MANIS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JOE MANIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF )

AGRICULTURE; THOMAS JAMES )

VILSACK, in his official ) 1:24-cv-175

capacity as the Secretary )

of Agriculture; MICHAEL )

WATSON, in his official )

capacity as Administrator )

of the Animal and Plant )

Health Inspection Service, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is a Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction with Request for Oral Argument

filed by Plaintiff Joe Manis. (Doc. 7.) Plaintiff requests that

Defendants the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”),

Thomas Vilsack, United States Secretary of Agriculture, and

Michael Watson, Administrator of the USDA’s Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) be enjoined from enforcing

the Horse Protection Act (“HPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1821 et seq.,

against Plaintiff through the USDA’s administrative adjudication

process. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for

preliminary injunction will be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is “a retired North Carolina businessman who has

been involved with Tennessee Walking Horses for the last 50

years, active in the North Carolina Walking Horse Association

(‘NCWHA’) for the last 30 years, and who owns walking horses,

one of which is regularly shown in competitions across the

southeast.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 1.) On May 19, 2023, the USDA’s

APHIS filed a complaint against Plaintiff “alleging that he

violated the HPA by allowing the entry of a horse he owned into

a Virginia horse show while the horse was allegedly sore.”1 (Id.

¶ 68.)

When the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) proposed

scheduling a hearing on the matter, Plaintiff “moved to dismiss

on the grounds that the USDA’s internal adjudication process is

unconstitutionally structured.” (Id. ¶¶ 71–72.) Plaintiff also

requested that any hearing before the ALJ be postponed in light

of his motion to dismiss “and the anticipated filing of this

Complaint.” (Id. ¶ 74.) The ALJ declined to issue a stay in the

1 Though Plaintiff denies this allegation, (see Compl.

(Doc. 1) ¶ 70), the merits of the USDA’s complaint against

Plaintiff are not at issue in this case, (see id. ¶ 97

(“[Plaintiff’s] constitutional challenges are irrelevant to the

merits of the allegation against him.”)).

proceedings, (id. ¶¶ 75–76), and Plaintiff filed his Complaint

in this court alleging the same claims, (see generally id.).

“In sum,” Plaintiff alleges that the USDA’s “enforcement

scheme subjects [him] to an unconstitutional hearing,

(1) without a jury as required by the Seventh Amendment, (2) in

violation of Article III of the Constitution, (3) before an ALJ,

who is improperly supervised, and whose dual-layer tenure

protection violates the separation of powers, and (4) whose

decision can only be appealed to a Judicial Officer who is

improperly wielding principal-officer power.” (Id. ¶ 94.)

A. Seventh Amendment Jury Requirement and Article III

Violation

Plaintiff contends that “[t]he pending allegation against

[him] is effectively a suit at common law with a legal remedy

for which he is entitled to a jury trial that is not available

in the USDA adjudication process.” (Id. ¶ 88.) Plaintiff also

argues that “[i]f a statutory claim ultimately adjudicates a

private right, it must be adjudicated by an Article III court.”

(Id. ¶ 171.) This is because, in Plaintiff’s view, “[t]he HPA

effectively codifies private right claims for fraud and breach

of contract,” therefore that statute must be “adjudicated by an

Article III court.” (Id. ¶¶ 171, 173.)

B. Improperly Supervised ALJs with Unconstitutional Dual-

Layer Removal Protection

The USDA ALJs, who are appointed by the Secretary of the

USDA, “make the initial decision in each adjudication.” (Id.

¶¶ 47–48 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 2.27(a)(1)).) ALJs “are empowered to

rule upon motions and requests, conduct conferences and

hearings, administer oaths and affirmations, issue subpoenas,

hear oral argument on facts or law, and take other significant

actions during the course of the administrative hearing.” (Id.

¶ 52 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1.144(c)).) Once the initial

adjudication process is complete, the ALJs “issue an initial

decision that ‘become[s] final without further proceedings

unless there is an appeal to the Secretary,’” who, as explained

in more detail below, has delegated his authority to hear such

appeals to the Judicial Officer. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54 (citing 7 C.F.R.

§ 2.27; 5 U.S.C. § 557; 7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)).)

