reasonableness determined by information possessed by the officer
How later courts described this case
- reasonableness determined by information possessed by the officer
- stating that “[a]lthough the other defendants ... did not join in the motion for summary judgment, the rationale for granting [the moving defendant's] motion applies equally to them” and, thus, granting summary judgment as to all defendants
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:17-cv-204-FDW
TIMOTHY UZZELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
FNU MURRAY, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by
Defendants Christopher Nichols and Darren Daves. (Doc. 24).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On November 8, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Timothy Uzell, an inmate in the custody of the
North Carolina Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”), currently incarcerated at Alexander
Correctional Institution (“Alexander”) in Taylorsville, North Carolina, filed this action, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants Kyle Murray, Christopher Nichols, Darren Daves, and
Owen Blanton, all of whom are alleged to have been working as correctional officers at Alexander
at all relevant times. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force against him on March
27, 2015. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
On September 10, 2018, Defendants Nichols and Daves filed the pending summary
judgment motion. (Doc. 24). On September 13, 2018, this Court entered an order in accordance
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with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements
for filing a response to the motion for summary judgment and of the manner in which evidence
could be submitted to the Court. Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and
the time to do so has passed.1 Thus, this matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Factual Background
1. Plaintiff’s Allegations
The unedited allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint are as follows:
On the date of 3/27/2015 at approximately 2 p.m. I was escorted out of my
cell by Lt. Nichols, Officer Daves, Officer Murray, and Officer Blanton to the
upstairs shower. After Officer Daves secured the shower door by locking it with
me inside he opened the trap door to take the handcuffs off of me. A brief struggle
happened and Officer Blanton along with Officer Murray and Lt. Nichols helped
subdue my arms while Officer Blanton and Officer Daves held my left arm. Lt.
Nichols and Officer Murray began to bend my fingers trying to break them. As I
began to tell for him to stop Lt. Nichols said to Officer Murray to not break all of
my fingers just 1 and maybe one more. At that time Officer Murray took my index
finger and began pulling it towards my thumb while pulling my other 3 fingers in
the opposite direction, splitting the webbing in between my fingers. I had to get
stitches as well as now physical therapy caused by damaged nerves in my hand
from the excessive force that was used. A violation of my Eighth Amendment.
(Doc. 1 at 3-4).
2. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Materials
In support of the summary judgment motion, Defendants rely on the pleadings and all the
attachments to the pleadings, including but not limited to the following (1) the Declaration of
Lauren Carcioppolo (“Carci Decl.”); (2) the Declaration of Raymond Hamilton (“Hamilton
Decl.”), a non-party who was employed as a correctional captain at Alexander and was the
1 Because Plaintiff did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, he is deemed to
have abandoned his claims. See Crosby v. Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 637 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011). In
an abundance of caution, however, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
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investigating officer with respect to the incident; (3) the Declaration of Christopher Nichols
(“Nichols Decl.”), a named defendant who was employed as a correctional lieutenant at Alexander;
and (4) the Declaration of Darren Daves (“Daves Decl.”), a named defendant who was employed
as a correctional officer at Alexander.
Defendants’ summary judgment materials show that on March 27, 2015, at approximately
14:00 hours, Lt. Nichols and Officers Daves, Murray, and Blanton were called to restrictive
housing after Plaintiff smeared feces on his cell wall and the cell window of his door and refused
orders to submit to handcuffs. (Doc. 24-7: Ex. F (p. 1 of Incident Report)). Upon Lt. Nichols’s
arrival, he observed what looked and smell like feces smeared all over Plaintiff’s cell window.
(Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12: Nichols Decl.). Lt. Nichols ordered Plaintiff to clean an area of his window so
he could observe his actions before having him submit to restraints. (Id.). Plaintiff complied with
Lt. Nichols’s order to clean the window and submitted to restraints. (Id.).
Lt. Nichols, Officer Daves, and Officer Murray then escorted Plaintiff to the shower so he
could clean the feces off of himself. (Id.). When the officers and Plaintiff reached the shower,
Plaintiff entered the shower; the shower door was secured; and Plaintiff turned around and stuck
his hands through the trap door to allow staff to remove his handcuffs. (Id.; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10:
Daves Decl.). Officer Daves then released the handcuffs from Plaintiff’s right hand. (Doc. 24-8
at ¶ 12; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). After his right hand was free from the handcuffs, Plaintiff, in one rapid
motion, spun around and lunged through the trap opening toward staff, striking Lt. Nichols in the
forearm near his elbow. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶12).
After striking Lt. Nichols, Plaintiff grabbed Officer Daves’ right hand and began twisting
and pulling violently. (Id.; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). Officer Daves ordered Plaintiff to let go of him.
(Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). Plaintiff then grabbed Officer Murray’s keys. (Id.). Officer
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Murray struggled with Plaintiff to try to maintain control of his keys. (Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). Staff
continued to attempt to pry Plaintiff’s hand off Officer Daves’ hand. (Id.). As Plaintiff was losing
his grip on Officer Daves’ hand, he latched onto Officer Daves’s wedding ring and pulled it off
his finger, causing injury to Officer Daves’ knuckle. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10.)
Meanwhile, Lt. Nichols maintained control of Plaintiff’s arm while officers Murray and
Daves attempted to get the keys out of his grip. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12). Officer Murray grabbed
Plaintiff’s hand then turned away from Plaintiff and broke Plaintiff’s grip on Officer Murray’s
keys. According to Officer Daves and Lt. Nichols, this was the point at which Plaintiff’s hand was
injured by the keys. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). Additional staff arrived, and Plaintiff
finally complied with the requests to be placed into full mechanical restraints. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12).
Plaintiff was seen by medical for his injury, and he received stitches to close the wound
between his fingers. (Id.). Both Officers Daves and Murray were seen by medical for their
injuries. (Id.). Although Lt. Nichols was struck in the arm, he chose not to seek medical attention.
(Id.). All three staff members returned to duty. (Id.).
Captain Raymond Hamilton subsequently investigated the use of force incident. (Doc. 24-
1 at ¶ 16: Hamilton Decl.). During his investigation, Captain Hamilton took numerous witness
statements, reviewed video of the incident, and took pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. at ¶ 17).
After reviewing all the information, Captain Hamilton concluded that (1) the incident happened as
described by Lt. Nichols and the correctional officers described, (id. Ex. F); (2) the use of force
was necessary because Plaintiff disobeyed and continued to disobey orders to release Officer
Daves’ hand, he had injured and continued to injure Officer Daves, and he grabbed Officer
Murray’s keys, (id. at ¶ 19); (3) Plaintiff’s injuries were consistent with either the keys being pried
out of his hand or Plaintiff’s hand being pried away from Officer Daves’ hand, (id. at ¶ 21); (4)
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the use of force against Plaintiff on March 27, 2015, by all personnel involved was applied in
accordance with the Use of Force P & P and SOP, (id. at ¶ 24); and (5) Plaintiff was not subjected
to an excessive use of force by any NCDPS personnel. As a result of his conduct, on March 27,
2015, Plaintiff was charged and found guilty of the offenses of Threatening to Harm or Injure
Staff, Disobeying an Order, and Assault on Staff with a Weapon. (Doc. 24-5, Ex. D; Doc. 24-7,
Ex. F).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences
and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is
no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the
movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for
summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather,
the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine
issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-
movant’s position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude
granting the summary judgment motion. Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
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“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides, in
pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-
movant, the non-movant must show the existence of a factual dispute on every essential element
of his claim.
III. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate
must satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–and a
subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim,
the Court must consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the
force was “applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Albers, 475 U.S. at 320-21. Furthermore,
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although the lack of serious injury may be considered a factor in the excessive force analysis, the
fact that the prisoner suffered only minor injuries is not dispositive in an excessive force claim.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010).
For the following reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
claim against them for excessive force. First, to the extent that Plaintiff has sued Defendants in
their official capacities, the suit is against the NCDPS and the State of North Carolina. However,
neither the State nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars
Plaintiff's suit for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies.
See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003).
Next, to the extent that Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their individual capacities, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Defendants used
excessive force against Plaintiff. Defendants’ evidence on summary judgment shows that the force
used by Defendants was applied in a good-faith effort to restore order and discipline, and it was
not done maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.2 That is, the record
demonstrates that the use of force was appropriate to control and restrain Plaintiff and to prevent
further injury to staff given his non-compliance with verbal orders and his combative behavior.
The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff attacked by violently turning and striking Lt.
Nichols’s arm, by grabbing Officer Daves’ hand and pulling and twisting his hand and arm, and
2 The Court notes that, as to any legal conclusions made in Defendants’ supporting affidavits
with regard to use of force, those legal conclusions have no impact on any legal determination by
this Court as to whether Defendants used excessive force. See United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d
150, 157 (4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the Court has not given these legal conclusions any weight
in its determination on summary judgment.
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by grabbing Officer Murray’s keys. In addition, Plaintiff refused repeated orders to let go of
Officer Daves’ hand. Indeed, not only did Plaintiff refuse repeated orders, instead, he escalated
the incident by grabbing Officer Murray’s keys.
