The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00116-MR
QUAMAINE DESHAWN )
CARMICHAEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
FNU MURPHY, et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Complaint
[Doc. 1]. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Complaint [Doc. 8].
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 7].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for incidents that allegedly occurred at the Marion Correctional
Institution. Liberally construing the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is also
attempting to state a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Plaintiff names as Defendants: Dr. Murphy, a mental health administrator;
Julia Jenkins, a program director; D. Cothron, an assistant warden of
programs, and H. Corpening, Marion C.I.’s warden.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Murphy arranged in late 2017 for
Plaintiff to consult with a psychiatrist, who determined that medication was
sufficient to treat Plaintiff’s mental illness. Plaintiff was prescribed
psychotropic medication in January 2018, and he was classified as Mental
Health Level Three (“M-3”). [Doc. 1-1 at 1].
Prior to the M-3 classification, Plaintiff had been “coerced” to
participate in Marion C.I’s Rehabilitative Diversion Unit (“RDU”),1 where he
remained for approximately 10 months. [Doc. 1-1 at 3]. Plaintiff alleges that
the RDU is not suitable for his mental health classification; that the “facility[’s]
designees”2 are incapable of ensuring that Plaintiff’s received his prescribed
medication on a continual basis as ordered; and that Defendants helped
other “similarly situated inmates” to be transported to “proper treatment
centers for mental health purposes.” [Doc. 1-1 at 2-3].
Plaintiff further alleges that he was an “individual with a disability” who
was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the Therapeutic Diversion
Unit (“TDU”), a special needs program for mentally ill offenders who are
transitioning from disciplinary restrictions into regular population, which
1 The RDU program at Marion “was created as part of NCDPS’s recent policy reforms
regarding restrictive housing in the North Carolina prisons.” Covington v. Lassiter, No.
1:16-cv-00387-FDW, 2017 WL 3840280, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2017) (discussing RDU
program at Marion C.I.).
2 Plaintiff does not identify these individuals.
“deprived Plaintiff [of] the ability to receive proper therapy and services of a
mental health Level 3 facility.” [Doc. 1-1 at 2, 4].
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied reasonable accommodations for
his disability after he made Dr. Murphy aware of the issue. He alleges that
Defendant Jenkins, as the RDU administrator, has direct knowledge of
RDU’s structure and the clinical status for which the program was designed,
and that “Plaintiff’s change in acuity level mandated that Defendant [Jenkins]
be made aware.” [Doc. 1-1 at 2]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cothron
“is responsible for proper management of all institutional programs” at
Marion C.I., and that Defendant Corpening “has final authority and
responsibility for all matters occurring within the institution.” [Id.].
As injury, Plaintiff alleges that his “condition worsened” such that he
“lacks the ability to effectively amalgamate into daily activities and operations
of normal life.” [Doc. 1-1 at 5]. He further alleges that he suffered from
mental and emotional injury due to solitary confinement, delayed
rehabilitation, and being denied the opportunity to attend his father’s funeral.3
[Doc. 1-1 at 5]. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 in damages.
3 Plaintiff alleges with regards to his father’s funeral that: “Plaintiff sustained pain and
suffering where denial of services prohibited him from attending funeral arrangements of
his father as RDU sanction matrix prohibits such action. As well as emotional injury
without injury incurred did delay rehabilitation and reform and closure towards first-degree
family loss.” [Doc. 1-1 at 5].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §
1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress
from governmental entities, officers, or employees).
In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set
forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
A § 1983 claim can be brought against a state official in three different
capacities: in his personal capacity, his official capacity, or in a more limited
way, his supervisory capacity. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223–24
(4th Cir. 2016). For personal liability, “it is enough to show that the official,
acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). In an official-capacity suit,
however, “[m]ore is required:” the suit is “treated as a suit against the entity,”
which must then be a “‘moving force’ behind the deprivation.” King, 825 F.3d
at 223 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). Thus,
the entity’s “‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of
federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Meanwhile, a supervisor can be liable where (1)
he knew that his subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his response
showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged
offensive practices;” and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link”
between his inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d
791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It appears that Plaintiff is asserting his claims against Defendants
Jenkins, Cothron, and Corpening under a theory of supervisory liability.