Plaintiff argues that USDA ALJs “enjoy two layers of

protection from removal by the President,” which violates the

separation of powers. (Id. ¶ 49.) ALJs “can be removed ‘only for

good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems

Protection Board’ (‘MSPB’).” (Id. ¶ 50 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 7521(a)).) In turn, the members of the MSPB may only “be

removed by the President . . . for inefficiency, neglect of

duty, or malfeasance in office.” (Id. ¶ 51 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 1202(d)).) Plaintiff argues that “[t]he President’s ability to

remove executive officers is central to the President’s

executive power,” yet he cannot exercise this power over ALJs

because both ALJs and the MSPB can only be removed for cause.

(See id. ¶¶ 130–39.)

C. ALJs’ Decisions Can Only Be Appealed to the Judicial

Officer, Who Improperly Wields Principal-Officer Power

Under the 1940 Schwellenbach Act, the Secretary of the USDA

“delegated his authority to impose civil penalties for

violations of the HPA to USDA’s Judicial Officer, a position

created by the Secretary.” (Id. ¶¶ 44–45 (citing 7 U.S.C.

§ 2204-2; 7 C.F.R. § 2.35; 10 Fed. Reg. 13769 (Nov. 9, 1945)).)

“In an appeal of an initial decision by an ALJ, the Judicial

Officer reviews the parties’ briefs, presides over oral

argument, and issues a final decision for the Department.” (Id.

¶ 55 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.145, 2.35(a)).) Therefore, through

this delegation, “[t]he Judicial Officer exercises the final

decision-making power of USDA in the adjudication.” (Id. ¶ 56

(citing 7 C.F.R. § 2.35).)

However, the Judicial Officer “was not appointed by the

President” or “confirmed by the Senate,” and Plaintiff alleges

that the Judicial Officer “does not hold any office created by

law.” (Id. ¶¶ 57–59.) “No statute or regulation permits the

Secretary to affirm, reverse, or otherwise review the decision

of the Judicial Officer,” and though the Secretary can revoke

his delegation to the Judicial Officer, he cannot do so

retroactively. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 63 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2204-3).) “As a

result, the Secretary is prohibited from reviewing, affirming,

modifying, or reversing the Judicial Officer’s decision after it

is made.” (Id. ¶ 64.)

Plaintiff alleges that this structure violates the

Appointments Clause because the Judicial Officer “functions as a

principal officer” by exercising “the final decision-making

authority in USDA’s adjudications,” without being “appointed by

the President and confirmed by the Senate as required by the

Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2, cl.

2.” (Id. ¶¶ 66–67.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 1, 2024. (Compl.

(Doc. 1).) On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with

Request for Oral Argument, (Pl.’s Mot. for a TRO and Prelim.

Inj. with Request for Oral Argument (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Doc. 7)),

and a brief in support, (Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for TRO and

Prelim. Inj. with Request for Oral Argument (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc.

8)). The court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order on March 27, 2024. (Doc. 16.) Defendants

responded to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction on

March 27, 2024, (Defs.’ Mem. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim.

Inj. (“Defs.’ Resp.”) (Doc. 18)), and Plaintiff replied on April

2, 2024, (Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s

Reply”) (Doc. 19)). The court heard oral argument from the

parties on April 17, 2024, after which it took Plaintiff’s

motion under advisement. The motion is now ripe for ruling.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Preliminary injunctive relief and TROs are not remedies

‘awarded as of right,’ but ‘[a]s a matter of equitable

discretion[.]’” Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus.

