The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
LATISHA G., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) 1:22CV793
)
MARTIN J. O7PMALLEY;,! )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Latisha G. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(2)), to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. The Parties have filed cross-motions
for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on November 20, 2019, alleging a
disability onset date of January 1, 2019. (Ir. at 30, 186-89.)? Plaintiff's application was denied
initially (Tr. at 79-92, 108-11) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 93-107, 115-22). Thereafter,
1 On December 20, 2023, Martin J. O’Malley was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Secutity, replacing Acting
Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin J.
O’Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken
to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
? Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #7].
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. at 123-24.) On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff, along with her attorney, attended
the subsequent telephonic hearing, at which Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert
testified. (Ir. at 30.) Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 42), and on July 19, 2022, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review of that decision, thereby making the ALJ’s conclusion the
Commissionet’s final decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-7).
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of
social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144
(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts ate not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the
AL) if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
cortect legal standard.” Hancock v. Asttue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (@nternal brackets
and quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation omitted). “It consists of more than a mete scintilla of evidence but may
be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)
(internal brackets and quotation omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a
2.
verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34
(internal quotation omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[ALJ].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). “Where conflicting
evidence allows teasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets
and quotation omitted). “The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the
claimant] is disabled, but whether the AL]’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is
suppotted by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
televant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability
benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
1981). In this context, “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3
3 “The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance
Program (SSDI), established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 ef seq., provides benefits to
disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 ef seg., provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. ‘The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for
determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 C.F-R. pt. 416 (SSI), governing these two programs are,
in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1.
“The Commissionet uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,
667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4), 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the
Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period
of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence
forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if
the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, the claimant is
disabled. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but
falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or
exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the AL] to assess whether, based on
+ “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the clatmant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d
at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect clatimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation omitted)).
The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the clatmant’s “ability to do
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or
skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers
all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at
562-63.
that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify
as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that
a significant number of jobs exist which the clatmant could perform, despite [the clatmant’s]
impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the AL] must decide
“whether the clatmant is able to perform other work considering both [the clatmant’s RFC]
and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its
“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available
in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.
Il. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” since her alleged onset date. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff met her
burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Ir. at 32.) At step two, the ALJ
further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
scoliosis, sciatica, obesity, and cervical dysplasia, migraines|.]
(Tr. at 32.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, individually or in
combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Tr. at 33-34.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed
PlaintifPs RFC and determined that she could perform light work with the following,
additional limitations:
[Plaintiff] can lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, carry 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, sit for stx hours in an eight-hour
workday, stand for six hours in an eight-hour workday, walk for six hours in an
eight-hour workday, and push and/or pull as much as she can lift and/or catty.
[Plaintiff] can frequently reach overhead to the left and frequently reach
overhead to the right. [She] can climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds occasionally,
stoop frequently, kneel frequently, crouch frequently, and crawl frequently.
[She] can work at unprotected heights frequently, in vibration frequently, and
in moderate noise.
(Tr. at 34.) At step four of the analysis, the AL] determined, based on the above RFC and the
vocational expert’s testimony, that Plaintiff remained capable of performing past relevant work
as a sales clerk and price marker. (Tr. at 40.) The AL] also made an alternative finding at step
five that, given Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, along with the testimony
of the vocational expert regarding those factors, Plaintiff could perform other jobs available
in the national economy. (Tr. at 41-42.) Based on his determinations at steps four and five,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 42.)
Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ failed to “adequately account for the vocationally
limiting effects of Plaintiff's migraine headaches” when assessing her RFC, despite having
included migraines among Plaintiffs severe impairments at step two of the sequential analysis.
(Pl.’s Br. [Doc. #11] at 4.) She notes that, although the ALJ “apparently accept[ed] [Plaintiffs]
statements regarding noise to be true and limit[ed] her to work in an environment with no
mote than moderate noise,” the ALJ omitted other limitations in the RFC which relate to her
migraines, such as light avoidance, time off task, or absences. (PI.’s Br. at 5.) As recounted in
the administrative decision,
[Plaintiff] testified that she experiences daily headaches as well as migraines that
occut twice a week. She noted that her migraines are accompanied by sensitivity
to both light and sound. She explained that when she experiences a migraine,
she takes her medication and then lies down in a dark room to rest and sleep
fot approximately three to four houts.
