“Nobody disputes that deploying a taser – a weapon ‘designed to cause excruciating pain’ that can ‘burn a subject’s flesh’ – is a ‘serious use of force.’”
How later courts described this case
- “Nobody disputes that deploying a taser – a weapon ‘designed to cause excruciating pain’ that can ‘burn a subject’s flesh’ – is a ‘serious use of force.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MONTREAL PERRY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22-CV-872
)
JOHN R. GUILL, JR., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge.
The plaintiff, Montreal Perry, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the
defendant, former Person County Sheriff’s Detention Officer John Guill. Mr. Perry
alleges that Officer Guill used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when he pushed and tased Mr. Perry, injuring Mr. Perry’s thigh and thumb. Officer Guill
now moves for summary judgment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact, the
motion will be denied.
I. Facts
The facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Perry, are as
follows. On December 20, 2020, Mr. Perry was in custody at the Person County
Detention Center serving an active sentence. Doc. 29-1 at 101, 123. The toilet in the cell
where Mr. Perry was being held malfunctioned by continuing to flush. Id. at 48. Mr.
Perry called the officer on duty through the Center’s intercom system and asked for
assistance to address the plumbing problem. Id. Officer Guill, who was attending the
Center’s control desk, told Mr. Perry he would report the issue to the officer who was
patrolling the area of the Center where Mr. Perry was located. Id.; Doc. 29-2 at ¶¶ 4–5.
After five minutes, no officer had arrived to assist, so Mr. Perry again used the
intercom. Doc. 29-1 at 48. No one responded, and Mr. Perry hit the call button again.
Id. Officer Guill then told Mr. Perry that he didn’t “give a fuck” about the toilet and to
stop calling. Id. Despite this instruction, Mr. Perry called through the intercom at least
10 times, causing a significant amount of noise in the control room; Officer Guill told Mr.
Perry to stop using the intercom and called Mr. Perry a “stupid motherfucker.” Id. at 49–
50; Doc. 29-2 at ¶ 6. In response, Mr. Perry challenged Officer Guill “to bring his ass
down there [to the cell]” to “say what he just said.” Doc. 29-1 at 50.
Five minutes later, Officer Guill went to Mr. Perry’s cell and was visibly angry.
See id. at 51–52. He was “red in the face” with “[h]is mouth balled up, like he was mad.”
Id. Mr. Perry and Officer Guill were standing on opposite sides of the cell door looking
at each other through a small window, and Officer Guill said, “[W]hat’s up,” meaning, as
Mr. Perry perceived it, “what [are] you going to do?” Id. at 52, 60–61. Mr. Perry
responded, “[W]hat’s up. Open the door.” Id. at 52. Officer Guill then radioed another
officer in the control room, asking him to open the door remotely. Id. After Officer Guill
asked his colleague to open the door, Mr. Perry said, “I’m going to beat [your] ass.” Id.
at 118. Mr. Perry “didn’t even think the door was really going to open,” and it shocked
him when the door was opened. Id. at 62.
After the door slid open, Mr. Perry and Officer Guill were standing face to face, id.
at 61, within arm’s reach of each other, id. at 63, “still getting ready to go at it.” Id. at 62.
Mr. Perry said, “[W]hat’s up,” and Officer Guill responded, saying “what’s up,” both
meaning “what [are] you going to do?” Id. at 52, 60. Without telling Mr. Perry to step
back or move, id. at 62, Officer Guill pushed Mr. Perry, id. at 52, 63, knocking Mr. Perry
back a couple of steps. Id. at 63. Then Officer Guill pulled out a taser and shot at Mr.
Perry; one taser prong hit him in his left inner thigh. Id. at 52, 63–64. Mr. Perry
immediately pulled the prong from his thigh. Id. at 52, 65. He did not feel an electric
shock, but removing the prong caused bleeding. Id. at 65.
Mr. Perry then took a couple of steps forward toward Officer Guill, and they were
again standing face to face. Id. at 66–67. Officer Guill then attempted to touch the taser
to Mr. Perry’s face, id. at 67; Doc. 29-2 at ¶ 10, but Mr. Perry took the taser from Officer
Guill; they “tussl[ed]” over possession of it. Doc. 29-1 at 68.
During this struggle, a second officer arrived and helped Officer Guill pin Mr.
Perry down on the cell bed. Id.; Doc. 29-2 at ¶ 10. Officer Guill had Mr. Perry’s right
arm held down, and Mr. Perry’s “thumb was stuck in the trigger spot of the taser.” Doc.
29-1 at 68. Officer Guill twisted and turned the taser to remove it from Mr. Perry’s hand,
causing injury to the thumb. Id.1 As the officers struggled with Mr. Perry to recover the
taser, they did not hit, punch, or kick Mr. Perry. Id. at 76.
After the officers recovered the taser, a third officer, Sergeant George Tingen
arrived. Id. at 73; Doc. 29-2 at ¶ 11. Sergeant Tingen instructed Officer Guill to pick up
1 Mr. Perry’s testimony is ambiguous about which officer twisted and turned the taser, but the
Court must at this stage view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Perry.
the taser and return to the control room. Doc. 29-1 at 74–75. Officer Guill complied and
left the cell. Id. at 75.
