The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:20-cv-596
JOHNNY H. COBLE JR. AND ROBIN COBLE, )
both on behalf of their minor child “J.H.C.”, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
) ORDER
)
LAKE NORMAN CHARTER SCHOOL, INC., et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. No. 3), Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, (Doc. No. 4), and
Motion to Expedite Review of Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO/Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 5).
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action against Defendants on October 27, 2020,
seeking, inter alia, a temporary restraining order to prevent Defendants from including The Poet
X in its ninth-grade language arts curriculum. Plaintiffs have alleged that by teaching this novel
Defendants violate the Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The Court has expedited consideration of this request given the time-sensitive nature of
Plaintiffs’ motion, the recent nature of the alleged violation, and the gravity of potential harm
outlined in the pleadings.
Upon considering the arguments presented by both parties, this Court denies Plaintiffs’
request for a TRO. Plaintiffs may proceed with this case after this denial. Today, the Court
simply finds that Plaintiffs have not presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the four factors of
-1-
the Winter test to grant the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Of those four
factors, the Court especially emphasizes that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence
that their claim is likely to succeed on the merits. The Court does not doubt the sincerity of
Plaintiffs’ religious objections, and the Court is troubled by Defendants’ decision to teach a book
that is so controversial that they have an established opt-out procedure in place to deal with
“several students who have chosen not to read The Poet X this fall.” (Doc. No. 9). Defendants
should be mindful that public schools are entrusted with the children of diverse families from
diverse religious backgrounds. As such, Defendants have a vital responsibility to ensure that
their school is not a divisive environment. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84
(1987). However, the Court does not intervene today to stop The Poet X from being taught
because the law does not support such an action as will be explained below.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendants will begin teaching The Poet X by Elizabeth Acevedo on Monday, November
9, 2020. The book won the 2018 National Book Award for Young Adults. Spoken-word artist
Acevedo’s verse novel is an arresting portrait of a young poet coming into her own. In nearly
every poem, the text grapples with at least one question about adolescence, family, gender, race,
religion, or sexuality that will have readers thinking about these questions in their own lives.
The book tells the story of fifteen-year-old Xiomara, whose name means “one who is
ready for war,” as she grows up in a poor, urban neighborhood of Harlem. The self-described
“brown and big and angry” Dominican girl furiously confronts catcalling boys, chafes under her
Catholic parents’ restrictive rules, endures verbal and physical abuse from her mother, and both
adores and resents her “genius” twin brother, who seems to be everything she’s not. She finds
-2-
moments of peace by writing in her poetry journal, joining a spoken-word poetry club, and
exploring a blossoming romance with Aman, her science partner. The core tension in the book is
between Xiomara and her mother. The book begins its ascent to a climax when devout Mami
discovers that Xiomara and Aman were seen kissing on a train. Mami’s fury at Xiomara’s secret
relationship is eclipsed only by the devastation that occurs when Mami finds and reads
Xiomara’s candid journal, which includes poems about her anger at her mother, boredom at
church, and desire for Aman. Mami burns the journal of poems, and Xiomara flees home. The
next day at school, her English teacher comforts her but stresses that she must return home and
talk with her Mami. On her way to confront her mother, Xiomara seeks the help of the kind and
understanding Catholic priest who has been teaching her confirmation class. The priest agrees to
help her speak to her mother. In the final pages of the book, the priest mediates heartfelt
discussions between Xiomara and her Mami and among the rest of her family. Her family,
friends, the priest, and her English teacher all attend her first slam poetry competition and throw
a party to celebrate her. At the end of the book, she doesn’t know if she will ever be as religious
as her Mami, but her “priest tells [her] it’s OKAY to ask questions . . . even if they seem
bizarre.” She learns who she is and what she wants. And she knows that she wants to be a slam
poet.
In the process of telling this story, the book contains several lines of poetry that seem to
disparage religion, such as:
- The Virgin Mary was “an impregnated virgin who was probably scared shitless.”
- The “parable” of Eve is “bullshit.” “[T]he Story of Genesis is Mad Stupid”
-3-
- Everything in the Bible is nothing more than “metaphor” “Jesus feels like … a friend I
just don’t think I need anymore.”
While these quotes disparage religion, Xiomara does not feel negatively toward religion as a
whole and admires her best friend’s faith, her brother’s faith, and the kindness of the priest
teaching her confirmation class. In fact, she appears to embrace faith again by the end of the
novel, even if her faith is not the same as her Mami’s.