(Tr. at 35) (internal citation to record omitted) (citing Tr. at 68-69). However, the AL]
concluded that Plaintiffs “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entitely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained 1n [the] decision.” (Tr. at 35.)
Plaintiff chiefly argues that the AL] erred in finding Plaintiff's statements regarding the
limiting effects of her headaches less than fully consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence of record. Under the applicable regulations, the AL]’s decision must “contain
specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and
supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent
reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Social Security
Ruling 16-3p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, SSR 16-3p,
2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (Oct. 25, 2017) (“SSR 16-3p”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
Moreover, in Arakas v. Commissioner, Social Security, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth
Citcuit clarified the procedure an ALJ must follow when assessing a claimant’s statements:
When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step
framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029
(Mat. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical
evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment” that could reasonably
be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.
Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess
the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they
affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step,
objective evidence is xot required to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029, at *4-5. SSR 16-3p recognizes that “symptoms cannot always be
measuted objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Id. at *4. Thus, the ALJ must consider the entire case record and
may “not disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence
does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5.
983 F.3d at 95 (internal brackets omitted). Thus, the second part of the test requires the AL]
to consider all available evidence, including Plaintiffs statements about her pain, in order to
evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects
her ability to work.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. This approach facilitates the AL]’s ultimate goal,
which is to accurately determine the extent to which Plaintiffs pain or other symptoms limit
her ability to perform basic work activities. Relevant evidence for this inquity includes
Plaintiff's “medical history, medical signs, and laboratory findings,” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595, as
well as the following factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529:
(1) [Plaintiff's] daily activities;
Gi) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [Plaintiffs] pain or
other symptoms;
(ii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
[Plaintiff] take[s] or [has] taken to alleviate [her] pain or other symptoms,
(v) Treatment, other than medication, [Plaintiff] receive[s] or [has] received
for relief of [her] pain or other symptoms;
(vi) | Any measures [Plaintiff] use[s] or [has] used to relieve [her] pain or other
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on [her] back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes
evety hour, sleeping on a boatd, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning [Plaintiffs] functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
In the present case, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the AL] provided more than
conclusory statements discounting Plaintiffs testimony. As instructed by the regulations, the
ALJ considered the entire case record and explained his reasons for deviating from Plaintiffs
statements regarding the impact of her symptoms on her ability to work. This explanation
was ptovided throughout the AL]’s RFC discussion. For example, the ALJ considered at
length Plaintiffs treatment records regarding her headaches. The ALJ first noted that the
treatment records reflect “new onset headaches” on May 29, 2020, related to Plaintiffs
radiation treatments and high blood pressure. (Tr. at 37, 412.) The ALJ noted that the
examination on May 29, 2020, showed “no focal neurological deficits, full orientation and
alertness, equal sensation in all extremities, no strength deficit, normal gait, and normal
coordination.” (Tr. at 37, 412-13.) At that visit, Plaintiffs primary care provider, Richard
Godine, PA, noted that Plaintiff was reporting headaches over the past two weeks, and he
“treated [her] headaches routinely and conservatively with over-the-counter (OTC) Tylenol or
Ibuprofen, [and] started [her] on propranolol for her high blood pressure and headaches.”
(Tr. at 37, 412-13.) PA Godine’s note reflects that the headaches ate “not intractable” and
that “propranolol would be helpful.” (Tr. at 413.) Notably, at a follow-up less than a week
later, on June 3, 2020, Plaintiff reported that she was “feeling much better.” (I't. at 412.) The
record reflects no mention of headaches until nearly a year later, on March 8, 2021, when
Plaintiff similarly reported that her migraines had resolved so she was no longer taking the
ptopranolol. (Tr. at 618.) As noted by the ALJ, at that visit, she was switched from
Gabapentin to Lyrica for her back pain. (Tr. at 37, 618.) However, shortly thereafter, Plaintiff
repotted “some headaches” after switching from Gabapentin to Lyrica for back pain. (Tr. at
37, 613.) At her next visit a month later on April 15, 2021, Plaintiff reported a headache for
the past 3 days, which the treatment note reflects as follows:
She presents for evaluation of migraine-like headaches over the past 3-4 days.
She desctibes the headaches as dull, throbbing pain behind the eyes and
alternating temples. There is associated fatigue, photophobia, phonophobia
and blurred vision. No nausea, vomiting, scotomas. She has been on
propranolol in the past for prophylaxis and this was helpful. She [was] actually
able to come off of it because her migraines abated. She has taken extra strength
Tylenol, Advil 800 mg with temporary relief of [this] headache but nothing has
been able to completely “knock in out.”
