Torres v. Davis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:18-cv-00314-MR

JONATHAN ANTHONY LEE TORRES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

FNU DAVIS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the parties’ Motions for

Summary Judgment [Docs. 39, 47]. Also pending are Plaintiff’s “Motion to

Amend and Consolidation LCvR 42.1” [Doc. 31] and Motion to Appoint

Counsel [Doc. 34].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Amended Complaint [Doc. 16] addresses incidents

that allegedly occurred at the Buncombe County Detention Facility (“BCDF”).

The Defendants are: Michael Davis, a BCDF shift sergeant; Aaron Uldricks,

a BCDF detention officer; Kim Caraway, a BCDF administrative support

associate; and Desiree Ruff, a BCDF administrative support specialist. The

Amended Complaint passed initial review on two alleged First Amendment

violations regarding interference with Plaintiff’s mail. First, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Davis improperly threw away an outgoing piece of mail on

August 30, 2018 as contraband. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Uldricks, Caraway, and/or Ruff improperly returned to sender an incoming

piece of legal mail from Plaintiff’s lawyer during the first two weeks of

September 2018. Plaintiff seeks damages.

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 39], arguing

that they are entitled to qualified immunity because no constitutional violation

occurred and they did not violate any of Plaintiff’s clearly established rights.

Plaintiff was informed of the legal standard that applies to summary

judgment motions and of the importance of filing a persuasive response to

Defendants’ Motion. [Doc. 43]. However, rather than responding to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed his own Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 47] to which he has attached a Declaration and

exhibits. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in his

favor and that the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense should be

rejected. Defendants filed a Response. [Doc. 49].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To

withstand a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely

on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one

inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.

Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311, (4th Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

The First Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth

Amendment, prohibits states from “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.

Const. Amend. I. This proscription “extends to both government regulations

that directly burden speech and those that have indirect chilling effects.”

Haze v. Harrison, 961 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2020). As a general matter,

prisoners have the right to both send and receive mail. See Thornburgh v.

Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).

Restrictions on this right are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.1 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see, e.g.,

1 It appears that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incidents at issue. The

same standard applies to pretrial detainees and prisoners in the context of alleged First

Amendment violations. See Haze, 961 F.3d at 658.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (a prisoner’s First Amendment

interest in corresponding does not preclude prison officials from examining

mail to ensure that it does not contain contraband; prison officials may open

mail from an attorney that is addressed to a petitioner only in the prisoner’s

presence).

Section 1983 “will not support a recovery for mere negligence.”

Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327 (1986)). Further, isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d

925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (“few isolated instances of plaintiff’s [legal] mail being

opened out of his presence” that were “either accidental or the result of

unauthorized subordinate conduct … were not of constitutional mandate.”);

Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“an isolated incident of

mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”);

Pearson v. Simms, 345 F.Supp.2d 515, 519 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 88 F. App’x

639 (4th Cir. 2004) (“occasional incidents of delay or non-delivery of mail are

not actionable under § 1983”).

Qualified immunity “shields police officers who commit constitutional

violations from liability when, based on clearly established law, they could

reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Estate of Jones by Jones

v. City of Martinsburg, W. Virginia, 961 F.3d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2020), as

amended (June 10, 2020) (internal citation omitted). To determine whether

qualified immunity applies, the courts conduct a two-step inquiry, in either

order: “(1) whether a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) whether the

right was clearly established at the time of the violation….” Booker v. S.

Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017). The doctrine of

qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d

95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff claims that his mail was mishandled on two occasions. The

first was on August 30, 2018, when Defendant Davis threw away one piece

of outgoing mail. Defendant Davis states in his Affidavit that he was

reviewing outgoing mail for the shift when he “found that Plaintiff had

submitted a letter for mailing with a return address of a different detention

facility and the name of a different inmate” [Doc. 39-2: Davis Aff. at 3], which

is a violation of Policy 400-11 and the Inmate Handbook. [Doc. 39-2 at 4;

Doc. 39-2: BCSO Policy and Procedure Manual at 6; Doc. 39-2: BCDF

Inmate Handbook at 8]. In Defendant Davis’ experience as a detention

officer, “an inmate will put the incorrect return address on a letter in an

attempt to get a letter delivered to another inmate in another facility without

paying postage or to avoid having the other facility inspect the contents of

the letter.” [Doc. 39-2: Davis Aff. at 3]. As neither Policy 400-11 nor the

Inmate Handbook gives guidance as to what to do in this situation, Defendant

Davis discussed the matter with another shift supervisor. They both agreed

that “the letter constituted contraband and was an attempt by the inmate to

defraud the postal system.” [Id. at 4]. Defendant Davis therefore threw away

the letter rather than returning it to Plaintiff and informed Plaintiff that he did

so because the letter was in violation of policy. [Id.]. Plaintiff lost his free

time on August 30, 2018 for this violation. [See Doc. 47-9: Incident Report].

Defendant Davis states that Plaintiff’s letter was the only letter that Davis has

ever thrown away and “[t]he only reason [he] threw away Plaintiff’s letter was

that [he] believed the letter to be contraband.” [Doc. 39-2: Davis Aff. at 5].

Plaintiff filed a grievance addressing the matter. [Doc. 47-10 at 1].

