TYLER v. LOCKLEAR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CASEY TYLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:20CV166

)

PAMELA J. LOCKLEAR )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before this court for review of the

Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation (“Recommendation”) filed on

September 1, 2022, by the Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 636(b). (Doc. 42.) In the Recommendation, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Recusal [and]

Motion for a New Trial,” (Doc. 41), be denied, that Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 32), be granted to the extent

she be entitled to qualified immunity, that Plaintiff’s April 18,

2017, prison disciplinary charge be removed from his prison

report, and that this action be dismissed. The Recommendation and

notice were served on the parties to this action on September 1,

2022. (Docs. 42, 43.) Plaintiff filed objections, (Doc. 45), to

the Recommendation.

This court is required to “make a de novo determination of

those portions of the [Magistrate Judge’s] report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This court “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the [M]agistrate [J]udge. . . . [O]r recommit the matter to

the [M]agistrate [J]udge with instructions.” Id.

This court has appropriately reviewed the portions of the

Recommendation to which objections were made and has made a de

novo determination which is in accord with the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation. This court therefore adopts the

Recommendation with one modification as to the amendment of the

records of Scotland Correctional and with the following

additional analysis.

I. THE DEFENDANT’S RECORD AT SCOTLAND CORRECTIONAL

Plaintiff’s Complaint explicitly states he is suing Pamela

Locklear in her individual capacity and not in her official

capacity. (See Doc. 1 at 2.) However, Plaintiff’s response says

he is “entitled to all types of damages against Locklear,” (Doc.

35 at 3.), and his Complaint elaborates that he seeks “the [A-

18] charge wiped from [his] records, costs in this suit,

$10[,000] in compensatory damages, [and] $100[,000] in punitive

damages.” (Doc. 1 at 5 (cleaned up).) This court construes

Plaintiff’s Complaint as he wrote it—meaning, as a suit against

Locklear in her individual capacity.

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“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from personal-capacity liability for

civil damages under § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Ridpath v. Bd.

of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). By contrast,

in official capacity suits, “qualified immunity is unavailable.”

Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995). While “a

plaintiff may not recover damages against state officials sued

in their official capacities,” official capacity suits seeking

injunctive relief are permitted. Johnson v. Ohai, No. 7:20CV717,

2021 WL 3410319, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2021).

The term “damages” refers to “[m]oney claimed by, or

ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or

injury.” Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

“[W]hile [courts] must construe pro se complaints liberally,”

“our task is not to discern the unexpressed intent of the

plaintiff, but what the words in the complaint mean.” Laber v.

Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).

Here, even though Plaintiff has sought what could be

construed as a request for injunctive relief by demanding the

removal of the A-18 disciplinary charge from his records, this

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court is not convinced that it must now interpret his claims as

a lawsuit against Locklear in her official capacity.

Plaintiff explicitly stated he was suing Locklear in her

individual capacity and not her official capacity by checking

the individual capacity box on his complaint form and leaving

the official capacity box unchecked. (See Doc. 1 at 2.)

Furthermore, the prewritten text on the complaint form clarified

that he was permitted to bring a complaint against defendants

“in their individual capacity or official capacity, or both.”

(Id.) For this court to decide that Plaintiff intended to sue

Locklear in her official capacity would require more than a

“liberal[]” construction of the pro se complaint, see Laber, 438

F.3d at 413 n.3, it would require interpreting the complaint in

direct opposition to its plain meaning.

Additionally, Plaintiff stated he was “entitled to all

types of damages against Locklear,” (Doc. 35 at 3 (emphasis

added)), nowhere in his submissions does Plaintiff characterize

the remedies he seeks as injunctive or otherwise state he is

seeking equitable relief against Defendant, other than the

removal of the charge from his record. (See Doc. 1 at 5.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff never makes an assertion that he is suing

Locklear’s office, rather than her as an individual. Taken

together the facts suggest Plaintiff only intended to sue

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Locklear in her individual capacity. This court therefore

construes the complaint as one seeking relief against Defendant

in her individual capacity.

In the Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

“Plaintiff’s April 18, 2017 prison disciplinary charge be removed

from his prison report.” (Doc. 42 at 14.) It is not clear to this

court what authority this Defendant may have, even in her

official capacity, to address the record filed in this case that

appears to contravene this court’s order. Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence to support a finding that Defendant has

authority to modify or remove the relevant record within Scotland

Correctional even if Plaintiff has sued Defendant in her official

capacity. Therefore, this court declines to enter an order

directing Defendant to modify any records of Scotland

Correctional. If Plaintiff believes that the record filed in this

case suggests Respondent Erik A. Hooks has failed to “‘restor[e]

[Plaintiff’s] forfeited good-time credits’ within thirty days” as

ordered previously, (Docs. 25, 26, Tyler v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833

(M.D.N.C. cert. denied May 18, 2020)), Plaintiff is directed to

file a motion for sanctions in Tyler v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833.

