recognizing courts “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing courts “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:19-CV-00080-MOC-WCM
JILLIAN WEBSTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) ORDER
ANDREW M. SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________________)
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Jillian Webster’s applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, requesting an order of reversal and remand for rehearing. (Doc. No. 9). The
Commissioner in turn filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting affirmance. (Doc. No.
12). In a Memorandum and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Metcalf determined Plaintiff’s
motion should be denied and the Commissioner’s should be granted. (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiff filed
an objection, asserting the ALJ failed to create a logical bridge connecting the evidence to his
ultimate findings of non-disability. (Doc. No. 20). As explained below, the Court agrees with
Plaintiff and will thus remand this case to the ALJ for a decision consistent with this Order.
Magistrate Judge Metcalf’s Memorandum and Recommendation carefully discusses the
administrative record and the ALJ’s final decision. The litigants do not object to that discussion,
so the Court incorporates it for this review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v.
De Leon-Ramirez, 925 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2019). Instead, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ
failed to logically explain how he ultimately concluded: (1) that Plaintiff suffers only moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace; and (2) that those limitations do not preclude
Plaintiff from working on a regular and continuing basis. (Doc. No. 20).
When evaluating a claimant’s disability, the Commissioner has a duty to consider and
explain what effect limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace will have on the claimant’s
residual functional capacity. See Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2015). A proper
explanation must highlight pertinent evidence, draw conclusions from that evidence, and provide
a logical explanation linking the evidence to the ultimate conclusion. See Thomas v. Berryhill,
916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir.), as amended (Feb. 22, 2019); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694
(4th Cir. 2018). Where the ALJ fails to provide a logical explanation, it “frustrates [the Court’s]
ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, requiring [it] to vacate and remand.” Thomas, 916
F.3d at 312. Otherwise, the Court would “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983).
When evaluating Plaintiff’s impairments at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from only moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 27). In so finding, the ALJ reasoned that, although Plaintiff
“reported some difficulty with her memory and completing tasks due to limited concentration and
focus, . . . she was able to watch television and use the internet properly,” and “could handle money
and pay bills [when] she has the finances.” (Id.). And when evaluating how these limitations
affected residual functional capacity, the ALJ discounted concerns about Plaintiff’s “decreased
concentration,” noting “she indicated she could handle her own personal care, take medications,
care for pets, perform household chores, prepare daily meals, watch television, shop, and use the
internet.” (Id. at 31). The ALJ did not otherwise explain how he determined that she suffered
from only moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. Nor did the ALJ explain
why these limitations do not preclude Plaintiff from working on a regular or continuing basis.
Standing alone, “the ability to perform sporadic daily activities is not inconsistent with a
claim of disability.” Reinhardt v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-488, 2015 WL 1756480, at *4 (W.D.N.C.
Apr. 17, 2015) (citing Totten v. Califano, 624 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1980)). Consequently, “an ALJ
must explain how he determined that performing a certain activity for a short period translates into
an ability to perform a different activity for a full workday.” Id.; see Brown v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding an ALJ erred by discrediting a claimant’s
symptom testimony based on “daily activities” where the “ALJ did not acknowledge the extent of
those activities” and “provided no explanation as to how those particular activities . . . showed that
he could persist through an eight-hour workday”). That required explanation was lacking here.
Attempting to avoid this result, the Commissioner points out that the ALJ elsewhere
observed Plaintiff generally has “good cognition.” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 32). Indeed, some record
evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s cognition generally—and concentration specifically—is not
impaired. (See Doc. No. 17 at 9 n.3 (collecting such evidence)). Still, as the ALJ acknowledged,
other evidence shows Plaintiff suffers from “decreased concentration.” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 31; see
id. at 27 (citing Exhibits B4E and B9E)). In his decision, the ALJ weighed the conflicting evidence
and found that Plaintiff suffered moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.
(Doc. No. 8-1 at 23). The Court will not circumvent shortcomings in the ALJ’s limitations analysis
by simply ignoring that finding. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (recognizing courts “may not
supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given”).
In sum, the ALJ’s decision failed to explain why Plaintiff’s sporadic daily activities
translated into an ability to perform different activities for a full workday. This failure frustrates
the Court’s review. Because reviewing courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute
their judgment for that of the ALJ, the Court will remand the case and allow the ALJ to evaluate
the evidence in the first instance. See Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013).
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection to the Memorandum and
Recommendation (Doc. No. 20) is SUSTAINED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 9) is GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is
DENIED. Pursuant to the power of this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ALJ’s final decision is
REVERSED, and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social Security for a
decision consistent with this Order.
Signed: March 23, 2020
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Max O. Cogburn i yg
United States District Judge Tie ga