TOWNSEND v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ANGELA T., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22CV842

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Angela T., brought this action pursuant to the

Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security (the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Docket Entry 1.) The

Commissioner has filed the certified administrative record (Docket

Entry 5 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have

submitted dispositive briefs in accordance with Rule 5 of the

Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) (Docket Entry 6 (Plaintiff’s Brief); Docket Entry 10

(Defendant’s Memorandum); Docket Entry 11 (Plaintiff’s Reply)).

For the reasons that follow, the Court should enter judgment for

the Commissioner.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB (Tr. 343-49), alleging a disability

onset date of August 1, 2013 (see Tr. 343). Upon denial of that

application initially (Tr. 112-32, 185-88) and on reconsideration

(Tr. 133-55, 195-202), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 203-04). Plaintiff, her

attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing.

(Tr. 54-90.) The ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not

qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 156-79.) The Appeals

Council thereafter granted Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 180-

84, 254-55, 446-48), because the ALJ’s “decision d[id] not define

the term ‘semi-rapid pace’” in the RFC (Tr. 182 (quoting Tr. 165)),

and ordered the ALJ to “offer [Plaintiff] an opportunity for a

[new] hearing, take any further action needed to complete the

administrative record, and issue a new decision” (Tr. 183).

The ALJ convened a new hearing, which Plaintiff, her attorney,

and a new VE attended. (Tr. 91-111.) Following that hearing, the

ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Act.

(Tr. 7-33.) The Appeals Council later denied Plaintiff’s request

for review (Tr. 1-6, 340-42, 493-95), thereby making the ALJ’s

ruling the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial

review.

In rendering that decision, the ALJ made the following

findings later adopted by the Commissioner:

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1. [Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements

of the . . . Act on December 31, 2018.

2. [Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful

activity during the period from her alleged onset date of

August 1, 2013 through her date last insured of December

31, 2018.

. . .

3. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] had the

following severe impairments: Major Depressive Disorder

(MDD), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), psychogenic

conversion disorder, hypertension (HTN), degenerative

joint disease (DJD) bilateral hips, degenerative disc

disease (DDD)/DJD of the spine, and right arm tendinitis.

. . .

4. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] d[id] not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

. . .

5. . . . [T]hrough the date last insured, [Plaintiff]

had the residual functional capacity to perform light

work . . . except occasionally climb ramps and stairs,

stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; never climbing ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, or balancing, with balance as

defined by the [Selected Characteristics of Occupations

(“SCO”)]. [She] can frequently but not constantly handle

and finger; should avoid exposure to concentrated

atmospheric conditions (as defined by the [SCO]) and

extreme cold and heat; and must avoid all exposure to

unprotected heights and dangerous machinery and cannot

operate vehicles. She can understand, remember, and

follow simple instructions; maintain concentration,

persistence, and pace for and adapt to and manage simple

routine tasks; perform work that is not on an assembly

line or at production pace; perform work that does not

require more than superficial or incidental contact with

the general public; work in proximity to but not

coordination with co-workers; and can respond

appropriately to supervisors if there is no more than

occasional interaction.

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. . .

6. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff wa]s

unable to perform any past relevant work.

. . .

10. Through the date last insured, considering

[Plaintiff]’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, there were jobs that

existed in significant numbers in the national economy

that [Plaintiff] could have performed.

. . .

11. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as

defined in the . . . Act, at any time from August 1,

2013, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018,

the date last insured.

(Tr. 12-25 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations

omitted).)

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope

of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”

Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has

not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited

review standard.

A. Standard of Review

“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”

Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a

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reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ

[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by

substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets

and quotation marks omitted).

“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of

more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less

than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th

Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “If

there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the

case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,

993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not

undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility

determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as

adopted by the Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal

brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence

allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is

disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the

[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether

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[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the

claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and

was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”

Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that

“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving

a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),

and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).1 “To regularize the

adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]

has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating

longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into

account a claimant’s age, education, and work experience in

addition to [the claimant’s] medical condition.” Id. “These

regulations establish a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to

1 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] . . .

provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while

employed. The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . .

for determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects

relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal

citations omitted).