Furthermore, in an email about why it decided to include The Poet X in the high school
reading curriculum, Defendants wrote that the book will help students grapple with their “own
identity in relation to the world” as “teachers guide the students with intelligent academic
discussion” of the text. (Doc. No. 1-1). At the end of the email, the school explains why this
book fits in with the purpose of a literature class:
[P]reparing our students for success beyond high school goes well outside of
strictly academic readiness and extends to introducing them to different thoughts
and ideas, oftentimes through literature; books allow our students to access a
world different from theirs and “meet” people, of varied backgrounds, races,
ethnicities, experiences, social-economic circumstance and more. To send our
graduates off into a world without this preparation can lead to the same ending as
sending them off ill-equipped academically. What students can learn through
literature and subsequent conversations with informed peers and teachers, is
invaluable as they grow to be critical thinkers and well-rounded members of our
society.
As this email makes clear, the school believes that teaching this book will create a space for
critical discussion about diverse worldviews. The purpose is not to attack Catholicism.
Finally, Jennifer Hunt, an English Language Arts teacher at Norman Lake Charter
School, submitted an affidavit in which she stated that in reading The Poet X, teachers “do not
ask students to endorse or disapprove of Xiomara’s religious views or any other person’s view of
religion.” (Doc. No. 9). Instead, the novel is used to teach the following topics:
-4-
- Poesy (the art and mechanics of writing poetry)
- A representation of slam poetry (which is often very different from other forms
of poetry)
- Characterization (dynamic, static, development)
- Themes of identity, family relationship, independence, finding one’s voice, and
stereotypes
- Literary devises and analysis
- Structure
- Verse v. Prose
- Writing
- Slam poetry and public speaking
Poetry comparison (using the works of Maya Angelou and Jacqueline Woodson)
(Id.). Ms. Hunt also explained various assignments given to high schoolers about The Poet X,
none of which involve religion. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that one of the primary goals of this book is to promote hostility toward
religion, specifically Catholicism. As such, they believe that teaching “the book to . . . young
impressionable minds” in a secondary school “runs afoul of the most basic precept underpinning
the Religion Clauses—that government must remain neutral in matters of religion.”
Notably, The Poet X was taught by Defendants during the 2018-19 school year, parents
were notified in August 2020 that the book would again be part of the curriculum, and Plaintiffs
confirmed on August 25, 2020 that they received notice that The Poet X would be taught in their
son’s ninth grade class. (Doc. No. 9). For students who would rather not read a main selection of
an English Language Arts unit (or whose families object), Defendants allow them to opt out and
to read another book. (Id.). Defendants offered this opt-out option to Plaintiffs’ son when they
raised objections to the book. (Id.). The school would have Plaintiffs’ son read a different book
with a different English Language Arts certified teacher in a different classroom. (Id.). In short,
Defendants assure the Court that “he will have the same opportunities for meaningful
engagement with the alternative text and with his classmates during that time.” (Id.).
-5-
II. TRO RULE
Applications for issuance of a TRO are governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). However,
“when the opposing party actually receives notice of the application for a restraining order, the
procedure that is followed does not differ functionally from that on an application for a
preliminary injunction.” Wright and Miller, 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2951 (3d ed.).
In evaluating a request for a TRO, the court considers the same factors applied for a
preliminary injunction. Pettis v. Law Office of Hutchens, Senter, Kellam & Pettit, No. 3:13-CV-
00147-FDW, 2014 WL 526105, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2014) (citing Hoechst Diafoil Co. v.
Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999)). In assessing such factors, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it will likely suffer irreparable harm
absent an injunction; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in its favor; and (4) the injunction is in
the public interest. League of Women Voters of N. Carolina v. N. Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236
(4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Preliminary injunctions should not be granted when there is only a
“possibility of irreparable harm” because a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)
(emphasis added)).
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires government neutrality with
respect to religion. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). It was
-6-
intended to protect against “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
To pass constitutional muster, challenged state action (1) must have a secular purpose, (2)
must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster
excessive state entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. The option of
nonparticipation does not save state action from an establishment clause challenge. Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). Finally, this Court notes that the Lemon test has been
questioned but not overturned in recent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., American Legion v. Am.
Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019).
Religious activities prohibited in public schools include daily readings from the Bible,
Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 203, recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, (id.), posting the Ten
Commandments in every classroom, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), beginning school
assemblies with prayer, Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981), and
teaching a Transcendental Meditation course that includes a ceremony involving offerings to a
deity, Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has stated clearly that
literary or historic study of the Bible is not a prohibited religious activity. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42;
Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 225. Not all mention of religion is prohibited in public schools.
