WILLIAMS v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLES V. W., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22CV471

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Charles V. W., brought this action pursuant to the

Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security (the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (Docket Entry 2.) The

Commissioner has filed the certified administrative record (Docket

Entry 7 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have moved

for judgment (Docket Entries 10, 15; see also Docket Entry 11

(Plaintiff’s Brief); Docket Entry 16 (Commissioner’s Brief)). For

the reasons that follow, the Court will enter judgment for the

Commissioner.1

1 On consent of the parties, this “case [wa]s referred to [the undersigned]

United States Magistrate Judge [] to conduct all proceedings . . ., to order the

entry of judgment, and to conduct all post-judgment proceedings therein.”

(Docket Entry 12 at 1.)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for SSI (Tr. 428-35), alleging a disability

onset date of May 1, 2015 (see Tr. 428).2 Upon denial of that

application initially (Tr. 150-73, 303-13) and on reconsideration

(Tr. 174-86, 317-19), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 320-22). Plaintiff, his

attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing.

(Tr. 35-55.) The ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not

qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 13-27.) The Appeals

Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6,

398-400, 621-23), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the

Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.

In rendering that decision, the ALJ made the following

findings later adopted by the Commissioner:

1. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since April 24, 2020, the application date.

2. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:

depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, posttraumatic

stress disorder, hereinafter “PTSD,” degenerative disc

disease in the lumbar spine, osteoarthritis in the hips,

and obesity.

. . .

2 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of May 1, 2015, Plaintiff

lacked eligibility for SSI benefits until his application date of April 24, 2020

(see Tr. 428). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (explaining that a claimant remains

ineligible for SSI benefits until date he or she files SSI application); 20

C.F.R. § 416.501 (stating that a claimant may not receive SSI benefits for any

period that predates first month he or she satisfies eligibility requirements,

which cannot precede application date).

2

3. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals

the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

. . .

4. . . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional

capacity to perform medium work . . . except he can

frequently climb ramps and stairs. He can occasionally

climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He can frequently

balance, stoop (i.e. bend at the waist), and crouch (i.e.

bend at the knees). [He] can understand, remember, and

carry out simple instructions. He can interact

appropriately with the general public, supervisors, co-

workers, or peers frequently during an 8 hour workday.

He can respond appropriately to changes in the work

setting frequently during an 8-hour workday. He can

maintain attention and concentration for 2-hour segments

over the course of an eight-hour workday. Time off task

during the workday can be accommodated by normal breaks.

He can apply commonsense understanding to carry out

detailed, but uninvolved, written or oral instructions.

He can deal with problems involving a few concrete

variables in or from standardized solutions.

. . .

5. [Plaintiff] has no past relevant work.

. . .

9. Considering [Plaintiff]’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that [he] can perform.

. . .

3

10. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as

defined in the . . . Act, since April 24, 2020, the date

the application was filed.

(Tr. 18-27 (space added) (bold font and internal parenthetical

citations omitted).)

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope

of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”

Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has

not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited

review standard.

A. Standard of Review

“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”

Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a

reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ

[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by

substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets

and quotation marks omitted).

“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of

4

more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less

than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th

Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “If

there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the

case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,

993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not

undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility

determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as

adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at

176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where

conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to

whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that

decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”

Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The issue before

[the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled,

but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled

is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a

correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d

585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that

“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving

a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),

and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to

5

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3 “To regularize the

adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]

has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating

longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into

account a claimant’s age, education, and work experience in

addition to [the claimant’s] medical condition.” Id. “These

regulations establish a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to

determine whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five

steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial

gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a

‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of

specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent

that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity

[(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any

other work.” Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174

3 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. The Disability

Insurance Benefits program . . . provides benefits to disabled persons who have

contributed to the program while employed. [SSI] . . . provides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . .

for determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects

relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal

citations omitted).

6

F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).4 A finding adverse to the

claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award

and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step determines

whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’

If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step

determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not,

benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th

Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at

each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,

270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and

two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment

is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,

the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.5 Step four

then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the

claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant

does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the

4 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the

claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the

[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).

