GUILFORD COLLEGE v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Guilford College, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 1:21-cv-00838

v.

)

Travelers Indemnity Company of America, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Guilford College brought this action in state court on September 20, 2021,

against its insurer, Defendant Travelers Indemnity Company of America, alleging that

Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim for an insured loss to Plaintiff’s business income caused by

events related to COVID-19. Defendant removed the matter to this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons

stated herein, Defendant’s motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a private, non-profit college in Greensboro, North Carolina. (ECF No. 4

¶2.) It operates as a residential college and typically requires traditional students under the age

of twenty-three to live on its campus and use campus facilities. (Id. ¶ 9.) From July 2019 to

1 When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint and views the complaint and any attached exhibits to it in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); Fayetteville Invs. v. Com.

July 2021, Plaintiff was insured under an insurance policy (the “Policy”) by Defendant. (Id. ¶

10.) The Policy included business income insurance. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Starting in spring 2020, cases of COVID-19 began to emerge in the United States and

North Carolina, including in the vicinity of Plaintiff’s campus. (Id. ¶ 13.) In response to the

spread of COVID-19, the Governor of North Carolina issued several executive orders related

to COVID-19, including an order that declared a “State of Emergency,” multiple orders

restricting gatherings at Plaintiff’s campus, an order that prohibited in-person dining at

Plaintiff’s eating facilities, and a stay-at-home order that restricted operations at educational

institutions. (Id. ¶¶ 18–23.)

Due to COVID-19 and the government orders related to COVID-19, Plaintiff shifted

its spring semester from in-person to remote. (Id. ¶ 26.) This entailed directing students not

to return to campus after spring break, directing employees to work remotely, and closing

residence halls and dining facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) Plaintiff also canceled on-campus and off-

campus events to comply with government restrictions on gatherings. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff lost

tuition revenue and room and board revenue and incurred extra expenses when it instituted

these measures. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29.)

On April 19, 2021, Plaintiff notified Defendant that it had suspended business

operations and had insurance claims under the Policy. (Id. ¶ 30.) Two days later, Defendant

denied the claims. (Id. ¶ 31.) Defendant informed Plaintiff that “[t]he presence or possible

presence of the COVID-19 virus does not constitute ‘direct physical loss of or damage to

property’ within the meaning of [the P]olicy,” (id. ¶ 32), and that “[t]he virus exclusion applies

. . . as the COVID-19 virus is a virus capable of inducing physical distress, illness, or disease,”

(id. ¶ 33).

Plaintiff then initiated this lawsuit against Defendant, seeking declaratory judgment that

the Policy covered the claims, (id. ¶¶ 52–66), recovery for breach of contract for not paying

the claims, (id. ¶¶ 67–74), and recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing for denying the claims without first investigating them, (id. ¶¶ 75–87).

Defendant files the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 12b(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure asserting that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion made under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the facts in the

complaint, specifically whether the complaint satisfies the pleading standard under Rule

8(a)(2). Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when the complaint

alleges sufficient facts to allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 709 (4th Cir.

2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The court “view[s] the complaint in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).

When considering a motion to dismiss, “a [district] court evaluates the complaint in its

entirety, as well as documents attached [to] or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont

de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). A district court

evaluating a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) can also “consider a document submitted by

the movant that was not attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the

document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s

authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016). Here,

Defendant has attached a copy of the Policy to its motion. (ECF No. 8-1.) The Policy is

integral to the Complaint and Plaintiff has not challenged its authenticity; therefore, the Court

will consider the Policy in addition to the Complaint.

III. DISCUSSION

Under North Carolina law2, an insurance policy is a contract, and its terms govern the

parties’ rights and duties. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dortch, 348 S.E.2d 794, 796 (N.C. 1986).

The meaning of the language used in the policy is a question of law. Guyther v. Nationwide Mut.

Fire Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 238, 241 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). The plain language of the policy

governs its interpretation. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin ex rel. Martin, 851 S.E.2d

891, 895 (N.C. 2020). If there are any ambiguities, those ambiguities are construed against the

insurer. Id. In insurance disputes, “[t]he party seeking coverage under an insurance policy

bears the burden “to allege and prove coverage.” Id. (quoting Brevard v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 137 S.E.2d 837, 839 (N.C. 1964)).

