The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00170-MR
JOSHUA SETTLEMYER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
T. HAMPTON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 35].
I. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 addressing a use of force incident that allegedly occurred at the
Marion Correctional Institution.1 The Defendants are Correctional Officers
Timothy Hampton (“Officer Hampton”) and William Smith (“Officer Smith”),
as well as Correctional Sergeant Joshua Smith (“Sergeant Smith”)
(collectively “Defendants”). The Amended Complaint passed initial review on
1 The Plaintiff was formerly a prisoner of the State of North Carolina but was recently
released from prison. [See Doc. 24].
claims of excessive force, failure to intervene, as well as failure to train and
supervise. [Doc. 25 at 4, 8].2
The Defendants now move for summary judgment. [Doc. 35]. The
Court notified the Plaintiff of the opportunity to respond to the Defendants’
Motion and to present evidence in opposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
[Doc. 39: Roseboro3 Order]. Plaintiff has not filed a response, and the time
to do so has expired. This matter is now ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
2 The Plaintiff’s original Complaint and Amended Complaint are not verified or signed
under penalty of perjury. [Docs. 1, 17].
3 Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need
not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt. Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 175,
180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence
from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md.,
48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.
On April 26, 2019 at approximately 18:33 hours, Officer Hampton and
Officer Smith were assisting in conducting showers for inmates. [Doc. 37-4:
Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶7]; [Doc. 37-5: Officer Smith Affid. at ¶ 7]. The
Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs behind his back so that he could exit his cell
to receive his shower. [Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶ 8]. As soon as
the cell door was opened, the Plaintiff aggressively advanced towards Officer
Hampton while also shouting derogatory remarks towards Officer Hampton.
[Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶¶ 9-10]; [Doc. 37-5: Officer Smith Affid.
at ¶ 9]. In accordance with NCDPS policy, Officer Hampton, using a soft
hands-on defensive tactic, placed his hand on the Plaintiff’s chest to stop his
advance, then used “a minimal amount of force (a slight shove)” to return the
Plaintiff to his cell. [Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶¶ 11-13, 19]; [Doc.
37-5: Officer Smith Affid. at ¶ 10]. Officer Hampton’s use of force was
“minimal but necessary to stop the advance of a combative inmate with a
history of gang activity and assaultive behavior.” [Doc. 37-4: Hampton Affid.
at ¶ 20].4 Officer Hampton then secured Plaintiff’s cell door, however, the
Plaintiff refused to return his hand restraints. [Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton
Affid. at ¶¶ 13-14]. Officer Hampton notified the sergeant on duty, Sergeant
Smith, of the incident. [Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶ 14]; [Doc. 37-
6: Sergeant Smith Affid. at ¶ 9].
Sergeant Smith conducted a preliminary investigation of the incident
by checking the Plaintiff for injuries and listening to his side of the story. [Doc.
37-6: Sgt. Smith Affid. at ¶ 10]. The Plaintiff explained that he could have
injured himself had he fallen while handcuffed, but at no point did the Plaintiff
say that he had fallen or that he needed any medical attention. [Doc. 37-6:
J. Smith Affid. at ¶ 11-12]. Nurse Angila Condrey5 screened the Plaintiff
following this incident but the Plaintiff denied needing medical treatment and
4 The Plaintiff is a validated member of a North Carolina Department of Public Safety
Security Risk Group with a history of assaultive/ combative behavior as an inmate. [Doc.
37-4: Officer Hampton Affid. at ¶ 17-18]; [Doc. 37-6: Sergeant Smith Affid. at ¶¶ 14-15].
5 Nurse Angila Condrey is not a Defendant in this action.
refused subsequent medical screening. [Doc. 37-2: Use of Force Report at
2, 10]; [Doc. 37-4: Hampton Affid. at ¶ 16]. The Plaintiff, in a disciplinary
hearing following the incident, was found guilty of disobeying an order and
using profane language. [Doc. 37-2: Use of Force Report at 4].
The Plaintiff has not presented any forecast showing that the
Defendants ever knowingly or willfully acted in any manner intended to
deprive the Plaintiff of any right secured by North Carolina law or the
Constitution or laws of the United States. [Doc. 37-4: Officer Hampton Affid.
at ¶ 23]; [Doc. 37-5: Officer Smith Affid. at ¶ 13]; [Doc. 37-6: Sergeant Smith
Affid. at ¶ 17].
