WOODS v. EDMONDS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

FELTON WOODS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FANTASIA EDMONDS, in her )

individual and official )

capacities; ATTORNEY JANE DOE, )

in her individual and official ) 1:23-CV-780

capacities; ALEXANDER )

STEVENSON REAMS II and )

ALEXANDRIA STEPHANIE REAMS, )

Co-Administrators of the )

estate of STEPHANIE REAMS, in )

her individual capacity; )

STEPHANIE REAMS (or her )

successor) in her official )

capacity; MAGGIE CVETICANIN, )

in her official capacity; and )

AMINAH THOMPSON, in her )

official capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

In a dispute over the adoption placement of two minor

children, Plaintiff Felton Woods contends that he was denied his

constitutional right of access to the courts when Defendants

delayed filing his state court adoption petitions for his two

great-grandchildren, K.T. and M.T., for two weeks. (Doc. 1.)

Woods seeks a declaratory judgment and damages under 42 U.S.C

§ 1983. (Id.) Presently before this court are the motions to

dismiss filed by Defendants Maggie Cveticanin and Fantasia Edmonds

(collectively the “Durham County Defendants”) (Doc. 11) and

Defendants Stephanie Reams and Aminah Thompson (collectively the

“County Clerk Defendants”) (Doc. 13). In addition, the Attorney

General filed a notice of death as to Defendant Stephanie Reams

(Doc. 22), who died after the filing of the complaint, and Woods

has moved to substitute the co-administrators of her estate for

her place (Doc. 25). Woods also moves to strike briefing filed on

Reams’s behalf on the ground that counsel lacked any authority to

do so since Reams was deceased at the time of the filing. (Doc.

26.)

Defendants raise myriad challenges to Woods’s complaint,

including standing, the Eleventh Amendment, judicial immunity,

qualified immunity, and the applicability of the constitutional

right of access to the filing of state adoption petitions. But

the ultimate inquiry is simple: because the County Clerk Defendants

are state officials entitled to official immunity, and because

Woods has failed to plead facts that plausibly allege a violation

of his constitutional right of access to the courts, the court

will grant both motions to dismiss without prejudice. The court

will also grant Wood’s motion to substitute but deny Woods’s motion

to strike.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

For the purposes of these motions, the facts alleged in the

complaint (Doc. 1) are taken as true and set out the following:

Plaintiff Woods is a resident of Georgia and is the great-

grandfather to K.T. and M.T., who are minors. (Id. ¶ 15.) The

guardianship of K.T. and M.T. has been in dispute for several

years. (Id. ¶ 24.) The two children entered foster care in North

Carolina at the direction of the Durham County Department of Social

Services (“DSS”) on January 5, 2018, after their mother, Jatoia

Potts, gave birth to K.T. in the state in August of 2017 and

remained in the state due to K.T.’s need for inpatient neonatal

intensive care. (Id. ¶ 28.)1 Throughout this time, Woods and

other relatives consistently made clear to DSS that they were

willing to provide a kinship home for the children. (Id. ¶¶ 15,

30.) DSS, however, consistently thwarted the families’ efforts to

secure a familial placement. (Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶¶ 32-37

(describing the placement of the children with a non-kin foster

family in a “foster-to-adopt” scenario), 38-62 (describing DSS’s

mishandling of familial rights via issues with filing paperwork

under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children).)

On February 3, 2023, Woods, through an agent, delivered

petitions for adoption for K.T. and M.T. to the Special Proceedings

office of the Durham County Clerk of Court, along with the filing

1 Potts’s parental rights were terminated after K.T. had suffered head

trauma, seizures, blood loss, possible fractures, retinal hemorrhages

in both eyes, and other “nonaccidental, life-threatening injuries.” In

the Matter of M.T. and K.T., 877 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. App. 2022) (affirming

termination of parental rights based on neglect and abuse).

fee for those petitions. (Id. ¶ 64.) The petitions were accepted

by the clerk’s office. (Id.) Later that same day, however,

Defendant Stephanie Reams, an assistant clerk employed by the

Durham County Clerk of Court, telephoned Woods’s counsel and

reported that the non-kin foster parents had also filed petitions

for the adoption of the two children on January 27, 2023. (Id.

¶ 65.) Reams stated that she had called the DSS social worker,

Defendant Fantasia Edmonds, about the case and intended not to

file Woods’s petitions as a result of their conversation. (Id.)

In response, Woods’s counsel said she would follow up the next

week, and she served both paper and electronic copies of the

adoption petitions on the attorney for DSS the same day. (Id.

¶¶ 65-66.)

Over the next several days, the clerk’s office continued to

take no action on Woods’s adoption petitions. On February 9, a

legal assistant for Woods’s counsel called the clerk’s office to

ask about the petitions and was informed that DSS was “doing an

investigation on it” and “the attorney for DSS is also looking

into it,” so the clerk’s office was “not going to file [Woods’s]

petition[s].” (Id. ¶ 67.) Woods’s counsel exchanged emails with

the attorney for DSS on February 10, 2023, who denied ever advising

the Clerk of Court in the matter, or any matter. (Id. ¶¶ 68-69.)

That same day, Woods’s counsel telephoned the Special Proceedings

division of the Clerk of Court’s office again and spoke with Reams,

who stated that she had spoken to both the DSS Social Worker,

Edmonds, and an unidentified “county attorney” from the “juvenile”

section about the matter, again asserting that those individuals

told her they were investigating the matter and that the clerk’s

office would not be filing the petitions until DSS told them what

to do.2 (Id. ¶ 70.)