Lieutenant Jeffrey Littrell found that Plaintiff should have placed the correct

return address on the envelope but that Davis should not have thrown away

the letter. [Doc. 39-6: Littrell Affidavit; Doc. 39-6 at 10: Grievance Response].

Plaintiff was given new paper and a new envelope to re-send his letter [Doc.

39-6 at 10: Grievance Response], and Captain Gould apologized for the

incident [Doc. 47-12 at 1]. Defendant Davis was instructed to place

contraband letters in the inmate’s personal belongings rather than throwing

them away. [Doc. 39-2: Davis Aff. at 4].

The second incident occurred in early September 2018, when a piece

of incoming legal mail from Plaintiff’s defense lawyer was returned to sender.

Defendants Caraway, Ruff, and Uldricks, who are responsible for intaking

and processing incoming inmate mail, filed affidavits regarding the period in

question. They state that Defendants Caraway and Ruff are responsible for

receiving the mail and determining whether the inmate is currently residing

in the Facility. [Doc. 39-3: Uldricks Aff. at 1-2; Doc. 39-4: Caraway Aff. at 1-

2; Doc. 39-5: Ruff Aff. at 1-2]. If the inmate is not residing in the Facility, the

mail is returned to the sender. [Id.]. If the inmate is residing at the Facility,

Defendants Caraway and Ruff forward the mail to Defendant Uldricks, who

sorts the mail and screens it for compliance with Policy 400-11. [Id.].

Defendants Caraway, Ruff, and Uldricks have no personal knowledge

of receiving any legal mail for Plaintiff or returning to sender any legal mail

for Plaintiff between August 1, 2018 and September 30, 2018. [Doc. 39-3:

Uldricks Aff. at 3; Doc. 39-4: Caraway Aff. at 2; Doc. 39-5: Ruff Aff. at 2]. If

Defendant Uldricks had received legal mail for Plaintiff, he would have

forwarded the legal mail to Plaintiff’s housing unit. [Doc. 39-3: Uldricks Aff.

at 3]. Neither Uldricks, Caraway, nor Ruff has ever intentionally returned a

piece of legal mail to the sender while knowing that the inmate is a resident

of the Facility. [Id.; Doc. 39-4: Caraway Aff. at 2; Doc. 39-5: Ruff Aff. at 2].

Lieutenant Littrell states that, other than the two mail incidents

addressed in the Amended Complaint, he could not find any other grievance

regarding Plaintiff’s mail. [Doc. 39-6: Littrell Aff.].

Plaintiff has filed sworn statements in which he aserts that there is no

“actual proof” that the return address on the outgoing letter was wrong; that

the facts show that Plaintiff’s mail was inspected before it reached Defendant

Davis; and that “[t]here is no reason why [Plaintiff would] need to put wrong

return address on mail” because the policy does not prohibit BCDF inmates

from writing to an inmate at another facility. [Doc. 47-2 at 2; see 47-3 at 4-

5]. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Davis should have known that

the allegedly incorrect outgoing letter should have been returned to Plaintiff

rather than being thrown away because all BCDF employees receive the

same training. Plaintiff appears to suggest that this incident may be

connected to a conversation that he had with Defendant Davis on August 29,

2018, when he asked Davis about “how SBI works” in the context of a

“situation with Sgt. Nathan Ball and body-cam video.”2 [Doc. 47-3 at 2].

2 Plaintiff fails to explain why this conversation would have prompted Defendant Davis to

retaliate against Plaintiff. Nor does Plaintiff explicitly allege that any retaliation occurred.

With regards to the legal mail, Plaintiff argues that because all BCDF

employees receive the same training, Defendants Caraway, Ruff and

Uldricks should have knowledge about the legal mail mistake. Plaintiff notes

that there are gaps in the mail logs and that either Defendant Caraway, Ruff,

or Uldricks must have rejected his legal mail. [Doc. 47-3 at 2].

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to refute Defendants’ assertions

that the outgoing letter’s return address violated policy and that Defendant

Davis’ destruction of the letter was based on his mistaken but good-faith

interpretation of BCDF policy. Plaintiff also fails to refute Defendants

Caraway, Ruff, and Uldricks’ assertions that they did not purposely

mishandle Plaintiff’s incoming legal mail. The existence of these two

unrelated instances of negligent mail mishandling by distinct Defendants

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Buie, 717

F.2d at 926; Davis, 320 F.3d at 351; Pearson, 345 F.Supp.2d at 519. Nor

has Plaintiff demonstrated that Defendants violated any clearly established

right. As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Booker,

855 F.3d at 538. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

will be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

Because this case is dismissed, Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend and [for]

Consolidation LCvR 42.1” [Doc. 31], in which he seeks to correct Defendants’

names and the capacities in which they are being sued, and Plaintiff's Motion

to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 34], will be denied as moot.?

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment, deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and

deny as moot Plaintiff's pending motions.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 39] is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 47] is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff's “Motion to Amend and Consolidation LCvR 42.1” [Doc. 31]

and Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 34] are DENIED as moot.

4. This action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

5. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: July 21, 2020

a i

< Reidinger wey

Chief United States District Judge ely

3 Even if the Motion to Appoint Counsel were not moot, it would be denied because

Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances. See Miller

v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4 Cir. 1987) (a plaintiff must present “exceptional

circumstances” in order to require the Court to seek the assistance of a private attorney

for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel).

10