BYRD v. NC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

AUSTIN WAYNE BYRD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV320

)

NC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH )

AND HUMAN SERVICES, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the

“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint

(Docket Entry 2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending

dismissal of this action.

RELEVANT STANDARDS

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To

address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that

“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt

determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of

the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.!

BACKGROUND

Asserting claims under Section 1983 via the Fifth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) (see Docket

Entry 2 at 3),* Plaintiff initiated this action against the North

Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (“Defendant”) (see

id. at 2). According to Plaintiff’s Complaint:

“[Defendant] denied [Plaintiff] benefits on multiple occasions

due to a drug charge in Georgia.” (Id. at 4.)° Specifically,

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine

Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se

complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint

- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must

plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551

U.S. at 94; then Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

* Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

> For legibility reasons, this Memorandum Opinion uses

standardized capitalization in all quotations from Plaintiff’s

materials.

[Plaintiff] applied for food stamps in March of 2019

while at the TROSA Residential Substance Abuse Program in

Durham[, North Carolina,] and was denied

[benefits]. . . . [Plaintiff] applied for the

Supplemental Nutritition [sic] Assistance Program to try

to receive benefits and was told [he] was not eligible

due to an out of state drug charge. [Defendant] informed

[Plaintiff] that a Class G or higher drug related

conviction is grounds for denial. . . . Denial due to

any possession or possession with intent to sell/deliver

drug charge is a violation of constitutional rights and

discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Substance possession is the direct result of a disability

listed in the ADA of 1990.

(Id.) Additionally, the Complaint asserts:

[The] ADA of 1990 lists a substance abuse addiction as a

disability. Not providing food and nutrition benefits to

someone who has a drug charge is discrimination. A drug

charge is a direct and unfortunate result of a person

with a disability. Using their disability against them

is a violation of constitutional rights.

(Id. at 5.)

The Complaint requests relief in the form of $100,000 in

damages and an injunction providing for “any North Carolina law[’s]

revis[ion] to allow people convicted of any class felony drug

charge to receive food and nutrition benefits.” (Id.)

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must

allege factual matter showing “that [he was] deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that

the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50

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(1999); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir.

2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,

but rather provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional

and statutory rights.”). To the extent the Complaint seeks relief

under Section 1983 for violations of the ADA (rather than the

United States Constitution), such claim merges with the private

cause of action under the ADA. Accordingly, this Memorandum

Opinion first analyzes any constitutional claim under Section 1983

and then addresses relief under the ADA.

A. Damages Under Section 1983

Because “Congress did not exercise its power to abrogate a

state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983,” Coffin v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 562 F.

Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983), “a State is not a person within the

meaning of § 1983,” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Accordingly, as a state agency, Defendant does

not constitute a person under Section 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at

71. For that reason, Plaintiff fails to state a proper claim for

damages against Defendant under Section 1983.

Nor could Plaintiff remedy this deficiency by naming the

official in charge of Defendant in his or her official capacity,4

because “a suit against a state official in his or her official

4 The Complaint alleges no facts that could support an

individual capacity suit against any official.

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capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit

against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a

suit against the State itself.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

“[I]t follows that state officials acting in their official

capacities cannot be sued for damages under [Section 1983].” Allen

v. Cooper, No. 1:19cv794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22,

2019).

The Court thus should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claim(s) for damages for failure to state a claim under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983

Unlike claims for damages, “the Eleventh Amendment permits

suits for prospective injunctive relief against [state agencies

through] state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Frew

ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). “Plaintiff does

request [a] certain form[] of injunctive relief in his Complaint.

However, as discussed in further detail below, [the requested

relief is] not even [a] potentially viable request[].” Carroll v.

Dosier, No, 1:12cv1176, 2012 WL 7963126, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 13,

2012).

Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief reaches far too

broadly. To the extent the Complaint requests anything beyond

injunctive relief specific to Plaintiff’s claims, “it is subject to

denial for exceeding the scope of Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Santiago

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v. Southern Health Partners, No 1:15cv589, 2015 WL 8179617, at *1

(M.D.N.C. Dec 7, 2015). “Injunctive relief . . . must be tailored

to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Stormans, Inc. V. Selecky,

586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). In this case, Plaintiff asks

the Court to enjoin enforcement of “North Carolina law . .. to

allow people convicted of any class felony drug charge to receive

food and nutrition benefits.” (Docket Entry 2 at 5.) Defendant

denied Plaintiff “benefits on multiple occasions due to a drug

charge [in Georgia]” (id. at 4). Accordingly, the requested relief

goes “beyond the scope of the [C]lomplaint,” Church of Holy Light of

Queen v. Holder, 443 F. App’x 302, 303 (9th Cir. 2011), because it

requests relief that applies beyond Plaintiff’s individual

Situation.

