Opinion

Ketchersid v. Murphy

Court
District Court, W.D. North Carolina
Filed
Jan 19, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.8%

granting motion to dismiss for individuals who were not named as defendants in the complaint but who were served

How later courts described this case

  • granting motion to dismiss for individuals who were not named as defendants in the complaint but who were served
  • a prisoner’s transfer moots a § 1983 request for declaratory and injunctive relief when the conditions of which the prisoner claims are unlikely to recur
  • “An individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court.... The right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others”
  • prisoner's suit is “confined to redress for violations of his own personal rights and not one by him as knight-errant for all prisoners.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00115-MR

JAMES LARKIN KETCHERSID, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

BRETT MURPHY, ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Amended

Complaint. [Doc. 13]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.1 [Doc.

21].

The pro se Plaintiff filed the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Marion Correctional

Institution.2 [Doc. 1]. Before the Complaint was screened for frivolity, the

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 13], and then a Supplemental

Complaint [Doc. 15], which was stricken. [Doc. 16]. The Plaintiff was given

30 days to file a Second Amended Complaint, and he was informed that, if

1 The Court had initially ordered the prison to transmit the full filing fee from the Plaintiff’s

prisoner trust account. [Docs. 10, 15]. However, the Plaintiff’s account balance fell below

the filing fee amount, so partial payment has now been ordered.

2 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Maury CI.

he failed to timely file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court would

proceed on the Amended Complaint. [Id.]. The Plaintiff has not filed a

Second Amended Complaint, and the time to do so has expired.

Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is now before the Court for initial

review.

The Plaintiff names as the sole Defendant Brett Murphy, the

psychologist coordinator at Marion CI, in his individual and official capacities.

[Doc. 13 at 2]. The Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed in September

2020 with panic disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression, and that he was

labeled as a Level 3 mental health inmate. [Doc. 13-1 at 2]. He alleges that

Marion CI could accommodate only inmates at mental health Levels 1 and

2,3 and that Defendant Murphy delayed and denied adequate care for his

serious conditions, which resulted in severe mental distress, pain, and

suffering. [Doc. 13 at 5]. He seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal

damages, and injunctive relief.4 [Id.; Doc. 13-1 at 8].

3 According to the Plaintiff, Marion CI lacked the services available at Level 3 facilities

such as 24/7 access to an on-call psychologist, and mental health classes. [Doc. 13-1 at

2-6, 8].

4 For injunctive relief, the Plaintiff asks that Level 3 inmates be housed only at Level 3

facilities. [Doc. 13-1 at 8]. This request is moot insofar as the Plaintiff no longer resides

at Marion CI. See generally Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1991) (a prisoner’s

transfer moots a § 1983 request for declaratory and injunctive relief when the conditions

of which the prisoner claims are unlikely to recur). To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions

seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Amended

Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon

clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional

scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,

a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not

permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint

which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

prospective injunctive relief, it does not appear that Defendant Murphy, the psychologist

coordinator at Marion CI who retired in April 2021, has the authority or ability to provide

such relief. [Doc. 13-1 at 6]; see generally Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Parties

The body of the Amended Complaint refers to individuals who are not

named as Defendants in the caption as required by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Such claims are nullities and they are

dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Londeree v. Crutchfield Corp., 68

F.Supp.2d 718 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1999) (granting motion to dismiss for

individuals who were not named as defendants in the complaint but who

were served).

The Plaintiff purports to sue Defendant Murphy, who appears to be a

state official, in his individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against

a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state

officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages

thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2

(M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits

for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various

agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As

such, the Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Defendant in his official

capacity do not survive initial review and are dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, the Plaintiff refers to incidents involving the mental health

needs of other inmates. As a pro se inmate, the Plaintiff is not qualified to

prosecute a class action or assert a claim on behalf of others. See Myers v.

Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schls., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“An individual

unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court.... The

right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to

litigate for others”); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625 (4th Cir. 1981)

(prisoner's suit is “confined to redress for violations of his own personal rights

and not one by him as knight-errant for all prisoners.”); Oxendine v. Williams,

509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“it is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned

litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a

class action.”). Therefore, to the extent that the Plaintiff attempts to assert

claims on behalf of others, they are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical/Mental Need

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Murphy: refused to transfer him to

a facility that could accommodate his Level 3 mental health needs [Doc. 13-

1 at 2; Doc. 13-1 at 4]; ignored the Plaintiff’s concerns and “persuad[ed] [him]

to believe [he] was receiving the correct amount of medical assistance,”

whereas Murphy was delaying and denying treatment for his “serious

medical need of mental health concerns” including suicidal thoughts [Doc.

13 at 4-5; Doc. 13-1 at 1-4]; and told “the Administration” not to take the

Plaintiff’s complaints seriously because he is a troublemaker [Doc. 13-1 at

4-5].

The Eighth Amendment encompasses a right to medical care for

serious medical needs, including psychological needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). To state a claim for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that he had

serious medical needs and that the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849

F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir.

2008)). A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko,

535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate

indifferent to a serious medical need, “the treatment [a prisoner receives]

must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn,

896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511

U.S. 825, 825 (1994). However, mere negligence or malpractice does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852. Further, “mere

‘[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s

proper medical care’ are not actionable absent exceptional circumstances.”

Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 840 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and

construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged

that Defendant Murphy was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical/

mental health needs. This claim has passed initial review.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of deliberate indifference

to serious medical/mental health needs against Defendant Murphy. The

claims for damages against Defendant Murphy in his official capacity are

dismissed with prejudice. The remaining claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Amended Complaint [Doc. 13] has passed initial review against

Defendant Murphy for deliberate indifference to serious medical/

mental health needs.

2. The claims asserted on behalf of other inmates, and for damages

against Defendant Murphy in his official capacity are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff an Opt-

In/Opt-Out form pursuant to the Standing Order in Misc. Case No. 3:19-mc-

00060-FDW and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 19, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge Ale

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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