DAWKINS v. STALEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MICHAEL DAWKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22-CV-299

)

TWANDA STALEY; FORSYTH COUNTY )

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Michael Dawkins brings this lawsuit against

Defendants Twanda Staley and the Forsyth County Department of

Social Services (“DSS”) alleging that they violated his civil

rights in state court proceedings involving his child support

obligations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242,

and the North Carolina Constitution. (Docs. 1, 1-1.) Defendants

have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Docs. 10, 11). Dawkins

responded in opposition. (Docs. 13, 14, 16.)

While the motion to dismiss was pending, Dawkins filed a

document entitled “Memorandum of Law in Support of the United

States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 17.)

Defendants responded in opposition. (Docs. 18, 19.) For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

granted, and the motion for summary judgment will be denied as

moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Dawkins as

the non-moving party, show the following:

Dawkins is a party to an ongoing child support proceeding in

the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, in Forsyth

County, North Carolina. (See Doc. 1-2.)1 On November 27, 2019,

that court ordered Dawkins to pay $488 per month in child support.

(Id. at 2.) Since then, Dawkins has apparently failed to comply

with that order, not having made a single child support payment

since January 19, 2017. (Doc. 1-2 at 2.) As of March 1, 2022, he

owed $24,158.45 in past due support, and $12,096 more in past due

support related to a prior order issued by the same court. (Id.

at 1.)

On March 4, 2022, Defendant Staley - an attorney for Forsyth

County Child Support Enforcement, a component of Defendant DSS -

moved the Forsyth County District Court to order Dawkins “to appear

1 The caption of the state court Order lists a Title IV-D case number

“IV-D # 0007087607.” (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) A Title “IV-D case means a case

in which services have been applied for or are being provided by a child

support enforcement agency established pursuant to Title IV-D of the

Social Security Act as amended and this Article.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-

129(7) (2011); see Watauga Cnty. on behalf of McKiernan v. Shell, 826

S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). In other words, “[a] Title IV-

D case commonly refers to cases in which the child support enforcement

agency is enforcing the child support order pursuant to Title IV-D of

the Social Security Act.” Williams v. Wayne County Friend of Court,

No. 16-cv-12888, 2017 WL 3944393, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 14, 2017).

and show cause” why he should not be held in contempt for his

failure to pay child support. (Id. at 2.) On March 22, 2022, the

court entered an “Order to Appear and Show Cause for Failure to

Comply Support Order and Order to Produce Records.” (Id. at 1.)

In that order, the court found “probable cause to believe [Dawkins

was] in contempt for failure to comply with” the November 27, 2019

child support order and ordered him “to appear in person [before

the court] . . . to show cause why [he] should not be subject to

income withholding or held in contempt of court for failing to

comply with the lawful orders of this Court.” (Id.) The court

further ordered Dawkins to bring with him “all records and

information relating to [his] employment and the amount and source

of [his] disposable income.” (Id.)

On April 18, 2022, two days before his scheduled court

appearance, Dawkins filed this action, alleging that Staley and

DSS violated his civil rights during the child support enforcement

proceedings. (Doc. 1.) Dawkins’s pro se complaint alleges that

DSS and Staley violated his constitutional right to due process

and his rights under the North Carolina Constitution by

“fraudulent[ly]” attempting to enforce the child support order

against him. (Doc. 1-1 at 6-7; see also id. at 3.) Dawkins’s

allegations are conclusory and rambling. In large part, he merely

recites the text of various federal statutes and regulations, as

well as various provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.

And then in conclusory fashion he claims that his rights pursuant

to those provisions have been violated. Much of the complaint,

for example, appears to take aim at Title IV-D of the Social

Security Act, which addresses enforcement of child support

obligations owed by noncustodial parents, 42 U.S.C. § 651,

including collection and disbursements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b.

Dawkins’s allegations, liberally construed, contend that the child

support enforcement proceedings initiated against him are

illegitimate because Title IV-D - a joint federal and state program

designed to enforce payment of child support2 - “has never been

passed into Positive Law and therefore imposes no obligation on

anyone who does not volunteer to be subject to it.” (Id. at 4.)