Moreover, the amount of force was directly related to the necessity of the use of force.
Specifically, the force was applied to Plaintiff’s hand and fingers in order to pry his grip off Officer
Daves and to retain or regain control of Officer Murray’s key. Plaintiff was attacking and injuring
the officers. He was pulling Officer Daves’ arm through the slot and twisting. Officer Daves
asserted in his affidavit that he believed that Plaintiff might be able to use the frame of the slot to
break his arm. (Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 10). Later in the incident, Plaintiff grabbed Officer Murray’s keys.
The officers involved in this incident did not just reasonably believe there was a threat--the threat
was real and significant. Furthermore, Defendants’ evidence shows that the officers did try to
temper their response. Officer Daves repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to let go of his hand. (Id.).
Finally, in his own declaration, Lt. Nichols asserts that be believed from his recollection of the
incident that Plaintiff “was injured . . . by the keys as Officer Murray pulled the keys from
[Plaintiff’s] grip. These keys are not normal household keys. Some of the keys can be as long as
three inches and can be jagged and sharp and could cause significant injury. Officer Murray
maintained control of [Plaintiff’s] arm until additional staff arrived.” (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 12).
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could
not find that Defendants had a sufficiently culpable state of mind because the evidence does not
support the contention that they acted “maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing
harm.”3 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-26, Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Although Plaintiff alleges in his
3 Defendants also argue that before March 27, 2015, Plaintiff had an extensive history of
infractions while in prison including, disobeying orders, associating with gangs, threatening to
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unverified complaint that sometime after the “struggle happened,” Lt. Nichols told Officer Murray
not to “break all of [Plaintiff’s] fingers just [one],” both Daves and Nichols deny that Nichols made
this statement. (Doc. 24-8 at ¶ 13; Doc. 24-9 at ¶ 11). Moreover, as noted, Plaintiff did not respond
to the summary judgment. As indicated above, once the party moving for summary judgment has
provided a forecast of evidence that shows there is no genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party,
and especially if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, must come forward with evidence
that supports his or her contention that there is one or more genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In addition, as also set forth above, a court considering a motion for
summary judgment cannot deny the motion on the basis of a scintilla of evidence and may, in fact,
ignore the nonmoving party’s version of events if that version of events seems implausible given
the weight of the evidence submitted by the moving party. Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 818 (4th
Cir. 1995).
In sum, application of the Whitley factors demonstrates that the use of force was necessary
and not excessive. Thus, Defendants Daves and Nichols are entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against them.4 Furthermore, despite that Defendants Blanton and
harm/injure staff and assault with a weapon. Further, the Plaintiff had been brought to the
restrictive housing unit on dozens of occasions. (Doc. 25 at 3). Defendants contend that this
evidence is relevant to the officers’ state of mind. See Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477
(4th Cir. 2005) (reasonableness determined by information possessed by the officer). In ruling
on the summary judgment motion, however, the Court has not considered this evidence because
Defendants have presented nothing to show that they actually knew about Plaintiff’s numerous
disciplinary infractions.
4 Defendant also raised qualified immunity as a defense to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
Because the Court has determined that there was no constitutional violation in the first instance,
the Court not need determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants
also contend that because Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ request for admission, he is
deemed to have admitted all the Requests for Admissions (“RFAs”). (Doc. 25 at 14). Because
the Court finds that the evidence presented by Defendants, which Plaintiff has not even
attempted to rebut, results in a finding of no excessive force, the Court will not address whether
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Murray have not joined in the summary judgment motion, the Court finds that the undisputed
evidence on summary judgment supports the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against these additional
defendants.°
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment for all Defendants in
this action.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Defendants Daves’ and Nichols’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 24), is
GRANTED. Furthermore, for the same reasons that summary judgment is being
granted in favor of Defendants Daves and Nichols, summary judgment is also
appropriate as to Defendants Blanton and Murray. Thus, this action shall be dismissed
with prejudice as to all Defendants.
2. The Clerk is instructed to terminate this action.
Signed: September 16, 2019
Frank D. Whitney é +3
Chief United States District Judge ~“#*’
Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted Defendants’ RFA’s by failing to respond to them.
> Courts have held that if one defendant is granted a motion for summary judgment, the district
court may sua sponte enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving, additional defendants “if
the motion raised by the first defendant is equally effective in barring the claim against the other
defendants, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion.”
Colan v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Al-Hashimi v.
Scott, 756 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (stating that “[a]lthough the other defendants ...
did not join in the motion for summary judgment, the rationale for granting [the moving
defendant's] motion applies equally to them” and, thus, granting summary judgment as to all
defendants).
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