default judgment is proper when “the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint support the relief sought”
How later courts described this case
- default judgment is proper when “the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint support the relief sought”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23-cv-253
)
AMERICAN TEC ELECTRIC )
COMPANY, d/b/a AMERICAN )
ELECTRIC COMPANY, and )
DAVID A. GOODSON, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiff, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, has filed a
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Against Defendants.
(Doc. 9.) In support of the motion, Plaintiff filed declarations
of Thomas H. Duke, (Doc. 11), a Senior Surety Claims Counsel,
and James A. Roberts, (Doc. 12), counsel for Plaintiff. After
consideration of the pleadings, evidence, and relevant
authorities, this court concludes Plaintiff is entitled to
default judgment and the motion will be granted.
In summary, the evidence and pleadings establish that
Plaintiff issued performance and payment bonds on behalf of
Defendants and, as part of that process, entered into a General
Agreement of Indemnity (“Indemnity Agreement”) with Defendants.
(Doc. 11 at 2.)1 Following Defendant’s failure to complete its
subcontract obligations, Plaintiff was compelled to perform its
obligations under the payment and performance bonds. (Id. at
2–3.) As a result, Defendants became liable to Plaintiff under
the terms of the Indemnity Agreement for the loss incurred by
Plaintiff. (See Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 1-1 at 3.) “Loss” is defined
as
any loss, fees, costs and expenses, including pre- and
post-judgment interest at the maximum rate permitted
by law, court costs, counsel fees, accounting,
engineering and outside consulting fees, which Surety
may sustain or incur . . . by reason of . . .
execution or procurement of a Bond, including any cost
incurred by Surety in fulfilling its obligations under
any Bond . . . or in enforcing any of the covenants
and conditions of this Agreement . . . .
(Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.) In this action, Plaintiff seeks recovery of
$708,643.83 paid on the Performance Bond, expert consulting fees
of $8,215.12 for investigation and resolution, pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$1,952.50, filing fees of $402.00, and service of process fees
in the amount of $770.00. (Doc. 10 at 4–5.)
1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to documents
filed with the court refer to the page numbers located at the
bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear on
CM/ECF.
I. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
“Before a . . . court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of
summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. V. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). The party moving for
default judgment must still show that the defaulted party was
properly served. Maryland State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166
F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996).
Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of New Hampshire with its principal place of business in
Boston, Massachusetts. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Defendant American Tec
Electric Company is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of North Carolina with its principal place of business
in Kannapolis, North Carolina. (Id. at 2.) Defendant David
Goodson is a citizen and resident of Kannapolis, North Carolina.
(Id.)
The summons and complaint were served on Defendants on
April 11, 2023. (Docs. 5, 6.) Defendants failed to answer or
otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure following proper service. The Clerk entered default
against Defendants on July 7, 2023. (Doc. 8.) This court has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there
is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.
B. Default Judgment
Generally, if a defendant fails to plead or otherwise
defend an action, this court has the discretion to enter default
judgment as to that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see Music
City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (E.D.
Va. 1985). “A court confronted with a motion for default
judgment is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in
determining whether the judgment should be entered, and the
moving party is not entitled to default judgment as a matter of
right.” EMI April Music, Inc. v. White, 618 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505
(E.D. Va. 2009). “Therefore, in determining whether to enter
default judgment, the Court may exercise its discretion by
considering many factors from the record.” Id. “Although the
clear policy of the Rules is to encourage dispositions of claims
on their merits, see Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th
Cir. 1974), trial judges are vested with discretion, which must
be liberally exercised, in entering such judgments and in
providing relief therefrom.” United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d
725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), 60(b)).
“Upon the entry of default, the defaulted party is deemed to
have admitted all well-pleaded allegations of fact contained in
the complaint.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Romenski, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 703, 705 (W.D.N.C. 2012). “However, the defendant is
not deemed to have admitted conclusions of law . . . .” Id. The
party moving for default judgment must still show that the
“unchallenged factual allegations constitute a legitimate cause
of action.” Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 494
(D. Md. 2010); see Romenski, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (default
judgment is proper when “the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint support the relief sought”).
In this case, Plaintiff asserts one claim for relief,
reimbursement from Defendants under the Indemnity Agreement.
(Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges, and this court finds, that
Plaintiff is entitled to recover all costs and expenses under
the terms of the indemnity agreement, including $708,643.83 paid
on the Performance Bond, $8,215.12 in expert consulting fees,
pre-judgment interest in the amount of $31,109.76, post-judgment
interest, and filing and service fees in the amount of
$1,172.00.
North Carolina law is controlling. The Indemnity Agreement
contains a provision requiring the payment of attorneys’ fees.
(Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 makes attorneys’ fee
provisions enforceable “upon any note, conditional sale contract
or other evidence of indebtedness.” While this court has not
been able to find a North Carolina Supreme Court case addressing
the issue of whether an indemnification agreement is evidence of
indebtedness, after review of Stillwell Enters., Inc. v.
Interstate Equipment Co., 200 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980),
GR & S Atl. Beach, LLC v. Hull, No. 11 CVS 5883, 2011 WL 4501912
(N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011), and United States v. Browne &
Assocs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 813 (M.D.N.C. 2010), this court
concludes the indemnification agreement is evidence of
indebtedness within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2.
Stillwell held that “evidence of indebtedness” refers to
“any printed or written instrument, signed or otherwise executed
by the obligor(s), which evidences on its face a legally
enforceable obligation to pay money.” Stillwell, 300 N.C. at
294, 266 S.E.2d at 817. This court agrees with the Browne court
that Stillwell suggests a “broad” construction of “evidence of
indebtedness.” Browne, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted an affidavit in support
of the attorneys’ fees that is not contested, (Doc. 12), and
this court finds the fees reasonable. This court finds Plaintiff
is entitled to the recovery of $1,952.50 in attorneys’ fees.
For the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment Against Defendants, (Doc. 9), is GRANTED and judgment
by default shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendants American Tec Electric Company, d/b/a/ American
Electric Company and David A. Goodson in the amount
of $749,140.71, a sum that includes principal paid, expert
consulting fees, prejudgment interest, and court and service
costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff have and recover
attorneys’ fees from Defendant in the amount of $1,952.50.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff have and recover from
Defendants interest at the statutory rate from the date of the
Judgment until paid.
A default judgment will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This the 25th day of September, 2023.
Le Minin _L. Webi Vi
United States District Type
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