5 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the

claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative

regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and

continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an

equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The

RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses

the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin

impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only

after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and

any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.

7

claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the

analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering

both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age,

education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.”

Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the government cannot

carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]

remains able to work other jobs available in the community,” the

claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.6

B. Assignment of Error

In Plaintiff’s first and only issue on review, he maintains

that “[t]he RFC determination is not supported by substantial

evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion

evidence of record and failed to create a logical bridge between

the evidence and the RFC.” (Docket Entry 11 at 3 (bold font and

single-spacing omitted).) More specifically, Plaintiff faults the

ALJ for “improperly evaluat[ing] the opinion of [Qualified Mental

Health Professional (‘QMHP’) Latonya] Moy[e]” (id. at 5), “who

opined that Plaintiff was markedly limited in [multiple abilities

pertaining to sustained concentration/persistence and social

6 A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.

The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three

in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail

at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations

of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a

claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993

F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the

process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).

8

interaction]” (id. at 4-5 (citing Tr. 1865-66)). According to

Plaintiff, “[t]he ALJ’s cursory analysis does not provide a legally

sufficient explanation regarding why [QMHP Moye’s] opinion was

rejected.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff deems the ALJ’s error in this

regard “harm[ful]” because, “[h]ad the ALJ properly evaluated the

opinion of [QMHP] Moy[e], Plaintiff may have been found disabled.”

(Id. at 12.) For the reasons explained in more detail below,

Plaintiff’s contentions lack merit.

For benefits applications filed on or after March 27, 2017

(such as Plaintiff’s (see Tr. 428-35)), the SSA has enacted

substantial revisions to the regulations governing the evaluation

of opinion evidence. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the

Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL

168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). Under the new regulations, ALJs need not

assign an evidentiary weight to medical opinions and prior

administrative medical findings or accord special deference to

treating source opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (providing

that ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,

including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a

claimant’s] medical sources”).7 Instead, an ALJ must determine and

7 The new regulations define a “medical opinion” as “a statement from a

medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether

you have one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions” in the

abilities to perform the physical, mental, or other demands of work activity or

to adapt to environmental conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). Those

regulations also define a “prior administrative medical finding” as a “finding,

9

“articulate in [the] . . . decision how persuasive [he or she]

find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior

administrative medical findings in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20

C.F.R. § 416.920c(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, when a medical

source provides more than one opinion or finding, the ALJ will

evaluate the persuasiveness of such opinions or findings “together

in a single analysis” and need not articulate how he or she

considered those opinions or findings “individually.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(b)(1).

In evaluating the persuasiveness of an opinion or finding, the

SSA deems supportability and consistency “the most important

factors” and thus the ALJ must address those two factors in

evaluating the persuasiveness of an opinion or a finding. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2).8 The ALJ must only address the three

other persuasiveness factors — the nature and extent of the medical

source’s relationship with the claimant and area of specialization,

as well as the catch-all “other factors that tend to support or

contradict” the opinion/finding, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(3)-(5) —

when the ALJ finds two or more opinions or findings about the same

other than the ultimate determination about whether [a claimant is] disabled,

about a medical issue made by [the SSA’s] Federal and State agency medical and

psychological consultants at a prior level of review.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.913(a)(5).

8 “Supportability” means “[t]he extent to which a medical source’s opinion

is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the source’s supporting

explanation.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency” denotes “the extent to which the opinion is

consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources

in the claim.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(c)(2).

10

issue “[e]qually persuasive” in terms of supportability and

consistency, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3).

On July 1, 2020, QMHP Moye completed a preprinted form

entitled “Mental Impairment Questionnaire” (Tr. 1865-68), on which

she opined that Plaintiff’s PTSD caused him to have “marked”

(defined as “serious” (Tr. 1865)) limitations in the following

mental, work-related abilities:

• “maintain attention and concentration for extended

periods” (id. (emphasis in original));

• “work in coordination with or in proximity to

others without being distracted by them” (Tr.

1866);

• “perform at a consistent pace with a standard

number and length of rest periods” (id.);

• “interact appropriately with the general public”

(id.);

• “accept instructions and respond appropriately to

criticism from supervisors” (id.);

• “get along with coworkers or peers without

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes”

(id.);

• “respond appropriately to changes in the work

setting” (Tr. 1867); and

• “travel in unfamiliar places or use public

transportation” (id.).