Having made no progress toward getting his petitions filed,

Woods initiated a lawsuit on February 15, 2023, in Durham County

Superior Court seeking a writ of mandamus against the Clerk of

Court, Defendant Aminah Thompson, and the Interim Director of DSS,

Sarah Bradshaw, requesting, inter alia, an order compelling the

clerk’s office to stamp and file his adoption petitions for K.T.

and M.T. (Id. ¶ 11.) The next day, February 16, 2023, another

employee from the clerk’s office called and informed Woods’s

counsel that his adoption petitions were technically deficient

because they lacked a wet (original) signature. (Id. ¶ 12.) Upon

being made aware of this, Woods sent original signature pages via

overnight delivery to the Special Proceedings office. (Id. ¶ 13.)

The corrected pages were received on February 17, 2023, and they

were then stamped and duly filed by the clerk’s office that day.

(Id. ¶ 14.)

2 The transcript of this recorded phone call is attached to and

incorporated into Woods’s complaint. (Doc. 1-1 (affidavit of Elizabeth

Simpson with transcript of phone call).)

B. Procedural History

Woods filed the present complaint on September 11, 2023,

alleging that the Durham County Clerk of Court and DSS violated

his constitutional right of access to the courts by refusing to

file, or delaying the filing of, his adoption petitions and seeking

redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Woods names five

Defendants: Edmonds, the social worker employed by DSS, in her

individual and official capacities; Attorney Jane Doe, the

attorney allegedly employed by the ”juvenile section” of Durham

County, in her individual and official capacities;3 Reams, an

assistant clerk employed by the Durham County Clerk of Court, in

her individual and official capacities; Cveticanin, the current

director of DSS who has “supervisory authority over the acts and

omissions of Durham DSS,” in her official capacity only; and

Thompson, the Durham County Clerk of Court who has “supervisory

authority over the acts and omissions of the Durham Office of the

Clerk of Court,” in her official capacity only. (Id. ¶¶ 16-20.)

Woods seeks a declaration that all of the Defendants, acting in

their official capacity, engaged in an unlawful and

unconstitutional delay in filing his petitions, and he seeks

compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants Reams, Edmonds,

and Doe in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 20-

3 Attorney Jane Doe is not a party to either of the motions to dismiss,

as her identity or even existence has yet to be confirmed.

21.)

The Durham County Defendants and County Clerk Defendants now

move to dismiss all claims. (Docs. 11, 13.) Those motions have

been fully briefed. (Docs. 12, 14, 17, 18, 23, 24.) Thereafter,

Woods filed two motions in response to the Notice of Reams’s death

(Doc. 22): one to substitute Alexander Stevenson Reams II and

Alexandria Stephanie Reams, co-administrators of the estate of

Stephanie Reams (the “Co-Administrators”), as a party in place of

Reams (Doc. 25); and one to strike any briefing related to Reams

that the County Clerk Defendants filed (Doc. 26). Neither of

Woods’s motions was accompanied by a brief. The County Clerk

Defendants filed a response to both motions (Doc. 30 (motion to

substitute); Doc. 31 (motion to strike)), and Woods failed to file

a reply to either. All motions are therefore ripe for review.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Substitute

Woods moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(a)(1) to substitute the Co-Administrators for Defendant Reams,

who is deceased. (Doc. 25.) According to Woods, survival of

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988, which looks to the state law of survivorship to determine

whether substitution in the case of death is appropriate. (Id.

¶ 4.) As North Carolina law provides for survivorship of all

claims except for causes of action (1) for libel or for slander,

(2) for false imprisonment, or (3) where “the relief sought could

not be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory after death,”

Woods maintains that the claims against Reams survive, and he moves

to substitute in the Co-Administrators in recognition of this.

(Id. ¶ 5 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1(b)).)

The County Clerk Defendants oppose this motion, asserting

that the court’s decision whether to grant the motion is

discretionary and arguing that the court should decline to exercise

its discretion here. (Doc. 30 at 1-2.) They argue that

substitution of the Co-Administrators for Reams in her official

capacity is improper because Reams’ successor in the county clerk’s

office has taken her position in the litigation automatically

pursuant to Rule 25(d), as Reams was serving as a public official.

(Id. at 2-3.)4 As to the individual capacity claim against Reams,

the County Clerk Defendants argue that the Co-Administrators

cannot be substituted insofar as Woods seeks punitive damages under

North Carolina law (id. at 3), and the remaining claims are

nugatory (id. at 4-7). Finally, the County Clerk Defendants

4 In their brief’s heading, the County Clerk Defendants argue that

“Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Ms. Reams were

extinguished upon her retirement and subsequent death.” (Doc. 30 at 2.)

However, their argument focuses on the automatic substitution of Reams’s

successor as Assistant Clerk of Court rather than on any termination of

the claims against her resulting from her death. (See id. at 2-3.)

Therefore, the court construes the County Clerk Defendants’ argument to

be that the claims against Reams in her official capacity were

“extinguished” only to the extent that they have already passed and

attached to Reams’s successor.

contend that the balance of equities disfavors substitution, as

any judgment against Reams in her individual capacity would be

paid by the State of North Carolina and not by her estate,

substitution is inconsistent with the purpose of § 1983, the Co-

Administrators are not in a position to provide evidence in defense

of Reams, and the court’s jurisdiction over the complaint remains

dubious. (Id. at 7-10.)

The court will allow the substitution of the Co-

Administrators, but only as to individual capacity claim against

Reams. As to the official capacity claims against Reams, the

County Clerk Defendants are correct that Rule 25(d) governs, and

the substitution of Reams’s successor was automatic. See F. R.