However, Plaintiff fails to make any plausible allegations that any of these
Defendants knew of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury or that any of
these Defendants displayed deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization
of their subordinates’ allegedly wrongful conduct. The allegations as stated
in Plaintiff’s Complaint provide no basis for a § 1983 claim against these
Defendants, and therefore the claims against them will be dismissed without
prejudice.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim of a violation of due process,
Plaintiff does not have a federally protected liberty interest in any particular
housing or classification unless it exceeds the scope of his original sentence
and imposes an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
“[C]hanges in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in
conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation) and the
denial of privileges … are necessarily functions of prison management that
must be left to the broad discretion of prison administrators to enable them
to manage prisons safely and efficiently.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340,
343 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
Plaintiff appears to allege that he was forced to participate in the RDU
without due process. This claim fails because Plaintiff had no right to any
particular classification during his imprisonment. Nor has he demonstrated
that the conditions that he experienced in the RDU presented atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See,
e.g., James-Bey v. N.C. Dep’t of Public Safety, 2019 WL 5198490 (W.D.N.C.
Oct. 15, 2019) (dismissing procedural due process RDU claim on initial
review); Watson v. Jenkins, 2019 WL 4780860 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019)
(same). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to state a due process
claim with regards to his placement in RDU, it will be dismissed.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that “involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “It not
only outlaws excessive sentences but also protects inmates from inhumane
treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
756, 761 (4th Cir.1996). Prison official must provide sentenced prisoners with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and “take reasonable
measures to guarantee the[ir] safety….” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526-27 (1984); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994). To
establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must
prove two elements: (1) “the deprivation of [a] basic human need was
objectively sufficiently serious,” and (2) “subjectively the officials act[ed] with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quotation omitted)).
This constitutional guarantee encompasses a right to medical care for
serious medical needs, including psychological needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 103-04. To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
or psychological need, a plaintiff must show that he had serious medical
needs and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those
needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir.
2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). A “serious
medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241
(internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, “the treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th
Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825.
However, mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852.
First, Plaintiff appears to allege that the conditions in the RDU program
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, Plaintiff has failed to
describe any conditions of the RDU that are sufficiently serious to rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that any of
the Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind. Therefore, this claim will
be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a serious psychological need by depriving him of treatment in
the TDU and failing to ensure he received his prescribed medication as
ordered. Although Plaintiff feels that RDU is unsuitable for him and he
wanted to be placed in the TDU instead, his treatment preferences do not
form the basis of a deliberate indifference claim, even if his psychological
condition is as serious as he asserts. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,
849 (4th Cir.1985) (a “[d]isagreement[ ] between an inmate and a physician
over the inmate's proper medical care,” has been consistently found to fall
short of showing deliberate indifference). Plaintiff’s allegation that Marion
C.I. personnel were incapable of administering his medication as prescribed
is too vague and conclusory to proceed. Plaintiff does not allege that any
Defendant personally failed to provide him with the medication as prescribed
or that they were even aware of any problems with his medication, or that
any issues with his medication were anything more than negligent.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims will be dismissed.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that
“[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection
requirement “does not take from the States all power of classification,”
Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979), but “keeps
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). To
succeed on an equal protection claim, a § 1983 plaintiff “must first
demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he
is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d
648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff alleges, in an entirely conclusory manner, that Defendants
aided similarly situated prisoners to be transferred out of Marion C.I.
However, Plaintiff fails to identify his own psychological condition, identify
other inmates with a similar condition, or allege that any alleged
discrimination was purposeful. Therefore, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim
will be dismissed.
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which
he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Constantine v. George
Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,
467 (4th Cir. 1999). States are obligated to make “reasonable modifications”
to enable the disabled person to receive the services or participate in
programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s unspecified psychological condition
is a disability under the ADA, he has failed to allege that he is qualified to
participate in the TDU or any other program from which he was excluded, or
that such exclusion was due to his alleged disability. Plaintiff has thus failed
to set forth an ADA violation and this claim will be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Complaint [Doc. 8] will be denied as
moot because the Complaint has failed to pass initial review.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant. The
Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so
chooses, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Should Plaintiff
fail to timely amend his Complaint, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)
days in which to amend the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Order. If Plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order
and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Service of
Complaint [Doc. 8] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 24, 2020
Sos
Chief United States District Judge AS
12