin, No. 1:16-cv-

1145, 2016 WL 6275340, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2016) (finding that a

single incidence of a cross-contaminated Ramadan meal does not constitute

a violation of the First Amendment or RLUIPA).

Plaintiff’s claim under the First Amendment and the RLUIPA are based

on a single instance of Plaintiff receiving a diabetic food tray instead of a

kosher food tray, albeit after Plaintiff had already been provided an kosher

food tray that Plaintiff complained was unsatisfactory. A single instance of

interference with a detainee’s religious beliefs does not constitute a violation

of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. See Bynum, 2017 WL 5466702, at *4;

Graham, 470 Fed. App’x at 15; Wofford, 2016 WL 6275340, at *3. There is,

therefore, no issue for the jury and the Court will dismiss these claims.

B. Excessive Force

The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial

detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389

(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force

claim is “solely an objective one.” Id. In determining whether the force was

objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer

knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 396). Considerations that bear on the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of the force include: the relationship between the need for

the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s

injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force;

the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived

by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id.

Under these considerations, the uncontroverted evidence before the

Court demonstrates that the force used on Plaintiff was reasonable and well

within constitutional limits. After being provided a diabetic food tray, Plaintiff

became argumentative and refused multiple commands to return to his cell.

Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs. After Sergeant Zabloudil refused to provide

Plaintiff with a third food tray, Plaintiff became more agitated. As Defendants

Patton and Castelin and Officer Rogers escorted Plaintiff to 4 West, Plaintiff

tried to pull away from Defendant Patton and became more aggressive and

started to kick at the officers. Officer Rogers then brought Plaintiff to the

ground. Plaintiff sustained a small cut to his chin while on the ground. He

was allowed to get up when he calmed down and agreed to follow the

officers’ orders. Plaintiff was provided medical care immediately following

the incident. The nurse who treated Plaintiff noted that she cleaned a small

amount of blood from Plaintiff’s chin. Plaintiff did not thereafter seek any

medical care for injuries related to the alleged use of force.

Thus, the forecast of evidence raises no genuine issue as to whether

the force employed was excessive. It is uncontroverted that the use of force

was proportionate to the need for force, that Plaintiff suffered minimal injury,

that Plaintiff’s combativeness and aggression presented a sufficiently

serious security problem, and that Plaintiff was actively resisting. Thus, the

force used on Plaintiff was necessary and objectively reasonable under the

circumstances created by Plaintiff. The forecast of evidence, therefore, does

not support that Defendants Castelin or Patton used excessive force on

Plaintiff. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim, and it will be dismissed.

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that

Defendants violated a constitutional right, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. Moreover, even if the

actions Plaintiff complains of were to give rise to some assertion of a

constitutional violation, any right underlying such claim is not clearly

established. Quite the contrary, the law is clear that neither of Plaintiff’s

claims rise to the level of any constitutional violation. As such, summary

judgment for Defendants would also be proper for Defendants on this

ground.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment.

O R D E R

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 40] is GRANTED and this action is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for extension of

time [Docs. 42, 44] are GRANTED.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to update the docket in this matter

to reflect Defendant FNU Castalone’s true full name as Kevin Castelin;

Defendant FNU Patton’s true full name is William Patton; and Defendant

FNU Sims true full name is Gregory Sims.

The Clerk is instructed to terminate this action.

Signed: January 3, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey ,

Chief United States District Judge ely

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