IV. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The free exercise clause recognizes the right of every person to choose among types of
religious training and observance, free of state compulsion. Abington Sch. Distr., 374 U.S. at
222. To establish a violation of that clause, a litigant must show that challenged state action has a
coercive effect that operates against the litigant’s practice of his or her religion. Id. at 223.
-7-
One aspect of the religious freedom of parents is the right to control the religious
upbringing and training of their minor children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
As parents, Plaintiffs have a direct, personal right to direct their son’s religious training. Collins
v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d at 764 n.1.
V. RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY IN SCHOOLS
The Establishment Clause is often thought of as solely preventing the state from
promoting or facilitating religion, but the case law has consistently clarified that the clause “is . .
. violated as much by government disapproval of religion as it is by government approval of
religion.” Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1396 (9th Cir. 1994).
The classroom has long been fertile ground for Establishment Clause claims based on a
hostility-to-religion theory. Schools have been a central battleground for good reason. Because
public schools are “sites for the creation of American identity,” the “[l]oss of control over what
[is] taught in the schools would be evidence of lost control over the public meaning of American
life.” Jennifer L. Bryan, “Talking ‘Religious, Superstitious Nonsense” in the Classroom: When
do Teachers’ Disparaging Comments about Religion Run Afoul of the Establishment Clause?, 86
S. CAL. L. REV. 1343, 1358 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has made clear that there is
an added degree of sensitivity and scrutiny when the practice being challenged takes place in
public schools because “families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family.” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583–84 (citations omitted). Therefore, “in no activity of the State
is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.” Id.
-8-
Despite the impassioned insistence by many that schools have grown increasingly hostile
to religion, charges of religious hostility have not fared well in the courts. Most of these claims
have come in the form of complaints about the content of public-school curricula, assertions that
the curricula either established religious hostility or the “religion” of secular humanism.
Ultimately, however, religious parents and students have not had much success in their attempts
to use the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause to force public schools to fashion
curricula they consider ideologically or theologically palatable. Courts have been skeptical of
these claims in part for a practical reason: devising a curriculum that would satisfy the demands
of all faiths in a religiously pluralistic society would surely be an impossible task. And even
more fundamentally, the case law has made clear that the First Amendment does not tolerate,
much less mandate, curricula that “cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in these cases have therefore been
unsuccessful because they have sought an unconstitutional remedy. It would violate the
Establishment Clause “to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106. The cases have ended
poorly for the plaintiffs no matter what element of the curriculum has been targeted, whether
secular humanism in general, sex education, evolution, or gay tolerance.
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test to determine whether Plaintiffs
will likely succeed on their religion clause claims against Defendants, the Court is mindful of the
particular concerns that arise in the context of public secondary schools but also that religious
challenges to school curricula, especially challenges to a particular book in a single course, have
-9-
proven unsuccessful. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that teaching The Learning Tree, a book that frequently disparaged Christianity, did not
violate the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause).
VI. DISCUSSION
The Court has closely read the Complaint (Doc. No. 1), the documents attached thereto,
and the arguments stated in the instant motion. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have, at least
initially, failed to make the required showing for a TRO.
As to the first consideration, the Court does not find enough evidence to support
Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants likely violated either the Establishment Clause or Free
Exercise Clause. In considering whether to grant a TRO, it is the burden of the plaintiff to
present the court with a forecast of evidence demonstrating likelihood of success. Here, Plaintiffs
did not put forward evidence that the school was endorsing the religious views contained in The
Poet X or that their son would be harmed by the school including the book in the ninth grade
English Language Arts curriculum.
The sincerity of Plaintiffs’ religious objections to The Poet X is not disputed, nor is the
fact that the book deeply offends Plaintiffs. Even accepting, however, that the work is
antithetical to the particular Christian beliefs espoused by Plaintiffs, its inclusion in the high
school curriculum alone does not violate the Establishment Clause. “[O]ne of the mandates of
the First Amendment is to promote a viable, pluralistic society and to keep government neutral,
not only between sects, but between believers and nonbelievers.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 716 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
-10-
Under Lemon, a state action or enactment does not violate the establishment clause if (1)
it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit
religion; and (3) it does not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at
612–13. Although clarity, in the current context, would be aided by substituting “non-religious”
for “alternative belief,” none of these factors supports a finding of likely impermissible
establishment in this case.