(Id.) QMHP Moye explained those limitations by stating that

Plaintiff “[wa]s often distracted by other[s] easily” (Tr. 1866),

that he “shows anxiety, fear and poor relationship with

individuals” (id.), and that “it[ wa]s difficult for [him] to

11

relate to others with trust, closeness and other components of

relationships” (id.). In QMHP Moye’s view, Plaintiff “had the

limitations and restrictions outlined in the Mental Impairment

Questionnaire since Nov[ember] 2019,” when she began treating him.

(Tr. 1868.)

The ALJ found QMHP Moye’s opinions “not persuasive” (Tr. 24),

and provided the following analysis supporting that finding:

The [ALJ] finds that [QMHP Moye’s] opinion is not

persuasive. While the noted symptoms are documented in

the record, [QMHP Moye’s] opinion is not supported by

[Plaintiff]’s treatment records that repeatedly document

[his] symptoms to improve with his treatment regimen.

[(Tr. 1525-26, 1544-45, 1547, 1553, 1585, 1589, 1594.) □

At the hearing, [Plaintiff] did not testify to difficulty

attending and completing tasks. Rather, he testified

that he is disabled due to blackouts and difficulty

controlling his tempter [sic]. [OMHP] Moy[e] failed to

note [Plaintiff]’s blackout spells, and the assessed

limitations regarding [his] social interaction are

inconsistent with [his] treatment records. The record

indicates that [Plaintiff] did well with group therapy.

[(Tr. 1428-29.)] He actively participated in group

discussions and denied psychological symptoms. In May of

2020, [Plaintiff] reported that he was grateful for the

opportunity to socialize with his fellow veterans. [(Tr.

1491, 1499-1505, 1511, 1518-19, 1821, 1837, 1844-46.)°*]

The foregoing evidence supports a finding that

[Plaintiff] has moderate mental limitations.

(Tr. 24 (internal citation to hearing testimony omitted) (emphasis

added).) Plaintiff challenges that analysis by the ALJ on three

grounds, none of which carries the day.

° Although the ALJ cited to pages 40 through 42 of Exhibit BoF (see Tr. 24;

see also Tr. 1844-46), those pages do not appear to contain information

supporting the ALJ’s observations that Plaintiff “actively participated in group

discussions and denied psychological symptoms” as well as reported gratitude “for

the opportunity to socialize with his fellow veterans” (Tr. 24; see also Tr.

1844-46).

12

First, Plaintiff argues that, “contrary to the ALJ’s finding,

the lack of reference to blackouts in [QMHP] Moy[e]’s opinion does

not constitute a deficiency in her assessment of [Plaintiff’s]

mental functioning.” (Docket Entry 11 at 6 (citing Tr. 24).) In

that regard, Plaintiff “notes that [QMHP] Moy[e]’s opinion clearly

provides at the outset that her opinion is based on Plaintiff’s

mental diagnosis of [PTSD] (rather than Plaintiff’s physical

impairment of blackout spells)” (id. (citing Tr. 1865) (emphasis in

original)), and “Plaintiff testified that he d[id] not know the

cause of his blackouts” (id. (citing Tr. 42)).

That argument glosses over the fact that, if Plaintiff did not

know the cause of his blackouts (see Tr. 42), but considered them

disabling (see Tr. 41), then the blackouts certainly could have had

a mental cause and thus held relevance to QMHP Moye’s assessment of

Plaintiff’s mental functioning. (See Tr. 709 (reflecting

Plaintiff’s report to consultative psychological examiner Mark I.

Salomon, MA (supervised by Dr. Charles Kronberg) that he suffered

blackouts twice per day), 1799-1804 (documenting absence of

blackout complaints to consultative medical examiner Zachary D.

Seitz, PA-C).) Accordingly, the lack of any reference to

Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling blackout spells on the Mental

Impairment Questionnaire completed by QMHP Moye diminishes the

consistency of her opinions with Plaintiff’s statements elsewhere

in the record.

