SILVA v. WALT DISNEY WORLD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DANIEL JAMES SILVA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:21CV912

)

WALT DISNEY WORLD, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket

Entry 1 (the “Application”)), filed in conjunction with his pro se

Verified Personal Injury Premises Liability Complaint (Docket Entry

2 (the “Complaint”)). The Court will grant the Application for the

limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . .

the action . . . is frivolous . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The United States Supreme Court has explained

that “a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations

and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989); see also Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256 (“The word

frivolous is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical

definition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

ANALYSIS

As its title indicates, the Complaint asserts a cause of

action for premises-liability-based, personal injury against

Defendant, apparently under Florida law. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-

20.) More specifically, the Complaint alleges that “[Plaintiff]

was on the Liberty Square Riverboat ride . . . [and] was standing

under one of the steam stacks on the ride when all of a sudden [he]

was burned by 3 or 4 very hot water droplets that emerged from the

steam stack . . . .” (Id. at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (“[T]he steam

droplets burned my right forearm . . . . [I] also suffered from an

aggravation in my PTSD because the rest of my day was ruined from

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the burn [as] the last time I remember being that [sic] was with my

dearly departed mother, so the burns ruined the renewed experience

of going to the [M]agic [K]ingdom . . . .”).) The Complaint

purports to rest this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on

diversity of citizenship. (See id. at 4.)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the

party asserting it. See id. Federal courts possess subject matter

jurisdiction over civil actions where complete diversity of

citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Here, the Complaint states that Plaintiff “seek[s] more the

[sic] 75,000 in damages [and that he is] a resident of a different

state then [sic] Florida (citizenship of diversity).” (Docket

Entry 2 at 4; see also id. at 2 (giving location of injury as

Orlando, Florida), 3 (alleging Plaintiff “was on the premises of

Walt Disney [W]orld” at time of injury), 11 (listing “[m]onetary

relief requested” as “100 dollars for the money spent as an

admission fee and food and drinks [Plaintiff] ate and drank at the

park, 5,000 usd for the physical burned [sic] suffered[, and]

70,000 for pain and suffering for the burn aggravating [his]

PTSD”), 13 (“ask[ing] for punitive damages in the sum of 2,000,000

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million [sic] dollars”).)! The Complaint’s allegations do not

satisfy either of the two basic requirements of Section 1332.

First, the Complaint does not adequately identify the

citizenship of Defendant, an artificial entity not denominated as

a corporation. (See id. at 1, 2.) “As [Defendant] is not a

corporation, it possesses its members’ citizenship. Nothing in the

record designates who [Defendant’s] members are.” Americold Realty

Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 382 (2016). Nor has

the undersigned Magistrate Judge located any applicable “law

[which] provides an answer,” id.; see also Muchler v. Greenwald,

624 F. App’x 794, 798 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[R]leliance on the

parties’ residency [i]s improper. ... [A]verments that parties

are ‘residents’ of their respective states, rather than ‘citizens’

or ‘domiciliaries’ of those states are jurisdictionally inadequate

for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”

(some internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff

has not carried his burden of establishing complete diversity of

citizenship between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Second, the Complaint does not meet Section 1332’s monetary

threshold. “In most cases, the ‘sum claimed by the plaintiff

controls’ the amount in controversy determination.” JTH Tax, Inc.

v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting St. Paul

' Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings omit emphasis, including

bold or enlarged font and underscoring, as well as extra spaces

between letters and lines of text.

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)); see

also Gordon v. National Bus. Consultants, Inc., No. 87-2676, 856

F.2d 186 (table), 1988 WL 86618, at *1 (4th Cir. 1998)

(unpublished) (“[P]unitive damages may be included in determining

whether a plaintiff has satisfied the amount in controversy

requirement.”). However, the general practice of deferring to a

plaintiff’s damages allegations in this context gives way if “it

appears or is shown that the amount is not claimed in good faith.

. . . A court would be remiss in its obligations if it accepted

every claim of damages at face value, no matter how trivial the

underlying injury.” Johnson v. Nixon, No. 3:17CV1901, 2018 WL

2031900, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2018) (unpublished) (internal

brackets and quotation marks omitted), recommendation adopted, 2018

WL 2017626 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2018) (unpublished); see also Bailey

v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 98-60582, 181 F.3d 96

(table), 1999 WL 346942, at *2 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The plaintiff’s

allegation [of the amount in controversy] will not control . . . in

those instances in which it is not made in good faith. . . .