Plaintiff has identified three distinct sections of the nearly two-hundred-page Policy

that it argues each can independently provide coverage for its claim. Those sections are: (1)

the main coverage clause of the “Deluxe Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage

Form”; (2) a “Dependent Property” coverage clause located in the “Additional Coverages”

2 The parties agree that the Court should apply North Carolina law to interpret the language in the

Policy. (ECF Nos. 8 at 11; 11 at 7); see Fortune Ins. Co. v. Owens, 526 S.E.2d 463, 466 (N.C. 2000)

section of that same form; and (3) a “Civil Authority” coverage clause, also located in the

“Additional Coverages” section of that same form.3 The Court concludes Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged it suffered any loss that would be covered by any of these sections. The Court

addresses each section in turn.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Loss Covered by the Deluxe Business

Income (and Extra Expenses) Coverage Form

Plaintiff contends that it has sustained a loss of business income that is covered under

the Policy pursuant to the main insuring clause of the “Deluxe Business Income (and Extra

Expenses) Coverage Form” section of the Policy. (ECF Nos. 4 ¶¶ 1, 49–50, 58, 59; 11 at 14.)

This clause states that:

[Travelers] will pay for:

 The actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary

“suspension” of your “operations” during the “period of restoration”; and

 The actual Extra Expense you incur during the “period of restoration”;

caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at premises which are described

in the Declarations . . . .

(ECF No. 8-1 at 67 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff argues that this language provides coverage because it lost business income

due to a “physical loss of . . . property” insofar as it lost full access to and use of its campus

property during the COVID-19 shutdowns. (ECF No. 11 at 14.) Defendant argues that this

coverage only applies when there has been actual physical damage to property (e.g., fire). (ECF

No. 8 at 12–30.) The Court rejects Plaintiff’s interpretation of this language and finds that

3 The Policy is divided into many titled sections that in turn have subsections that have their own titles.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a plausible claim that its loss of business income was “caused

by direct physical loss of or damage to property” as required by this section of the Policy.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that under North Carolina law the

foregoing “physical loss” language in a business income insurance policy unambiguously

requires that an insured suffer actual physical harm to property, rather than some inability to

fully utilize property. N. State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 875 S.E.2d 590, 592–93 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2022). In that case, because the “[p]laintiffs did not allege that their loss resulted

from physical harm to their property,” the court found that the plaintiffs’ loss was not covered.

Id. at 593. Prior to this decision, other courts applying North Carolina law had reached the

same conclusion in the context of insurance claims for business income lost due to COVID-

19 shutdowns. See, e.g., Summit Hosp. Grp., Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-254, 2021 WL

831013, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2021) (“[A] plain reading of the policy at issue and its

provisions requires that there be a direct physical loss or damage to plaintiff’s properties in

order for coverage . . . to apply.”), aff’d, No. 21-1362, 2022 WL 2072759 (4th Cir. June 9, 2022).

Here, Plaintiff did not allege any physical damage to its property. (See ECF No. 4 ¶ 44

(“Guilford College has not claimed physical damage at Guilford College’s property caused by

COVID-19.”).) The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a loss

covered under the main insuring clause of the Deluxe Business Income (and Extra Expenses)

Coverage Form in the Policy.

B. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Loss Covered by the Dependent Property

Coverage

Plaintiff also argues that the Policy separately extends coverage for losses described in

a nearly identical “Dependent Property” coverage clause. (ECF No. 11 at 22.) As mentioned

follows a few sections after the primary insuring language addressed above. One of the main

distinctions between the two clauses is that prior clause triggers for damage to the insured’s

own premises, whereas the Dependent Property clause triggers for damage to property owned

by someone else that the insured depends on (e.g., a vendor or supplier). (See ECF No. 8-1 at

78 (defining “Dependent Property”).)

Regarding coverage for losses related to Dependent Property, the Policy states that:

[Travelers] will pay for:

(a) The actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary

“suspension” of your “operations” during the “period of restoration”; and

(b) The actual Extra Expense you incur during the “period of restoration”;

caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at the premises of a ‘dependent

property’ located anywhere in the world . . . .

(ECF No. 8-1 at 68 (emphasis added).)

This clause uses the same “direct physical loss of or damage to property” language as

discussed above. The same analysis therefore applies. Because Plaintiff has not alleged any

physical harm to any Dependent Property (indeed, the Complaint does not identify any

Dependent Properties), it has not plausibly pled a loss covered by this clause.

C. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Loss Covered by the Civil Authority Coverage

The last Policy section that Plaintiff identifies as extending coverage for its loss is the

“Civil Authority” coverage, (ECF No. 11 at 15–22), which is part of the same Additional

Coverages section as the Dependent Property coverage, (ECF No. 8-1 at 68–69).