13

Next, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s observation that

Plaintiff’s mental symptoms improved with treatment as a basis to

discount QMHP Moye’s opinions. (See Docket Entry 11 at 6 (citing

Tr. 24).) According to Plaintiff, “there was ample probative

evidence to support the limitations assessed by [QMHP] Moy[e] that

the ALJ never considered in analyzing the persuasiveness of [her]

opinion[s].” (Id. at 10.) In that regard, Plaintiff points to (1)

a mental health treatment visit on September 23, 2019 (id.

(referencing Tr. 1542-46)),10 where a “mental status examination

revealed fair insight, fair judgment, and fair impulse control” and

resulted in “assess[ments of PTSD ], unspecified depressive

disorder, [and] rule out unspecified psychotic disorder” (id. at 11

(citing Tr. 1545)); (2) a mental health telephone encounter on

April 20, 2020, reflecting an “assess[ment of] adjustment disorder

with depressed mood, personal history of suicide attempt, personal

history of self-harm, and suicidal ideations” (id. (citing Tr.

1502)); and (3) a “Nexus Statement” completed by Lutricia Callair,

LCSW, on July 13, 2021, on which she opined that “it [wa]s more

likely than not that Plaintiff’s [PTSD] was related to his military

service” and noted that Plaintiff reported “recurring nightmares at

a frequency [of] two to three times per week” (id. (citing Tr.

10 The record reflects the actual date of that visit as September 19, 2019.

(See Tr. 1542, 1546.)

14

1870)). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s arguments miss the

mark.

As an initial matter, and contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions

that “the ALJ never considered” the evidence (id. at 10 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 11 (“The ALJ failed to consider the

aforementioned, probative evidence in assessing the supportability

of [QMHP] Moyl[e]’s opinion[s].” (emphasis added))), the ALJ

expressly cited to all three pieces of evidence relied on by

Plaintiff as supporting QMHP Moye’s opinions. In the ALJ’s

analysis of QMHP Moye’s opinions, the ALJ observed that, (1)

“[Plaintiff] actively participated in group discussions and denied

psychological symptoms” (Tr. 24 (citing, inter alia, Tr. 1502 (page

90 of Exhibit B3F))), and (2) ™“[QMHP Moye’s] opinion is not

supported by [Plaintiff]’s treatment records that repeatedly

document [his] symptoms to improve with his treatment regimen” (id.

(citing, inter alia, Tr. 1544-45 (pages 133 and 134 of Exhibit

B3F))). Moreover, the ALJ later noted LCSW Callair’s statement

“that [Plaintiff’s] PTSD related to time in-service

and] . . . cause[d] recurrent nightmares .. . two to three times

a week,” but “d[id] not accord any evidentiary value to th[at]

statement, as an opinion [wa]s not offered,” and “Ms. Callair[’s]

statements [we]re based on [Plaintiff]’s report and [we]re of no

15

value in determining [Plaintiff]’s mental [RFC]” (Tr. 24 (citing

Tr. 1870 (page 2 of Exhibit B8F))).11

Furthermore, and more significantly, the record pages relied

on by Plaintiff actually support the ALJ’s decision to find QMHP

Moye’s opinions unpersuasive (see Tr. 24). For example, the

September 2019 mental health treatment note documents Plaintiff’s

statement that “[he was] doing pretty good right now” and “enjoying

hobbies such as home repair/remodeling” (Tr. 1544), as well as that

he appeared “calm” and “cooperative” with a normal, euthymic

affect, and remained able to “attend[] to [the] examiner,” and “to

concentrate fully” with “no overt deficits” in memory (Tr. 1545).

Similarly, the telephone encounter on April 20, 2020, reflects

Plaintiff’s “state[ment] that [he was] doing ok and not having any

mental or physical issues with the current [Covid] pandemic.” (Tr.

1502.) Although Plaintiff points to the diagnoses appearing at the

end of that encounter (see Docket Entry 11 at 11 (citing Tr.

1502)), which include “[s]uicide [a]ttempt” and “self-harm” as well

as “[s]uicidal [i]deations” (Tr. 1502), those conditions appear to

constitute historical diagnoses, as they do not correspond to any

11 Although the ALJ did not discuss LCSW Callair’s statement in the same

paragraph in which he analyzed QMHP Moye’s opinions (see Tr. 24), the Court

considers the ALJ’s entire decision when reviewing for substantial evidence.