Under the circumstances, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim(s) against Defendant for “fail[ure] to state a

claim on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii). See PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,

639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[The Fourth Circuit] will

vacate an injunction if it . . . does not carefully address only

the circumstances of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis added)).°

° To the extent the Court construed the Complaint to request

only injunctive relief for Plaintiff, the Complaint still fails to

show entitlement to relief because of the fatal deficiency noted in

Footnote Seven.

II. ADA Claims

The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff applied for “food

stamps” and benefits from the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance

Program,” but “[Defendant] denied [Plaintiff] benefits on multiple

occasions due to a drug charge [he incurred] in Georgia,” and this

denial violated his rights under the ADA. (Docket Entry 2 at 4.)

The Complaint characterizes “[s]ubstance possession [a]s the direct

result of [substance abuse addiction, which is a] disability listed

in the ADA.” (Id.)

A. Damages Under The ADA

An ADA claim for damages raises complex issues regarding

Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment states that

“[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.

XI. This language generally bars suits against a state in federal

court without the state’s consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This immunity

“applies not only to the state itself but extends also to state

agents and state instrumentalities . . . or stated otherwise to

arms of the State.” Zemedageghu v. Arthur, No. 1:15cv57, 2015 WL

1930539, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015) (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted). In some instances, however, state agencies

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remain “subject to suit if . . . Congress, acting under powers

granted to it in [S]ection [F]ive of the Fourteenth Amendment, has

clearly abrogated [their] immunity.” Id.; see also Seminole Tribe

of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (holding that “[Section]

5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s] Congress to abrogate

[Eleventh Amendment] immunity”). To make this determination, the

Court “must resolve two predicate questions: first, whether

Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that

immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to

a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541

U.S. 509, 517 (2004).

“The first question is well-settled.” Zemedageghu, 2015 WL

1930539, at *8. Title II of the ADA provides that “[a] State shall

not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution

of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court

of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42

U.S.C. § 12202. Accordingly, “Congress unequivocally expressed its

intent under Title II to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity.” Zemedageghu, 2015 WL 1930539, at *8.

The remaining question concerns “whether Congress enacted

Title II pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority,

i.e. the enforcement power in Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment “authorizes Congress to create a cause of

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action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth

Amendment rights.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158

(2006). “Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for

damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the

Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign

immunity.” Id. at 159 (emphasis added). A determination of

whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity thus

requires a claim-by-claim analysis of: “(1) which aspects of

[Defendant’s] alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent

such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3)

insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate

the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation

of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless

valid.” Id.

Accordingly, “[t]he first step of the Georgia inquiry requires

the [Court] to assess whether Defendant[’s] alleged conduct forms

the basis for a Title II claim.’” Holly Hill Nursing LLC v.

Padilla, No. 8:17cv3554, 2018 WL 5013826, at *8 (D. MD. Oct. 16,

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title II of “[t]he ADA[]

mandates that ‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.’” Davis v. Doe, No. 1:14cv373, 2014 WL 1835853, at *3

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(M.D.N.C. May 8, 2014) (brackets omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132). “In order to establish a violation of Title II [of the

ADA], [Plaintiff] must allege that,” id., “(1) he has a disability,

(2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in the [public

benefit], and (3) he was excluded from the [public benefit] on the

basis of his disability,” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health

Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012) (footnote omitted).

As to the first of these elements, “[u]nquestionably, drug

addiction constitutes an impairment under the ADA.” A Helping

Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., 515 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2008);

see also Regional Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of

Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “physical

or mental impairment includes drug addiction and alcoholism”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Complaint does not allege

that Plaintiff ever received a diagnosis of substance abuse

addiction (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-6); however, the Complaint does

allege that he attended “TROSA Residential Substance Abuse Program”

in 2019 (id. at 4). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to

demonstrate that, at the time of the benefits denial, he suffered

from “substance abuse addiction” under Title II of the ADA. See

Start, Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., 295 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (D. Md.

2003) (noting that “prospective patients [of a drug treatment

facility] satisfied . . . definition of disability under the ADA”).

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Next, Plaintiff must demonstrate “he is otherwise qualified to

participate in the [public benefit].” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461.

Plaintiff qualifies to participate in the public benefit if he,

“without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or

practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for

the receipt of services . . . provided by a public entity.” 42

U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). The federal statute

establishing eligibility requirements for food stamp benefits

states:

An individual convicted (under Federal or State law) of

any offense which is classified as a felony by the law of

the jurisdiction involved and which has as an element the

possession, use, or distribution of a controlled

substance shall not be eligible for . . . benefits under

the supplemental nutrition assistance program or any

State program carried out under th[e Food and Nutrition

Act of 2008, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2012].

