The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:20-cv-00229-MR
TIMOTHY D. KING-EL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
FNU WILSON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 8].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Timothy D. King-El (“Plaintiff”) is a North Carolina state
inmate currently incarcerated at Scotland Correctional Institution in
Laurinburg, North Carolina. He filed this action on August 18, 2020, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on events alleged to have occurred at his
previous place of incarceration, Marion Correctional Institution (“Marion”).
[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff names Sergeant FNU Wilson, Assistant Unit Manger Saint
T. Tapp, and Unit Manager Jeffrey E. James, all employees of Marion, as
Defendants in this matter. [Id. at 3-4]. Plaintiff claims his rights under the
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution were
violated by Defendants’ conduct. [Id. at 7]. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
On 02/05/19 and again on 02/08/19 Sgt. Wilson and
Mr. Tapp; the Assistant Unit Manager on (F. Unit) at
Marion Corr. Inst. denial me the opportunity to go
through my personal property. To pick or choose
(ten books) of my belief, which are (Hindu or
Hinduism) which are my rights by the D.O.C. policy
at (M.C.I.) when I was assign to FU1W-02.1
Accordingly to the religion policy at (M.C.I.) And
accordingly to (step two) and (step three) of my
grievance response. Sgt. Wilson and Mr. Tapp; are
in violation of my rights by the D.O.C. policy at
(M.C.I.) It (state) in the (policy) offender is
encouraged to go through the items and work with
unit staff to get to the allowable amounts of property
within limits of M.C.I. policy.
I was denial the opportunity to go through my
(personal property) by policy at (M.C.I.) It’s also
(state) in the (religion policy.) However you can only
possess religious property for the religion you have
declared, which is currently Hindu. All my book’s that
I had on (Hindu or Hinduism.) Was in my personal
property. That they put in the (facility locker room,) at
M.C.I.
[Id. at 7 (grammatical errors uncorrected)]. Plaintiff also alleges, “[l]ike one
day after the incident, I believe it was on the same day after the incident, that
I sent a (Postage Debit Authorization Forms) to the Unit Asst. Manager Mr.
1 In another section of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that 30 books, nine magazines,
numerous hygiene products, and a Georgetown Law Journal were withheld from Plaintiff.
[Doc. 1 at 5].
Capp and Unit Manager Mr. J. Jones [illegible].”2 [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff also filed grievance records as exhibits to his Complaint. [See
Doc. 1-1]. These records reflect that Plaintiff had moved several times
between E and F units at Marion between the middle of December 2018 and
early 2019 and that Plaintiff’s personal property inventories reflect that
Plaintiff was over the limit on the number of books he was allowed to possess
in his cell. [See Doc. 1-1 at 3]. In the Step Three response to a January 11,
2019 grievance filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff was “encouraged to work with unit
staff to get to the allowable amounts of property.” [Id.]. Plaintiff was further
advised that he “may have reading material from any religious group as long
as [he is] within the property limits.” [Id.].
For injuries, Plaintiff claims he was denied the opportunity to go
through his personal property at Marion and that he suffered “a lot of stress
about his personal property.” [Id. at 5, 7].
For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages or, in the alternative,
injunctive relief, including being allowed to go through his property according
to “M.C.I. policy” and having his property sent to his home. [Id. at 8].
2 It appears here that Plaintiff may have inadvertently referred to Defendant Unit Manager
Jeffry E. James as “Unit Manager Mr. J. Jones.” [Doc. 1 at 5]. This discrepancy is of no
consequence because, regardless of the true identity of this Defendant, Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim against him, and he will be dismissed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff contends that his rights under the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the above-described conduct.
Giving Plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, it appears he is
alleging that, when he was transferred to F Unit at Marion, his personal
property, including his religious materials, was placed in a “facility locker
room” and Defendants Wilson and Tapp did not give Plaintiff the opportunity
to go through this property to retrieve certain materials because he already
had the maximum allowed personal property in his cell. Apparently, this
effectively prevented Plaintiff from having the ten (10) religious books related
to his declared religion, Hinduism, that he was allowed to have in his cell. As
to Defendant James, Plaintiff only alleges that Plaintiff sent him and
Defendant Capp a “Postage Debit Authorization Form,” presumably for use
in mailing Plaintiff’s materials “to the home address [Plaintiff] gave them.”
[Id. at 5].
A. First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”
U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). To state a free exercise claim under the First
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that he held a
sincere religious belief, and that the official action or regulation substantially
burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989). Here, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the
benefit of every reasonable inference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim against Defendants Tapp and Wilson is not clearly
frivolous. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a First Amendment claim
against Defendant James, alleging only that Plaintiff gave James a postage
debit authorization form to send Plaintiff’s property to his home address.
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant James, therefore, fails
initial review.
B. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff claims the alleged conduct violated his rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners
from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of
confinement. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “Prison
conditions may be harsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Dixon v.
Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, taking Plaintiff’s
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983 for violation of the Eighth
Amendment in relation to his personal property. Plaintiff’s claim that he was
not allowed to go through his personal property and retrieve certain books
simply does not fall within the protections of the Eighth Amendment. As
such, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim does not survive initial review.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff purports to bring his claim under the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging the Fourteenth Amendment “means
that the government can’t discriminate against [him] or treat [him] poorly
because of [his] religion.” [Doc. 1 at 7].
To establish an equal protection violation, Plaintiff first must
demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he
is similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was the result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d
648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the plaintiff must set forth “specific,
non-conclusory factual allegations that establish an improper [discriminatory]
motive.” Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts that he was treated differently from others with whom he is
similarly situated. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts tending to show
that Defendants participated in any purposeful discrimination. Thus, Plaintiff
has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against
either Defendant. This claim, therefore, fails initial review.
Finally, because Plaintiff has been transferred from Marion to Scotland
CI, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are moot and will be dismissed.
Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim against Defendants Wilson and Tapp is not clearly
frivolous. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a claim against Defendant
James, and he will be dismissed. Further, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief
will be dismissed.
This Court recently enacted Local Rule 4.3, which sets forth a
procedure to waive service of process for current and former employees of
the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) in actions filed
by North Carolina State prisoners. In light of the Court's determination that
this case passes initial review in accordance with this Order, the Court will
order the Clerk of Court to commence the procedure for waiver of service as
set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Defendants Wilson and Tapp, who are
alleged to be current or former employees of the NCDPS.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall commence
the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for
Defendants Wilson and Tapp, who are alleged to be current or former
employees of NCDPS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims asserted in this matter as
to all Defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice, with the exception
of the First Amendment claim against Defendants Wilson and Tapp, which
is allowed to pass initial review.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief in
this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: October 23, 2020
ie ee
Chief ca States District Judge AS