See McCartney v. Apfel, 28 F. App’x 277, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting

challenge to ALJ’s finding for lack of sufficient detail where other discussion

in decision adequately supported finding and stating “that the ALJ need only

review medical evidence once in his decision”); Kiernan v. Astrue, No. 3:12CV459,

2013 WL 2323125, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 28, 2013) (unpublished) (observing that,

where an “ALJ analyzes a claimant’s medical evidence in one part of his decision,

there is no requirement that he rehash that discussion” in other parts of his

analysis).

16

contemporaneous reports by Plaintiff of suicidal ideation (let

alone suicide attempts or self-harm) (see id.; see also Tr. 1501

(mental health telephone encounter dated April 27, 2020, including

same suicide and self-harm diagnoses along with same statement that

Plaintiff was “doing ok”)).'* Moreover, all of Plaintiff’s other

peer support telephone notes reflect only the diagnoses of

“[Ta]nxiety disorder, unspecified” and/or “[a]djustment disorder

with depressed mood” (Tr. 1479-82, 1488-96, 1498, 1503-04). With

regard to LCSW Callair’s statement that Plaintiff’s PTSD “[m]Jore

likely than not related to” an “exposure” and an “incident” during

his military service, and that “[Plaintiff] report[ed] recurring

nightmares about they [sic] incident 2 to 3 times per week” (Tr.

1870 (emphasis added)}), the ALJ appropriately discounted that

statement as based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports (see Tr. 24).

These records, along with the other evidence cited by the ALJ,

confirm that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to

deem QMHP Moye’s opinions unpersuasive.

Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff's

active participation in group therapy sessions as a reason for

finding QMHP Moye’s opinions unpersuasive. (See Docket Entry 11 at

6 (citing Tr. 24).) In Plaintiff’s view, “[t]he ALJ failed to

Indeed, none of Plaintiff’s treatment records during the relevant period

T9357) any suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, or self-harm. (See Tr. 1340-

‘3 The record does not contain any treatment records from LCSW Callair or

from QMHP Moye.

17

build a narrative bridge explaining how Plaintiff’s ability to

successfully interact with others in a controlled, clinical,

supportive setting (namely, group therapy) . . . in the context of

interaction with a trusted mental health professional are [sic]

indicative of an ability to engage in mental activities in a work

setting on a regular and continuing basis.” (Id. at 7 (citing Tr.

24) (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff points out that “language

in the mental category of listed impairments” (id.) requires ALJs

to “consider the evidence in light of the psychosocial supports and

assistance that serve to reduce the demands placed on the

individual” (id. at 8 (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1,

§ 12.00)). That assertion falls short.

The ALJ’s decision makes abundantly clear that she did not

consider only Plaintiff’s ability to actively participate in (and

express gratitude about) group therapy to discount QMHP Moye’s

opinion that Plaintiff suffered “marked” limitation in several

abilities relating to social interaction (Tr. 1866). For example,

in assessing the paragraph B criteria at step three of the SEP, the

ALJ provided the following rationale for finding only “moderate”

limitation in interacting with others:

In interacting with others, [Plaintiff] has moderate

limitations. Here, [Plaintiff] alleged that he has

difficulty engaging in social activities, getting along

with others, and spending time in crowds. However,

according to his statements, [he] is also able to get

along with others, shop, spend time with friends and

family, take public transportation, and live with others.

Finally, the medical evidence shows that [Plaintiff] had

18

a good rapport with providers, was described as pleasant

and cooperative, had good interactions with non-medical

staff, and appeared comfortable during appointments.

(Tr. 20 (citing hearing testimony and Tr. 563-81 (Function Reports

of Plaintiff and his brother)) (emphasis added).) That analysis

shows that the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s own statements, and those

of his brother, regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with

others outside the setting of his mental health treatment.

Put simply, Plaintiff’s first and only assignment of error

fails as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an error warranting relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability is affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Judgment Reversing Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Docket Entry 10) is DENIED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

(Docket Entry 15) is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

September 14, 2023

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