Regul. Auth., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (D.D.C. 2023)

(quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018)). “A

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish” four

prongs: “that [1] he is likely to succeed on the merits, that

[2] he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that [3] the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and that [4] an injunction is in the public interest.”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

“Courts considering whether to impose preliminary injunctions

must separately consider each Winter factor.” Di Biase v. SPX

Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017). “A preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect the

status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of

the lawsuit,” and the moving party bears the burden of “clearly

establish[ing] entitlement to the relief sought.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “need not

establish a ‘certainty of success,’ but must make a clear

showing that he is likely to succeed.” Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 230

(citation omitted). “[T]he burden placed upon Plaintiff[] to

show that each requirement of a preliminary injunction is met is

high. Consequently, merely ‘providing sufficient factual

allegations to meet the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]

12(b)(6) standard of Twombly and Iqbal’ does not show a

likelihood of success on the merits.” J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 338 F.R.D. 33, 60 (D. Md. 2020) (citation

omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that the “USDA’s in-house adjudication

process imposes a here-and-now constitutional injury on

[Plaintiff] — namely, (1) the absence of a principal officer to

issue a final decision in the case and supervise the inferior

officer ALJs, (2) the lack of ALJs properly accountable to the

President, (3) the absence of a jury as required by the Seventh

Amendment, and (4) the unlawful attempt to adjudicate private

rights outside of an Article III court.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 89.)

1. The USDA Judicial Officer Exercises Principal

Officer Power Without a Constitutional Appointment

to Do So

“The Appointments Clause requires that the President ‘shall

nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,

shall appoint . . . [principal] Officers of the United

States.’”” In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 44 F.4th 1369, 1372

(Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Art. II, § 2, cl. 2). “Thus, ‘[the

President] may be assisted in carrying out [executive]

responsibility by officers nominated by him and confirmed by the

Senate, as well as by other officers not appointed in that

manner but whose work . . . must be directed and supervised by

an officer who has been.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 6 (2021)).

Plaintiff argues that the Judicial Officer

unconstitutionally exercises principal officer power without a

proper appointment under the Appointments Clause because “[t]he

Secretary cannot review the Judicial Officer’s decisions because

of the statutory bar on the retroactive revocation of a

delegation.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 6 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2204-

3).)2 Therefore, the Judicial Officer is not supervised by a

principal officer, so the Judicial Officer wields principal

officer power without a proper appointment in violation of the

Appointments Clause. (Id.) However, Defendant argues that the

Judicial Officer is sufficiently supervised by the Secretary and

“is an inferior officer because his delegation may be revoked,

his decisions are subject to the Secretary’s review, and he may

be terminated at will.” (Def.’s Resp. (Doc. 18) at 8.)

In Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), the

Supreme Court enumerated the factors to be considered in

evaluating whether an officer is principal or inferior: “whether

(1) the officer is bound to follow regulations promulgated by an

agency head, (2) the officer can be removed at will and without

cause by the agency head, and (3) the agency head can review the

decisions of the officer.” McConnell v. USDA, 4:23-cv-24, 2023

WL 5963782, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2023) (citing Edmond,

520 U.S. at 661).

Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that the Secretary has no

control over the Judicial Officer, there are certain mechanisms

of control in place:

2 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located

at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear

on CM/ECF.

The Secretary may promulgate regulations which the

Judicial Officer must follow. 15 U.S.C. § 1828; 7

C.F.R. § 1.131 . . . . Furthermore, the Judicial

Officer is removable at will, and the Secretary may

revoke his delegation of authority to the Judicial

Officer at any time. 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2.

McConnell, 2023 WL 5963782, at *3. Plaintiff argues that because

this delegation cannot be revoked retroactively, and the

Secretary cannot review decisions already made by the Judicial

Officer, the Secretary does not adequately supervise the

Judicial Officer. (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 13–14.) However, “the

fact that the Secretary cannot review the Judicial Officer’s

decisions does not defeat inferior-officer status” because the

Edmond analysis requires examination of all three factors, not

solely whether the Secretary can review the Judicial Officer’s

decisions.3 See McConnell, 2023 WL 5963782, at *4 (citing

Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998)).

Though the Secretary cannot retroactively override the

Judicial Officer’s decisions, which are final decisions of the

USDA, the Secretary exercises control over the Judicial Officer

3 Plaintiff argues that under Arthrex, “[t]he test for

distinguishing an inferior officer from a principal officer is

supervision.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 11 (citing United States v.

Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021)).) However,

the Arthrex Court specifically stated: “we do not attempt to

‘set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between

principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause

purposes.’” Arthrex, 594 U.S. at 23. Instead, the Court

“reaffirm[ed] and appl[ied] the rule from Edmond.” Id. at 27.

both in his ability to promulgate regulations the Judicial

Officer must follow as well as remove the Judicial Officer from

his position should the Secretary choose to do so. These

restrictions on the Judicial Officer are significant, and do not

appear to permit the Judicial Officer to have the sort of

unfettered discretion typical of a principal officer. The court

declines to assume, based on the limited4 record at this stage,

that these mechanisms are insufficient to render the Judicial

Officer’s decisions actions that may be undertaken only by a

principal officer duly appointed under the Appointments Clause.

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits of his claim that the Judicial Officer

unconstitutionally exercises principal officer power in

violation of the Appointments Clause.

4 By “limited record,” this court is referring to the

absence of an in-depth recounting of the applicable regulations

by either party. The Government points to regulations such as 7

C.F.R. § 2.12, 7 C.F.R. § 1.132, 9 C.F.R. §§ 11.1 et seq., and

60 Fed. Reg. 8446 (Feb. 14, 1995), (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at

9), all of which, when considered in tandem with 7 U.S.C.

§ 2204-2, suggest there may be adequate supervision even though

the Judicial Officer’s decision is final agency action. For

purposes of a preliminary injunction, this court finds that

Plaintiff has established a plausible, and perhaps possible,

chance of success but falls short of establishing a likelihood

of success on the merits.

2. The USDA Judicial Officer is an Improperly Appointed

Inferior Officer and His Status as an Inferior

Officer Leaves USDA ALJs without Adequate Principal

Officer Supervision

Plaintiff argues that, even if the Judicial Officer is an

inferior, rather than a principal officer, “he still cannot

exercise that authority because Congress did not create an

office for the Judicial Officer.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 15.)

Plaintiff further contends that “if the Judicial Officer is only

an inferior officer, . . . [t]he ALJs, whom the Judicial Officer

supervises, lack oversight from a properly appointed officer.”

(Id. at 17.)

a. The Creation of the Judicial Officer

Plaintiff contends that the Judicial Officer’s office is

not established by law in violation of the Appointments Clause

because “the Judicial Officer holds no office established by

Congress.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 15.)

The USDA Secretary is authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2 to

delegate “the whole or any part of any regulatory function which

the Secretary is . . . required or authorized to perform” if the

Secretary “deems that the delegation . . . will result in the

more expeditious discharge of the duties of the Department of

Agriculture.” 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2. The Secretary is authorized to

both designate “officers or employees” to receive delegations of

his authority, and to “assign appropriate titles to such

officers or employees.” Id. Pursuant to this statutory

authorization, the Secretary created the office of Judicial

Officer to “act as final deciding officer” in several enumerated

adjudicatory proceedings conducted by the USDA. See 7 C.F.R. §

2.35; see also 7 C.F.R. § 2.4.

Though Congress itself did not explicitly create the office

of Judicial Officer, it did explicitly grant the Secretary

authority to do so. 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2. The fact that the

Judicial Officer’s position was created by the Secretary through

regulations pursuant to a statutory authorization, rather than

directly through a statute, does not mean that the Judicial

Officer’s office was not statutorily authorized. In fact, as

Plaintiff states in his brief, the Appointments Clause itself

“permits inferior officers to be appointed by a head of

department if Congress ‘vest[ed]’ that authority in him ‘by

Law.’” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 16 (citing U.S. Const. art. II,

§ 2, cl. 2).) It is not clear to the court how the appointment

process for the Judicial Officer described above fails to

comport with the Appointments Clause. Therefore, Plaintiff does

not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his

claim that the Judicial Officer cannot be an inferior officer

because his position was not established by law.

b. ALJ Supervision

Plaintiff argues that if the Judicial Officer is an

inferior officer, the USDA ALJs are not properly supervised

because they are supervised by the Judicial Officer, an inferior

officer, rather than the Secretary himself, a principal officer.

He asserts that because “[t]he Judicial Officer is the exclusive

avenue for review of USDA ALJs’ initial decisions,” the ALJs are

not adequately supervised by a principal officer. (Pl.’s Br.

