The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:21-CV-00464-FDW-DSC
REGINA BOSTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
I.C. SYSTEM, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules
8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. No. 3) filed September 10, 2021.
Defendant’s Motion is now ripe for review, and, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff Regina Boston filed a complaint in small claims court for
Mecklenburg Court, North Carolina against Defendant I.C. System, Inc., and, on September 3, 2021,
Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to this Court. (Doc. No. 3-1, p. 1). In her Complaint, Plaintiff
asserts Defendant violated several subsections of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692 et seq. (the “FDCPA”) as well as North Carolina’s consumer protection statutes, N.C.G.S. §
75-50 et seq. (Doc. No. 1-2, p. 5) (the “NCDCA”). Specifically, without providing any factual
context, Plaintiff asserts “Defendant is liable to [Plaintiff] per 15 USC 1692k and N.C.G.S. 75-56(a)-
(d).” Id. Instead of including factual allegations to support her claims, Plaintiff, in her Complaint,
merely states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Defendant has violated [Plaintiff’s] rights by its conduct by stating in violation of 15 USC
1692b(2) consumer owes a debt per 15 USC 1692a(5) [sic] N.C.G.S. 75-50(2) via a
communication per 15 USC 1692(a)(2) being a consumer credit report.
Defendant has further caused [Plaintiff] harm or injury via its conduct per the following:
[N.C.G.S. §§ 75-51 through 75-55]”
Id.
Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on September 10, 2021 (Doc. No. 3). This Court
entered a Roseboro Notice on October 19, 2021, notifying Plaintiff of her right to respond to
Defendant’s Motion and extending the deadline by which Plaintiff could respond by twenty-one
(21) days, up to and including November 9, 2021. (Doc. No. 6). As of the date of this Order,
Plaintiff has failed to respond.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) for failure to satisfy Rule
8(a)(2) pleading requirements and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as required
by Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) requires, in pertinent part, “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 requires “more than
an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation,” but instead requires a heightened
notice pleading requirement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To meet this heightened pleading requirement, Plaintiff’s
pleading must have “sufficient factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). In other words, to satisfy Rule 8, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of
what the… claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, Plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’”. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly at 570). While
the Court accepts plausible factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers those facts in the
light most favorable to a plaintiff in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “need not accept as true
unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt.'s Inc. v. J.D.
Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F. 3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“When considering a motion to dismiss involving pro se parties, the court construes the
pleadings liberally to ensure that valid claims do not fail merely for lack of legal specificity.”
Brown v. Charlotte Rentals LLC, No. 3:15-cv-0043-FDW-DCK, 2015 WL 4557368, at *2
(W.D.N.C. July 28, 2015) (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)). At the
same time, though, the Court should not “assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff.”
Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151 (quotation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint, even when liberally construed, fails to sufficiently plead grounds
for relief under both the FDCPA and the NCDCA. Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any
factual allegations to support the claims she asserts and, instead, merely recites conclusory statements
referencing subsections of the FDCPA and the NCDCA. Indeed, Defendant asserts, and the Court
agrees, that the only sentence that vaguely resembles a factual allegation, “Defendant has violated
[Plaintiff’s] rights by its conduct by stating in violation of 15 USC 1692b(2) consumer owes a debt
per 15 USC 1692a(5) [sic] N.C.G.S. 75-50(2) via a communication per 15 USC 1692(a)(2) being a
consumer credit report”, (Doc. No. 1, p. 5), is merely “a legal conclusion guised as a factual
allegation” (Doc. No. 3-1, p. 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not have sufficient factual
content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant is liable for violations
of the FDCPA and the NCDCA, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) must be
GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 3) is
GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. No. 1-2) is DISMISSED without prejudice. The
Clerk is respectfully directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: November 17, 2021
Frank D. Whitney é +3
United States District Judge ages