Blackburn v. Teague

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:21-cv-00074-MR

MAURICE CORNELIUS BLACKBURN, )

JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

N. TEAGUE, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Amended

Complaint [Doc. 11]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 addressing an incident that allegedly occurred at the Alexander

Correctional Institution. The Plaintiff named as Defendants: N. Teague, FNU

Deal, and FNU Smith, who are “floor officers” at Alexander CI. [Doc. 1 at 3].

On September 13, 2021, the Court entered an Order on initial review allowing

the claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement to proceed,

dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice, and granting the Plaintiff

thirty days to amend. [Doc. 9]. The Amended Complaint is now before the

Court on initial review.

The Plaintiff names the same three Defendants in their individual and

official capacities. In his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff again alleges that

he was left unsupervised in four-point restraints for an extended period of

time without access to a bathroom. [Doc. 11 at 5; 11-1 at 1]. The Plaintiff

further alleges that Defendant Teague ignored Plaintiff’s “mental health

request and medical treatment.” [Doc. 11 at 5]. As injury, the Plaintiff states:

“I sustained constipation [sic], and declared medical emergency for

dizziness, headaches, due to inhaling toxic fumes, no medical treatment was

given to me. I also advised medical I had reptum [sic] pain.” [Id.]. The

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions

seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Parties

The body of the Amended Complaint contains allegations against

several individuals who are not named as defendants in the caption as

required by Rule 10(a). This failure renders the Plaintiff’s allegations against

them nullities. See, e.g., Londeree v. Crutchfield Corp., 68 F.Supp.2d 718

(W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1999) (granting motion to dismiss for individuals who

were not named as defendants in the compliant but who were served). The

allegations directed at individuals not named as Defendants are therefore

dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff also purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials,

in their individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather

is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials

acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov.

22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary

damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See

Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities do not survive

initial review and will be dismissed.

B. Conditions of Confinement

The Plaintiff complains that he was left unsupervised in four-point

restraints for an extended period of time without access to a bathroom.

The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons, ... but neither

does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). To

establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment in the context of a challenge

to conditions of confinement, an inmate must allege (1) a “sufficiently

serious” deprivation under an objective standard and (2) that prison officials

acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health and safety under a

subjective standard. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991). Only

extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an

Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). To

be sufficiently serious, the deprivation must pose a “serious or significant

physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged condition,” or a

“substantial risk of serious harm resulting from ... exposure to the challenged

conditions.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003)).

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and

construing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, he has stated an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants Teague, Deal, and Smith regarding

the conditions of his confinement. This claim has survived initial review.

C. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical/ Mental Need

The Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Teague ignored the

Plaintiff’s requests for mental health and medical treatment.

The Eighth Amendment encompasses a right to medical care for

serious medical needs, including psychological needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). To state a claim for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that he had

serious medical needs and that the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849

F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir.

2008)). A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko,

535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate

indifferent to a serious medical need, “the treatment [a prisoner receives]

must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn,

896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511

U.S. at 825. However, mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the

Eighth Amendment. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852. Further, “mere

‘[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s

proper medical care’ are not actionable absent exceptional circumstances.”

Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (quoting Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 840 (4th Cir.

1985)).

The conditions the Plaintiff has identified are not sufficiently serious

medical or mental health needs to support a deliberate indifference claim.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Teague was deliberately

indifferent to a serious mental health or medical need is dismissed without

prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement has passed initial review against Defendants Teague, Deal, and

Smith. The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The claim against Defendants Teague, Deal and Smith has passed

initial review for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in their

individual capacities.

2. The Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their official

capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The remaining § 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

4. The Clerk shall commence the procedure for waiver of service as

set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Defendants Teague, Deal, and

Smith, who are alleged to be current or former employees of

NCDPS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: October 27, 2021

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge wy