Elsewhere, Dawkins invokes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 – two federal

criminal statutes - ostensibly to allege that Staley and DSS, by

attempting to enforce the child support order against him, engaged

in an illegal conspiracy meant to deprive him of certain

constitutional rights. (Id. at 4-6.)

Dawkins seeks an order from this court that “all the TITLE

IV-D contracts . . . cease and desist and that the rears [sic]

2 When a state establishes a plan that meets certain Title IV-D

requirements, such as creating programs for locating absent noncustodial

parents, establishing paternity, and obtaining child and spousal

support, see 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1), the federal government provides funds

to that state to reimburse its operation of the plan, id.

§§ 655(a)(1)(A), and 655(a)(2)(C). See Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp.

2d 854, 860 (D.S.C. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d

316 (4th Cir. 2002); Hunt v. Hunt, 784 S.E.2d 219, 223 (N.C. Ct. App.

2016).

terminated” and that “STALEY do not contact the plaintiff never

again regarding the Title IV-D schemes.” (Id.) He also asks that

“FORSYTH COUNTY DSS/CPS, STALEY be ordered to pay the cost of court

and restitution fines in the amount of $60,000 for the Title IV-D

Cases that the Defendants fraudulent file [sic] against the

Plaintiff, for depriving the Plaintiff of his right to due process,

Constitutional rights and breaking the Federal laws.” (Id.)3

On August 31, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the case

pursuant to both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) arguing that: (1) Dawkins has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can granted for an alleged violation of his

rights under § 1983; (2) Dawkins’s claims are barred by

governmental immunity; (3) the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (4) the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims under

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because “no private civil cause of action

for damages exists” under these statutes. (Doc. 11.) Dawkins

responded in opposition. (Docs. 13, 14, 16.)

On December 9, 2022, while Defendants’ motion to dismiss was

3 In his Amended Response in Opposition, Dawkins embellishes the

conclusory allegations of his complaint by advancing several new

arguments and theories of liability. (Doc. 16.) It is well-established,

however, that “the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in

opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor

Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984); accord S. Walk at Broadlands

Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,

184 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the court will not consider these new

allegations and contentions.

still pending, Dawkins filed a document entitled "Memorandum of

Law in Support of United States' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.” (Doc. 17.) Defendants responded in opposition by

filing another motion to dismiss, this one seeking “an order

dismissing” Dawkins’s putative summary judgment motion for failing

to comply with this court’s local rules. (Docs. 18, 19.)

The motions are now fully briefed and ready for resolution.

II. ANALYSIS

“When reviewing a pro se complaint, federal courts should

examine carefully the plaintiff's factual allegations, no matter

how inartfully pleaded, to determine whether they could provide a

basis for relief. In addition, in order to determine whether the

claim of a pro se plaintiff can withstand a motion to dismiss, it

is appropriate to look beyond the face of the complaint to

allegations made in any additional materials filed by the

plaintiff.” Armstrong v. Rolm A. Siemans Co., 129 F.3d 1258 (4th

Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (unpublished table decision).4

However, the liberal construction of a pro se plaintiff's pleading

does not require the court to ignore clear defects in pleading,

Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760-HMH-JRM, 2009 WL 2782238, at

*2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to “conjure up questions never

4 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but

are cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).

squarely presented in the complaint,” Brice v. Jenkins, 489 F.

Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Va. 2007) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Nor does it require that the court become an

advocate for the unrepresented party. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see Warren v. City of

Greensboro, 280 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784 (M.D.N.C. 2017), aff'd sub

nom. Warren v. Tolbert, 717 F. App'x 281 (4th Cir. 2018).

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine & Younger Abstention

Defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 11 at 7.)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar that

“prohibits the United States District Courts, with the exception

of habeas corpus actions, from ‘sit[ting] in direct review of state

court decisions.’” See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122

F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting D.C Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). In Exxon Mobil

Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280

(2005), however, the Supreme Court made clear that federal

jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine if suit

“was filed before the end of the state courts' appeal process.”

Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1029, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006)

(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 290–91). Here, Dawkins’s state

court proceedings have not concluded; accordingly, the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1031-

32; accord Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir.

2009); Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones

del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005). As

explained below, however, the Younger abstention doctrine

nevertheless obliges the court to abstain from hearing Dawkins’s

claims. See Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir.

