LEAK v. DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRADLEY LEAK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV439

)

DAVISON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 6) (the

“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint

(Docket Entry 1). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending

dismissal of this action.

RELEVANT STANDARDS

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To

address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that

“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]Jourt

determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii).

A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of

the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id.’

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine

Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th

(continued...)

BACKGROUND

Asserting claims (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) under the First,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution, as well as Title VI (presumably of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964) (see Docket Entry 1 at 6),° Plaintiff initiated this

action against six defendants: (1) Davidson County Sheriff’s

Department, (2) Davidson Medical Department, (3) Davidson County

Detention Center, (4) Nurse Madison, (5) Doctor E, and (6) Sgt.

Watson (collectively, the “Defendants”) (see id. at 2-3).

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint (and attachments thereto):

At an earlier, unspecified date, “[Plaintiff] was diagnosed

[with] psychosis[].” (Id. at 19.) On April 23, 2023, during

Plaintiff’s detention at the Davidson County Detention Center,

“Nurse Madison had Doctor E [] stop[ Plaintiff’s] mental health

medications[.] Officer W[atson ] had his camera on[] when Nurse

Madison said that she would never give [Plaintiff his] mental

'(,..continued)

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se

complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint

- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must

plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551

U.S. at 94; then Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

* Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

health [medication] ever again. [Defendants] stopped [Plaintiff’s]

mental health medication.” (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff has characterized this denial of medication as “a

prima fac[ie] case [of] discrimination” (id. at 15), for which he

seeks “summary judgment, damages, injunction, [and] punitive

damages” (id. at 5).

DISCUSSION

I. Discrimination Claim

To begin, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants engaged in

“discrimination” which violated his rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment (and presumably Title VI) (id. at 13; see also id. at 6

(invoking Title VI)), as well as “[rJetaliation [in violation] of

[the] lst Amendment” (id. at 6). However, simply using the terms

“discrimination” or “retaliation,” and even asserting in conclusory

fashion that Defendants’ conduct constituted a “prima fac[ie] case

[of] discrimination” (id. at 15), does not suffice to state a

viable claim. See, e.g., Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (observing that

“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions” and

that a viable complaint “demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). The Complaint

lacks any factual allegations establishing discrimination or

retaliation or identifying the motivating bias for any alleged

discrimination or retaliation. (See Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.)

Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination and

retaliation claim(s) for failure to state a plausible claim. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Claims Against Institutional Defendants

Additionally, the Complaint names Davidson County Sheriff’s

Department, Davidson Medical Department, and Davidson County

Detention Center as the first three defendants. (Docket Entry 1 at

2-3.) However, Davidson County Sheriff’s Department, Davidson

Medical Department, and Davidson County Detention Center do not

qualify as legal entities subject to suit and/or persons within the

meaning of Section 1983.

“State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the

capacity to be sued in federal court. There is no North Carolina

statute authorizing suit against a county’s sheriff’s department.”

Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004)

(internal citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Jail

Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:15cv91, 2016 WL 5417399, at *2 (M.D.N.C.

Aug. 19, 2016) (concluding that Orange County Jail and Orange

County Sheriff’s Department do not qualify as “entit[ies] capable

of being sued in federal court”), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

5415755 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016); Capers v. Durham Cnty. Sheriff

Dept., No. 1:07cv825, 2009 WL 798924, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 23,

2009) (holding that “Durham County Sheriff Department is not a

legal entity capable of being sued”); Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F.

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Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (dismissing Section 1983 claims

against Bladen County Sheriff’s Department because it “lacks legal

capacity to be sued,” as no North Carolina “statute authoriz[es]

suit against a North Carolina county’s sheriff’s department”). To

remedy that issue, Plaintiff could potentially name the Sheriff of

Davidson County as a defendant, but any such claim would still fail

to state any claim for relief. The Complaint describes no personal

involvement by the Sheriff in the alleged violations and theories

of respondeat superior or liability predicated solely on a

defendant’s identity as a supervisor do not exist under Section

1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

Claims against Davidson Medical Center and Davidson County

Detention Center suffer from a similar flaw. Section 1983 imposes

liability only on “persons” who violate a plaintiff’s federally

protected civil rights, but Davidson County Detention

Center — including its constituent part, the Davidson Medical

Center — “is a building and not a person.” Allen v. Correct Care

Sols., No. 1:21cv146, 2021 WL 954624, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4,

2021), recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 949633 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12,

2021), aff’d, 853 F. App’x 858 (4th Cir. 2021); see also Allen v.

