WARNER v. SCOTLAND COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JEFFREY DAVID WARNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV595

)

SCOTLAND COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the

“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint

(Docket Entry 2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending

dismissal of this action.

RELEVANT STANDARDS

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To

address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that

“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt

determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous . . .” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

BACKGROUND

Asserting claims under Article 1 Section 8 of the United

States Constitution, 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) & (b)(2), and Title II of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (Docket Entry 2 at 3-4),

Plaintiff initiated this action against Scotland County Social

Services (“Defendant”) (id. at 2). According to the Complaint:

“[T]he [C]ounty . . . sold [Plaintiff’s] house . . . [and

c]ompletely ignor[ed] state law” in “an attempt to deprive

[Plaintiff] of justice.” (Id. at 4.) “[Plaintiff] also invoke[s]

[T]itle 2 of the American[s with D]isabilit[ies A]ct . . . [which]

also includes a private right [of action].” (Id.) “With [the

attached] evidence [Plaintiff] file[s his] lawsuit” and requests

relief via “suspen[sion of] [S]cotland [C]ounty court[’]s file

number 23cvm412” and “a writ of execution” for the sheriff for his

“attempt to evade justice.” (Id.)

In a prior case, Plaintiff litigated this same basic dispute

against Defendant. See Warner v. Scotland Cnty. Soc. Servs., No:

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1:22cv676, 2023 WL 2992423, at *1-3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2023)

(recounting Plaintiff’s prior complaint against Defendant for

violation of 38 U.S.C. § 5ll(a)), recommendation adopted, 2023 WL

2990360 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2023). Subsequently, the Court (per

Judge Biggs, adopting the undersigned Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation) “ordered [the] action [] dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Warner, 2023 WL

2990360, at *1 (emphasis and all-cap font omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Res Judicata Effect of Original Suit

The doctrine of res judicata bars attempts to relitigate

claims adjudicated in a previous suit between the same parties.

See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Res judicata also forecloses

claims in a second proceeding which a litigant could have raised in

the first proceeding. See Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740

(4th Cir. 1990) (observing that “the appropriate inquiry is whether

the new claim arises out of [the] same transaction or series of

transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment”); Harnett

v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Res judicata

precludes the litigation by the plaintiff in a subsequent action of

claims with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or

series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action

arose.” (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted)).

Application of res judicata generally requires satisfaction of

three conditions: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior

suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier

and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies

in the two suits.” Jones v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n, 115 F.3d

1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997). Absent a grant of leave to cure

identified deficiencies, a dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)

“ha[s] a res judicata effect on frivolousness determinations for

future in forma pauperis petitions.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

25, 34 (1992) (emphasis omitted); see also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Ҥ 1915 dismissals

with prejudice would have a res judicata effect on future in forma

pauperis petitions” (emphasis omitted)); Waller v. Groose, 38 F.3d

1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 1994) (“hold[ing] that the § 1915([e])

dismissal of [the plaintiff’s] first claim has res judicata effect

and establishes that [the plaintiff’s] second, identical claim is

frivolous for § 1915([e]) purposes”).1

As documented in the Background section, the Court (per Judge

Biggs) dismissed Plaintiff’s earlier federal claim against

Defendant arising from a dispute surrounding Plaintiff’s child

support obligations. The attached “evidence [Plaintiff relies on

to] file [the instant] lawsuit” (Docket Entry 2 at 4) primarily

1 The language now set out in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) previously

appeared in Section 1915(d). See Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1161 n.3.

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consists of documentation from his prior action (see Docket Entry

2-1 at 1-381, 384, 386-543, 615-16).* As such, the prior dismissal

carries a “res judicata effect on frivolousness determinations for

[Plaintiff’s current] in forma pauperis [application],” Denton, 504

U.S. at 34 (emphasis omitted), because Plaintiff’s instant action

relies on the prior action and involves claims he brought or could

have brought in that prior action, see, e.g., Keith, 900 F.2d at

740; Harnett, 800 F.2d at 1314.

Moreover, given that Plaintiff relies on the factual matter

underlying the dismissed claims in Plaintiff’s prior action as the

evidence for his claims in the instant action, res judicata

principles bar relief and mandate dismissal for frivolousness. See

Lindiment v. Jones, No. l:lVev501, 2017 WL 4119644, at *5-6

(M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2017) (“[B]ecause [the p]Jlaintiff’s claims in

the [o]lriginal [s]uit and the instant [c]lomplaint arise from the

same underlying events .. .[, each claim in the instant complaint]

remains subject to res judicata. Under these

circumstances, . . . [the instant complaint’s claims] are

frivolous .. . .” (internal citation omitted)), recommendation

adopted, 2017 WL 4417676 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2017); Pack v. David,

Civ. Action No. 07-2004, 2007 WL 4947819, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 1,

* The remaining documents in Plaintiff’s packet of evidence

originate from the underlying state proceedings regarding

Plaintiff’s child support dispute. (See, e.g., id. at 561 (noting

Plaintiff’s offense as “child support”) .)

2007) (ruling that, where prior “dismissal provide[d] res judicata

effect,” new actions qualify for dismissal as “frivolous” (emphasis

omitted)); Petros v. City of Wheeling, No. 5:05cv140, 2006 WL

1705911, at *2-3 (N.D. W. Va. June 16, 2006) (dismissing with

prejudice under Section 1915(e) and explaining that, because new

“action ha[d] arisen out of the same controversy as [the

plaintiff’s] previous two actions,” res judicata barred new

action); see also Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir.

1996) (observing that “Section 1915([e]) is aimed at the dismissal

of frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits” and concluding

that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it

rejected [the plaintiff’s] attempt to relitigate [the same] claim”

(emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)).

II. Remaining ADA Claim

Alternatively, beyond “invok[ing] [T]itle 2 of the [ADA]” and

asserting “Title 2 also includes a private right [of action],” the

Complaint does not offer any factual allegations regarding

Defendant’s alleged violations of the ADA. (Docket Entry 2 at 4.)

Due to the total lack of factual allegations under the ADA, the

Complaint obviously fails to establish a plausible ADA claim

against Defendant. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.”). Accordingly, even assuming

res judicata does not bar such claim, the Court should dismiss any

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ADA claims against Defendant as frivolous due to their obvious

conclusory character.

CONCLUSION

The Complaint suffers from obvious defects which render it

frivolous.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket

Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT

TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as frivolous.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

January 30, 2024

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