Civil Authority coverage requires the insurer to pay for a business’s lost income when

there are government public safety orders that shut down the neighborhood around the

business and thereby cut into the business’s revenue.4 For example, if a building collapses

near an insured business and then local authorities prohibit access to the vicinity while they

clean up the collapse, an insured might turn to this kind of coverage.5 Here, the Policy

provides coverage based on whether four conditions relating to such a scenario are met:

 First, there must be a “Covered Cause of Loss” (a defined term) that causes

damage to property (specifically, property that is in the vicinity of the insured’s

property and that is not directly insured under the Policy).6

 Second, there must be an action of “civil authority” (an undefined term) taken

in response to dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage caused

by that “Covered Cause of Loss.”7

4 The clause states:

When a Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property other than property at the

described premises, [Travelers] will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you

sustain and the actual Extra Expense you incur caused by action of civil authority that

prohibits access to the described premises, provided that both of the following apply:

(a) Access to the area immediately surrounding the damaged property is

prohibited by civil authority as a result of the damage, and the described

premises are within that area but are not more than 100 miles from the

damaged property; and

(b) The action of civil authority is taken in response to dangerous physical

conditions resulting from the damage or continuation of the Covered

Cause of Loss that caused the damage . . . .

(ECF No. 8-1 at 68–69.)

5 See, e.g., Abner, Herrman & Brock, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 331, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

(finding that civil authority coverage triggered after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

because government orders shutting down Manhattan prevented plaintiff-insured from accessing its

offices).

6 “When a Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property other than property at the described

premises . . . and the described premises . . . are not more than 100 miles from the damaged

property . . . .” (ECF No. 8-1 at 68.)

7 “The action of the civil authority is taken in response to dangerous physical conditions resulting

from the damage or continuation of the Covered Cause of Loss that caused the damage . . . .” (ECF

 Third, that action of civil authority must prohibit access to an area that

immediately surrounds the damaged property and that includes the insured’s

property.8

 Fourth, whatever lost business income that the insured claims coverage for

must have been caused by that action of civil authority.9

In the past two years many courts across the country have considered whether similar

civil authority clauses in insurance policies provide coverage for losses related to COVID-19;

however, the vast majority of decisions reviewed by this Court found that Civil Authority

coverage does not apply to such claims—for a wide variety of reasons.10 While the Court

finds the reasoning in these many cases persuasive, for the purposes of Defendant’s motion

in this case, the Court need not address every permutation of the arguments that can be made

regarding Civil Authority coverage. Here, it is enough for Defendant to prevail that COVID-

19 cannot be a “Covered Cause of Loss” as that term is defined in the Policy. See Pez Seafood

DTLA, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1205–08 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (finding

8 “When . . . action of civil authority . . . prohibits access to the described premises [and] [a]ccess to

the area immediately surrounding the damaged property . . . and the described premises are within

that area . . . .” (ECF No. 8-1 at 68–69.)

9 “[W]e will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain . . . caused by [the] action of civil

authority.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 68.)

10 See, e.g., Promotional Headwear Int’l v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1205 (D. Kan. 2020)

(“[A]ccess to Plaintiff’s property was not prohibited by the Stay-at-Home Orders; therefore, the

Policy’s civil authority coverage provision does not apply.”); WM Bang LLC v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of

Am., 559 F. Supp. 3d 225, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“By failing to plead that neighboring properties

suffered any physical loss, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show they are entitled to Civil

Authority Coverage under the Policy.”); Lansdale 329 Prop, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 537 F.

Supp. 3d 780, 793 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (“[T]he relevant Closure Orders were not issued in response to

‘dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage or continuation of the Covered Cause of

Loss.’ Rather, . . . the Closure Orders were issued to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus to any

of these properties.”); Newchops Rest. Comcast LLC v. Admiral Indem. Co., 507 F. Supp. 3d 616, 625 (E.D.

Pa. 2020) (“The civil authority action cannot be both the cause of that damage and the response to

that even though plaintiff insured had plausibly alleged that actions of civil authority in

response to COVID-19 damage to nearby property had prohibited access to insured’s

premises, nevertheless civil authority coverage did not trigger because COVID-19 was not a

“Covered Cause of Loss”).