Durham Cnty. Magistrate Off., No. 1:20cv90, 2021 WL 6755021, at *4

(M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Durham County Detention Facility do[es]

not qualify as [a] legal entit[y] subject to suit.”),

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 286817 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 2022),

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aff’d, No. 22-1088, 2022 WL 2987941 (4th Cir. July 28, 2022). Even

if Plaintiff substituted the Davidson County Sheriff, as the person

responsible for Davidson County Detention Center and/or its Medical

Center, the Complaint contains no factual matter showing any

conduct by the Sheriff in the operation of Davidson County

Detention Center or its Medical Center which violated Plaintiff’s

federal constitutional or statutory rights. (See Docket Entry 1

at 1-27.)

Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief

as to these three Defendants, warranting dismissal under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. Claims Against Sgt. Watson

As to claims against Sgt. Watson, the Complaint alleges only

that Sgt. Watson “had his camera on[] when Nurse Madison said that

she would never give [Plaintiff his] mental health [medication]

ever again.” (Id. at 5.) However, “[a] successful individual

capacity claim must allege that the defendant was personally

involved in the deprivation of [Plaintiff]’s rights.” Bunting v.

Cooper, Civ. Action No. 5:17-CT-3098, 2017 WL 5639948, at *3

(E.D.N.C. May 23, 2017) (citing, inter alia, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676). The Complaint fails to set out any facts showing Sgt.

Watson’s personal involvement in the alleged violations of

Plaintiff’s rights. (See Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.) Thus, the Court

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should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. Watson for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IV. Claims Regarding Plaintiff’s Medical Care

The Complaint also alleges Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims based on deliberate indifference due to the denial of

medical care as to the remaining two Defendants, Nurse Madison and

Doctor E. (See id. at 6; see also id. at 13 (accusing Nurse

Madison of violating Plaintiff’s Due Process Clause rights by

denying him medication), 16 (same as to Nurse Madison and Doctor

E), 22 (asserting that denial of medication by Nurse Madison and

Doctor E constituted “deliberate indifference”), 26 (same).)

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need can state a claim

under Section 1983. See, e.g., Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241

(4th Cir. 2008). However, “[d]eliberate indifference is a very

high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). “Moreover,

mere disagreement with treatment received is not enough to state a

claim for relief.” Crump v. Yapp, et al., No. 1:22cv474, 2022 WL

21825813, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2022). The Complaint sets out

no facts establishing Nurse Madison or Doctor E acted in deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s alleged medical need. (See Docket

Entry 1 at 1-27.)

Further, the Complaint fails to establish that Plaintiff’s

mental health medication qualifies as a serious medical need. A

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medical need qualifies as serious if it “has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even

a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s

attention.” Iko, 535 F.2d at 241. The Complaint apparently

contends that Plaintiff needs medication due to his “diagnos[is] of

psychosis[]” (Docket Entry 1 at 19), but the Complaint does not

provide any factual matter showing the need for the specific

medication at issue or adverse effects from its denial (see id. at

1-27). Moreover, the Complaint alleges no facts regarding the

timing or source of the alleged diagnosis. (See id.)

Under these circumstances, the Court should dismiss these

claim(s) against Nurse Madison and/or Doctor E for failure to state

a claim for relief under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

V. Official Capacity Claims

Finally, the Complaint alleges claims against Defendants in

their official capacity. (See id. at 2-3.) For reasons stated in

the preceding sections, the Complaint fails to state any claim

against Defendants. Assuming for the purposes of discussion each

Defendant qualified as a person subject to suit under § 1983, for

official-capacity liability to attach, “it must be shown that the

actions of [Defendants] were unconstitutional and were taken

pursuant to a custom or policy of the entity.” Giancola v. State

of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 1987)

(observing that official capacity suits actually target employing

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entity); see also Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] required a

plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a [local governmental

body] under § 1983 to identify a [local governmental] ‘policy’ or

‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”).

The Complaint does not allege facts which (if accepted as

true) would establish that any constitutional violations occurred

pursuant to a custom or policy of Defendants’ entities. (See

Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.) As a result, the Court should dismiss all

claims against Defendants in their official capacity under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION

This action fails to state a viable claim for relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket

Entry 6) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT

TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

February 5, 2024

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