Civ. Pro. Rule 25(d) (“The officer’s successor is automatically

substituted as a party.”). The estate is therefore not the proper

party to take her position with respect to those claims. Rather,

the court is authorized to order the successor to be identified

and named appropriately in later proceedings. See id. (“The court

may order substitution at any time, but the absence of such an

order does not affect the substitution.”) In the meantime, the

court may proceed on the official capacity claims noting that

“Reams” is a mere misnomer for the person presently operating as

her successor. See id. (“Later proceedings should be in the

substituted party’s name, but any misnomer not affecting the

parties’ substantial rights must be disregarded. The court may

order substitution at any time, but the absence of such an order

does not affect the substitution.”)

As to the individual capacity claim against Reams, Woods is

correct that the Co-Administrators can and should be substituted.

When a defendant dies during the pendency of an individual-capacity

action, the estate is the proper party to take the decedent’s place

if one is to be substituted. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 166 n.11 (1985). Moreover, survivorship of a § 1983 claim

rests on state law, and North Carolina’s default rule provides for

liberal survivorship of claims in all but a very few instances.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1(a). Though the County Clerk Defendants

argue that this is a situation where any damages granted would be

“nugatory,” this misunderstands that exception. The North

Carolina Court of Appeals has defined “nugatory” by its common

definition in Black’s Law Dictionary: “of no force or effect,

useless, invalid.” In re Higgins, 587 S.E.2d 77, 78 (N.C. App.

2003). In operation, this exception has been invoked only in

situations where the remedy sought became nonsensical or

impossible after a party’s death – for example, where one spouse

dies during the pendency of an action pursuing a divorce decree

and dissolution of marriage, or in petitions for guardianship where

the incompetent adult whose authority was at issue dies during the

pendency of the action. See Elmore v. Elmore, 313 S.E.2d 904 (N.C.

App. 1984) (divorce); In re Higgins, 587 S.E.2d at 78-79

(guardianship). Moreover, “North Carolina courts have only

applied th[e] § 28A–18–1(b)(3) [nugatory] exception to prospective

remedies.” McGill v. Town of Coats, No. 5:12–CV–631–FL, 2013 WL

953929 at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2013) (citing Brown v. Town of

Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 300 (4th Cir.2013)); see also McGowen v. Rental

Tool Co., 428 S.E.2d 275, 276 (N.C. App. 1993) (allowing a suit

for retrospective personal injury to survive under North Carolina

survival statute). By contrast, Woods seeks only retroactive

monetary damages against Reams in her individual capacity, which

her estate can provide in the event Woods’s claim proves

meritorious.5 Substitution of the parties therefore would not be

nugatory, and because North Carolina policy supports liberal

survival of claims, substitution is heavily favored.

Woods’s motion to substitute the Co-Administrators for the

individual capacity claim against Reams will therefore be granted,

and the Co-Administrators are substituted as to any individual

capacity claim against her.

B. Motion to Strike

Woods also moves to strike all briefing filed on Reams’s

5 The County Clerk Defendants’ brief focuses on the fact that there is

no merit to Woods’s claim for damages, as his punitive damages claim is

barred and he has not alleged any actual injury that would entitle him

to compensation under § 1983, which they argue renders the claims

nugatory. (Doc. 30 at 4, 6-7.) However, the merits of the claim for

the requested relief have no bearing on the analysis; it is “the purpose

or the desired end result of a proceeding” assuming the merits on which

the analysis turns. In re Higgins, 587 S.E.2d at 78 (emphasis added).

behalf on the ground that she was deceased at the time those papers

were filed. (Doc. 26.) At the outset, the court notes - as do

the County Clerk Defendants - that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added).

Because the County Clerk Defendants’ motion to dismiss is not a

pleading, the motion to strike is improper and will be denied.6

Even if the court were to consider Woods’s motion to disregard

the arguments made on Reams’s behalf on the merits of that request,

it would still warrant denial. Woods argues that counsel for the

County Clerk Defendants lacked the authority to file any motion or

brief on Reams’s behalf because Reams was deceased at the time of

filing and her death terminated any lawyer-client relationship

between the two. (Doc. 26 ¶¶ 2-7.) The County Clerk Defendants

disagree, noting that the Attorney General’s office represents

them in this matter, and they contend that the lawyer-client

relationship with Reams persists given the Attorney General’s

statutory obligation to defend her as an employee of the state.

(Doc. 31 at 4-6.)

The County Clerk Defendants are correct. Pursuant to North

6 Woods’s motion to strike also violates Local Rule 7.3(j), which excuses

the requirement of a brief in only a limited set of motions, and a motion

to strike is not one of them. This, too, is grounds to deny the motion.

Carolina General Statute § 114-4(2), the Attorney General has a

duty to defend arms of the state in litigation such as this. See

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-2(2) (“Pursuant to Section 7(2) of Article

III of the North Carolina Constitution, it shall be the duty of

the Attorney General: . . . [t]o represent all State departments,

agencies, institutions, commissions, bureaus or other organized

activities of the State which receive support in whole or in part

from the State.”) That duty includes representing the state

judiciary, of which the County Clerk’s office is a subdivision, in

claims made against it and the duty to defend individual state

employees in their official and individual capacities who seek

representation in litigation relating to their work. See N.C.

Gen. Stat §§ 143-300.3, 143-300.5. The Attorney General was

authorized to file the briefing on Reams’s behalf. Therefore, the

court can and will consider any arguments raised therein.

