Fisher v. Cathey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:19-cv-00519-MR

ROBERT ANTHONY FISHER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

EDDIE CATHEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Complaint

[Doc. 1]. Also pending are Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents

[Doc. 11] and Motion to Compel [Doc. 13]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis. [Doc. 9].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983,1 complaining about incidents that allegedly occurred at the

Union County Jail. Plaintiff names as Defendants: Union County Sheriff

Eddie Cathey; Captain Miles, the Union County Jail Administrator;

1 Plaintiff also claims jurisdiction according to “Negligence, Federal Tampering with Mail”

[Doc. 1 at 1], however, this theory provides no basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. See

generally Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2000) (federal criminal statutes do not

ordinarily create individual rights); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995) (negligent

deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Lieutenant Adcock; Sergeant Medlin; Detention Officer Orlando; and

Detention Officer Hargis.

In his Complaint,2 Plaintiff describes the causes of action as “Violating

Mail Privileges,” and “Coercion, threats & theft, cover up.” [Doc. 1 at 3].

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Orlando and Hargis removed his property,

including his legal mail, when they took him to “Admin” on March 26, 2019,

at which point all of Plaintiff’s documents went missing. [Doc. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants Orlando and Hargis “threaten[ed] [Plaintiff] with

coercion.” [Doc. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Medlin,

Adcock and Miles viewed video surveillance of the incident. [Doc. 1 at 3].

Plaintiff asserts that he believes that “Jail Admin” is trying to cover up

something. [Doc. 1 at 5]. For injuries, Plaintiff alleges that the loss of his

property rendered him unable to establish a defense in his criminal case. He

also alleges mental anguish and physical stress. He appears to seek the

termination of Defendants Orlando and Hargis’ employment and $950,000 in

damages. [Doc. 1 at 5].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

2 Portions of the Complaint are illegible.

grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district

court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set forth

a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

As a threshold matter, to the extent that Plaintiff was convicted of the

offenses for which he claims he was deprived access to the courts, Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the

United States Supreme Court held as follows:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction and

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a

§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

Plaintiff’s success on the claim that the loss of his documents deprived

him of a criminal defense would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction in the underlying criminal matter. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 353 (1996) (to satisfy the injury requirement of an access to courts

claim, the prisoner must demonstrate that his nonfrivolous post-conviction or

civil rights legal claim has been frustrated or impeded). Plaintiff is now in the

custody of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety and has not

alleged that a conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.3

Therefore, this claim appears to be barred by Heck.

Plaintiff’s other claims are insufficient to proceed. Plaintiff makes no

factual allegations whatsoever with regards to Defendant Cathey. See

generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (a short and plain statement of the claim is

required). To the extent that Plaintiff alleges Defendants Medlin, Adcock and

Miles viewed a videotape, that Defendants Orlando and Hargis threatened

and coerced him, and that a cover-up occurred, these claims are too vague

and conclusory to state a plausible claim against any Defendant. Id. These

allegations will therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

IV. PENDING MOTIONS

First, Plaintiff has filed a Request for Production of Documents in which

he seeks discovery from Defendants in this action [Doc. 11]. The Request

will be denied as premature as the Complaint has not passed initial review,

Defendants have not been served, and discovery has not commenced. In

3 Plaintiff’s address of record is at the Piedmont Correctional Institution. The NCDPS

website indicates that Plaintiff is presently incarcerated on multiple charges of robbery

and witness intimidation.

addition to being premature, this Request has also been misdirected to the

Court. See LCvR 26.2.

Second, in his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff asks the Court to intervene

in a dispute between Plaintiff and the Jail with regards to a medical debt.

[Doc. 13]. The Court declines to insert itself into a dispute between Plaintiff

in the Jail, and therefore, the Motion will be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant. The

Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so

chooses, to show that Heck does not apply and to otherwise properly state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend

his Complaint, this action will be dismissed without prejudice and without

further notice to Plaintiff.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)

days in which to amend the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this

Order. If Plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order

and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed without

prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Production of

Documents [Doc. 11] and Motion to Compel [Doc. 13] are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: June 8, 2020

5 a □□

£ Reidinger ay,

Chief United States District Judge AY