II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The Recommendation also finds that “it was not objectively

unreasonable for Defendant to think that the evidence—prison

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officials’ statements and the investigation report—used to

support her disciplinary decision was sufficient to satisfy the

due process requirements for the charged offense against

Plaintiff.” (Doc. 42 at 11.) Plaintiff objects and argues this

holding is inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit’s prior finding

that the evidence was “at most, neutral assertions or conclusory

statements of culpability and are not affirmative evidence of

Tyler’s guilt.” (Doc. 45 at 1-2); Tyler v. Hooks, 945 F.3d 159,

172 (4th Cir. 2019). However, the record in this case, as

submitted by Defendant, is different from the record submitted

to this court and the Fourth Circuit in Tyler v. Hooks. In

addition to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis in the

Recommendation, this court finds that affirmative evidence was

submitted to Defendant during the disciplinary hearing.

In Tyler v. Hooks, The Fourth Circuit found that to prove

the due process violation at issue in both of these cases, the

State must provide evidence to support the conclusions “that

Tyler knew that: (1) his allegation against Officer Gaddy was

false and (2) if it were true that it could have exposed Officer

Gaddy to criminal liability.” Tyler, 945 F.3d at 171.

While the Fourth Circuit expressed its concerns about

Officer Gaddy’s equivocal statement presented as record

evidence, it recognized that there was some ambiguity in that

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statement. See Tyler, 945 F.3d at 173. However, on the record in

that case, the Fourth Circuit further found there was no

evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff knew the false

claim could lead to criminal charges. See id.

However, the evidence in this case is different from that

presented in Tyler v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833. There, the prison

disciplinary package for the A-18 conviction, (Doc. 6–2, Tyler

v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833), contains the records as described by

the Fourth Circuit. That is, records which include at best

“neutral assertions or conclusory statements,” Tyler, 945 F.3d

at 172, such as “[t]he investigating officer reviewed the video

and stated that it did not add to nor take away from the

reporting party’s statement” and “Sgt. Gaddy stated that he had

no knowledge of the inmate’s disciplinary issue.” (Doc. 6-2

at 6, Tyler v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833.)

The record in this case contains an affidavit by Defendant

in which she states that she “reviewed the evidence package in

its entirety, which included the investigator’s report.” (Doc.

33-3 ¶ 15.) Attached to her affidavit is an incident report

which was not provided in the previous case. (See Doc. 33–3 at

88–96.) That report, also available at Doc. 33-4, contains

substantially more information than was provided in the prior

case, Tyler v. Hooks. (Compare, Doc. 33–3 at 88–96 with, Docs.

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6–2, 6–3 Tyler v. Hooks, No. 1:17CV833.) Plaintiff has not

challenged this new information, instead choosing to rely upon

the Fourth Circuit’s prior finding on appeal. (See Doc. 35 at 1

(“the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals decided that defendant

Locklear had convicted me of a prison rule violation in 2017,

without sufficient evidence to do so.”).) However, the new

evidence submitted in this case provides not only sufficient,

but substantial, evidence to support Defendant’s finding that

Plaintiff knowingly made a false report.

The remaining question is whether any evidence supports a

finding by Defendant that Plaintiff “knew that the allegation

could have exposed [Officer Gaddy] to criminal liability.”

Tyler, 945 F.3d at 173. This court does not find the record

submitted in this case provides any new insight or evidence on

that issue.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that there has been

substantial evidence presented that Plaintiff knowingly made a

false allegation, this court finds qualified immunity still

applies. This court finds that at the time of his disciplinary

conviction, there was no clearly established law or rule that,

in order to violate the Disciplinary Procedures, ch. B,

§ .0202(a)(A18)(2016), Tyler had to know that his false

allegation “could have exposed Officer Gaddy to criminal

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liability,” Tyler, 945 F.3d at 171, or perhaps more

significantly, that Defendant should reasonably know that the

adverb “knowingly” applied “to all the subsequently listed

elements of the crime.” See Tyler, 945 F.3d at 171 (quoting

Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009).

The Fourth Circuit relied upon Flores-Figueroa in reaching

its conclusion that Tyler had to know that he could have exposed

Gaddy to criminal liability before he could be convicted of the

A-18 offense. Insofar as this court is aware, the Tyler opinion

is the first time Flores-Figueroa’s holding has been applied to

disciplinary infractions. While this court agrees with the

Fourth Circuit’s construction of the A-18 rule, this court does

not find, here, that a construction consistent with Defendant’s

findings is unreasonable. As Justice Alito, concurring in part

in Flores-Figuero, points out,

[i]n interpreting a criminal statute such as the one

before us, I think it is fair to begin with a general

presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all

the elements of an offense, but it must be recognized

that there are instances in which context may well

rebut that presumption. For example, 18 U.S.C. §

2423(a) makes it unlawful to “knowingly transport an

individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in

interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that

the individual engage in prostitution, or in any

sexual activity for which any person can be charged

with a criminal offense.” The Courts of Appeals have

uniformly held that a defendant need not know the

victim's age to be guilty under this statute.

