WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RONALD C. WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) 1:20cv904

RONALD C. WILLIAMS, II, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

This lawsuit is an intrafamilial dispute over ownership of a

warehouse, the rights to a related lease, and a promise to support

the Plaintiff. After now 84-year-old Plaintiff Ronald C. Williams

(“Williams”) deeded the property and assigned the lease to his

son, Defendant Ronald C. Williams, II (“Calvin”), he sought to

undo the transactions. On cross motions for summary judgment, the

court dismissed Williams’s claim seeking to declare void the

transfer of the deed to the property. (Doc. 58.) A bench trial

was held on March 21, 2022, on the merits of Williams’s remaining

claim seeking a declaratory judgment voiding the assignment of the

lease for the warehouse.1 For the reasons that follow, the court

declines to grant the relief requested, and Williams’s claim will

1 Williams has since trial filed a flurry of letters to the court making

a variety of post-trial arguments and claims. (Docs. 88 through 96.)

Leave of court for post-trial briefing was not sought, and the court

does not consider them as it relates to the merits of the claim.

be dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Williams filed his initial complaint in

Guilford County (North Carolina) Superior Court in August 2020.

(Doc. 1-1.) Defendant Calvin, his adult son, timely removed the

action to this court, invoking diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1441. (Doc. 1.)

Williams’s amended complaint seeks to undo his transfer to

Calvin of the deed to a warehouse and the assignment of the rights

under a lease agreement with a warehouse tenant.2 Williams brought

2 In his amended complaint, Williams alleges that he and Calvin “agreed

to deed the warehouse to [Calvin] until [Williams] requested it back.”

(Doc. 19 ¶ 4.) Williams alleges that “[his] warehouse was hijacked” and

that “[a]lthough [he] never agreed to sell it on any terms, Calvin

created the attached ‘Guidelines’.” (Id. ¶ 11.) The “Guidelines”

describe the alleged consideration for the deed transfer, including

Calvin’s statement that “[Williams] has conveyed ownership of the

warehouse to me upon the following conditions: I am required . . . to

support him until his death.” (Doc. 19 at 15.)

Williams’s description of events leading up to the deed transfer

and lease assignment has changed throughout the life of the case;

including arguing at one time that the lease assignment was not made to

Calvin, but actually made to himself. (See Doc. 37-3 25:13-26:9 (“You

see that I assigned the lease to myself. Right?”).) Williams’s more

recent filings, and arguments at trial, suggest his position has changed

such that he contends that the transfers were made in exchange for

Calvin’s promise to “support [Williams] in every way”. (See Defendant’s

Trial Exh. 4 at 13; Defendant’s Trial Exh. 5 (“I deeded the warehouse

to Calvin in exchange for his taking care of me until my death.”); see

also Doc. 36 (presenting arguments on summary judgment based upon

Calvin’s alleged promise to provide “room, board, medical care”); Doc.

52 at 1 (“The undisputed material facts are: . . . the alleged contract

does not define with certainty the words ‘room, board, medical care, and

related needs’ and ‘support’ or any other words . . . .”); Doc. 81 at 6-

8 (admitting he “exchange[d] the lease . . . for Calvin’s promise to

‘support’ [him]” and contending that “[t]he alleged contract which Calvin

contends gave ownership of the warehouse to him is ‘void for

indefiniteness’ . . . [s]o, the deed [is not enforceable]” (emphasis

omitted)).)

three claims against Calvin: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation,

based on a claim that Calvin induced Williams to transfer the deed

to the property/warehouse under Calvin’s oral representation that

he would transfer it back to Williams when the latter requested

it; (2) an action for “void contract,” alleging that the oral

promise to return the property omitted material terms as to what

Calvin could do with the property while holding it and as to the

mechanics for determining its return to Williams upon the latter’s

demand; and (3) unjust enrichment, alleging that Williams’s

transfer of the warehouse was not intended to be a gift and that

Calvin failed to make certain payments to or on behalf of Williams.