Plaintiffs largely rest their claim on Part 2 of the Lemon test by arguing that teaching The
Poet X has a primary effect of advancing alternative beliefs and inhibiting religion, but they also
allege violations of the other two prongs.
Here, Defendants state that the book was included within the curriculum for two entirely
non-religious (i.e., secular) and commendable purposes: (1) exposing students to different
cultural outlooks and (2) teaching literary form and mechanics. In marked contrast to the
orchestrated prayer, mandatory Bible reading, Decalogue, or creationism cases all of which
involved the school’s promoting religion, Plaintiffs have not presented adequate evidence that
The Poet X was selected by the school out of hostility toward Christianity or fealty to any
secularist credo. “The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). No such purpose has been adequately shown.
The crux of Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim is therefore that inclusion of The Poet
X in the public school curriculum has the primary effect of advancing the “religion” of
“alternative beliefs,” while being hostile toward Christianity, especially Catholicism. (Doc. No. 4
at 2). Plaintiffs insist that the book launches a “frontal assault on Christian beliefs and values.”
-11-
(Id.). Assuming, arguendo, that this characterization is correct, and that such views are consistent
with “with an alternative path to liberation and meaning,” (Id.) “‘not every law that confers an
“indirect,” “remote,” or “incidental” benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone,
constitutionally invalid.’ ” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). “Total separation of church and state is
simply impossible.” Grove, 753 F.2d at 1539 (Canby, J. concurring)(citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at
678-79). In other words, the First Amendment is not violated merely because particular
governmental activity “‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions.’” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980).
The issue is not whether The Poet X embodies anti-Christian elements; the Court assumes
that it does. Instead, the issue is whether its selection and retention by school officials
“communicat[es] a message of government endorsement” of those elements. It is not the purpose
of the public schools “to cultivate an official faith or ideology, whether religious or humanistic in
character....” Kauper, “Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court,” 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031,
1066 (1963). Yet, even the Bible may occupy a place in the classroom, provided education and
exposure do not become advocacy or endorsement. Abington, 374 U.S. at 225.
In assessing whether inclusion of The Poet X communicates governmental endorsement
or approval of its purportedly “anti-Christian” elements, the Court must first examine the work
as a whole. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. The passages identified by Plaintiffs are references to
religion in a work depicting a poor, Afro-Latina, adolescent’s painful process of coming of age.
These passages are less theology than anthropology, less commentary on religion than comment
prompted by the frustrating confrontation of adolescents with parents, sexual desire, religious
-12-
doubt, and loneliness. And while that distinction might be lost on third-graders, it is bound to be
understood by Plaintiffs’ son’s classmates—high school freshman confronting many of the same
questions, and doubtless beginning to appreciate many of the challenges of making decisions
about who they want to be.
Second, the Court must examine the work as a whole in the context of the entire
curriculum. Even though the Court is not aware of all the books in Defendant’s freshman
literature curriculum, surely this is not the only book to be read. Were the school board in
Plaintiffs’ district to require local principals to read over their public address systems a
resolution, drawn in words from the book, declaring Jesus Christ to be a “friend who texts too
much,” or “a friend we don’t think we need anymore,” there would be little doubt that the effect
would be to communicate governmental endorsement of anti-Christian sentiments. Here,
however, The Poet X bears the sole signature of its author, Elizabeth Acevedo. It is a work of
fiction, not dogmatic philosophy. It is one book, only tangentially “religious,” thematically
grouped with others in the freshman literature curriculum. And based on the evidence before the
Court at this early stage, the purpose and effect appears to be to expose students to the attitudes
and outlooks of an important American subculture.
Plaintiffs may be correct in suggesting that the work “hard[ly] ... constitutes the objective
study of Christianity”, yet objectivity in education need not inhere in each individual item
studied; if that were the requirement, precious little would be left to read. Instead, objectivity is
to be assessed with reference to the manner in which often highly partisan, subjective material is
presented, handled, and “integrated into the school curriculum, where [even] the Bible may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
-13-
religion, or the like.” Stone, 449 U.S. at 42; see Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 225. At this
time, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence about how the book is taught to prove the school is
being hostile to religion.
Similarly, inclusion of The Poet X as representative of a particular literary genre (slam
poetry / verse novel) neither religiously inhibits nor instills, but simply informs and educates,
students on a particular social outlook forged in the crucible of Afro-Latinx urban life. To
include the work in the curriculum, without further evidence of the school’s endorsement, no
more communicates governmental endorsement of the author’s or characters’ religious views
than to assign Paradise Lost, Pilgrim’s Progress, or The Divine Comedy conveys endorsement or
approval of Milton’s, Bunyan’s, or Dante’s Christianity.