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Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 660 (cleaned up). Therefore, even

an absence of evidence to prove Plaintiff knew his false

allegation could have exposed Officer Gaddy to criminal

liability is not sufficient to defeat qualified immunity.

In light of the evidence presented here, this court finds

that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Ridpath,

447 F.3d at 306 (“Qualified immunity shields government

officials performing discretionary functions from personal-

capacity liability for civil damages under § 1983 ‘insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609)); see also Biggs 66

F.3d at 61 (noting that in official capacity suits, “qualified

immunity is unavailable”); see also Johnson, 2021 WL 3410319,

at *1 (stating that while “a plaintiff may not recover damages

against state officials sued in their official capacities,”

official capacity suits seeking injunctive relief are

permitted).

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES

This court has independently considered its obligations to

recuse in light of Plaintiff’s allegations. This court agrees

with, and adopts, the findings of the Magistrate Judge. Adverse

rulings do not constitute a basis upon which recusal is required.

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This court turns now to a matter not raised by the parties

or in the Recommendation. This case marks the second time the

State of North Carolina has failed to file significant, possibly

case dispositive, documents in a timely fashion in matters before

this court. A case otherwise unrelated except as to the named

Plaintiff, Tyler v. Poole, 1:17CV1142 (M.D.N.C. settlement

reported Aug. 5, 2022), was filed and ultimately tried to a jury.

After the jury was unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial was

declared. (See Doc. 102, Tyler v. Poole, 1:17CV1142.) Following

the mistrial, the State, by and through the Attorney General,

produced a previously undisclosed “Daily Custody Observations

Report” to Plaintiff that was central to the case and explained

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. (See e.g. Doc. 124–1,

Tyler v. Poole, 1:17CV1142.) If that document had been produced

prior to the mistrial, it might have been case dispositive; as a

late-filed document, it resulted hearings and proceedings that

would have been completely avoidable had it been disclosed in a

timely fashion.

The present case, Tyler v. Locklear, is related to an

earlier case, Tyler v. Hooks, 1:17CV833. Both cases arise out of

a May 1, 2017 disciplinary proceeding for an A-18 offense. (See,

Doc 6 at 1, Tyler v. Hooks, 1:17CV833; see also Doc. 33 at 2,

Tyler v. Locklear, 1:20CV166.) In Tyler v. Hooks, the State filed

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what purported to be Plaintiff Tyler’s prison disciplinary

package for his May 1, 2017 A-18 conviction. (Doc. 6–2, Tyler v.

Hooks, 1:17CV833.) That disciplinary package was relied upon by

the Magistrate Judge, this court, and the Fourth Circuit in

reaching our respective decisions.

In the present case, Defendant, by and through counsel, has

filed a motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 33), accompanied by an

affidavit of the Disciplinary Hearing Officer who adjudicated the

May 1, 2017 A-18 disciplinary action, (Doc. 33–3 at 1–3). The

affidavit produces and authenticates the full disciplinary

record. (Id. at 88–96.) That disciplinary record includes a

previously undisclosed Incident Report explaining the full

investigation as relevant to the A-18 violation. (Doc. 33-3 at

88–90; Doc. 33-4.) The previously undisclosed Incident Report is

not only material in this case; it likely would have been

material, if not dispositive, in Tyler v. Hooks.

No evidence has been presented to suggest, nor does it

appear to this court, that the belatedly disclosed records

described above have been falsely created or presented. They

appear to be the original records created and maintained during

the regular course of duties at the institution. Nor is it clear

why these records were not disclosed in a timely fashion, nor who

may be at fault for the failure to provide complete records. Both

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the Attorney General’s office and the custodian of records at

Scotland Correctional Institution should be able to maintain and

produce state records in some type of reliable fashion. If either

the State or the Institution chooses to act in a manner that

undermines its own defenses, that is their decision. However, any

such decision, whether intentional or unintentional, will not be

permitted to undermine proceedings in this court. The belated

disclosure of significant documents reflects an unacceptable

indifference to fairness to opposing parties and the court.

The Attorney General and officials at Scotland Correctional

Institution are hereby cautioned that any further belated

disclosure of records will not be permitted to undermine the

fairness of the proceedings in this court for all parties. Any

further instances of late disclosure may result in the issuance

of a show cause order requiring counsel and the parties to appear

and explain any belated production.

For the reasons set out herein,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation,

(Doc. 42), is ADOPTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Recusal

[and] Motion for a New Trial,” (Doc. 41), is DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, (Doc. 32), is GRANTED to the extent she be entitled to

qualified immunity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is hereby DISMISSED.

A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered

contemporaneously with this Order.

This the 30th day of September, 2022.

Winer 1 len Me

United States District Ju

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