The Defendants have filed video surveillance of the incident that
shows:
6:33:01 An officer unlocks the cell door as a second officer
stands by;
6:33:11 Plaintiff exits the cell while advancing towards the
officer and speaking;
6:33:12 An officer applies one hand the Plaintiff’s chest to
push him back against the cell doorway, then shoves
the Plaintiff back through the cell doorway;
6:33:16 Cell door is closed;
6:33:19 The door trap is closed and the officers proceed to
the next cell;
6:34:16 An officer returns to lean against the Plaintiff’s cell
door and appears to make a radio communication;
6:34:27 The officer walks away;
6:35:03 An officer returns to the Plaintiff’s cell, opens the door
trap, appears to remove his restraints, and leaves;
6:35:28 A third officer arrives at the Plaintiff’s cell and
appears to confer with him; and
6:35:47 The third officer walks away
[See Doc. 39: Order Granting Motion to File Video Exhibit Manually].
IV. DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff alleges that Officer Hampton used excessive force by
pushing him back towards the cell, that Officer Smith failed to intervene, and
that Sergeant Smith failed to train and supervise the officers.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
satisfy both an objective component – that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious – and a subjective component – that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996).
This subjective standard requires proof of malicious or sadistic action
by a prison official in order to make out an excessive force claim. This is
because prison “[o]fficials are entitled to use appropriate force to quell prison
disturbances.” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. “Because officials must act ‘in
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,’
deliberate indifference is not a sufficiently rigorous standard.” Id. (citing
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. “Rather, in these circumstances, in order to make
out an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that officials
applied force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Fourth Circuit recognizes a cause of action for bystander liability
“premised on a law officer’s duty to uphold the law and protect the public
from illegal acts, regardless of who commits them.” Stevenson v. City of
Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Randall v.
Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002)). A “bystander
officer” can be liable for his or her nonfeasance if he or she: “(1) knows that
a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”
Randall, 302 F.3d at 204.
In order to make out an Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory
liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that [his] subordinate was engaged in
conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable
risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge
was so inadequate as to show “deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged
offensive practices,”; and (3) that there was an
“affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's
inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff.
Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the Plaintiff contends that Officer Hampton violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force against him, that
Officer Smith failed to intervene during the incident, and that the incident
occurred due to Sergeant Smith’s failure to adequately train and supervise
the officers. The forecast of the evidence before the Court, however, leaves
no genuine issue of material fact for trial on these issues. The Plaintiff’s
aggressive advance towards Officer Hampton, while also shouting
derogatory remarks, warranted Officer Hampton’s use of force sufficient to
control the Plaintiff and return him to his cell. Furthermore, the Plaintiff
denied needing medical treatment and refused a subsequent medical
screening after the incident. As such, the record is clear that the force
employed was not serious or significant. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s only
apparent complaint was the potential that he could have fallen while
handcuffed. Notwithstanding such hypothetical concerns, the Plaintiff has
submitted no forecast of evidence that the force Officer Hampton used was
objectively unreasonable, that Officer Hampton subjectively applied such
force with the requisite state of mind, or that the Plaintiff sustained any injury
whatsoever. In sum, the undisputed forecast of evidence before the Court
shows that Officer Hampton acted reasonably under the circumstances and
exercised only the minimal amount of force necessary to restore order and
discipline in response to Plaintiff’s aggressive behavior and actions. See
Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. Further, Officer Hampton denies that he acted for
the purpose of depriving any right secured to the Plaintiff, which the Plaintiff
does not attempt to refute.
Without any use of excessive force, the Plaintiff’s claim against Officer
Smith for failure to intervene during the incident necessarily fails. Likewise,
because Officer Hampton’s use of force was appropriate, allowed under
NCDPS policy, and does not pose an unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury, the Plaintiff’s claim against Sergeant Smith for failure to adequately
train and supervise the officers necessarily fails as well.
Therefore, the Defendants will be granted summary judgment as to
these claims.®
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants summary judgment for
the Defendants’ and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 35] is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: August 11, 2021
5 wail
< Reidinger Cy
Chief United States District Judge “*‘l
6 In light of the Court’s conclusion that the forecast of evidence presented fails to
demonstrate a constitutional violation, the Court need not address the Defendants’
assertion of the defense of qualified immunity. Curiously, the Defendants also argue that
the Plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief should be denied as moot.
However, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive
relief as moot. [See Doc. 25].
11