2006) (applying Younger abstention rather than Rooker-Feldman

where Plaintiff’s state court proceedings had not yet concluded).5

The Younger abstention doctrine is an exception to the general

rule that federal courts must decide cases within their

jurisdiction. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Huffman

v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1975) (extending Younger to

pending civil state court proceedings). The doctrine “rests on

the fundamental precepts of equity and comity,” Robinson v. Thomas,

855 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2017), and requires that federal courts

dismiss cases rather than intervene in pending state proceedings.

See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Nivens

I”).

The Younger inquiry proceeds in two steps. See Sprint

Communications Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013); Air Evac

EMS, Inc. v. McVey, 37 F.4th 89, 96, n.2 (4th Cir. 2022) (observing

5 Although abstention was not specifically addressed by the parties, the

court may raise it sua sponte. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143

n.10 (1976).

that “undergoing both steps of the analysis is important.”).

First, the court considers whether the state proceeding at issue

is one of the three types of proceedings that warrant Younger

abstention: (1) an “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” (2)

“certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings’” that are “‘akin to a

criminal prosecution’ in ‘important respects,’” and (3) “pending

‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in

furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

functions.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (omission in original)

(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989); Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604); see

McVey, 37 F.4th at 96. Second, if the proceeding fits into one of

these categories, then abstention is appropriate “if there is (1)

an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any

substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2)

implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and

(3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise

the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.”

Moore v. City of Asheville, N.C., 396 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Nivens I, 319 F.3d at 153); see McVey, 37 F.4th at 96

(referring to these as the “Middlesex factors”).

Even if both steps are satisfied, however, extraordinary

circumstances may nevertheless allow federal court intervention if

the state brought the action in bad faith or to harass, where the

state statute is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional, or

where other “extraordinary circumstances” exist that present a

threat of immediate and irreparable injury. Younger 401 U.S. at

49–54; see McVey, 37 F.4th at 96; Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d

237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Nivens II”).

Dawkins’s suit meets the criteria for Younger abstention.

First, this case involves a challenge to Sprint's third category

of proceedings: pending state civil proceedings involving orders

“uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform

their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The prototypical examples of

situations falling within this third category are Juidice v. Vail,

430 U.S. 327 (1977), and Pennzoil [Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1

(1987)].” Aaron v. O'Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 1016 (6th Cir. 2019).

In Juidice, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Younger,

federal courts should not interfere in state court proceedings “in

which the State's contempt process is involved,” 430 U.S. at 335,

because the contempt process “stands in aid of the authority of

the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not

rendered nugatory,” id. at 336 n.12. In Pennzoil, the Supreme

Court abstained from interfering with the ability of Texas state

courts to require the posting of appeal bonds because of the

“importance to the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of

their courts.” 481 U.S. at 13. Together, Juidice and Pennzoil

establish that pending state proceedings fit within Sprint’s third

category if a federal plaintiff’s demand for relief would “directly

or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” Elna

Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th

Cir. 2020).

Here, Dawkins’s federal lawsuit falls into Sprint’s third

category because it implicates how North Carolina courts manage

their own child support proceedings – a subject in which the states

have an especially strong interest. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415, 435 (1979) (explaining that “[f]amily relations are a

traditional area of state concern.”) On November 27, 2019, the

state court initially ordered Dawkins to pay child support in the

amount of $448 per month (Doc. 1-2 at 2), but after Dawkins failed

to make any payments for more than two years, the court issued

another order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

(Doc. 1-2 at 1.) Dawkins filed this suit in federal district court

in an effort to derail and nullify the state court’s efforts,

asking this court to “cease and desist” his “TITLE IV-D contracts,”

to “terminate[]” his past due balance, and to order “STALEY [to]

not contact the plaintiff never again regarding the Title IV-D

schemes.” (Doc. 1-1 at 6.) Both state court orders which Dawkins

seeks to avoid undoubtedly qualify as being “uniquely in

furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78; see Matter of Alamance Cnty.

