BROWN v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ANGELICA ROSE BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA ) 1:22-cv-717

AT CHAPEL HILL; SHIMUL MELWANI )

(in her individual capacity); )

SHREEDHARI DESAI (in her )

individual capacity); MICHAEL )

CHRISTIAN (in his individual )

capacity); BOARD OF GOVERNORS )

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the

District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 39.) For the reasons stated herein, the

motion will be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For an overview of the factual allegations in this case,

see the court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order entered October 20,

2023. (Mem. Op. and Order (Doc. 37) at 2–21.)1

On October 29, 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of

this court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Pl.’s Mot. for

Recons. of the District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I and II

of Pl.’s Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Doc. 39).) Plaintiff

attached a brief in support. (Mem. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for

Recons. Regarding the Dismissal of Counts I and Count II of the

Am. Compl. Against the Individual Defs. (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc. 39-

1).) Defendants filed a response on November 20, 2023, (Defs.’

Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Def.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 43)), and

Plaintiff replied on November 22, 2023, (Reply Br. in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. Regarding the Dismissal of Counts I and

Count II of the Am. Compl. Against the Individual Defs. (“Pl.’s

Reply”) (Doc. 44)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows for any

interlocutory order to “be revised at any time before the entry

1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located

at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear

on CM/ECF.

of a judgment.” There are only three circumstances where a court

may revise an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b): “(1) ‘a

subsequent trial produc[ing] substantially different evidence’;

(2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear error causing

‘manifest injustice.’” Carlson v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 856 F.3d 320,

325 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Canoe

Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003)).

“However, when assessing a Rule 54(b) motion for

reconsideration, these standards are not applied with the same

strictness as when they are used under Rule 59(e).” Mobley v.

Greensboro City Police Dep’t, No. 1:17-cv-114, 2018 WL 6110997,

at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2018); accord Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325

(“Compared to motions to reconsider final judgments pursuant to

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)’s

approach involves broader flexibility to revise interlocutory

orders before final judgment as the litigation develops and new

facts or arguments come to light.”).

“Despite this flexible approach[,] . . . the discretion

Rule 54(b) provides is not limitless.” Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325.

Indeed, “such discretion is ‘subject to the caveat that where

litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they

should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted,

to battle for it again.’” U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S.

Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 257 (4th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Off. Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile,

Inc. v. Coppers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir.

2003)). Motions for reconsideration2 “may not be used . . . to

raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the

issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case

under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to

address in the first instance.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire

Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Madison

River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d

617, 619 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“A motion to reconsider is appropriate

when the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position

or the facts or applicable law, or when the party produces new

evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise

of due diligence.”).

2 Although the Fourth Circuit has not specifically

articulated the standard for evaluating a motion for

reconsideration under Rule 54(b), see Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d

at 514–15, district courts in the Fourth Circuit routinely look

to the standards governing the reconsideration of final

judgments under Rule 59(e) for guidance in considering a motion

for reconsideration of an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b).

See Dhruva v. CuriosityStream Inc., No. SAG-23-2265, 2024 WL

712467, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2024); Volumetrics Med. Imaging,

LLC v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys. Inc., No. 1:05CV955, 2011 WL

6934696, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2011) (unpublished).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that this court committed clear error in

two respects: “(1) rejecting her disparate treatment and

retaliation claims arising under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 on the

incorrect grounds that Section 1981 requires an underlying

employment relationship; and (2) dismissing the claims in Count

I under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

when the individual Defendants never moved to dismiss said

claims, which represents a plausible basis for relief under

existing authority, and the Court did not provide notice of its

intent to rule sua sponte.” (Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 39) at 1–2.)

A. Section 1981

First, Plaintiff argues that “the Court fundamentally erred

in its analysis that Section 1981 liability is limited to

adverse employment-based actions.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 2.)

Plaintiff’s statement that “[t]here is also no indication in the

Memorandum Opinion that the Court’s dismissal of the Section

1981 discrimination and retaliation claims was rooted in any

rationale other than the assumption that Section 1981 requires

the assertion of an employment relationship” is incorrect. (Id.

at 10.) As Plaintiff recites, Section 1981 protects her right to

“make and enforce contracts,” which includes “the making,

performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of

the contractual relationship.” (See id. at 7 (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981(b)).)

The court understood the scope of Section 1981 when it

considered Plaintiff’s claims. (See Mem. Op. and Order (Doc. 37)

at 33–35.) However, Plaintiff failed to plead any semblance of a

contract other than an employment contract between herself and

Defendant UNC-CH in the context of her job as a graduate

research assistant. There is simply an absence of factual

allegations or legal argument as to the existence of a

contractual relationship between Plaintiff and UNC-CH in the

context of her enrollment as a student in the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff now attempts to raise such factual assertions and

legal arguments in her motion for reconsideration, which is not

permissible. See Pac Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (A motion for

reconsideration “may not be used . . . to raise arguments which

could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment,

nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel legal theory

that the party had the ability to address in the first

instance.”). Section 1981 governs the right to make and enforce

contracts. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included only

sparse allegations alluding to the existence of an employment

contract between herself and UNC-CH that did not survive a

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis. Plaintiff did

not previously allege facts or provide any legal argument

supporting the existence of a contract between herself and UNC-

CH relating to her enrollment as a student and cannot do so now.

B. Equal Protection Claims Against Individual Defendants

Second, Plaintiff argues that “the Court erred in

dismissing [her] Equal Protection Claim against each Individual

Defendant in Count I” because “[a]t no point in their briefing

in support of their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint did

the Individual Defendants ever actually move to dismiss the

Equal Protection claims.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 2.)

Plaintiff correctly states that “the Court did not review the

Equal Protection claim [in Count I] as an independent cause of

action.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 14.) This is because

Plaintiff failed to clearly delineate an independent Equal

Protection claim in Count I. Accordingly, the parties did not

brief the issue, (see id.), and the court did not consider such

a claim in its Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a

complaint set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Labram v.

Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1995). “The essential purpose

of Rule 8 is to afford ‘the opposing party fair notice of the

nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general

indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Burlington

Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 1982)

(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1215, at 109–10 (1971)).

In her Amended Complaint, the only reference whatsoever

that Plaintiff makes to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause is a boilerplate recitation that “Defendants

Melwani, Desai and Christian’s violations of Plaintiff’s rights

occurred while they were acting under color of state law, and

local ordinances, regulations, and customs of North Carolina in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, thus entitling Plaintiff to all appropriate relief

provided under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶¶

143, 151.) This paragraph appears under the subheadings “Count I

Disparate Treatment Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983”3 and “Count

II Unlawful Retaliation Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,”

respectively. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiff does not identify

how Individual Defendants acted under color of state law, or

identify the local ordinances, regulations, and customs pursuant

3 Plaintiff clearly states that her “claims against

Defendants Melwani, Desai, and Christian pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 1981 are effectuated by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” (See Am. Compl.

(Doc. 26) ¶¶ 142, 150.)

to which Individual Defendants acted. These two scant paragraphs

did not serve to provide Individual Defendants, or the court

itself, with “fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of”

the Equal Protection claim that Plaintiff now seeks to

retroactively assert through a motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, this court did not commit clear error when it

dismissed Count I in its entirety.

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I

and II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. 39), is DENIED.

This the 24th day of May, 2024.

bw Mi hun L. Mibu, AL~

United States District a

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