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determine whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five

steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial

gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a

‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of

specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent

that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity

[(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any

other work.” Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174

F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).2 A finding adverse to the

claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award

and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step determines

whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’

If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step

determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not,

benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th

Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at

each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,

270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and

2 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the

claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the

[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).

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two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment

is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,

the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.3 Step four

then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the

claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant

does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the

claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the

analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering

both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age,

education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.”

Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the government cannot

carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]

remains able to work other jobs available in the community,” the

claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.4

3 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the

claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative

regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and

continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an

equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The

RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses

the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin

impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only

after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and

any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.

4 A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.

The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three

in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail

at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations

of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a

claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993

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B. Assignment of Error

In Plaintiff’s first and only issue on review, she maintains

that “[t]he ALJ [] failed to include significant limitations

resulting from [Plaintiff]’s impairments [in the RFC] and failed to

provide an adequate discussion rejecting those limitations.”

(Docket Entry 6 at 5 (block quote formatting omitted); see

also Docket Entry 10 at 1-6.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues

that, despite the ALJ’s finding the opinions of the state agency

psychological consultants “‘moderately’ persuasive” (Docket Entry

6 at 7 (purporting to quote Tr. 21-22)), “[t]he ALJ’s RFC failed to

include the[ consultants’] limitations” that Plaintiff “could only

‘carry out short and simple instructions’” (id. (emphasis added)

(quoting Tr. 129, 152)). According to Plaintiff, the RFC’s

restrictions to “simple instructions” and “simple routine tasks”

permitted “a much greater level of ability than the [consultants’]

opinions [the ALJ] relied upon[,] and the ALJ gave no indication

for why, or what records, supported eliminating the preclusion of

detailed instructions.” (Id.) Plaintiff additionally faults the

ALJ for “f[inding] that [Plaintiff] could respond with [sic]

supervisors appropriately only if she interacted with supervisors

on no more than an occasional basis” (id. at 8 (citing Tr. 16)),

but “fail[ing] to adequately explain how the frequency of

F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the

process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).

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interaction with supervisors [wa]s related to [Plaintiff]’s ability

to respond to supervisors appropriately” (id.; see also id.

(“[Plaintiff] must be able to respond appropriately to supervisors

any time she interacts with [them] no matter the frequency.”

(citing Social Security Ruling 85-15, Titles II and XVI: Capability

to Do Other Work – The Medical-Vocational Rules as a Framework for

Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments, 1985 WL 56857 (1985)

(“SSR 85-15”), and Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) DI

25020.010(B)(2)))). Those contentions miss the mark.

In this case, both state agency psychological consultants

opined that, despite Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments, she

remained “able to make simple work related decisions and carry out

short and simple instructions.” (Tr. 129, 152 (emphasis added).)

In turn, the ALJ evaluated the opinions of state agency

psychological consultants as follows:

Moderate weight is given to the opinion of [the s]tate

agency psychological consultant [at the reconsideration

level of review,] Jacquelyn A. Harrison, Ph.D. Dr.

Harrison opined in June 2017 that [Plaintiff]’s

personality disorders, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive

disorders, and depressive, bipolar, and related disorders

impairments are severe. She further stated that

[Plaintiff] is capable of performing routine tasks in a

stable, low pressure setting with a low level of

interpersonal demands. In addition, Dr. Harrison

mentioned that [Plaintiff] has social interaction

limitations. Finally, Dr. Harrison opined that

[Plaintiff] has moderate limitations in the areas of

interacting with others, adapting or managing oneself,

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and

understanding, remembering, or applying information.

Moderate weight is given to the opinion of Dr. Harrison

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because it is well supported, consistent with the

limitations noted in the record, consistent with

[Plaintiff]’s testimony that she sometimes has a hard

time dealing with others, and consistent with the medical

records, which showed symptoms of anxiety, depression,

and crying spells, but orientation times three, a normal

mood, a normal affect, normal speech, normal attention,

normal concentration, cooperativeness, normal behavior,

normal judgment, normal cognition, good judgment, normal

recent and remote memory, goal directed and linear

thoughts, and no hallucinations, suicidal ideations, or

delusions. However, though it is not inconsistent with

the record it is vague [as] it does not define low

pressure and low level of interpersonal demands.