C. Motions to Dismiss

1. Standard of Review

The motions to dismiss raise challenges to both the court’s

jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the complaint.

As to jurisdiction, federal district courts are limited in

their exercise of judicial power. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Challenges to the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction at this stage are addressed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). CGM, LLC v. BellSouth

Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir.2011); see also Pitt

Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2009)

(noting district court’s re-characterization of defendant’s

challenge to standing from a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)). When resolving

a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), “‘the district court is to regard

the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider

evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding

to one for summary judgment.’” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166

F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg &

Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.

1991)). Where a defendant has not provided evidence to dispute

the veracity of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint,

the court accepts facts alleged as true just as it would under

Rule 12(b)(6). Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192–93 (4th

Cir. 2009) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.

1982)). In addition, the court assumes the truth of the facts

augmented by a plaintiff’s affidavits. Fair Hous. in Huntington

Comm., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, N.Y., 316 F.3d 357, 362 (2d

Cir. 2003). Ultimately, however, the plaintiff bears the burden

of “clearly . . . alleg[ing] facts demonstrating that he is a

proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.” Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975).

In contrast, a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of a complaint” and “does

not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim,

or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v.

Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To be considered

sufficient, a claim must “plead[ ] factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable” and must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully,” thus rendering it facially

plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007)). Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “only ‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief’” is required to meet this threshold. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). While “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary,” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (alteration in original);

see also Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1227

(4th Cir. 1998) (“Even under the liberal standards of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . a plaintiff ‘must at least set

forth enough details so as to provide defendant and the court with

a fair idea of the basis of the complaint and the legal grounds

claimed for recovery.’” (quoting Self Directed Placement Corp. v.

Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990))).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept

as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,”

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and all reasonable inferences must be

drawn in the plaintiff’s favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d

472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). But while “the complaint, including all

reasonable inferences therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the

plaintiff’s favor,” this “does not mean that the court can ignore

a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set

forth a claim.” Estate of Williams–Moore v. All. One Receivables

Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing

McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 95 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir.

1996)). Mere legal conclusions are not accepted as true, and

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

2. County Clerk Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The County Clerk Defendants challenge the complaint on both

Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional grounds and on Rule 12(b)(6)

sufficiency grounds. The court will address each in turn, starting

with the jurisdictional challenge. See Jones. v. Jones v. Am.

Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting

that questions of jurisdiction are “threshold issue[s]” that must

be addressed “before addressing the merits” of a claim).

a. Jurisdictional Challenges Under Rule 12(b)(1)

The County Clerk Defendants argue both that Woods lacks

standing to proceed and that the official capacity claims are

barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.7 (Doc. 14 at 7, 9.) The

County Clerk Defendants contend that Woods lacks standing because

he has failed to allege both an injury in fact and redressability.

According to them, Woods has failed to allege an invasion of a

legally protected interest because he has failed to show he has a

constitutional right that has been violated, and he has similarly

failed to show any concrete injury or damage resulting from the

14-day delay in filing his adoption petitions. (Id. at 8.)

Relatedly, they argue that Woods has failed to show redressability,

as his complaint seeks no prospective remedy and makes only

improper claims for retrospective declaratory relief and claims

for damages without alleging any basis for actual compensation as

7 The Fourth Circuit has not conclusively established whether a dismissal

based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6). See Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524–25 n.2 (4th

Cir. 2000). On the one hand, the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged the

Supreme Court’s holding that sovereign immunity conferred by the Eleventh

Amendment is a “jurisdictional bar.” Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d

536, 542 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 73 (1996)). On the other hand, it has noted that Eleventh

Amendment immunity can be waived unlike other matters of subject matter

jurisdiction, and it has characterized it as an affirmative defense that

defendants have the burden of demonstrating. Id. at 543. Here, the

County Clerk Defendants characterize their Eleventh Amendment argument

as jurisdictional, so the court will treat it as such. See Johnson v.

N.C. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 454 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 (M.D.N.C.

2006).

required by § 1983. (Id. at 8-9.) While the County Clerk

Defendants acknowledge that “nominal damages may satisfy the

redressability requirement for standing,” they note that Woods

does not request such relief, thus failing to meet the

redressability requirement. (Id. at 9 (emphasis in original)

(citing Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801–02 (2021).)

Second, the County Clerk Defendants argue that the claims

against each of them in their official capacity are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. (Id.) They maintain that any damages sought

as to Defendant Reams, or her successor, fall squarely within the

prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment because Woods is reaching

for state funds without alleging waiver or congressional

abrogation of sovereign immunity. (Id. at 10.) In addition, the

County Clerk Defendants contend that the declaratory judgment

claims against them are all barred because they seek a statement

that retroactively recognizes past wrongdoing, which is

prohibited, and not a judgment addressing an ongoing

constitutional violation, which would be permitted under Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908), and its progeny. (Id. at 11-

12.) Thus, the County Clerk Defendants argue, the case should be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

As to standing, Woods argues that he has pled a violation of

his constitutional right of access to the courts, which suffices

as a legally-protectable interest, and has provided a complaint

that is at least sufficient to rest on a request for nominal

damages. (Doc. 18 at 3.) He contends that the right of access to

the courts encompasses the right to file a petition for adoption,

which he alleges was denied him, thus satisfying the injury in

fact requirement. (Id.) Moreover, he maintains that at a minimum,

the possibility of nominal damages can support redressability for

his complaint, as nominal damages are permitted by § 1983 and may

be implied as available relief even if not specifically claimed.

(Id. (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Moore v.

