Medina v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00074-MR

SAMUEL MEDINA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OF

UNITED STATES, et al., ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Mark

Chapman’s Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 18].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971), for the alleged violation of his civil rights in connection

with the conditions of his pretrial detention at the Buncombe County

Detention Center (“BCDC”) on federal charges.1 The sole Defendant

1 The Complaint also passed initial review on a claim that the law enforcement officer who

arrested him improperly confiscated cash from him at the time of his arrest. [Doc. 7]. At

that time, the case was assigned to Judge Frank D. Whitney. That claim was

subsequently dismissed as barred by res judicata. [Doc. 13].

remaining in the case is Mark Chapman, the supervisory deputy United

States Marshall at the relevant time.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chapman violated his

constitutional rights by having him placed in solitary confinement while he

was a federal pretrial detainee at BCDC.2

Defendant Chapman has now filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that

the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and

that he is entitled to qualified immunity.3 [Doc. 18]. The Plaintiff was

informed of his right to respond to the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). [Doc. 20]. The Plaintiff

filed a Response [Doc. 21], and Defendant Chapman filed a Reply.4 [Doc.

24].

2 The Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine

and is presently serving a 188-month sentence. [See Criminal Case No. 1:16-cr-00051-

MR-WCM-2 (“CR”) Doc. 125].

3 The Court will not consider the Declaration of Otis Hamilton, a supervisory deputy U.S.

Marshal, that the United States filed in the instant civil action. [Doc. 12-1: Hamilton Decl.].

Doing so would convert the instant Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary

Judgment, which the Court declines to do. See Sec’y of State for Def. v. Trimble

Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) (when deciding a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint and any attached documents

“integral to the complaint.”).

4 The Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking an extension of time to file a sur-reply which was

denied as moot because fairness did not dictate that the Court grant the Plaintiff leave to

file a sur-reply. [Doc. 26]. The Plaintiff nevertheless filed a Sur-Reply, which will be

stricken as improperly filed. [Doc. 27]. Even if the Sur-Reply were considered, however,

it would not change the Court’s analysis of the Motion to Dismiss in any way.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the central issue is

whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Francis v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 2009). In that context, the court

accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Giacomelli,

588 F.3d at 192.

The court is not required to accept “legal conclusions, elements of a

cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement….” Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255; see Giacomelli,

588 F.3d at 192. That is, while “detailed factual allegations” are not required,

the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007); see Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Twombly, 50

U.S. at 570. In short, the well-pled factual allegations must move a plaintiff’s

claim from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;

Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he was jailed at BCDC on federal

criminal charges in April 2016. The Plaintiff alleges that he insisted on

requesting bond even though his lawyer told him that doing so would make

the Government “angry” with him. [Doc. 1: Complaint at 1]. The Plaintiff

alleges that immediately upon returning to BCDC from his detention hearing

on July 27, 2016, BCDC guards placed the Plaintiff in solitary confinement

without due process or even being told the reason for this order. [Id. at 2].

The Plaintiff believes that he was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation

for having exercised his First Amendment right to request bond. [Id. at 3].

The Plaintiff pleaded guilty in the federal criminal case about two weeks later

because his lawyer told him that signing a plea deal would make his “trouble”

go away, which the Plaintiff understood to mean that he would be released

from solitary confinement. [Id. at 2]. However, the Plaintiff remained in

solitary confinement for another nine months after pleading guilty. [Id.].

The record in the Plaintiff’s criminal case, of which the Court takes

judicial notice,5 reflects that Plaintiff’s attorney filed a Motion for Detention

Hearing on July 20, 2016. [CR Doc. 47]. Magistrate Judge Dennis Howell

granted the motion and held a detention hearing on July 27, 2016. The

Government presented evidence that the Plaintiff, while he was being held

at BCDC, attempted to: continue directing the distribution of

methamphetamine; arrange a divorce from his wife and his marriage to

another woman who was a potential witness so that he could prevent her

from testifying through spousal immunity; and arrange for retaliation against

a cooperating witness. [CR Doc. 63: Courtroom Recording of July 27, 2016

Detention Hearing); see also CR Doc. 134: Sentencing Transcript at 28

(discussing threats of retaliation made by Plaintiff)]. Magistrate Judge

Howell denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for pretrial release and entered an Order

of Detention after finding, inter alia, that “[l]etters written by the defendant

were introduced into evidence … showing the continued efforts of defendant

to direct distribution of methamphetamine and procure payment for the drug

5 Courts may consider facts and documents subject to judicial notice without converting

a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Clatterbuck v. City of

Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds, Reed v.

Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). “Under this exception, courts may consider relevant

facts obtained from the public record, so long as these facts are construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff along with the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[and] … that the defendant has attempted to convince his wife to obtain a

divorce so he can marry a potential witness in an attempt to preclude that

witness from testifying [against him].” [CR Doc. 65: Addendum to Order of

Detention at 3; see also CR Doc. 62: Order of Detention].

At BCDC, the Plaintiff submitted a written grievance regarding his

placement in solitary confinement. A written response dated August 1, 2016

states: “Your housing assignment was changed at the request of the U.S.

Marshalls Service. Until we are directed to do differently by them your

current assignment will remain the same.”6 [Doc. 1-2 at 3: Response to

Grievance].

IV. DISCUSSION

Under Bivens, an individual may bring a civil suit against a federal

officer for damages stemming from a constitutional violation. Trulock v.

Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 399 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001). The purpose of Bivens is to

“deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”

Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Correctional Servs.

Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil

Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (§ 1983 applies only to state actors)). “[A]

6 The Defendant argues that it is unclear whether the Plaintiff exhausted the available

administrative remedies and raises lack of exhaustion to preserve that defense. [Doc. 19

at 8 n.3].

Bivens action does not lie against either agencies or officials in their official

capacity.” Dao v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994)).

The Plaintiff claims that he was improperly placed in solitary

confinement and that this was done in retaliation for having requested bond.

A. Conditions of Pretrial Detention

First, the Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly placed in solitary

confinement where he experienced harsh conditions. “[A] pretrial detainee

has a right under the Due Process Clause to be free from punishment before

his guilt is adjudicated.” Tate v. Parks, 791 Fed. App’x 387, 390 (4th Cir.

2019) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). An individual pretrial

detainee may raise a substantive due process challenge to his conditions of

confinement “where they are so disproportionate or arbitrary that they are

not related to legitimate penological objectives and amount to punishment.”

Id. (citing Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174-76 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To

prevail on such a claim, a detainee must show that the challenged treatment

or conditions were either (1) imposed with an express intent to punish, or (2)

not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive objective, in which case

an intent to punish may be inferred.” Id. (citing Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178).

The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because he does not allege that

Defendant Chapman requested that he be placed in solitary confinement

with an express intent to punish rather than in accordance with a legitimate

nonpunitive objective. The Government produced evidence at the July 27,

2016 detention hearing which led Magistrate Judge Howell to find that the

Plaintiff had engaged in misconduct, including the attempt to continue

distributing methamphetamine and to interfere with witnesses while he was

detained at BCDC. The Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant

Chapman’s recommendation of solitary confinement was done with an

express intent to punish him rather than for a legitimate penological objective

of effectuating Judge Howell’s order by preventing his further efforts to

distribute methamphetamine and interfere with witnesses in the criminal

case. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (“if a particular condition or restriction of

pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”). Moreover,

the Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Chapman, a deputy U.S. Marshal,

had any knowledge of control over the conditions that the Plaintiff allegedly

experienced in solitary confinement. Therefore, Defendant Chapman’s

Motion to Dismiss will be granted on the claim that he improperly

recommended that the Plaintiff be placed in solitary confinement.

B. Retaliation

Second, the Plaintiff alleges that his placement in solitary confinement

was in retaliation for having exercised the right to request bond. The First

Amendment right to free speech “includes not only the affirmative right to

speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the

exercise of that right.” Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir.

2000). Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising a

constitutional right. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th

Cir.1978). In order to state a colorable retaliation claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege: “(1) []he engaged in protected First Amendment activity,

(2) the defendant[] took some action that adversely affected [his] First

Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between [his]

protected activity and the defendant[’s] conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d

239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005)). In the prison context,

retaliation claims are treated with skepticism because “[e]very act of

discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it

responds directly to prisoner misconduct.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74

(4th Cir. 1994).

The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that his placement in solitary

confinement was retaliatory. The record in the criminal case reflects that the

Plaintiff requested a detention hearing through counsel on July 20, 2016, but

the Plaintiff does not allege that he was placed in solitary confinement at that

time. A detention hearing came before Magistrate Judge Howell on July 27,

2016 at which the Government presented evidence that the Plaintiff had

attempted to distribute methamphetamine and interfere with witnesses while

he was a detained at BCDC. It was not until after Magistrate Judge Howell’s

findings that the Plaintiff had engaged in misconduct from BCDC that the

Plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement. The Plaintiff suggests that the

temporal proximity between the detention hearing and his placement in

solitary confinement demonstrates that Defendant Chapman’s request was

in retaliation for the Plaintiff having exercised his right to seek bond.

However, a speculative claim based on only temporal proximity between the

Plaintiff’s detention hearing and his placement in solitary confinement is

insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Adams, 40 F.3d at 74

(conclusory allegations of retaliation are insufficient); Wagner v. Wheeler, 13

F.3d 86, 91 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]emporal proximity ... is simply too slender a

reed on which to rest” a Section 1983 retaliation claim). The Plaintiff fails to

allege any facts demonstrating a causal relationship between Defendant

Chapman’s request and the Plaintiff’s insistence on a detention hearing.

Instead, the record in the criminal case demonstrates that the legitimate

penological objective of halting the Plaintiff’s efforts to distribute

methamphetamine and interfere with potential witnesses unquestionably

justified his placement in solitary confinement. Therefore, Defendant

Chapman’s Motion to Dismiss the retaliation claim will be granted.

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Chapman argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on

the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity.7 “Qualified

immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in

light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions

were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

“To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court

must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer

violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos,

884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to

7 To the extent that the Plaintiff intended to assert Bivens claims against the United States

or against Defendant Chapman in his official capacity, they fail as a matter of law. See

Meyers, 510 U.S. at 484-86; Chao, 306 F.3d at 184.

make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d

95, 100 (4" Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As set forth in the preceding sections, the Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated in any way. Further,

it is not clearly established that a pretrial detainee who has attempted to

engage in illegal activity from jail has a right to be free from solitary

confinement. Defendant Chapman is therefore entitled to qualified immunity,

and his Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. 18] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Sur-Reply [Doc. 27] is

STRICKEN as improperly filed.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 2, 2021

Se ee

Chief United States District Judge Ale

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