(Doc. 19.) The amended complaint also alleges that the parties’

agreement is void because it fails to set out key terms, such as

a formula for determining the amount of rental income to which

Williams is entitled and what living expenses are covered, and who

determines where Williams shall live and how much will be spent on

his living expenses. (Doc. 19 ¶ 11.) While the amended complaint

does not so indicate, Williams’s promise to assign his rights under

a lease to the property and Calvin’s promise to care for Williams

in exchange is set out in handwriting at the end of the lease

agreement, which is not attached to or expressly referred to in

the complaint. (See Defendant’s Trial Exh. 4.)

In January 2021, Williams filed a motion that the court

construed as one seeking a preliminary injunction, which the court

denied. (Docs. 23, 33.) Both parties then moved for summary

judgment (Docs. 37, 57), and Williams filed notices to voluntarily

dismiss his claims for fraudulent misrepresentation (Doc. 40) and

unjust enrichment (Doc. 41). The court denied Williams’s motion

for summary judgment; the court granted Calvin’s motion relating

to Williams’s request for a declaration that the deed transfer was

void but denied it as to Williams’s claim relating to the validity

of the lease assignment; and the court granted Williams’s motions

to dismiss his fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment

claims, which were dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 58.)

This left for trial Williams’s claim for a declaration that

the lease assignment was void because the consideration for it –

Calvin’s promise to care for Williams for life – was too vague.

The court held a bench trial on this claim on March 21, 2022.

Williams presented two witnesses: himself and Calvin; Calvin

presented three witnesses: himself, Williams, and his sister,

Audra Dougherty. At the close of Williams’s case-in-chief, Calvin

moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the court reserved ruling. The case is ready

for resolution.

Pursuant to Rule 52, the court enters the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law based upon an evaluation of the

evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, and the

inferences that the court has found reasonable to be drawn

therefrom.

II. ANALYSIS

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), as Williams is a resident of North Carolina,

and Calvin is a resident of Colorado.

Williams’s sole remaining claim has been construed by the

parties as seeking a declaratory judgment that Williams’s lease

assignment to Calvin fails for lack of consideration because

Calvin’s promise to care for him for life is allegedly too

indefinite to constitute valid consideration. Williams’s case at

trial focused on whether the handwritten promise related to the

lease assignment is indefinite enough to render the assignment of

the lease void.

The parties do not dispute that, about twenty years ago,

Williams purchased a warehouse located in Union County, North

Carolina. On October 1, 2018, Williams entered into a five-year

lease agreement with a tenant on a standard North Carolina

Association of Realtors, Inc. form lease. (Defendant’s Trial

Exh. 4.) Pursuant to the lease, the tenant pays approximately

$75,000 per year in rent with annual 3 percent increases. (Id.)

From about July 2019 to May 6, 2020, Williams resided with

Calvin in the son’s Colorado home. In April 2020, Williams,

Calvin, and Calvin’s siblings made plans for Williams to enter an

assisted living facility, Abbotswood at Irving Park

(“Abbotswood”), located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Due to

Williams’s health at the time, he and his family expected him to

remain at Abbotswood indefinitely.

On April 16, 2020, Williams transferred the property on which

the warehouse was located to Calvin via a quitclaim deed.

(Defendant’s Trial Exh. 2.) Williams prepared the deed, drafted

it, signed the deed before a notary, and mailed the deed to the

Union County, North Carolina Register of Deeds to be recorded, all

without requiring assistance from anyone. Williams was neither

directed nor coerced to make this transfer. At about that time,

Williams voluntarily drafted and executed an assignment to Calvin

of the current tenant’s lease agreement, as described above. On

page 13 of the lease, the parties handwrote the following:

For valuable consideration, Ronald C. Williams

hereby assigns this lease to Ronald Calvin Williams

For valuable consideration, Ronald C. Williams II

agrees to support in every way his father, Ronald C.

Williams

(Id. at 13.) This is followed by the signatures of father and

son, Williams and Calvin. The phrase “support in every way” is

not defined. Subsequent emails and testimony indicate that the

parties understood the phrase “support in every way” to mean that

Calvin would pay the financial cost of Williams’s room, board,

medical care, and related expenses while at Abbotswood. The

parties understood that the cost of Williams’s support at

Abbotswood could ultimately exceed the revenue generated from the

lease of the warehouse.3 (See Defendant’s Trial Exh. 5.)