Liszewiski, 838 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2016)).

As to the Eleventh Amendment, Woods argues that he is

suffering an ongoing constitutional violation, which is not immune

from suit under Ex parte Young. (Id. at 4.) He asserts in his

brief that his petitions for adoption have yet to be referred to

a judge for decision8 and the harm of refused access to the courts

therefore continues. (Id. at 5-8.) Thus, Woods maintains that

the relief he seeks is prospective in nature and thus not barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.)

8 Despite citing to paragraph 73 of the complaint for allegations of an

ongoing constitutional violation, Woods’s response brief contains

assertions of improper post-filing misconduct that appear nowhere on the

face of the complaint. (See Doc. 1.) The County Clerk Defendants argue

that such assertions are not to be considered on the jurisdictional

issue. (Doc. 23 at 5-7.) This is correct. While the court may consider

evidence that does not appear on the face of the complaint when assessing

its jurisdiction under 12(b)(1), Evans, 166 F.3d at 647, for reasons

discussed infra, these statements are not evidence, and the court

declines to consider them.

Beginning with the requirement of standing, a plaintiff must

allege “‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy

as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to

justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf’”

for a case or controversy to be justiciable in federal court.

White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 789

(4th Cir. 2004)). This requirement is “an integral component of

the case or controversy requirement.” CGM, 664 F.3d at 52

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The party seeking

to invoke the federal courts’ jurisdiction has the burden of

satisfying Article III’s standing requirement. Miller v. Brown,

462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006). To meet that burden, a plaintiff

must demonstrate three elements: (1) that he has suffered an injury

in fact that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent”; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct; and (3) that a favorable decision is likely to

redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560–61 (1992).

Notably, however, “standing in no way depends on the merits

of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.”

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citing Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). Thus, when conducting a standing

analysis, the court “assumes that the plaintiff’s legal theory is

correct because, ‘were that not the case, [the court] would

effectively be deciding the merits under the guise of determining

the plaintiff’s standing.’” Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United

States, 948 F.3d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing

Servs., 338 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Citizens for

Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 507 F.

Supp. 3d 228, 238 (D.D.C. 2020) (reciting the principle that

standing assumes the plaintiff’s legal theory); Dickten Masch

Plastics, LLC v. Williams, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1220 (S.D. Iowa

2016) (assuming the plaintiff’s legal theory of ERISA preemption

for the purposes of analyzing standing); Dougherty v. Drew Univ.,

534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 372-73 (D.N.J. 2021) (assuming the alleged

contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant

university for the purposes of analyzing standing); NB ex rel.

Peacock v. D.C., 682 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (accepting the

plaintiff’s theory of Medicaid benefits deprivation for the

purposes of analyzing standing).

Here, Woods has plausibly alleged standing. As to injury in

fact, no party disputes that Woods was denied the filing of his

petitions for two weeks - that his petitions were not filed when

he first presented them on February 3, 2023, and that they remained

unfiled until February 17, 2023. The only dispute is whether the

allegations amount to a constitutional violation. Although the

County Clerk Defendants point out several ways in which this claim

for constitutional protection may be deficient, that conflates the

inquiry with the separate merits analysis, which the court

addresses infra.

Woods has similarly adequately pled redressability. While

his request for declaratory relief is insufficient to satisfy

redressability because it impermissibly seeks a retroactive remedy

against state officials barred by the Eleventh Amendment (for

reasons noted infra), his request for damages under § 1983 is

seemingly broad enough to support redressability. (Doc. 1 at 20-

21.) Woods need only plead an entitlement to damages as one who

experienced a constitutional wrong. (Doc. 1.) The amount, whether

nominal or more substantial, is of no moment. Although Woods would

be better advised to include a request for nominal damages as part

of his complaint, at least some federal courts have held that “it

is not necessary to allege nominal damages” which may be granted

on “proof of deprivation of a right to which the plaintiff was

entitled.” Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965); see

also Cooper Health Sys. v. Maxis Health Sys., No. CV 18-702

(RMB/AMD), 2021 WL 5905705, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2021)

(acknowledging in dicta that “a broad prayer for relief can support

a claim for nominal damages even where a party has (1) been unable

to support a calculation of actual damages and (2) not explicitly

requested nominal damages in its pleading”); Allah v. Al–Hafeez,

226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (construing a pro se complaint to

include claim for nominal damages where complaint sought only

compensatory and punitive damages); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d

623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Howard v. Int’l Molders & Allied

Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 779 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Basista and noting an entitlement to nominal damages where

no actual damages are proven). Given that Woods makes both a

generic claim for an undefined type of damages (Doc. 1 at 19) and

prays the court for “any further relief as is necessary, just, and

proper” (id. at 21), the court construes the complaint to include

a request for nominal damages. Thus, Woods satisfies the standing

requirements.

As for immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against

states and any state instrumentality properly characterized as an

“arm of the state.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S.

425, 429–30 (1997). District courts throughout North Carolina

have long recognized county clerks and assistant clerks of North

Carolina’s Superior Courts as state officials that may qualify for

Eleventh Immunity protections given their statutory designation

and relationship to the state judiciary. See Gabriel v. Forsyth

Cnty. Clerk of Ct. Ms. Susan Frye Off. of 21st Jud. Dist. Ct., No.

1:18-CV-354, 2019 WL 2215853, at *2 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2019), aff’d

sub nom. Gabriel v. Frye, 814 F. App’x 785 (4th Cir. 2020)

(dismissing official capacity 1983 claims brought against an

assistant clerk as barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Alford v.