Because the federal judiciary has been too timid to execute the

congressional mandate in tort litigation, we have all contributed

to clogging dockets, monopolizing trial rooms, and committing the

expense and energies of our system to a plethora of cases which do

not belong in federal courts.” (internal brackets, citations, and

quotation marks omitted)).

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In this case, “it is clear that Plaintiff has arbitrarily

alleged an excessive amount in damages to meet the jurisdictional

amount in controversy. Doing so is prohibited and goes against the

limited scope and purpose of diversity jurisdiction . . . .”

Johnson, 2018 WL 2031900, at *2. Put another way, the Complaint

“offers no facts that support the amount of compensatory and

punitive damages sought,” id. at *3, the sums proposed qualify as

“both fanciful and delusional, and [the Complaint] cannot support

a finding that this case involves [more than] $75,000 in

controversy,” id. “[E]ven in the unlikely event [Plaintiff] could

establish that [any aggravation of a PTSD] condition [was]

proximately related to Defendant[’s negligence], [Plaintiff has]

not support[ed] his extraordinary requests for . . . compensatory

damages and . . . punitive damages. As such, Plaintiff’s damage

claims lack a good faith basis.” Id.; see also Bailey, 1999 WL

346942, at *2 (“[W]e [have] held to a legal certainty that a

plaintiff’s unliquidated damages tort claim based on a minor injury

. . . could not meet the amount in controversy requirement of

[Section] 1332 . . . . The instant case is reminiscent of [that

prior case], in that [the plaintiffs’] unliquidated tort damages

claims are patently absurd and devoid of any potentially reasonable

support . . . . As such, the $75,000 amount in controversy of

[Section] 1332 has not been met, so the district court was without

jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v.

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Brown, No. 7:19CV2504, 2019 WL 6255829, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2019)

(unpublished) (“[A] litigant cannot establish federal Jurisdiction

by asserting an amount in controversy that is frivolous ... .”

(internal quotation marks omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2019

WL 6255134 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (unpublished).

Because Plaintiff’s invocation of subject matter jurisdiction

under Section 1332 “lacks an arguable basis [both] in law [and] in

fact,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, the Court should dismiss this case

as frivolous, see Overstreet v. Colvin, No. 4:13CV261, 2014 WL

353684, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (unpublished) (holding that

courts may consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of

frivolity review); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514

(2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of

a challenge from any party.”).°

* Additionally, “it is apparent from the face of the

[C]lomplaint that this [C]ourt does not have personal jurisdiction

over [ Dlefendant[].” Alvarado v. County of Tulare, No. 3:17CV40,

2017 WL 3129821, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2017) (unpublished). In

particular, “[t]he [C]lomplaint makes clear that [Plaintiff’s]

claims are based on acts or omissions that occurred in the State of

[Florida]. None of the acts or omissions is alleged to have

occurred in [North Carolina]. In addition, there are no

allegations suggesting that [Defendant] .. . ha[s] any connection

to [North Carolina].” Id. As a result, the Complaint does not

establish the constitutionally required minimum contacts between

Defendant and North Carolina to support this Court’s exercise of

personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See id. at *2 (discussing

personal jurisdiction standard). “Because it is apparent from the

face of the [C]Jomplaint that personal jurisdiction is lacking and

there is no reason to believe that [ D]lefendant would waive this

(continued...)

CONCLUSION

The Complaint frivolously fails to establish subject matter

jurisdiction in this Court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application (Docket Entry 1)

is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO

CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Complaint (Docket Entry 2) be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) as frivolous for want of

subject matter jurisdiction.

/s/_L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

September 29, 2022

“(...continued)

basis for dismissal, the [C]lourt [also could] . . . dismiss the

case without prejudice [on that basis].” Id.; see also Greer v.

Safeway, 317 F. App’x 838, 840 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[Courts] have

read § 1915(e)(2) to authorize a district court’s sua sponte

dismissal of claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.”); Alvarado,

2017 WL 3129821, at *1 n.1 (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit [has] explained that the screening authority

afforded to courts in actions filed in forma pauperis

differentiates such actions from ordinary civil suits and justifies

an exception to the general rule that an affirmative defense should

not be considered sua sponte.”); Barth v. Walt Disney Parks &

Resorts U.S., Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

(granting dismissal motion challenging personal jurisdiction filed

by Disney-entity defendants in suit over personal injury alleged to

have occurred on Walt Disney World premises in Florida), aff'd, 697

Apo’x 119 (3d Cir. 2017).