21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (parentheses omitted) (emphasis added). The

corresponding North Carolina regulation similarly provides that

“Controlled Substance Felons [] are permanently disqualified from

receiving F[ood and ]N[utrition ]S[ervices] benefits.” North

Carolina Department of Health and Human Services

Food and Nutrition Services Manual, FNS 270 Eligibility

Requirements: Controlled Substance Felons, Section 270.01(A):

Requirement for Controlled Substance Felons, https://policies.ncd

hhs.gov/divisional/social-services/food-and-nutrition-services/po

licy-manuals/fns-270-controlled-substance-felons.pdf (last visited

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Feb. 12, 2024).° Acting pursuant to that rule, Defendant informed

Plaintiff that “[he] was not eligible [for food stamp benefits] due

to an out of state drug charge. (Docket Entry 2 at 4.) Thus,

Plaintiff does not meet the requirements to receive food stamps or

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits under Section

(a).

Even if Plaintiff met the requirements to receive benefits, he

would not establish a valid ADA claim against Defendant because he

cannot show that “he was excluded from the [public benefit] on the

basis of his disability.” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461. “Plaintiff’s

disability must constitute a ‘motivating cause’ of the exclusion

from the public benefit.” Brooks v. Diaz, No. 1:14cv794, 2014 WL

5390575, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2014) (citing Halpern, 669 F.3d

at 462). The Complaint contains no factual matter to support an

® Section 862a carves out an exception where “[a] state

may .. . exempt any or all individuals domiciled in the State from

the application of [Section 862a(a)].” 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d) (1) (A).

Accordingly, North Carolina crafted such an exception under which,

“La]n individual convicted of a Class H or I felony that involved

possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance

committed on or after August 23, 1996, in North Carolina may

reestablish eligibility for F[ood and |N[utrition |S[ervices]

benefits if they meet [additional conditions].” North Carolina

Department of Health and Human Services Food and Nutrition Services

Manual, FNS 270 Eligibility Requirements: Controlled Substance

Felons, Section 270.02 (A): Exceptions to Permanent

Disqualification, https://policies.ncdhhs.gov/divisional/social-s

ervices/food-and-nutrition-services/policy-manuals/fns-270-contro

lled-substance-felons.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2024). Plaintiff

fails to meet the criteria for this North Carolina exception as his

felony drug conviction occurred in Georgia not North Carolina.

(See Docket Entry 2 at 4 (“[Plaintiff] was charged with a simple

possession drug charge in the State of Georgia ... .”).)

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inference that his disability, substance abuse addiction, acted as

a motivating cause for his denial of benefits. (See Docket Entry

2 at 1-6.) In fact, “[Defendant] informed [Plaintiff] that

a... drug related conviction is grounds for denial” and that

“The] was not eligible due _ to an out of state drug charge.” (Id.

at 4 (emphasis added) .)

Under these circumstances, the Complaint does not allege a

valid Title II ADA claim against Defendant and therefore does not

satisfy the first prong of the Georgia inquiry. As a result,

Plaintiff has not established a valid abrogation of sovereign

immunity, and the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim for

damages for failure to state a viable claim under Section

1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii). See Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Loc. Ret.

sys., 707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting at the first step of

the Georgia inquiry that, “if a plaintiff cannot state a Title II

claim, th[is] [C]ourt’s sovereign immunity inquiry is at an end”).’

’ Tf Plaintiff alleged a valid ADA claim, the Court would move

onto the second prong of the Georgia inquiry and evaluate “to what

extent [Defendant’s] misconduct also violated the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. “Because [Plaintiff’s

claim] does not implicate any fundamental rights or involve any

suspect classifications,” Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424

(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted), the question before

the Court would become whether “there is any reasonably conceivable

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the

classification,” Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,

508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). In this case, Defendant’s denial of

Plaintiff’s benefits claim due to a previous out-of-state drug-

related felony conviction could have three rational bases

“(1) deterring drug use; (2) reducing fraud in the food stamp

(continued...)

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B. Injunctive Relief Under The ADA

Finally, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief under the ADA

and asks that “any North Carolina law [be] revised to allow people

convicted of any class felony drug charge to receive food and

nutrition benefits.” (Docket Entry 2 at 95.) However, as

previously mentioned, the Complaint does not state a plausible

Title II ADA claim. Moreover, the governing North Carolina

regulation on this issue, see FNS 270.01(A), simply implements a

federal statute, see 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a). Defendant lacks

authority to alter federal law and thus Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief fails as a matter of law for that reason as well.

See Carroll, 2012 WL 7963126, at *l.

CONCLUSION

This action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (2) (B) (11).

‘(...continued)

program; and (3) curbing welfare spending.” Turner, 207 F.3d at

424, “[T] here is a rational connection between the

disqualification of drug felons from eligibility for food stamps

and... the government’s desire to deter drug use.” Id. at 425.

“This is all that is required to sustain a classification in the

face of an equal protection challenge when the challenged

classification is subject to rational basis review.” Id. Asa

result, Plaintiff also would fall short on the second step of the

Georgia inquiry, thereby requiring a finding that no abrogation of

sovereign immunity occurred as to his damages claim under the ADA.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket

Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT

TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

February 14, 2024

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