Ct. Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 129, 137 (N.C. 1991) (citations

omitted)(explaining that the court’s “inherent power” to “do all

things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration

of justice” includes the power to issue “an order to show cause”);

Massey v. Massey, 323 S.E.2d 451, 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)

(explaining that parties have “an obligation to observe [a court]

order [to pay child support] until it [is] lawfully changed.”);

McMiller v. McMiller, 336 S.E.2d 134, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)

(citation omitted)(noting that “[c]ivil contempt proceedings are

a proper method of enforcing orders for payment of child

support.”).

Consequently, this case fits comfortably into Sprint’s third

category of ongoing state proceedings that warrant Younger

abstention. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 (cautioning that the

district court should “stay its hand” where there are pending state

proceedings involving the enforcement of orders and judgments out

of “respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal

questions presented in state-court litigation”); Parker v. Turner,

626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that “the state's interest

in preserving the integrity of its contempt proceedings, as well

as its domestic relations cases, requires us to analyze this case

under Younger”); Gibson v. Lopez, No. 21-CV-02610-WJM-NYW, 2022 WL

2158986, at *6 (D. Colo. Jun. 15, 2022) (finding plaintiff’s

federal challenge to state child support enforcement proceedings

fell within Sprint’s third category and holding that Younger

abstention was appropriate).

The second step of the Younger inquiry requires consideration

of the “additional factors” laid out in Middlesex County Ethics

Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982): (1) whether there is “an ongoing state judicial

proceeding”; (2) whether that state proceeding “implicate[s]

important state interests”; and (3) whether that state proceeding

provides “an adequate opportunity ... to raise constitutional

challenges.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; see Sprint, 571 U.S. at

81; McVey, 37 F.4th at 96. Each of these factors is met here.

First, Dawkins is subject to an ongoing child support order,

which is to be monitored by the North Carolina state court system

and is subject to modification at any time. See Catawba Cnty. ex

rel. Rackley v. Loggins, 804 S.E.2d 474, 478 (N.C. 2017) (citation

omitted) (explaining that “[a] judicial decree in a child custody

and support matter is subject to alteration upon a change of

circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and, therefore,

is not final in nature.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (2021)

(“An order of a court of this State for support of a minor child

may be modified or vacated at any time”). Second, states have a

recognized interest in “ordering and enforcing child support

obligations.” Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F. Supp. 2d

185, 194 (D.D.C. 2009); see Briggman v. Virginia, Dep't of Soc.

Servs., Div. of Child Support Enf't, 526 F. Supp. 2d 590, 604 (W.D.

Va. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is well established that child

support matters implicate important state interests.”); McAllister

v. North Carolina, No. 5:10-CV-79-D, 2011 WL 883166, at *5

(E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2011) (citations omitted) (“[T]he importance of

the State’s interest in child support matters cannot be

questioned.”). Third, Dawkins has had adequate opportunity to

raise his constitutional claims in state court. The Supreme Court

has made clear that, in the area of domestic relations, “state

processes are [equal] to the task of accommodating the various

interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise

in child-welfare litigation.” Moore, 442 U.S. at 435. There is

no reason to depart from that observation here. See Delaney, 659

F. Supp. 2d. at 194 (“[A] party in a child support proceeding can

raise any federal constitutional claims he may have.”);

McAllister, 2011 WL 883166, at *5 (“[B]ecause the Cumberland County

District Court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of the child

support order, McAllister continues to have a venue to assert any

constitutional claim he wishes to raise.”); Price v. Biggs, 846

S.E.2d 781, 785-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (considering Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge in child support

modification action).

Finally, no extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant the

relief Dawkins seeks. Though “federal intervention may be proper

where there is a showing of bad faith or harassment by state

officials,” Robinson, 855 F.3d at 286 (internal quotation marks

omitted), Dawkins’s vague allegations of bad faith are clearly

insufficient to trigger this exception.6 See Weitzel v. Div. of

Occupational & Pro. Licensing of Dep't of Com. of State of Utah,

240 F.3d 871, 877 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (“[I]t is

the plaintiff's ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger

abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith

or harassment.”); Crenshaw v. Supreme Ct. of Indiana, 170 F.3d

725, 729 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that mere allegations of bad

faith without supporting facts are insufficient to trigger Younger

bad faith exception). Nor does Dawkins claim that Title IV-D of

the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., which

supplies the enforcement mechanism for child support obligations,

is “flagrantly unconstitutional.”7

6 See Doc. 1-1 at 3 (“FORSYTH COUNTY DSS/CPS, STALEY are attempting to

employ one of the four nefarious schemes by fraud, concealment, and

misrepresentation of material facts you are implemented to obtain it.”)