Moreover, moderate weight is given to the opinion of [the

s]tate agency psychological consultant [at the initial

level of review,] Brian Grover, Psy.D., dated February

2017. Partial weight is given to the portion of the

opinion indicating that [Plaintiff] has moderate

limitations regarding interacting with others, adapting

or managing oneself, and concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace. He also stated that [Plaintiff] is

capable of performing routine tasks in a stable, low

pressure setting with a low level of interpersonal

demands. These portions of the opinion are well

supported, consistent with the limitations noted in the

record, and consistent with the medical evidence of

record as a whole. However, the portion of the opinion

noting that [Plaintiff] is capable of performing routine

tasks in a stable, low pressure setting with a low level

of interpersonal demands is vague similar to Dr.

Harrison. Thus, only moderate weight is given to the

opinion of [Dr. Grover].

(Tr. 21-22 (internal parenthetical citations omitted).) Plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error with respect to that

analysis by the ALJ.

To begin, the ALJ did err by failing to explain why she

assigned “[m]oderate weight” to the state agency psychological

consultants’ opinions (Tr. 21, 22), but did not include their

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limitation to “short and simple instructions” (Tr. 129, 152

(emphasis added)) in the RFC but, rather, only limitations to

“simple instructions” and “simple routine tasks” (see Tr. 16). See

Raymer v. Colvin, No. 14cCV6009, 2015 WL 5032669, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.

Aug. 25, 2015) (unpublished) (“[A]n ALJ who chooses to adopt only

portions of a medical opinion must explain his or her decision to

reject the remaining portions.”); see also Social Security Ruling

96-8p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles IT and XVI: Assessing

Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184, at

*7 (July 2, 1996) (“SSR 96-8p) (providing that, if conflict exists

between medical opinion and RFC, “the [ALJ] must explain why the

opinion was not adopted”).

Moreover, the ALJ’s omission of the modifier “short” when

limiting Plaintiff to simple instructions (see Tr. 16) impacted the

availability of jobs cited by the VE and adopted by the ALJ at step

five of the SEP. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has held that an apparent conflict exists between an RFC’s

“limitation to short, simple instructions” and jobs the DOT rates

as requiring a Reasoning Development Level of 2 (“RDL 2”), which

entails the ability to carry out “detailed but

uninvolved . . . instructions,” Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307,

313 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added); see also Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140, 143 (4th Cir.

2019) (holding “that a limitation to ‘short’ instructions was

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inconsistent with the concept of ‘detailed but uninvolved

instructions’ in [RDL] 2 because detail and length are highly

correlated”). Here, the DOT rates two of the four jobs provided by

the VE in response to the ALJ’s dispositive hypothetical question

(see Tr. 106-07), and later adopted by the ALJ at step five of the

SEP (see Tr. 24) as requiring RDL 2, see DOT, No. 361.687-014

(“Classifier”), 1991 WL 672991 (G.P.0. 4th ed. rev. 1991);° DOT,

No. 222.687-014 (“Garment Sorter”), 1991 WL 672131.

The ALJ’s error in that regard, however, qualifies as

harmless, as the DOT rates the two remaining jobs cited by the VE

(see Tr. 105-06) and adopted by the ALJ at step five of the SEP

(see Tr. 24) at RDL 1, see DOT, No. 323.687-014 (“Cleaner,

Housekeeping”), 1991 WL 672783; DOT, No. 920.687-026 (“Bander,

Hand”), 1991 WL 687967,° which requires a worker to “[a]pply

commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step

instructions,” DOT, App’x C (“Components of the Definition

Trailer”), § III (“General Educational Development”), 1991 WL

688702 (emphasis added). Under such circumstances, the ALJ’s

failure to either accept and adopt the state agency psychological

consultants’ limitation to “short and simple instructions” (Tr.

° The DOT job “Classifier” corresponds to the job the VE and ALJ called

“laundry sorter.” (Tr. 24 (initial caps omitted), 106.)

° The VE and ALJ referred to the “napkin band wrapper” job (Tr. 24 (initial

caps omitted), 106), which the DOT calls “Bander, Hand.”

