Stratton v. State of North Carolina

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:20-cv-00455-MR

SPENCER STRATTON by and )

through biological mother, natural )

guardian, next friend, guardian ad )

litem KATHY STRATTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

STATE of NORTH CAROLINA, )

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )

of HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES, )

MECKLENBURG COUNTY )

DEPARTMENT of SOCIAL )

SERVICES, MECKLENBURG )

COUNTY CLERK of COURT, )

)

Respondents. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petitioner’s pro se Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] and the Petitioner’s pro se Motion for

Joinder of Additional Party. [Doc. 5].

I. BACKGROUND

Spencer Stratton (the “Petitioner”) is an adult male who was in the

custody of the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services

(“MCDSS”) at the time the present Petition was filed. [Doc. 1 at 1]. The

Petitioner first came into the MCDSS’s custody on January 30, 2001, after

the MCDSS filed a petition in the Mecklenburg County District Court alleging

that the then-minor Petitioner and his nine minor siblings were neglected and

dependent. Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 521 F. App'x

278, 284 (4th Cir. 2013). On February 2, 2001, the Mecklenburg County

District Court conducted a hearing on the matter and issued an order placing

the children in foster care pending final adjudication of the neglect petition.

Id. at 285.

On January 14, 2002, the Petitioner reached the age of majority. [Doc.

1 at 8]. He was given a competency assessment and determined to be

incompetent on February 18, 2002. [Id.]. On February 19, 2002, the

Mecklenburg County Superior Court denied the MCDSS’s neglect petition

and returned the Petitioner to the custody of his Petitioner’s biological

mother, Kathy Stratton. [Id.; Doc. 1-2 at 25].

On September 21, 2006, the Mecklenburg County Superior Court

issued an order instructing the MCDSS to take custody of the Petitioner.

[Doc. 1-2 at 16]. On the following day, the Mecklenburg County Superior

Court entered an order removing Kathy Stratton as the Petitioner’s guardian

and appointing the MCDSS as the Petitioner’s guardian. [Id. at 17].

From October 2006 until April 16, 2019, the Petitioner was in the

custody of the MCDSS and resided in a North Carolina group home. [Doc.

1 at 9]. On April 16, 2019, Kathy Stratton took the Petitioner from that home,

causing the North Carolina Department of Public Safety to issue a Silver

Alert. [Id. at 9]. On April 18, 2019, the MCDSS filed a motion in Mecklenburg

County Superior Court seeking an order authorizing law enforcement to take

temporary custody of the Petitioner and return him to MCDSS custody. [Doc.

1-2 at 2]. On the same date, a Mecklenburg County Assistant Clerk of

Superior Court issued an order directing law enforcement to secure physical

custody of the Petitioner. [Id. at 3]. On March 9, 2020, law enforcement

found the Petitioner in Maryland and returned him to MCDSS custody in

North Carolina. [Doc. 1 at 10].

On March 17, 2020, Kathy Stratton filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the Mecklenburg County Superior Court on behalf of the Petitioner.

[Doc. 1-2 at 54]. On March 20, 2020, the Mecklenburg County Superior

Court denied the Petition. [Id.]. On May 20, 2020, Kathy Stratton appealed

to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. [Id. at 52]. On May 27, 2020, the

North Carolina Court of Appeals denied her appeal. [Id.]. On July 17, 2020,

Kathy Stratton filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of North

Carolina, which was denied on July 20, 2020. [Id. at 51].

On August 6, 2020, the Petitioner filed the present Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

North Carolina. [Doc. 1]. The Petition asserts that the Petitioner is

unlawfully in the custody of the MCDSS pursuant to an unlawful order from

the Mecklenburg County courts and must be released. [Id.]. On August 14,

2020, the Eastern District transferred this matter to this Court, finding that

venue was proper because the Petition challenges actions committed within

this District. [Doc. 3].

On August 18, 2020, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Joinder of

Additional Party, asserting that MCDSS resigned its guardianship of the

Petitioner and that Kevin Paul Oliver, a registered agent of Phoenix

Counseling Center, was now the successor guardian of the Petitioner. [Doc.

5 at 1]. Accordingly, the Petitioner claims that Kevin Paul Oliver is a

necessary party to be joined. [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, district courts must conduct a frivolity review

of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and

identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. The Court is also guided by Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which

directs district courts to dismiss habeas petitions when it plainly appears from

the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief. Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254;

When conducting a frivolity review, the Court must determine whether

the filing raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon

clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional

scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). The frivolity

review may also examine whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction

over the action. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). If

the Court determines “that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must

dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A pro se filing must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not

permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint

which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep't

of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

Kathy Stratton characterizes herself as the Petitioner’s “biological

mother, natural guardian, next friend, [and] guardian ad litem.” [Doc. 1 at

17]. Nevertheless, she cannot file a pro se habeas petition on his behalf.