Whether COVID-19 can be a “Covered Cause of Loss” is critical due to the second

condition for Civil Authority coverage—the requirement that there be an action of civil

authority in response to the damage caused by a “Covered Cause of Loss.” For this

requirement to be satisfied, there must be some underlying “Covered Cause of Loss” with a

causal connection to the actions of civil authorities; the mere existence of actions of civil

authority in the absence of a related “Covered Cause of Loss” is not enough. Plaintiff’s

Complaint and arguments indicate that the only possible candidate for this requisite “Covered

Cause of Loss” is COVID-19.11 Therefore, if COVID-19 does not satisfy the definition of

“Covered Cause of Loss,” then Plaintiff’s allegations cannot meet the requirements for Civil

Authority coverage. Thus, the definition of “Covered Cause of Loss” is a major issue that

both Defendant and Plaintiff have addressed. (ECF Nos. 8 at 21; 11 at 21.)

11 Plaintiff definitively designates the government orders that restricted travel and gatherings as the

requisite actions of civil authority. (ECF No. 11 at 17-18 (citing ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 18–26).) Plaintiff has

alleged and argued that these orders were in response to damage caused by COVID-19. (ECF Nos.

4 ¶ 17 (“Various civil authorities . . . recognized the presence and loss of or damage to property and

people by COVID-19 and . . . have issued orders impairing (and even eliminating) access to businesses

and organizations, including Guilford College.”); 11 at 17.) This causal relationship between the

orders and COVID-19 identifies COVID-19 as the alleged “Covered Cause of Loss” (per the

requirement that the actions of civil authority be the result of damage caused by the “Covered Cause

of Loss”). The other way to identify COVID-19 as the alleged “Covered Cause of Loss” is to look at

what else in the Complaint may have caused damage to property. Accepting for the sake of analysis

that a reduction in ability to use property can be damage, the government orders themselves might

arguably be the “Covered Cause of Loss” that damages property. However, as other courts have

observed, the actions of civil authority and the “Covered Cause of Loss” in this situation cannot be

With respect to the definition of “Covered Cause of Loss,” the Policy states:

Covered Causes of Loss means RISKS OF DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS unless

the loss is excluded or limited in:

a. Section C. Exclusions or Section D. Limitations of the Deluxe Property

Coverage Form; or

b. Section B. Exclusions and Limitation of this Coverage Form; or

c. In the Declarations or by endorsement.

(ECF No. 8-1 at 68.)

Relevant to both the parties’ arguments, the effect of subsection (a) in this definition

is to expressly incorporate exclusions located in a different part of the Policy; “Deluxe

Property Coverage Form” is the name of a large section of the Policy that itself contains many

subsections. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 29 et seq.) Within these incorporated exclusions, the Policy

has a “Virus Exclusion.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 48–49.) Defendant argues that this “Virus

Exclusion” prevents COVID-19 from being a “Covered Cause of Loss.” (ECF No. 8 at 21–

30.) The Court agrees.

The Virus Exclusion in the Deluxe Property Coverage Form is part of a list of items

that Defendant “will not pay for.”12 (ECF No. 8-1 at 46.) The Virus Exclusion specifically

excludes “[a]ny virus, bacterium, or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing

physical distress, illness, or disease.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 48.) This language is straightforward

and unambiguous, as is its effect on Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff alleged that COVID-19 is a

virus that causes disease.13 (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 13–14.) Therefore, COVID-19 is not a “Covered

12 “We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following.” (ECF

No. 8-1 at 46.)

13 While the nomenclature makes no difference here, per the federal Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention, “COVID-19 is a respiratory disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus.” Coronavirus

Cause of Loss”; it is excluded from the definition of that term and Defendant is not obligated

to pay for damage caused by it. See, e.g., Boxed Foods Co., LLC v. Cal. Cap. Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp.

3d 516, 521 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he [p]olicy’s Virus Exclusion excludes viruses as a Covered

Cause of Loss, thereby precluding [p]laintiffs’ claim . . . under the Civil Authority provision.”);

Border Chicken AZ LLC v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 3d 699, 704 (D. Ariz. 2020)

(dismissing insured’s complaint because civil authority provision required a “Covered Cause

of Loss” and a virus exclusion unambiguously precluded COVID-19 from being a “Covered

Cause of Loss”). This means that Plaintiff has not alleged that there were any actions of civil

authority taken as a result of damage from a “Covered Cause of Loss,” and Plaintiff therefore

has not alleged coverage under the Civil Authority provision of its Policy.

