The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:18-cv-164-RJC-DSC
JACLYN ABNEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) ORDER
)
CLIFFORD J. WHITE, )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court to memorialize the Court’s ruling at the
hearing on June 10, 2019. As ordered and for the reasons stated in open court at the
hearing on June 10, 2019 before the undersigned, and herein, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 18), on all claims.1
Because no material facts are in dispute, and Plaintiff has failed to establish
that Defendant lacked probable cause for her arrest warrants, Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for an alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure,2 and Plaintiff’s state-law claims for malicious prosecution and false
1 Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
2 “An arrest is a seizure of the person.” Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th
Cir. 2001). “[T]he general rule is that ‘Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable”
only if based on probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213 (1979)). Here, because Plaintiff’s arrest warrants were based on probable cause,
her seizure was reasonable, and thus Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must fail.
imprisonment.3
Although the resisting misdemeanor was not the crime of the century, not the
conduct the most egregious, nonetheless, two magistrate judges found probable cause
existed to issue Plaintiff’s arrest warrants under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223. And even
if the Court were to find that Trooper White’s procurement of the arrest warrants
lacked probable cause, Plaintiff’s conviction in state District Court after her first
arrest establishes probable cause as a matter of law, regardless of the fact that the
matter was subsequently dismissed in Superior Court.4
As to Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims, summary judgment in favor of
Defendant is appropriate because Plaintiff failed to offer more than a scintilla of
evidence to support her claims, let alone enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find
against Defendant.5
3 One element of a malicious prosecution claim is “lack of probable cause for the
initiation of the earlier proceeding.” Hoover v. McDowell Cty, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
12719, at *6–7 (citing Best v. Duke Univ., 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (N.C. 1994)).
“Involuntary restraint and its unlawfulness are the two essential elements of [false
imprisonment].” Parrish v. Boysell Mfg. Co., 188 S.E. 817, 820 (N.C. 1936) (quoting
State v. Lunsford, 81 N.C. 528 (1879)). “Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim
for false arrest.” Adams v. City of Raleigh, 782 S.E.2d 108, 112 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016)
(internal citations omitted).
4 “Absent a showing that the conviction in District Court was procured by fraud or
other unfair means, the conviction conclusively establishes the existence of probable
cause, even though the plaintiff was acquitted.” Hoover v. McDowell County, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 12719, at *7 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Myrick v. Cooley, 371 S.E.2d
492, 495 (N.C. App. 1988)). Here, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s conviction
was not procured by fraud or unfair means; therefore, Plaintiff’s conviction
conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause.
5 To prevail on an assault and battery claim against a law enforcement officer, a
plaintiff must show that the officer used excessive force under the given
circumstances. Glenn-Robinson v. Acker, 538 S.E.2d 601, 615 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the handcuffs were tight,
Lastly, even if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs constitutional rights were
violated in this case, qualified immunity would shield Defendant from suit because
Plaintiffs constitutional rights were not “clearly established” at the time such that a
reasonably prudent officer in Defendant’s position would have known of those rights.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 18), is
GRANTED; and
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
Signed: June 19, 2019
Otef 4 Cr Of
Robert J. Conrad, Jr. ‘ey
United States District Judge “ee
painful, and left little marks on her wrists after they were removed. She submitted
no documentation or evidence showing that this caused her anything more than
temporary discomfort.