Although litigants in federal court have a statutory right to act as their own

counsel, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the statute does not permit “unlicensed laymen

to represent anyone other than themselves.” Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d

137, 139 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[i]t

is well settled that a pro se litigant may not represent another individual or

entity in federal court, and a minor or incompetent plaintiff cannot proceed

without counsel in a civil action.” Peter B. v. Buscemi, No. CA 6:10-767-

TMC, 2014 WL 6983356, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2014) (citing Myers v.

Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schools, 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005)); see also

Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2009); Osei-

Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir.

1991); Lewis v. Lenc–Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830 (7th Cir., 1986).

That prohibition also bars nonlawyers from representing individuals pro se

based on guardianship or a power of attorney. Itiowe v. Robert Wood

Johnson Univ. Hosp. Hamilton, 556 F. App’x 125, 125 (3d Cir. 2014).

Because Kathy Stratton is a non-lawyer attempting to represent the

Petitioner pro se based on her purported status as his guardian ad litem, the

Petition must be dismissed.

Even if the Petition were otherwise properly before the Court, it would

be barred by the domestic relations exception to the Court’s jurisdiction.

“The domestic relations exception ‘divests the federal courts of power to

issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,’ Ankenbrandt v. Richards,

504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992), and to rule on any issues that are inextricably

intertwined with those matters. Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 860-61 (8th Cir.

1994). “Federal courts “lack power to issue these types of decrees because

of the special proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century

and a half in handling issues that arise in the granting of such decrees.’”

Reale v. Wake Cty. Human Servs., 480 F. App'x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704)). In the Fourth Circuit, the

application of the domestic relations exception is “guided by the principles

announced in Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087-89 (4th Cir. 1980).”

Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 1982). In Cole, the

Fourth Circuit explained that district courts “must consider the exact nature

of the rights asserted or of the breaches alleged” to determine whether the

domestic relations exception applies. Cole, 633 F.2d at 1089. While federal

courts have jurisdiction over cases that implicate domestic relations as part

of “generally cognizable common law torts[,]” they lack jurisdiction over

cases that “seek a declaration of present or future rights as to custody or

visitation.” Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 834. Because the Petition seeks the

release of the Petitioner from his current guardianship, [Doc. 1 at 17], it

implicates present and future rights regarding his custody and challenges the

state court’s prior determination of the Petitioner’s legal guardian.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Petition is barred by the domestic

relations exception.

The Court further concludes that the Petition constitutes an improper

exercise of habeas corpus. “Although a federal habeas corpus statute has

existed ever since 1867, federal habeas has never been available to

challenge parental rights or child custody.” Lehman v. Lycoming Cty.

Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3237, 73 L.

Ed. 2d 928 (1982). While the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed

whether federal habeas corpus jurisdiction extends to adult guardianship

cases, the First Circuit has held in a persuasive opinion that it does not

because it involves an area of state domestic relations law. Hemon v. Office

of Pub. Guardian, 878 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1989). In Hemon, a son filed an

application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to nullify the Office of Public

Guardian's status as guardian of his mother. Id. at 14. The First Circuit

noted that the Supreme Court has held that the federal habeas corpus

statute does not confer jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on a state

court judgment that terminates domestic family rights because “[t]he federal

writ of habeas corpus, representing as it does a profound interference with

state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions, should be reserved

for those instances in which the federal interest in individual liberty is so

strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns.” Id. (quoting

Lehman, 458 U.S. at 515-16 (1982)). According to the First Circuit, “the

same concerns about federalism and finality that counsel against federal

habeas jurisdiction over child custody disputes also counsel against federal

habeas jurisdiction over disputes regarding guardianship. Id. at 15. The

Court finds the First Circuit’s reasoning in Hemon persuasive and consistent

with precedent from the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court regarding the

scope of the habeas right. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 693; Wasserman, 671

F.2d at 835; Doe, 660 F.2d at 106; Cole, 633 F.2d at 1087-89. Accordingly,

the Court concludes that habeas relief is not available in adult guardianship

cases like this one.

For these reasons, the Petition must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Because this action is being dismissed, the Motion for Joinder of Additional

Party will be denied as moot.

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,

the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability as Petitioner has not

made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003) (in order to

satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484 (2000) (holding that when relief

is denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish both that the

correctness of the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the

petition states a debatably valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right).

O R D E R

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is hereby DISMISSED and the Petitioner’s pro se

Motion for Joinder of Additional Party [Doc. 5] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to issue a

certificate of appealability pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: February 1, 2021

Martifi Reidinger ey,

Chief United States District Judge ely

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