II. Discussion
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At summary judgment, courts “must
construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. This prohibition extends to the excessive force by prison officials against
prisoners and forbids “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hill v. Crum, 727
F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
To prove a constitutional violation for use of excessive force, the plaintiff must
satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. See Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d
104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019). First, the plaintiff must show that the prison official applied
force “sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action;” this objective standard is “not a
high bar” and requires “only something more than ‘de minimis’ force.” Id. Second, the
plaintiff must show that the officer applied force “maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 113 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21). An
officer acts “maliciously and sadistically” when he “inflicts pain not to induce
compliance, but to punish an inmate for intransigence or to retaliate for insubordination.”
Id. (cleaned up). This subjective prong “is a demanding standard.” Id. at 112.
Here the parties agree that Officer Guill’s use of the taser satisfies the objective
component required for an excessive force claim. See Doc. 29 at 14; Doc. 31 at 6;
Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112 (“Nobody disputes that deploying a taser – a weapon ‘designed
to cause excruciating pain’ that can ‘burn a subject’s flesh’ – is a ‘serious use of force.’”).
The relevant inquiry then focuses on the subjective component and whether Officer Guill
used force to punish or retaliate against Mr. Perry. See Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113.
Here, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Perry supports the
inference that Officer Guill went to Mr. Perry’s cell and had the door opened so that he
could assault and tase Mr. Perry to punish him for using the intercom to call repeatedly
and for challenging Officer Guill to fight. By Mr. Perry’s account, Officer Guill insulted
him and used profanity over the intercom and came to his cell in response to Mr. Perry’s
challenge; Officer Guill was angry when he arrived; Officer Guill quickly had the door
opened despite Mr. Perry’s inflammatory language; and Officer Guill said nothing about
the toilet, instead almost immediately pushing and then tasing Mr. Perry. See Doc. 29-1
at 49–52, 59–64. No party contends there was an emergency with the toilet, so there was
no need for Officer Guill to use force on Mr. Perry to respond to the plumbing
malfunction, and Officer Guill made no effort to temper or avoid the need for a forceful
response before entering the cell. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 762 (4th Cir.
1996) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 and identifying factors appropriate for
consideration in determining whether to infer an officer acted maliciously and
sadistically).
Courts afford officers “wide-ranging deference in their determinations that force is
required to induce compliance with policies important to institutional security.” Brooks,
924 F.3d at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when officers use force for the
“very purpose of causing harm,” to punish or retaliate, they “cross the line into an
impermissible motive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the defendant points out in the briefing, there are significant factual disputes
over what happened that day. See Doc. 29 at 9–10. By Officer Guill’s account, Mr. Perry
was repeatedly demanding an immediate solution to the noisy toilet and was cursing but
said nothing threatening. Doc. 29-2 at ¶ 6. Officer Guill also says he went to the cell
“for the sole purpose of resolving the problem with [Mr. Perry’s] toilet” and “in order to
achieve peace,” id. at ¶ 7, and that when he arrived at the cell, he told Mr. Perry he “was
there to deal with the problem with his toilet.” Id. at ¶ 8. Officer Guill states that Mr.
Perry initially did not threaten him but did so immediately after Officer Guill asked that
the cell door be opened and that before Officer Guill had time to cancel the request to
open the doors, the doors opened and Mr. Perry assaulted him. Id. at ¶ 9. If this is so,
then there was no constitutional violation. But the material facts are disputed, so the jury
will have to resolve the conflict in the evidence over whether Officer Guill “acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112.
As to whether Officer Guill violated Mr. Perry’s constitutional rights during the
removal of the taser from Mr. Perry’s hand, the evidence of a malicious motive to punish
or cause harm is quite a bit thinner. Arguably, it is sufficient and, in any event, what
happened after other officers arrived will be generally relevant at trial. A decision in
plaintiff’s favor at summary judgment does not preclude evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence as it actually is presented at trial.
The parties present conflicting accounts of why Officer Guill went to Mr. Perry’s
cell, what they communicated to each other there, and why Officer Guill had the cell door
opened. Because this disputed evidence is material to Officer Guill’s motive and whether
he acted maliciously, see id., the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
B. Qualified Immunity
Generally, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a corrections officer who “has
violated a prisoner’s constitutional right” is “shielded from liability . . . if an objectively
reasonable officer could have believed that his actions were lawful in light of clearly
established law.” Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When an officer asserts immunity from an alleged violation that
contains a “wrongful intent” element, such as an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim, the officer’s subjective intent governs both the substantive claim and the immunity
defense, and the analyses merge. See Brooks, 924 F.3d at 118–19 (“Because ‘the case
law is intent-specific,’ clearly establishing that the bad faith and malicious use of force
violates the Eighth Amendment rights of prison inmates, a corrections officer who acts
with that culpable state of mind reasonably should know that she is violating the law.”).
Like in Brooks, the excessive force claim here contains a “wrongful intent”
element. 924 F.3d at 118. The inquiry controlling Officer Guill’s claim of immunity then
collapses into the same analysis as the subjective intent prong of the excessive force
claim. Because there is a genuine dispute over the material facts about Officer Guill’s
state of mind when he used force against Mr. Perry, his immunity defense will be denied.
It is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. 28, is
DENIED.
This the 22nd day of February, 2024.
UNITED STATES < JUDGE