On April 26, 2020, Williams sent an email to his daughter,

Dougherty, stating that he had

deeded the warehouse to Calvin in exchange for his taking

care of me until my death. Then he will divide it three

ways. His obligation to support me exists whether there

is enough or not. He could be required to spend his own

money.

(Id.)

On April 30, 2020, Calvin sent an email to the tenant of the

warehouse stating, “As mentioned, Dad [Williams] has moved the

title of the building over to me. He will be stepping back from

his financial management as he moves into the retirement center in

Greensboro. If anything needs my attention, please [contact] me.”

(Defendant’s Trial Exh. 11.)

On May 9, 2020, Williams sent Calvin an email stating, “I

suggest as a solution to the warehouse management problem that you

receive the rent and pay all bills without my input and that I

receive only my [social security] Check.” (Defendant’s Trial

Exh. 8.) Calvin responded, “Sounds like a plan.” (Id.) Calvin

understood Williams’s May 9, 2020 email to be a clarification of

his support obligation. From June 2020 through February 2021,

Calvin paid the $4,040.00 monthly cost of Williams’s suite at

3 Abbotswood offers varying levels of care, ranging from independent

living, to assisted living, to specialized care.

Abbotswood.4

In March 2021, unbeknownst to Calvin, Williams moved out of

Abbotswood into a traditional apartment community in Greensboro,

North Carolina, called The Lofts. The Lofts is not a senior living

facility and does not offer the same amenities as Abbotswood.

Williams requested, and Calvin agreed, that Calvin would pay the

monthly cost of rent for Williams’s apartment and that Calvin would

send Williams an additional $1,000.00 per month for utilities,

food, and other necessary living expenses. Calvin has paid the

rent at The Lofts and supplied the $1,0000 since March 2021.

Williams has periodically requested additional funds from Calvin

for purposes outside of room, board, and related expenses. Calvin

has largely denied these various requests.

A. Mootness

During the trial, Calvin argued that Williams’s claim is

mooted because the proceeds from the lease are due to the owner of

the warehouse as a matter of law by virtue of the court’s entry of

judgment against Williams on his claim to declare the deed transfer

invalid. If true, this preliminary issue would resolve whether

the court is in a position to grant the relief Williams seeks.

While Calvin did not raise this argument until trial, standing

4 Williams claims that Calvin failed to properly pay certain support

obligations relating to Abbotswood. These are not relevant to the

court’s resolution of the lease issue, and the court therefore does not

address them.

is a threshold jurisdictional requirement and can be raised by any

party or sua sponte by the court at any time. See Plyler v. Moore,

129 F.3d 728, 731 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that issues

regarding subject-matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any time

by either party or sua sponte by this court”); Center State Farms

v. Campbell Soup Co., 58 F.3d 1030, 1038 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Because

objections to standing are jurisdictional in nature, they may be

raised at any time.”). Whether a party has standing to maintain

an action in federal court is a question of federal, not state,

law. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)

(holding that “[s]tanding to sue in any Article III court is, of

course, a federal question which does not depend on the party’s

prior standing in state court”). In adjudicating claims for

declaratory relief, federal courts apply the federal Declaratory

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, rather than state analogues such

as North Carolina General Statute § 1-253. See White v. National

Union Fire Insurance Co., 913 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1990)

(holding “[f]ederal standards guide the inquiry as to the propriety

of declaratory relief in federal courts, even when the case is

under the court’s diversity jurisdiction”).5 The court therefore

has construed Williams’s declaratory claim for “void contract” as

5 Thus, while the record indicates that both parties were living in a

shared household in Colorado when they entered into the subject

contracts, the court need not resolve whether Colorado or North Carolina

law applies.

to the lease as a claim brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.6