It remains to be considered whether the work “inhibits” Catholicism, as Plaintiffs
contend. There is, at least initially, apparent merit to this claim. When the work does discuss
religion, it often does so in a fashion that generally casts doubt upon Catholic doctrine—from the
inerrancy of Scripture to the role of women in society. Nevertheless, in the context presented,
these passages do not offend the Establishment Clause.
First, the work’s purported hostility to religion may be more apparent than real. It is true
that questioning traditional religion is one of the topics of the work. Yet the same might be said
of celebrated authors such as Chaucer, Voltaire, Paine, Twain, or Sinclair Lewis. It is also true
that the adolescent protagonist in the The Poet X comes to doubt and question many of the
simple pieties she has been taught. In the novel, her mother quotes scripture to her while abusing
her, and she feels unloved and alone in the church. These circumstances lead to searching
questions and nagging doubts. But they are not new questions; even figures in the Bible like Job
-14-
doubted God’s goodness. Neither do Xiomara’s questions reflect hostility toward religion. In
fact, by the end of the novel, the protagonist has developed a better relationship to faith, and the
Catholic priest is critical to repairing the hurt that has defined her family for much of the novel.
Of course, Plaintiffs may personally support the traditional religious doctrines doubted by
the protagonist in The Poet X. The issue, however, is not whether the work disapproves of any
particular religious vision, including Plaintiffs’, but whether its inclusion in the public school
curriculum indicates, intentionally or not, that the government joins in that disapproval. Because
there has been an insufficient showing that Defendants endorse these views, it is not likely that
Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits.
As to the second consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not likely to suffer
irreparable harm absent an injunction because the school has provided accommodations to
Plaintiffs’ son that enable him to opt out of reading the book while still receiving the same
quality of instruction from a different English Language Arts certified teacher. In their brief,
Plaintiffs contend that allowing students to opt out of an activity is not sufficient to salvage an
unconstitutional policy. In doing so, they cite several Supreme Court cases where the Court held
that voluntary opt-out policies in schools did not remedy policies that violate the Establishment
Clause. But in each of the cited cases, the Court first made a finding that an Establishment
Clause violation had occurred. Here, no such finding has been made. For example, in Engel and
Abington School District, school districts mandated daily prayer, and the schools allowed
students to leave class during daily prayers if they objected to participation. 370 U.S. at 430; 374
U.S. at 224-25. In those cases, the Court found that the school had established a religion by
having the whole school participate in religious prayers. Therefore, giving the students the
-15-
chance to leave made them feel like outsiders of a government, established religious community.
Here, Defendants included a book hostile to certain forms of Christianity in a literature
curriculum, and Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence that Defendants endorse the
beliefs in the book in any way similar to the schools’ endorsement of religious prayer in Engel
and Abington School District. Furthermore, it has long been established that providing students
the ability to opt out of reading objectionable texts mitigates any potential Free Exercise
violation. See, e.g., Grove, 753 F.2d at 1533 (reasoning that allowing a student to opt out of
reading The Learning Tree mitigated against a finding of a Free Exercise violation).
As to the third factor, the balance of hardships weighs against issuing the TRO. While
this Court is sensitive to Plaintiffs’ desire to push The Poet X to later in the curriculum to give
this Court more time to hear a more developed case, the fact remains that granting the TRO
would require the school district to rearrange a carefully crafted curriculum. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs have been aware that this book was in the curriculum for months and waited until only
last week to file a complaint thereby leaving the school with little time to reformulate the English
Language Arts curriculum.
Fourthly, the Court has considered where the public interest lies. The public has an
interest in parents being able to control the religious upbringing of their children, but it also has
an interest in public schools being able to teach students using a thoughtfully established
curriculum. The Court can find no indicia at this point that teaching The Poet X will be
burdensome to Plaintiffs’ religious rights. This factor weighs against issuance of a TRO.
VII. CONCLUSION
-16-
In short, the four factors of the Winter test taken together weigh significantly against
issuing a TRO. The Court therefore concludes that a Temporary Restraining Order is an
inappropriate remedy as the Plaintiffs’ have not met their burden under the Winter test.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. Nos. 3, 4) is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expedite Review of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. No. 5), is GRANTED.
November 6, 2020
Max O. Cogburn i )
United States District Judge ttget
-|7-