(Ir. at 604.) In response, as noted by the ALJ, PA Godine switched Plaintiff back to
Gabapentin rather than Lyrica, and prescribed Maxalt and Ibuprofen. (Tr. at 37, 605.) At the
next visit a month later, on May 19, 2021, Plaintiff reported a migraine headache over the past
4 days, and reported that the Maxalt provided “temporary relief.” (Tr. at 586.) Given the
“persistent and worsening migraines” reflected in the treatment notes over the past 60 days,
PA Godine concluded that she “[c]ould consider propranolol” for “migraine prophylaxis,”
and she was sent for evaluation by a neurologist. (Ir. at 587.) The neurologist, Dr. Leroy
Seaux, noted a normal sleep study and prescribed Fiorinal for her headaches. (Ir. at 858,
885.)> As described by the ALJ:
[Plaintiff] complained of migraine-type headaches, described as dull and
throbbing pain behind the eyes and alternating temples and associated with
fatigue, photophobia, phonophobia, blurred vision, nausea, vomiting, and
scotomas.... [H]er neurological exam was within normal limits. Mr. Godine
started [Plaintiff] on Maxalt (Rizatriptan). [Plaintiff] reported some temporary
telief from the Maxalt, and her neurologic exam remained within normal limits.
[Plaintiff] was referred to neurologist Leroy D. Seaux, M.D. for her headaches
and difficulty sleeping. ... A sleep study was negative for sleep apnea and she
slept well throughout.
(Ir. at 38) (internal citations to record omitted). Based on this treatment record, the ALJ
found that the record regarding her headache reflects routine and conservative treatment and
improvement on medication. (Tr. at 37, 40.) This conclusion is supported by the record
outlined above, showing treatment in May 2020, immediately improved with propranolol, with
abatement of her migraines to the point that she discontinued propranolol, and with and no
complaints in the record again until March 2021, following a change in medication, with notes
5 At the hearing, Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she takes “Albuterol” to treat her migraines. (Tr. at 68.)
However, a review of Plaintiffs medication list reveals that she likely confused albuterol with butalbital, a
barbiturate prescribed to her for treatment of headaches, or Fiornal, the brand name for the same medication.
(See Tr. at 885.)
10
reflecting additional medication adjustments in April and May 2021 and the option to re-start
propranolol as well as prescriptions for Maxalt and Fiorinal.
In addition, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs own reports regarding her activities and
limitations, and found that:
[Plaintiffs] own subjective reports of symptom intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects do not support her allegations of disabling limitations. The
claimant is independent in her personal hygiene and dressing. The claimant
ptepartes simple meals for herself. The claimant lives with her boyfriend. She
does chores around her apartment including sweeping, loading the dishwasher,
packing her boyfriend’s lunch, and assisting with loading the clothes washer.
She initially testified that she does not shop for groceries by herself, but later
clarified that she can perform small shopping trips to purchase one or two items
by herself, with her most recent shopping trip of this nature occurring
approximately two weeks prior to her hearing. She independently manages her
personal finances. The claimant drives. For enjoyment, she watches television,
plays games on her smartphone, colors, and reads.
(Tr. at 38-39) (internal citations to record omitted). The ALJ also noted Plaintiffs initial
allegation of “disability due to ‘scoliosis, sciatica nerve, and slow learning.” (Tt. at 35.) This
is consistent with Plaintiffs function reports, as outlined by the ALJ above, which do not
mention any disability or limitations based on headaches. (Tr. at 223-30, 239-46, 253-60.)
Overall, the AL] summarized the evidence relating to Plaintiff's headache impairment
as follows:
[Plaintiff] experiences headaches including migraine headaches. Her primary
cate provider has prescribed a number of medications for these headaches, with
some imptovement. She also consulted with a neurologist, who referred her
for a sleep study that was negative. Despite her impairments, [Plaintiff] is
independent in her personal cate, does some household chores, packs her
boyfriend’s lunch, goes on short grocery shopping trips, independently manages
het personal finances, periodically drives, watches television, plays games on her
smattphone, colors, and reads. ‘Taking the entirety of the evidence into
consideration, [Plaintiff] is limited to no greater degree than that assessed in the
above residual functional capacity.
