“Where the motion is nothing more than a request that the district court change its mind, however, it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)”
How later courts described this case
- “Where the motion is nothing more than a request that the district court change its mind, however, it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:20-cv-00239-MOC-DCK
JAMES MCDONALD SHEA BROWN JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
TRUIST BANK, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER )
WITH SUNTRUST BANK, )
)
Defendant. )
THIS MATTER is before the court on Plaintiff’s pro se Motion for Relief from the Court’s
Order to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 53). Plaintiff also asks this Court to reconsider its decision. (Doc. No.
53 at 1). Plaintiff brings his Motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) and (6).
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 60(b)(3) provides district courts the power to relieve a party from an adverse judgment
because of “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). A moving party must establish three
factors in order to state a successful Rule 60(b)(3) motion: “(1) the moving party must have a
meritorious [claim]; (2) the moving party must prove misconduct by clear and convincing
evidence; and (3) the misconduct prevented the moving party from fully presenting its case.”
Shultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Square Constr. Co. v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 657 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1981).
Even where a moving party satisfies the Schultz three-prong test, a district court must
“balance the competing policies favoring the finality of judgments and justice being done in
-1-
view of all the facts, to determine within its discretion, whether relief is appropriate in each
case.” Id. Essentially, Rule 60(b)(3) provides an avenue for revisiting judgments that were
obtained unfairly, not judgments which the moving party merely believes were erroneous.
Schultz, 24 F.3d at 630.
Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes a district court to grant relief from a final judgment for “any other
reason that justifies relief." The United States Supreme Court has held that Rule 60(b)(6) may be
invoked in only “extraordinary circumstances” when the reason for relief from judgment does not
fall within the list of enumerated reasons given in Rule 60(b)(l)-(5). See Aikens v. Ingram, 652
F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011), citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.
11 (1988).
Importantly, “Rule 60(b) does not authorize a motion merely for reconsideration of a legal
issue.” United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Where the motion is
nothing more than a request that the district court change its mind, however, it is not authorized
by Rule 60(b)”). As shown below, Plaintiff’s Motion does not present the Court with any
“extraordinary circumstances,” “misconduct,” or a “meritorious claim.” Plaintiff is merely asking
the Court to change its mind. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Presentation of New Law and Facts
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims on
statute of limitations grounds. Plaintiff now asserts, for the first time, that his causes of action are
actually criminal allegations of “concealment of a will” and criminal “withholding vital
information.” (Doc. No. 53 at 1). Plaintiff now argues that the Court should have conducted its
-2-
statute of limitation analysis under the criminal statutes and applied criminal law to his case.
Plaintiff’s position makes no sense. First, Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendant Truist.
Plaintiff does not have standing to bring criminal claims against Truist. Criminal liability results
from enforcing public codes of behavior as embodied in the laws, with the government prosecuting
individuals or institutions. In a criminal case, the government brings charges against the person
alleged to have committed the crime. Plaintiff’s argument is meritless.
Second, even if Plaintiff had the legal ability to bring criminal charges against Truist, he
failed to make any criminal allegations in his Complaint. Even allowing for pro se status, the Court
can only consider the facts and claims Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint. It is not the Court's role
to “act as the plaintiff’s advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the
plaintiff failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.” See Brock v. Carroll, l 07 F.3d 241,
243 (4th Cir. 1997). Attempting to bring criminal charges in a civil suit and alleging claims that
were not made in the underlying Complaint do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” under
Rule 60(b)(6).
B. The Fraud Component of Rule 60(b)(3)
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) provides an avenue for setting aside a judgment if the moving
party can show it has a meritorious claim and that the adverse party procured the judgment by
some fraudulent means. In other words, Rule 60(b)(3) focuses on judgments which were unfairly
procured by the adverse party. Schultz, 24 F.3d at 631; citing Anderson v. Cryovac Inc., 862 F.2d
910, 924 n.10 (1st Cir. 1988). While not clear, Plaintiff’s argument regarding fraud consists of
allegations that Truist misrepresented facts to the Court upon which the Court mistakenly relied in
-3-
dismissing Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff further contends that the Court ignored Plaintiff’s facts, which
he contends were proof of Truist’s “malicious” and “malevolent” conduct.
The Court's careful 17-page opinion, however, cites the facts of the case directly from
Plaintiff’s Complaint. It is Plaintiff’s own account that establishes the facts Plaintiff knew, and
when he knew them, that formed the basis for the Court's dismissal of the Complaint. The basis
for fraud found in Plaintiff’s Motion appears to stem from Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court's
application of the law to the facts, as opposed to endorsing Plaintiff’s “naked assertions and
unadorned conclusory allegations.” Rule 60(b)(3) is unavailing to Plaintiff because Rule 60(b)(3)
provides an avenue for revisiting judgments that were obtained unfairly, not judgments which the
moving party merely believes were erroneous. Schultz, 24 F.3d at 630.
C. Collateral Estoppel of the Conservator Claim
Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Truist alleges Truist wrongfully declined to pursue a
claim Ms. Brown's estate had against her former conservator, John Weaver. Plaintiff does not
contest the Court's collateral estoppel analysis, but rather makes a muddled semantic argument that
the Court incorrectly couched his claim as “preventing a fraud.” Semantics aside, Plaintiff alleged
the identical claim against Truist that he pursued against Mr. Weaver. The Weaver trial court
dismissed his lawsuit based on the statute of limitations. See Brown v. Weaver, No. E2018-00783-
COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6706285 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (perm. app. denied, Tenn. S.C.
Apr. 11, 2019). Plaintiff appealed, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals likewise denied Plaintiff’s
claims. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed again to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court declined to review. (Id.). The Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that Plaintiff discovered
-4-
the fraud within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, but waited another two years and
fifty-one weeks to file his complaint. (Id. at *6).
Therefore, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of whether Truist
wrongfully declined to pursue Plaintiff's claims against Mr. Weaver. This Court analyzed the
previous litigation and correctly determined that Plaintiff cannot pursue the identical, previously
dismissed claims. Again, Plaintiff does not make a showing of fraud on Truist’s part in the Court's
decision; he merely disagrees with it and wants the Court to change its mind.
Hl. CONCLUSION
The reasons Plaintiff provides in its Motion for Relief and Reconsideration fail to provide
this Court with grounds to grant relief under either Rule 60(b)(3) or Rule 60(b)(6). Review of the
Judgment, (Doc. No 51), reveals that it is a lawful Judgment which is consistent with current case
law and that Plaintiffs Complaint was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Nothing in the
Plaintiff's filing in any manner calls into doubt the dismissal of this action.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's pro se Motion for Reconsideration and
Relief of Judgment (Doc. No. 54) is DENIED.
Signed: January 9, 2021
i )
ager
Max O. Cogburn i yg
United States District Judge Toa gt
5-