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129, 152 (emphasis added)), or reject the limitation and explain

the rejection (see Tr. 21-22) amounts to harmless error, see

generally Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989)

(observing that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common

sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion

unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a

different result”).’

Lastly, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for ‘%“fl[inding] that

[Plaintiff] could respond with [sic] supervisors appropriately only

if she interacted with supervisors on no more than an occasional

basis” (Docket Entry 6 at 8 (citing Tr. 16)), but “fail[ing] to

adequately explain how the frequency of interaction with

’ Plaintiff “conceded that the VE offered some [RDL 1] jobs, but [argues

that Plaintiff could Jnot guess that[,] had the VE been given greater

limitations, he would still have given jobs existing in significant numbers in

the national economy, when combined with [Plaintiff]’s other limitations.”

(Docket Entry 6 at 7.) The issue before the Court, however, does not turn on

whether, as a general matter, “greater limitations” would have resulted in the

VE testifying that no jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy

that Plaintiff could have performed. Rather, the issue remains whether the ALJ’s

inclusion of the state agency psychological consultants’ limitation to “short and

simple instructions” (Tr. 129, 152 (emphasis added)) in the RFC and dispositive

hypothetical question would have led to that no-jobs testimony. The record

before the Court demonstrates that a restriction to short and simple instructions

would not have caused the VE to eliminate the housekeeping cleaner and napkin

band wrapper jobs, as the DOT rates both jobs at RDL 1, see DOT, No. 323.687-014

(“Cleaner, Housekeeping”), 1991 WL 672783; DOT, No. 920.687-026 (“Bander, Hand’),

1991 WL 687967, i.e., as involving “simple one- to two-step instructions,” DOT,

App’x C (“Components of the Definition Trailer”), § III (“General Educational

Development”), 1991 WL 688702 (emphasis added). Moreover, the VE testified that

220,000 housekeeping cleaner jobs and 12,000 napkin band wrapper jobs existed in

the national economy (see Tr. 105-06), numbers that clearly qualify as

significant under Fourth Circuit precedent, see Hicks v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1048,

1051 (4th Cir. 1979) (“Claimant contends that the light and sedentary jobs

described by the [VE] . . . do not exist in significant numbers within the

region. We do not think that the approximately 110 jobs testified to by the [VE]

constitute an insignificant number.”).

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supervisors [wa]s related to [Plaintiff]’s ability to respond to

supervisors appropriately” (id.; see also id. (“[Plaintiff] must be

able to respond appropriately to supervisors any time she interacts

with [them] no matter the frequency.” (citing SSR 85-15, and POMS

DI 25020.010(B)}) (2)))). In Plaintiff’s view, “[t]his issue is

crucial because the ALJ determined [Plaintiff] was limited to

unskilled work, and the ability to interact appropriately with

supervisors is critical to the performance of unskilled work.”

(Id.)

Here, the ALJ found in the RFC that Plaintiff retained the

ability to “respond appropriately to supervisors if there is no

more than occasional interaction.” (Tr. 16.) In other words, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff can respond appropriately to supervision

in work settings where interaction with supervisors occurs only

occasionally. That finding coheres with the state agency

psychological consultants’ opinion that Plaintiff had moderate (not

marked) limitation in her “ability to accept instructions and

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors” (Tr. 129, 152)

and therefore needed a job “with a low level of interpersonal

demands” (Tr. 130, 153), as well as with the ALJ’s finding that

Plaintiff had moderate (not marked) limitation in social

interaction at step three of the SEP (see Tr. 15). The VE, in

turn, cited four jobs whose DOT code contains a fifth digit of “8”

(Tr. 105-07 (citing DOT Nos. 323.687-014, 920.687-026, 361.687-014,

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222.687-014)), representing the lowest level of human interaction

in the workplace, see Fletcher v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV166, 2016 WL

915196, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2016) (unpublished),

recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016) (Osteen,

Jr., C.J.). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ

“failed to adequately explain how the frequency of interaction with

supervisors [wa]s related to [Plaintiff]’s ability to respond to

supervisors appropriately.” (Docket Entry 6 at 8.)

In sum, Plaintiff’s first and only issue on review fails as a

matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an errors warranting remand.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability be affirmed, and that this matter be

dismissed with prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

October 12, 2023

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