when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”
How later courts described this case
- when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”
- claims of negligence are the province of state law and do not support a constitutional claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:21-cv-00292-MR
JARRET DEMON HUNTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Amended
Complaint [Doc. 15]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc.
11].
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff filed the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Piedmont and Eastern
Correctional Institutions, and the Gaston and Catawba County Jails.1 [Doc.
1]. On October 27, 2021, the Complaint was dismissed on initial review and
the Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend. [Doc. 14].
1 The Plaintiff is presently housed at the Gaston County Jail.
The Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint that is before the
Court for initial review. [Doc. 15]. He names as Defendants North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) probation officers Mary Goins and
FNU Little in their official and individual capacities. [Id. at 2]. He appears to
assert: that Defendant Goins erroneously told him, upon his release from
custody on June 1, 2020, that his probation would likely be terminated within
a week; that Defendant Little failed to terminate the Plaintiff’s probation; that
the Plaintiff was re-arrested on charges resulting from Little’s failure to
terminate the probation; and that he was jailed between September 17 and
November 17, 2020. [Id. at 13]. He seeks $2 million in damages and an
award of full custody of his children. [Id. at 14].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to
dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions
seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees).
In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Amended
Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon
clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional
scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not
permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint
which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
The Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials, in their
individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting
in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v.
Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019).
Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages
against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger
v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, the Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants in their official capacities do not survive initial review and
will be dismissed.
The Court now turns to the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in
their individual capacities. Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, the
Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Goins was negligent for telling him
that his probation may be terminated. However, mere negligence fails to
support a § 1983 claim.2 See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
328 (1986) (claims of negligence are the province of state law and do not
support a constitutional claim). Nor can Defendant Little be held liable for
failing to terminate the Plaintiff’s probation because such action may only be
taken by a court. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1342(b) (“The court may terminate a
period of probation and discharge at any time earlier than that provided in
subsection (a) if warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the ends of
2 To the extent that the Plaintiff is asking the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a North Carolina negligence claim, the Court declines to do so because no federal
claim has passed initial review. See Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594, 595 (2018)
(when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”); see 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
justice.”) (emphasis added). Defendant Little cannot be held liable under §
1983 for failing to take an action that exceeds his authority. Accordingly, the
claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities will be dismissed
because the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court further notes that the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, i.e.
custody of his children, that is unavailable in this action. Neither of the
Defendant probation officers appears to have any authority over, or
involvement with, child custody matters. Moreover, “federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child custody
matters” because domestic relations issues are traditionally within the
province of the state courts.3 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir.
2006). As such, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for injunctive relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff has not stated any claim for relief, and his Amended
Complaint will be dismissed on initial review. The Court will dismiss this
action with prejudice because the Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to
amend the Complaint once, and further amendment would be futile. See
Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 790 F. App’x 535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).
3 Moreover, such relief appears to be unavailable as a practical matter, as the Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint [Doc. 15] fails initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)
for failure to state a claim and is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.
IT 1S SO ORDERED.
Signed: December 2, 2021
5 a if
< Reidinger Ls,
Chief United States District Judge lll