Mecklenburg Cnty. Clerk of Superior Ct., No. 3:19-CV-156-MOC-DSC,

2019 WL 2881556, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 2, 2019) (finding official

capacity 1983 claims brought against the Mecklenburg County Clerk

of Superior Court and the Assistant Clerk barred by Eleventh

Amendment); Hinton v. Whittenton, No. 5:23-CV-98-BO-BM, 2024 WL

1234948, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (noting that North Carolina

clerks of court are state officials where performing statutorily

authorized judicial duties); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-40

(vesting clerks with court power “by law in respect of special

proceedings and the administration of guardianships and trusts”);

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-102(b) (“An assistant clerk is authorized to

perform all duties and functions of the office of clerk of superior

court, and any act of an assistant clerk is entitled to the same

faith and credit as that of the clerk.”); Special Proceedings,

Durham Cnty. N.C., https://www.dconc.gov/county-

departments/departments-a-e/clerk-of-superior-court (last visited

June 6, 2024) (including adoptions as part of the special

proceedings clerks of court handle by statute). Thus, Reams’s

successor and Thompson both enjoy Eleventh Amendment protections

in their official capacity, subject to the limitations provided

for in Ex parte Young.

Ex parte Young provides an exception to Eleventh Amendment

immunity where suit is brought against state officials in their

official capacity, and “(1) the violation for which relief is

sought is an ongoing one, and (2) the relief sought is only

prospective.” Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 627

(4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160).

Woods argues that his claims survive on these grounds (Doc. 18 at

4-8), but this is not so. In his briefing, Woods attempts to

recharacterize his constitutional challenge by alleging that the

violation of his right of access is ongoing because his petitions

have not been referred to a district court for contested adoption

proceedings as they should have been. (Doc. 18 at 5-7, 12-15.)

In addition, he claims that the declaratory relief sought

prospectively seeks to preclude the Defendants from continuing

their interference with the courts. (Id.) The problem is that

none of these allegations or prayers for relief appears in the

complaint. The complaint says nothing of any wrongdoing occurring

after the original petitions were stamped and filed on February

17, 2023. (See Doc. 1.) Nor does the request for declaratory

relief suggest an ongoing issue. (See id.) Instead, Woods

specifically prays for the court to

[d]eclare that the instruction given by Edmonds and Doe,

agents of the Durham Department of Social Services, to

Reams, a Durham County assistant clerk of court, between

the dates of February 3, 2023, and February 15, 2023,

regarding the filing of plaintiff’s adoption petitions

for minors KT and MT, and Reams’ subsequent failure to

file the petitions, was unlawful and unconstitutional.

(Id. at 20 (emphasis added).) The alleged wrongdoing that took

place during the two-week delay is not only the focus of Woods’s

complaint - it is the only wrongful conduct alleged. And

correspondingly, the relief Woods seeks is exclusively

retrospective in nature.

As the County Clerk Defendants point out, the court is limited

to deciding this motion on the allegations appearing on the face

of the well-pleaded complaint. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 449 (4th Cir. 2011) (limiting

its consideration of the facts to those that are contained within

the pleadings). Those allegations may be supplemented factually

on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, but “[i]t is well-established that

parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing.” S. Walk

at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands,

LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184-85 (4th Cir. 2013). So, while evidence

that is developed to support facts beyond the pleadings may be

considered in a jurisdictional inquiry, the assertions here are

not presented as facts. On the plain language of the complaint,

Woods seeks only retroactive relief to redress the state officials’

alleged past wrongful conduct, and that is what the court must

consider.

As a result, the claims against Reams’s successor and Thompson

in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The court will therefore grant the County Clerk Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Woods’s claims against them in their official capacities

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

b. Sufficiency Challenges Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The County Clerk Defendants argue that Woods’s complaint

against Reams in her individual capacity, now against the Co-

Administrators, fails to state a claim and thus should be

dismissed. (Doc. 14 at 13.) First, they argue that Woods has not

alleged a deprivation of a federally protected right on the ground

that the constitutional right of access to the courts does not

attach to the filing of an adoption petition. (Id. at 13-18.) At

best, they argue, Woods has alleged a potential violation of state

law, which is also dubious, as the complaint acknowledges the

petitions lacked an original signature. (Id. at 15-16.) Second,

they argue that Woods has failed to plead an injury that resulted

from the delayed filing, which is “fatal to his claim” because

constitutional right of access claims require a clear showing of

specific injury. (Id. at 18-19.) Third, they contend that Reams

is protected by quasi-judicial immunity in her role as an assistant

clerk, shielding her from liability for any alleged constitutional

violation that took place in the course of her judicial business.

(Id. at 19-22.) Fourth and relatedly, they maintain that Reams

would be entitled to qualified immunity for any constitutional

violation because the constitutional right of access to the courts,

even if it extends to this context, is not so clearly established

as to avoid immunity. (Id. at 22-23.) Fifth and finally, they

argue that the court should refrain from intervening under the

domestic relations abstention doctrine. (Id. at 23-24.)

Woods disputes each of these arguments. First, he argues

that the right of constitutional access to the courts encompasses

a cognizable action for denial of a civil petition in an adoption

proceeding. (Doc. 18 at 8-12.) He denies that any federal

“fundamental rights” limitation exists and that, even one did, the

right to file an adoption petition would qualify because it

implicates the right to associate with one’s kin. (Id. at 8-10.)