(Doc. 8) at 17.) However, as discussed above, the Secretary can

revoke his delegation of authority to the Judicial Officer at

will at any time, and the Secretary can also take on the

Judicial Officer’s authority without revoking that delegation.

“This means that the Secretary can step in and review the

decisions of an ALJ before it is reviewed by the Judicial

Officer,” which is a powerful method of supervision. McConnell,

2023 WL 59637, at *5 (citing Fleming v. USDA, 987 F.3d 1093,

1103 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). Therefore, the Secretary “has

considerable influence over whether an ALJ’s decision becomes

the final decision of the agency,” because he may, “at his

election, step in and act as final appeals officer in any case.”

Fleming, 987 F.3d at 1103. Additionally, as Defendants explain,

the USDA ALJs “must follow the Secretary’s procedural and

substantive regulations.” (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at 13 (citing

Fleming, 987 F.3d at 1103).)

Plaintiff contends that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment does not permit the Secretary to intervene at

will to review an ALJ’s decision himself.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8)

at 18 (citing Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th

Cir. 1986).) In Utica Packing, the Secretary of Agriculture

replaced a judicial officer after the judicial officer had

already rendered a final decision in a case, then the Secretary

petitioned the judicial officer’s replacement for

reconsideration of the case to achieve an outcome favorable to

the Secretary. 781 F.2d at 75–78. The facts and circumstances in

Utica Packing were so unique that the court does not find that

case to stand for the general proposition that a party’s due

process rights are violated each time the Secretary chooses to

exercise the authority delegated to the Judicial Officer.

Further, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “the

Appointments Clause was intended to prevent unappointed

officials from wielding too much authority, not to guarantee

procedural rights to litigants.” In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc.,

44 F.4th 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Piano Factory

Grp., Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, 11 F.4th 1363, 1374

(Fed. Cir. 2021)). Accordingly, because the ALJs are “at some

level [] subject to the direction and supervision of an officer

nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,”

Arthrex, 594 U.S. at 27, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a

likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.

3. The USDA ALJs’ Removal Protection

Plaintiff argues that “USDA ALJs enjoy two layers of tenure

protection through the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 5 U.S.C.

§ 1202(d). But they ‘exercise significant executive power’ such

that the President’s removal authority cannot be restricted by

two layers of tenure protection.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 20

(citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561

U.S. 477, 514 (2010)).) Defendants argue that Free Enterprise

should not be applied here because that case dealt with a highly

unique set of facts, (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 18) at 15), which led the

Court to clarify that its holding “does not address that subset

of independent agency employees who serve as administrative law

judges,” Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.

As the Fourth Circuit has explained, there is a circuit

split as to whether the removal scheme for ALJs is

constitutional — the Ninth Circuit has declared the scheme

constitutional, while the Fifth Circuit has deemed it

unconstitutional. See K & R Contractors, LLC v. Keene, 86 F.4th

135, 148 (4th Cir. 2023). The Fourth Circuit did not ultimately

provide a resolution to the question of whether a scheme in

which ALJs can only be removed for cause, as determined by the

MSPB, whose members can also only be removed for cause, is

constitutional. See K & R Contractors, 86 F.4th at 148–49.

However, the “good cause” standard applicable to ALJs includes

“all matters which affect the ability and fitness of the ALJ to

perform the duties of office.” Abrams v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 703

F.3d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (deferring to agency’s reasonable

construction of “good cause” under Chevron deference). In turn,

a member of the MSPB can be removed for “inefficiency, neglect

of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). These

restrictions on removal do not appear to “tie[] the President’s

hands and hinder[] his control over his subordinates.” Decker

Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8 F.4th 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021).

Because of inconsistencies in the caselaw and the lack of

available precedent, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that he is

likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that the ALJs’

removal mechanism is unconstitutional.

4. Plaintiff’s Right to a Trial by Jury in an Article

III Court

Plaintiff argues that the “HPA violation [he] is alleged to

have committed is essentially a common-law claim involving

private rights for which [he] is entitled to a jury trial.”

(Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 20.) This is, according to Plaintiff,

because “[a]ny claims in federal court that seek legal remedies

such as civil monetary penalties require a jury trial,” and “the

HPA empowers APHIS to seek and collect civil monetary penalties

— a legal remedy — through USDA’s in-house adjudication

process.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 149, 150 (citing Tull v. United

States, 481 U.S. 412, 418–23 (1987); 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)).)