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. Plaintiff’s response to the Virus

Exclusion is that the Complaint did not allege the presence of a virus on its campus and the

Virus Exclusion only pertains to viruses actually present on insured property; a virus in the

surrounding community would not be excluded. (ECF No. 11 at 10–14.) However, the Virus

Exclusion does not contain any language that explicitly states a location a virus must be found

for the exclusion to apply. Rather than rely on any plain statement in the Policy, Plaintiff

instead argues that: (1) “In order for a virus to be ‘capable of inducing . . . disease,’ the virus

would need to be present at Guilford College’s premises such that it could infect a person”;

and (2) the fact that the Virus Exclusion is located in the Deluxe Property Coverage section

of the Policy indicates it only relates to conditions at the insured property. (ECF No. 11 at

12–13.)

Plaintiff’s first argument is not persuasive given that, as alleged by Plaintiff, COVID-

19 cases occurred across the United States. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 13.) This demonstrates that

COVID-19’s capacity to cause disease has nothing to do with whether it is on Plaintiff’s

campus. Plaintiff draws its argument from an opinion and order of a state district court in

Oklahoma, Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma v. Lexington Insurance Company, No. CV-20-42 (Okla.

Dist. Ct. Feb. 15, 2021). (ECF No. 11 at 11.) This Court respectfully declines to adopt the

reasoning of that court.

Regarding Plaintiff’s second argument, even in the context of an insurance claim

brought under a property insurance policy (rather than a business income policy), the kind of

virus exclusion language used in this Policy does not require viral contamination be at the

insured premises. See Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F. Supp. 3d 353, 360–62

(W.D. Tex. 2020) (finding virus exclusion barred coverage under a property insurance policy

even though COVID-19 was not present at the insured properties). Accordingly, the fact that

the Virus Exclusion here is set out in a property section of the Policy rather than adjacent to

the Civil Authority clause is not a reason to construe it as only excluding viruses on Plaintiff’s

property. See Robert E. Levy, D.M.D., LLC v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp. Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 1158,

1168 (E.D. Mo. 2021) (collecting cases where courts have held that virus exclusions were not

limited to instances where a virus contaminated the insured’s property); LJ New Haven LLC v.

AmGUARD Ins. Co., 511 F. Supp. 3d 145, 154 (D. Conn. 2020) (rejecting the virus-on-

premises argument because viruses are not intrinsically linked to real property, and because it

requires adding a restriction that does not appear in the plain language of the exclusion).

Returning to the plain language of the Policy because the Virus Exclusion does not

state that a virus must be discovered on the insured property before it applies, this Court will

not impose such a restriction. See Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 348 S.E.2d at 796 (“[A court has

a] duty to construe and enforce insurance policies as written, without rewriting the contract or

disregarding the express language used.”). A pathogenic virus, wherever found, is not a

“Covered Cause of Loss.” COVID-19 is a pathogenic virus, and so COVID-19 is not a

“Covered Cause of Loss.” Therefore, the government shutdown orders that affected Plaintiff

were in response to damage caused by a non-“Covered Cause of Loss.” Plaintiff has not

plausibly pled that it suffered losses due to an action of civil authority taken in response to a

“Covered Cause of Loss.”14

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes three counts: one for declaratory judgment, another for

breach of contract, and the third for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 52–87.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly pled

that its insurance claims were covered by the Policy, the Court will dismiss the Complaint in

its entirety. See Golden Coral Corp. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 559 F. Supp. 3d 476, 491-92 (E.D.N.C.

2021) (dismissing a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing count where plaintiff-

insured failed to plead a loss covered by the policy because breach of good faith requires a

refusal to pay a valid claim as an element).

14 Many courts facing similar COVID-19 insurance cases have found that virus exclusions such as the

one in this Policy directly foreclose coverage, without stepping through the definition of “Covered

Cause of Loss.” See Cali Fresh, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 20CV522, 2021 WL 3620074, at *4–5

(M.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2021) (collecting cases). The Court finds the reasoning in those cases persuasive

and applicable here since the Policy, in addition to incorporating the Virus Exclusion by reference

into the “Covered Causes of Loss” definition, also separately incorporates the Virus Exclusion by

reference into a set of exclusions that apply to the three sections Plaintiff attempted to plead coverage

under. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 74.) In this case however, Defendant urged the less direct “Covered

Cause of Loss” method of applying the Virus Exclusion, (ECF No. 8 at 24–18), and the Court

For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7),

is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 4), is DISMISSED in its entirety.

This, the 12th day of September 2022.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs

United States District Judge