Moreover, he maintains, any claim that the petitions were

statutorily deficient is pretextual, as the statute does not

require a wet signature. (Id. at 11-12.) Second, Woods argues

that he has alleged a judicially-cognizable injury, as the failure

to file his adoption petitions has resulted in a failure to trigger

the judicial procedures provided for in the case of a contested

adoption.9 (Id. at 12-15.) Third, he argues that Reams is not

9 Here, too, Woods presents an entirely different theory of the violation

of his constitutional right of access to the courts and of the injury

he sustained than the one he asserts in the complaint. While the facts

in the complaint allege a past violation (see Doc. 1), Woods’s response

brief asserts that a violation that is ongoing (see Doc. 18 at 12-15).

The theory of the violation matters, as there are different elements a

plaintiff must prove for a past violation versus an ongoing violation.

See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-416 (distinguishing between

two types of constitutional right of access violations, those that

“turn[] on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” and those that

allege “an opportunity already lost”). As the County Clerk Defendants

are correct that “parties cannot amend their complaints through

briefing,” the court will disregard any new factual assertions and theory

of the case predicated on those assertions presented in the briefing and

entitled to judicial immunity because she did not act at judicial

direction or in a discretionary judicial function. (Id. at 15-

18.) Fourth, he contends that the application of qualified

immunity is not appropriate at this stage (id. at 18), and, even

if it were, it would not apply because a constitutional right of

access to the courts in the context of adoption petitions was

manifestly apparent at the time of the violation (id. at 19-21).

Fifth and finally, he asserts that the domestic relations

abstention doctrine should not be applied here, as it has a narrow

application to a small subset of diversity jurisdiction cases, and

this action is founded on the court’s federal question

jurisdiction. (Id. at 21-22.)

While the parties spar on the complexities of these arguments,

the court need not address them all, as it is apparent that the

facts of the complaint fail to plausibly allege the elements of a

constitutional violation. In other words, even assuming - without

deciding - that there is a constitutional right in this context,

that a claim against Reams for violating it can survive any

immunity defenses, and that any claim should not be avoided by any

abstention hurdle, Woods’s complaint fails on simple Rule 12(b)(6)

grounds.

focus only on the facts and theory apparent on the face of the well-

pleaded complaint. (Doc. 23 at 2-3 (quoting S. Walk at Broadlands

Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,

184 (4th Cir. 2013)).)

The Supreme Court defined the contours of constitutional

right of access claims in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403

(2002). There, the Court laid out two types of cases: those that

present ongoing barriers to accessing the courts, and those that

challenge a barrier to accessing the courts that once existed but

has since been removed. Id. at 412-414. As to the former, “the

essence of the access claim is that official action is presently

denying an opportunity to litigate for a class of potential

plaintiffs.” Id. at 413. That is because “[t]he opportunity has

not been lost for all time, however, but only in the short term;

the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the justification for

recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff in a position to

pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition

has been removed.” Id. Suits of this nature include those where

prisoners have been denied access to a law library, indigent

plaintiffs are not offered a waiver of the fee for civil suits

asserting family rights, or individuals are and continue to be

denied access to counsel. Id. (collecting cases). By contrast,

the other type covers “specific cases that cannot now be tried (or

tried with all material evidence), no matter what official action

may be in the future.” Id. at 413-14. Examples include those

where the denied access caused the loss of an opportunity to

litigate or seek some form of relief, or those that led to an

inadequate settlement of a meritorious case. Id. at 414

(collecting cases). Unlike the first type of case, “[t]hese cases

do not look forward to a class of future litigation, but backward

to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have

commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently

unobtainable.” Id. “The ultimate object of these sorts of access

claims, then, is not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply

the judgment in the access claim itself, in providing relief

obtainable in no other suit in the future.” Id.

Woods’s complaint raises a backwards-looking challenge that

falls into the latter category of cases. It alleges that his right

of access to the courts was violated when the County Clerk

Defendants declined for two weeks to file his petitions for

adoption of K.T. and M.T. (Doc. 1 at 17-21). The complaint

acknowledges that the denial of his petitions is not ongoing; the

petitions were stamped and filed on February 17, 2023. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Consequently, Woods seeks only damages and a declaratory judgment

aimed at acknowledging that the two-week denial of his petitions

was wrongful. (See id. at 17-21.) And although he asserts a

refusal to refer his petitions in his briefing, as discussed supra,

the court cannot consider such assertions on this record.

In a backwards-looking constitutional right of access claim,

a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) that he has a

“‘nonfrivolous,’ ‘arguable’ underlying claim” that could have

stood properly before a court, (2) the official actions which

prohibited him from accessing the court in that underlying case,

and (3) that he has suffered some irreparable harm in that there

is “a remedy that may be awarded [by the court] as recompense but

not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.”

Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414-415; see also Murdock v. Thompson, No.

20-6278, 2022 WL 17352171, at *4 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022)

(“Generally, to prevail on [a backwards-looking access] claim, a

plaintiff must establish (1) that he lost the opportunity to pursue

a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim, (2) the official acts

frustrating the litigation; and (3) that the relief he seeks is

unobtainable in other suits.” (internal quotations omitted)).10

The third element is of particular importance. The Supreme

Court has counseled that “[t]here is, after all, no point in

spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial

of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after

litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.”

Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

353 n.3 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of actual injury as

also being related to the non-frivolousness requirement). Some

courts interpret the injured remedy component as requiring

litigants to show that an opportunity previously available to them

10 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but

are cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).

in litigation is now “completely foreclosed” as a result of the

alleged interference. See Harbury, 536 U.S. at 412 (quoting

Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 600–01 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); Broudy

v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On any

interpretation, what is clear is that a constitutional right of

access claim arises only in the narrow circumstance where a

plaintiff has lost a remedy that cannot be regained or his

circumstances cannot be otherwise rectified except by bringing the

constitutional claim. See Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414-415. Moreover,

any alleged “lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the

complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at

415 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–515

(2002)).

