The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:18-cv-00347-MR
KADEEM WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
MORGAN KIZER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 46].
I. BACKGROUND
The incarcerated Plaintiff Kadeem Williams (“Williams” or simply, “the
Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
addressing various incidents that allegedly occurred at the Marion
Correctional Institution.1 The Complaint passed initial review on the
Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against: Morgan Kizer, a correctional
housing unit manager at Marion C.I.; and Rodney Kinser, a correctional
1 The Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Correctional Institution.
sergeant at Marion C.I.2 [Doc. 1: Complaint; Doc. 9: Initial Review of
Complaint].
In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants used
excessive force against him during an encounter on July 8, 2018.
Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that Unit Manager Kizer “threw [him] to the
ground.” [Doc. 1: Complaint at 4]. The Plaintiff further alleges that Sergeant
Kinser, who weighs more than 200 pounds, placed his right knee on the
Plaintiff’s face, leaned his body weight onto the Plaintiff’s face, and placed
his fingers on pressure points on the Plaintiff’s face. [Id.]. The Plaintiff further
alleges that Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser refused to allow a nurse
to take the Plaintiff’s vitals after the incident. [Id.].3
The Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to all the
Plaintiff’s claims. [Doc. 46: Defendants’ MSJ]. The Court notified the Plaintiff
of the opportunity to respond to Defendants’ Motion and to present evidence
in opposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. [Doc. 50]. The Plaintiff,
however, did not respond. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for
disposition.
2 This case was assigned to Judge Frank D. Whitney at that time.
3 Plaintiff’s Complaint was neither verified nor signed under penalty of perjury. [Doc. 1].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need
not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt. Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 174,
180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence
from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md.,
48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The forecast of evidence before the Court, taken in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, shows the following.
On July 8, 2018, Unit Manager Kizer was assigned to upper E-Unit
where the Plaintiff was on Self-Injurious Prevention observation. [Doc. 48-
1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 8]. At approximately 5:45 p.m., the Plaintiff began
smearing feces in the cell and covered the observation camera. [Doc. 48-1:
Kizer Affid. at ¶ 8]. At 6:19 p.m., the Plaintiff submitted to restraints and was
escorted to the shower to decontaminate. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 8]. At
approximately 6:39 p.m., Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser escorted
the Plaintiff back to the observation cell. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 9; Doc.
48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 8]. As the officers began entering the cell, the Plaintiff
pushed back against Unit Manger Kizer, who immediately used a bent-wrist
technique with his left hand on the Plaintiff’s left hand and escorted him to
the bunk. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 9]. Unit Manager Kizer then placed
the Plaintiff flat against the bunk while maintaining control of the Plaintiff’s
left arm. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 9]. Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant
Kinser began to transition the Plaintiff to full restraints in the front. [Doc. 48-
1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 10]. The Plaintiff was using vulgar language and made
statements such as: “I want you to kill me. Go ahead I want you to kill me.”
[Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 10].
As Unit Manager Kizer was giving the Plaintiff an order to stop cursing,
the Plaintiff began to resist by attempting to pull away and by making fists
and pulling his arms into a flexed position so as to prevent Kizer and Kinser
from applying restraints. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 10]. The Plaintiff head-
butted Sergeant Kinser, striking the back of Kinser’s head. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer
Affid. at ¶ 11, 15; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 8]. Sergeant Kinser placed his
left hand on the Plaintiff’s right shoulder, and he and Unit Manager Kizer
placed the Plaintiff on the floor to regain control over him while Kinzer
continued holding the Plaintiff’s left restraint and left arm. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer
Affid. at ¶ 11; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 9]. Unit Manager Kizer continued
giving the Plaintiff orders to stop resisting which the Plaintiff ignored. [Doc.
48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 11].
Captain Eric Wilson4 then called a “code 4,” requesting additional staff
to assist. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 11; Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 18].
Officers Eric Patton and Kasey Radford5 responded to the code 4. [Doc. 48-
3: Guzman Affid. at ¶18]. Officer Patton used a shield to pin the Plaintiff to
the floor. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 18]. Officer Radford then entered
the cell and assisted in restraining the Plaintiff with a waist chain and black
box. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 18]. As soon as the Plaintiff stopped
4 Captain Wilson is not a Defendant in this action.
5 Officers Patton and Radford are not Defendants in this action.
resisting and the correctional objectives of control and staff safety were
satisfied, all force ceased. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 11, 20]; [Doc. 48-2:
Kinser Affid. at ¶ 9]. Once the Plaintiff was in full restraints, he was helped
to his feet and placed against his bunk. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 18].
All staff then exited the cell without further incident. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman
Affid. at ¶ 18]; [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 11; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶
10]. The Plaintiff remained in the cell in full restraints due to his disruptive
behavior. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 18].
Neither Unit Manager Kizer nor Sergeant Kinser placed a knee on, or
applied pressure point holds to, the Plaintiff’s face. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid.
at ¶ 13-14; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 12-13]. While Sergeant Kinser placed
his hand on the Plaintiff’s shoulder as they placed the Plaintiff on the floor,
and Kinser placed his knee on the Plaintiff’s shoulder to control him until he
stopped resisting [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 16; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at
¶ 15], all of the force that Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser applied
was in direct response to the Plaintiff’s actions and was to maintain control
over the Plaintiff and to prevent staff assault [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 17-
20; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 14, 16]. The amount of force that Unit
Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser used was the minimal amount of force
necessary to achieve the correctional objectives. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at
¶ 20; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 16]. Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant
Kinser did not apply force on the Plaintiff for the purpose of causing him harm
or pain, and only applied as much force as they believed necessary to
accomplish the correctional objective. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 21; Doc.