Ld
(Tr. at 40.)
Plaintiff, who beats the burden of proving disability, presents no evidence, other than
her own testimony, that her headaches would cause any specific work limitations. The AL]
appears to have given Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt by including a noise restriction in the
REC. Having done so, the ALJ was not requited to include further restrictions regarding light
and time off task given the lack of support for such limitations, as well as contrary evidence,
including Plaintiffs treatment history and activities. Similarly, Plaintiffs argument that
migtaines would cause her to miss two or more days of work pet month, and therefore would
be disabling, amounts to nothing more than conjecture. In fact, Plaintiff herself never testified
that she would require such a restriction. Moreover, none of Plaintiffs providers or other
medical sources opined that Plaintiffs headaches caused any limitations at all during the time
period in question.
In her Reply Brief, Plaintiff relies on the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Shelley C.
v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 61 F.4th 341, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2023), in
which the Court affirmed and clarified its previous holding Arakas. Specifically, in Shelley C.,
the Fourth Circuit held that the
6 With regard to the noise limitation, the Court notes that from the ALJ’s questioning of the Vocational Expert
(Tr. at 74-75), it is apparent that the AL] was addressing each of the categories of potential environmental
conditions set out in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, Appendx D, and in reviewing those categories included the limitation to only “moderate”
noise. See Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles
Appendix D (“Environmental Condition components within the USES Occupational Analysis Program
ptovide a systematic means to describe fourteen possible surroundings or settings in which the occupation is
found or the job may be performed” specifically: 1. Exposure To Weather, 2. Extreme Cold, 3. Extreme Heat,
4. Wet And/Or Humid, 5. Noise Intensity Level, 6. Vibration, 7. Atmospheric Conditions, 8. Proximity To
Moving Mechanical Parts, 9. Exposure To Electrical Shock, 10. Working In High, Exposed Places, 11.
Exposure To Radiation, 12. Working With Explosives, 13. Exposure To Toxic, Caustic Chemicals, 14. Other
Environmental Conditions).
12
symptoms of [major depression], like those of fibromyalgia, are “entirely
subjective,’ determined on a case-by-case basis. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96 (emphasis
added). Ultimately, because of the unique and subjective nature of [major
depression], subjective statements from claimants “should be treated as
evidence substantiating the claimant’s impairment.” Id. at 97-98.
Shelley C., 61 F.4th at 361-62. Plaintiff now argues that migraine headaches, like fibromyalgia
and depression, consists of “entirely subjective” symptoms, and as such, the AL] “should not
tely upon the absence of objective medical evidence to discredit [Plaintiffs] symptom|]”
testimony. (Pl.’s Reply [Doc. #15] at 1.) However, in the present case, the ALJ did not rely
upon the absence of objective evidence alone to discount Plaintiffs symptoms. Rather, the
ALJ cited Plaintiffs conservative treatment, her symptomatic improvement as documented in
the treatment records, and her continuing ability to perform a variety of daily activities. (T'r.
at 38-40.) As set out above, the ALJ also noted Plaintiffs ability to work prior to her alleged
onset date, despite a long history of migraines and other headaches, and Plaintiffs failure to
fully comply with medical treatment recommendations, including medication usage, follow-up
appointments, and maintaining a sleep schedule. (See Tr. at 36-39.) Accordingly, this is not a
scenatio in which the AL] failed “to assess [the] claimant’s capacity to perform relevant
functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the
analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir.
2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Here, the
AL} included Plaintiffs migraines among her severe impaitments, crafted the RFC to account
for her credibly established limitations, and explained the omission of additional limitations in
accotdance with the regulations and relevant case law, including Arakas. Substantial evidence
therefore supports this AL]’s determination.
13
Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reconsider and te-weigh the evidence presented.
However, it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence or reconsider the AL]’s
determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, “[w]here
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets
and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a different fact-finder
could have drawn a different conclusion, ot even “whether [Plaintiff] is disabled,” but rather,
“whether the AL]’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence
and was teached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589.
Here, the ALJ reviewed the evidence, explained his decision, and clearly explained the reasons
for his determination. That determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Plaintiff has not identified any errors that require remand, and Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse
the Decision of the Commissioner should therefore be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding no
disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dipositive Brief [Doc. #11] is DENIED, that
Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #13] is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
This, the 15t* day of Match, 2024.
__/s/ Joi Blizabeth Peake _
United States Magistrate Judge
14