(errors in original); id. at 4-5 (claiming that DSS and Staley “knowingly

failed” to make certain disclosures regarding the Title VI-D program

with the intent to deceive).

7 Dawkins’s only allegation regarding “Title IV-D” of the Social Security

Act is that it “has never been passed into Positive Law and therefore

imposes no obligation on anyone who does not volunteer to be subject to

it.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4.) This is obviously an invalid basis to avoid the

law. See Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting

same argument and finding that “Congress’s failure to enact a title into

positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the

underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable”); Proctor v. Title 4-D,

318 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346, n.7 (D.D.C. 2018).

Accordingly, the court finds that Younger abstention is

appropriate, and Dawkins’s federal claims are therefore dismissed

with prejudice. See Nivens II, 444 F.3d at 247 (“[W]hen a district

court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically

dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits.”).

B. Even Were Younger Abstention Not Appropriate, Dawkins

Fails to State a Federal Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be

Granted

Alternatively, even if Younger abstention were not

appropriate, Dawkins’s complaint clearly fails to state a federal

claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A

claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint

considered with the assumption that the facts alleged are true.”

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts may consider

documents attached to either the complaint or the motion to dismiss

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment so

long as the documents are “integral to the complaint and

authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180

(4th Cir. 2009); see Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d

159, 164 (4th Cir. 2016).

First, the § 1983 claims against DSS fail as a matter of law

because Dawkins’s complaint is completely devoid of any

allegations of a municipal policy or custom that caused his

injury.8 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–

91, 694–95 (1978); Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty. Sch.

Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 532–33 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (“Monell permits suits against a municipality for a

federal constitutional deprivation only when the municipality

undertook the allegedly unconstitutional action pursuant to an

official policy or custom.”). For the same reason, the same claims

against Staley in her official capacity fail. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 690, n.55 (noting official capacity claims “represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent”); Huggins v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 683

F.3d 525, 532, n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (treating the “County and the

Officials sued in their official capacities as the County”); Hogan

v. Cherokee Cnty., 519 F. Supp. 3d 263, 283 (W.D.N.C. 2021)

8 For purposes of determining liability under Monell, DSS is treated as

a municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 662, n.4 (explaining that the

New York City Department of Social Services “enjoys the same status as

New York City” for purposes of liability under § 1983).

(finding § 1983 claims against the county-defendant “redundant” of

those made against county employees in their official capacity).

Next, the § 1983 claims made against Staley in her individual

capacity also fail because Dawkins’s factual allegations do not

give rise to the reasonable inference that Staley violated his

constitutional rights. Aside from the vague and cursory suggestion

that Staley “fraudulent[ly]” filed the motion for order to show

cause in Dawkins’s child custody case (Doc. 1-1 at 6), the

complaint is devoid of any factual allegations describing what

occurred, how Staley caused Dawkins’s injury, and what

constitutional harm Dawkins incurred. A well-pleaded complaint,

however, must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” or “naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. And while the court is mindful of Dawkins’s pro se

status, “generosity is not fantasy,” Bender v. Suburban Hosp.,

Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1998), and the court will not

plead Dawkins’s claim for him by “construct[ing] full blown claims

from sentence fragments,” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d

1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Dawkins also alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.

(Doc. 1-1 at 4-6.) These claims necessarily fail because “these

are criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of

action and are thus not enforceable through a civil action.”

Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch,

J.); accord Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989);

Tribble v. Reedy, 888 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table

decision); Booth v. Henson, 290 F. Appx. 919, 920 (6th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished).

Finally, Dawkins’s remaining claim is one under the North

Carolina Constitution. The court, in its discretion, declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim now that all

federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction.”)

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is

GRANTED and Dawkins’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE, except for his state law claims under the North Carolina

Constitution, which is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dawkins’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 17) is DENIED as moot.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

January 27, 2023