Defendant responds that “[u]nder the public-rights framework,

USDA adjudications under the HPA involve public rights that

Congress has created and, thus, are beyond the scope of the

Seventh Amendment.” (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at 18.)

The Seventh Amendment states that “[i]n Suits at common

law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,

the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S. Const.

amend. VII. However, “when Congress properly assigns a matter to

adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the Seventh

Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that

action by a nonjury factfinder.’” Oil States Energy Servs. LLC

v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 345 (2018) (quoting

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)).

That said, “[a] jury trial may be required for claims created by

statute when the action is ‘analogous to “Suits at common

law.”’” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6 (quoting Tull v. United

States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)).

“A statutory claim is analogous to a common law claim if:

(1) it is sufficiently similar to ‘18th-century actions brought

in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of

law and equity,’ and (2) it provides a legal (monetary) remedy.”

Id. (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417–18). Plaintiff argues that an

HPA enforcement proceeding is not only “an action for civil

monetary penalties, but it is also effectively a common law

fraud claim” because “[o]wners of horses are prohibited from

allowing one of their horses to be entered into a horse show

while sore to prevent owners from gaining an unfair advantage in

the competition and harming fellow competitors.” (Pl.’s Br.

(Doc. 8) at 24–25.) However, this court concurs with the court

in McConnell that the HPA is not analogous to common-law fraud,

but is instead “a distinct cause of action created by Congress

and properly assigned to a federal agency to administer within

its area of expertise.” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6. This is

because the HPA “does not require any false statements or

misrepresentation, nor does it require any injury to a third

party. Simply because it is possible to commit both common law

fraud and violate the HPA at the same time does not mean the

claims are analogous.” Id.

Further, even if the HPA can be analogized to a common-law

fraud claim, “the ‘public-rights’ doctrine may still allow the

claim to be heard before an administrative agency without a

jury.” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6 (citing Granfinanciera,

492 U.S. at 42, 51). The Court in Granfinanciera held that “when

Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign

their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury

trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh

Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be “preserved” in

“suits at common law.”’” Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51. “Public

rights” actions, as opposed to disputes between private

citizens, “aris[e] between the Government and persons subject to

its authority in connection with the performance of the

constitutional functions of the executive or legislative

departments.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011).

Here, the USDA’s enforcement of the HPA “clearly involves

statutory public rights.” Sasser v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A.,

990 F.2d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 1993). While the HPA does not have a

clear congressional declaration of purpose like the Clean Water

Act at issue in Sasser did, the HPA statute is clear that its

goals were to prevent “the movement, showing, exhibition, or

sale of sore horses in intrastate commerce” which “adversely

affects and burdens interstate and foreign commerce,” and that

“regulation under this chapter by the Secretary is appropriate

to prevent and eliminate” these burdens. See 15 U.S.C. §

1822(3), (5).5 These goals reflect Congress’s “authority in

connection with the performance of the constitutional functions

of the executive or legislative departments,” see Stern, 564

U.S. at 489, rather than legislation regarding typical disputes

between private citizens.

Plaintiff does not carry his burden of clearly

demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim

that HPA violations must be adjudicated through a jury trial in

an Article III court.6

Because Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on

the merits of each of his claims, this court will not evaluate

the remaining Winter factors.

5 The USDA’s HPA Fact Sheet states that “USDA has two goals

in administering the Horse Protection Act: eliminate the cruel

and inhumane practice of soring,” and “promote fair

competition.” USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,

The Horse Protection Act, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/

default/files/bro-horse-protection-act.pdf (last accessed Apr.

22, 2024).

6 “The same private rights analysis for the availability of

a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment is applicable to

whether Congress can ‘assign adjudication of that cause of

action to a non-Article III tribunal.’” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 170

(quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53).)

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion fora

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with

Reguest for Oral Argument, (Doc. 7), is DENIED.

This the 24th day of April, 2024.

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ls Akinun Lb. Webi, Vi

United States District Jyape

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