As the County Clerk Defendants point out, Woods has failed to

allege a cognizable injury or lost remedy. He has not alleged

that his chance to adopt K.T. and M.T. was foreclosed by the two-

week delay in filing or that he suffered any other irreparable

loss of judicial recourse. His petitions have been stamped and

filed in the same manner as they would have on February 3.

Moreover, and importantly, Woods makes no claim for any relief

that is not available in other suits. On the contrary, the

complaint makes clear that Woods successfully availed himself of

a writ of mandamus through the state courts to direct the County

Clerk Defendants to file his petitions. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11-14.) Thus,

without alleging some injury in the form of a remedy that was lost

or an irreparable circumstance due to the brief delay, Woods’s

complaint fails to raise a cognizable constitutional right of

access claim.

The court therefore will grant the County Clerk Defendants’

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint against the Co-

Administrators, who now represent Reams in her individual

capacity.

3. Durham County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Durham County Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion is

substantially similar to that of the County Clerk Defendants. They

argue that the constitutional right of access does not extend to

the denial of filing an adoption petition (Doc. 12 at 7-9); that

the alleged two-week delay does not qualify as an actual injury as

required for a constitutional right of access claim (id. at 9-10);

that the complaint is self-defeating because it acknowledges that

the petitions Woods was trying to submit were deficient because

they lacked a wet signature (id. at 10-11); that there is no

proximate cause against them because other parties prevented the

filing of the petitions (id. at 11-12); that the official capacity

claims fail for lack of an allegation of a policy, custom, or

practice attributable to the Durham County DSS (id. 12-14); and

that the individual capacity claims are barred by qualified

immunity (id. at 15-17).

Woods makes substantially the same arguments in his response

briefing as he did against the County Clerk Defendants. He argues

that the right of access to the courts extends to the ability to

file petitions for adoption (Doc. 17 at 8-10); that he has alleged

a sufficient injury, again relying on a theory of the case and

assertions that are not alleged in the complaint (id. at 10-14);

that any alleged “deficiencies” in the petitions acknowledged in

the complaint were pretextual (id. at 14-15); that the Durham

County Defendants colluded with the County Clerk Defendants,

satisfying the proximate cause requirement (id. at 16); that there

are facts sufficient to support a policy or custom for the official

capacity claims (id. at 16-19);11 and that the Durham County

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for their

individual capacity claims (id. at 19-23).

Woods’s claims fail for the same reasons as those articulated

as to Reams and the County Clerk Defendants. That is, the court

need not address all of these arguments because the complaint’s

failure to allege facts to support a plausible claim that Woods

suffered a constitutional harm are dispositive. Consequently, the

Durham County Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

11 Here, too, Woods attempts to incorporate facts that do not appear on

the face of the complaint. The court similarly declines to consider

them here.

***

In sum, each of Woods’s claims fails to survive a motion to

dismiss. The claims against Reams (or her successor) and Thompson

in their official capacity fail because those individuals are

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, thus depriving the

court of jurisdiction. Woods’s claims against Reams in her

individual capacity, Cveticanin in her official capacity, and

Edmonds in both her individual and official capacities fail because

Woods’s complaint does not plausibly allege facts that support the

elements of a constitutional right of access claim. The

Defendants’ motions to dismiss will therefore be granted in full.

In light of Woods’s assertions in his briefing that some

ongoing delay continues to exist, the court would be remiss not to

advise Woods that, if true, his remedy, if any, lies with the North

Carolina state courts. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 292

(7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part) (clarifying

that “errors of state law differ from offenses against the

Constitution” and noting that having “opportunities to correct

mistakes before a suit reaches its conclusion [in state court]

means that there is no constitutional problem in the first place”).

Woods has already demonstrated that he successfully invoked the

jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts in pursuit of mandamus

relief to overcome the two-week delay, and there is no reason to

believe, nor does Woods allege, that he cannot do so again if

necessary. Id. (noting that only if a plaintiff is prevented from

seeking such judicial relief would there be a plausible claim that

the litigant lacked access to the courts). If Woods’s assertions

that his petitions have yet to be referred to a district court

judge are true, a federal court action would be in the “wrong

judicial system, seeking the wrong relief.” Id. Moreover, the

court has avoided resolving many other defenses raised by the

Defendants here, so Woods should not conclude that the court has

determined that it would exercise jurisdiction over any claim for

future relief in any event. This case is quintessentially a

domestic matter resting on specific North Carolina law applicable

to adoptions, which the North Carolina courts are best-suited to

resolve.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS ORDERED that Woods’s motion to substitute parties for

Defendant Reams (Doc. 25) is GRANTED, and Alexander Stevenson Reams

II and Alexandria Stephanie Reams are substituted for Reams as the

proper Defendants for any individual capacity claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), and Reams’s successor as

Durham County Assistant Clerk of Court is substituted for any

official capacity claims pursuant to Rule 25(d).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Woods’s motion to strike (Doc. 26)

is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County Clerk Defendants’ motion

to dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED, and the claims against Thompson

and Reams’s successor in their official capacity are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(1), and the claims against the Co-Administrators

representing Reams in her individual capacity are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Durham County Defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 11) is

GRANTED, and Woods’s individual and official capacity claims

against Defendants Cveticanin and Edmonds are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

June 21, 2024