48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 17]. Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser’s use
of force during the incident complied with the Department’s Use of Force
Policy. [Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶¶ 23-24; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid. at ¶ 19-
20].
The Defendants have submitted video files containing prison video
surveillance footage of the incidents at issue. The footage shows the
following events:
6:37:08 Plaintiff enters the cell, handcuffed behind his back, with
leg shackles, escorted by two officers; Plaintiff turns
around towards the officers
6:37:11 Plaintiff is taken towards the bunk and is leaned over it
6:37:30 Officers stand the Plaintiff up
6:37:34 A third officer enters the cell
6:38:03 Waist chain is removed
6:38:38 Handcuffs are unlocked but remain fastened to Plaintiff’s
left wrist
6:39:04 Handcuff is refastened to Plaintiff’s right wrist in the front
6:39:20 Plaintiff visibly flexes his arms
6:39:31 Plaintiff butts his head forward into an officer’s head
6:39:33 Officers take the Plaintiff to the cell floor
6:39:35 One officer places a knee on Plaintiff’s back; two other
officers have hands on the Plaintiff
6:40:53 A fourth officer enters the cell with a shield and secures the
Plaintiff to the cell floor
6:41:37 A fifth officer enters the cell and applies a waist chain
6:42:51 Plaintiff begins shifting on the floor, flexing his arms
6:44:22 Plaintiff is moved to a seated position near the bunk
6:44:21 Officers begin exiting the cell
6:44:51 Plaintiff is leaned over the bunk, restrained by the shield
6:45:08 The last officer, holding the shield, exits the cell
6:45:10 The cell door is secured
6:45:20 Plaintiff turns toward the camera and appears calm and
unharmed
[Doc. 51: Defendants’ Video Exhibit].
At 7:00 p.m., Melanie Setzer,6 a registered nurse, was summoned to
conduct a post use of force medical assessment; however, the Plaintiff
refused the assessment. [Doc. 48-6: Guzman Affid. Ex at 39; Doc. 48-3:
Guzman Affid. at ¶ 29; Doc. 48-1: Kizer Affid. at ¶ 12; Doc. 48-2: Kinser Affid.
at ¶ 11]. The Plaintiff did not appear to be in distress. [Doc. 48-6: Guzman
Affid. Ex at 39; Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 29].
Braden Guzman,7 a correctional lieutenant at Marion C.I., investigated
the incident by taking witness statements and reviewing video footage. [Doc.
48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶ 13, 19]. Lieutenant Guzman concluded that all
correctional staff, including Unit Manager Kizer and Sergeant Kinser, carried
out their duties in accordance with the Use of Force Policy and that the
amount of force used was reasonably applied to achieve a legitimate
correctional objective, i.e., to ensure the Plaintiff’s compliance with orders
and to mitigate any risk of assault on staff. [Doc. 48-3: Guzman Affid. at ¶
21, 25, 28].
IV. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
6 Nurse Setzer is not a Defendant in this action.
7 Lieutenant Guzman is not a Defendant in this action.
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
satisfy both an objective component – that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious – and a subjective component – that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996).
This subjective standard requires proof of malicious or sadistic action
by a prison official in order to make out an excessive force claim. This is
because prison “[o]fficials are entitled to use appropriate force to quell prison
disturbances.” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. “Because officials must act ‘in
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,’
deliberate indifference is not a sufficiently rigorous standard.” Id. (citing
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. “Rather, in these circumstances, in order to make
out an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that officials
applied force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force against him. The
forecast of the evidence before the Court, however, leaves no genuine issue
of material fact for trial on this issue. The Plaintiff’s refusal to follow orders
and his physical resistance to the officers escorting him, resisting the officers
attempting to restrain him, and head-butting an officer, warranted the
Defendants’ use of force to control the Plaintiff and prevent him from
assaulting staff. Furthermore, the Plaintiff refused a medical evaluation after
the incident and he did not appear to be in distress. The Plaintiff has
submitted no forecast of evidence that the force the officers used was not
objectively reasonable, that either of the Defendants subjectively applied
force with the requisite state of mind, or that he sustained any injury
whatsoever. In sum, the undisputed forecast of evidence before the Court
shows that Defendants Kizer and Kinser acted reasonably under the
circumstances and exercised only the minimal amount of force necessary to
restore order and discipline and prevent the Plaintiff from assaulting staff.
See Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. Further, Defendants Kizer and Kinser deny
that they acted for the purpose of causing the Plaintiff harm or pain, which
the Plaintiff does not attempt to refute.
The Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but
who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their
actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the
court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer
violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos,
884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d
95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because
Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that Defendants Kizer and
Kinser violated a constitutional right, the Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff's individual capacity claims.
For all these reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 46] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: April 14, 2021
Martifi Reidinger ay,
Chief United States District Judge ally
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