Federal courts sitting in diversity may enter declaratory

judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 if three conditions are

met: (1) the complaint alleges an “actual controversy” between the

parties “of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant issuance

of a declaratory judgment”; (2) the court has subject matter

jurisdiction over the parties, independent of the request for

declaratory relief; and (3) the court does not abuse its discretion

in exercising jurisdiction. Volvo Construction Equipment North

America, Inc. v. CLM Equipment Co., Inc., 386 F.3d 581, 592 (4th

Cir. 2004); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,

239-41 (1937) (explaining that the “actual controversy”

requirement for a declaratory judgment is synonymous with the

Article III requirements). The Declaratory Judgment Act does not

require courts to issue declaratory relief; “[r]ather, a district

court’s decision to entertain a claim for declaratory relief is

discretionary.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric

Co., 139 F.3d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see also

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995).7

6 This court’s earlier statement that “North Carolina courts can and have

considered actions to declare a contract null and void” only addressed

Williams’s claim in so far as it related to Calvin’s contention that

“North Carolina courts do not recognize an action for ‘void contract.’”

See Williams v. Williams, No. 1:20CV904, 2021 WL 3679613, at *6 (M.D.N.C.

Aug. 19, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-2020, 2021 WL 5985535 (4th Cir.

Dec. 17, 2021).

7 The Fourth Circuit has enumerated several factors that a district court

To satisfy the “controversy” requirement of Article III, the

dispute must be “definite and concrete, touching the legal

relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Medimmune,

Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). A plaintiff

must “establish[] throughout all stages of litigation (1) that he

is suffering an injury-in-fact or continuing collateral

consequence, (2) that his injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action or decision, and (3) that a favorable decision

would be likely to redress his injury.” Townes v. Jarvis, 577

F.3d 543, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., dissenting) (emphasis

omitted) (footnote omitted) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,

10-14 (1998)).

“[M]ootness has been described as the doctrine of standing

set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must

exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must

continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Jarvis, 577 F.3d

at 546 (citations omitted). “Thus, for a controversy to be moot,

it must lack at least one of the three required elements of Article

should consider in determining whether to exercise its discretion to

entertain a declaratory judgment action. See Ind-Com, 139 F.3d at 422.

These include whether “the declaratory relief sought: (1) will serve a

useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue,

and (2) will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty,

insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.”

Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, the district court should consider

(3) principles of federalism, efficiency, comity, and procedural

fencing, id. at 423, and (4) whether “allowing [the] case to go forward

would produce piecemeal litigation,” id. at 424.

III standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, or (3)

redressability.” Id. at 546-47 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). For an injury to satisfy

the redressability standard, “it must be likely, as opposed to

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing standing.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (citation omitted); see Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561 (“[E]ach element [of standing] must be supported in the

same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation.”).

Here, Williams alleges injuries from the transfer of the

warehouse and assignment of the lease: (1) losing the ownership

rights to the warehouse, and (2) losing the right to receive rental

payments pursuant to the lease. (See, e.g., Docs. 83; 81; 36 at

13 (arguing this court should hold “Williams still owns the

warehouse, lease, and rents.”)). At summary judgment, this court

decided Williams’s declaratory “void contract” claim relating to

the deed/warehouse, granting Calvin’s motion to dismiss this claim

on the ground that the deed transfer was valid. (Doc. 58 at 27

(holding that “[b]ecause the [warehouse] deed is valid, it will

not fail for lack of consideration”).) Thus, Williams can no

longer recover ownership of the warehouse, and his only remaining

injury is the loss of rental income.

Williams transferred the warehouse to Calvin through a

quitclaim deed (Defendant’s Trial Exh. 2), and he did not

“expressly reserve his right to collect subsequently accruing

rents.” Pearce v. Gay, 139 S.E.2d 567, 569 (N.C. 1965). As owner

of the warehouse, Calvin enjoys the rights of the “landlord” under

North Carolina law and is thus entitled to the rent proceeds of

the warehouse. See, e.g., Gates v. Max, 34 S.E. 266, 267 (N.C.

1899); Pearce, 139 S.E.2d at 569 (“A conveyance of land, which is

subject to a valid and continuing lease, passes to the purchaser

the right to collect the rents thereafter accruing. . . . If the

grantor is to collect rents accruing subsequent to the effective

date of the conveyance, he must, by reservation in his deed,

provide that grantee shall not be entitled to possession prior to

the expiration of the term fixed in the lease, or otherwise

expressly reserve his right to collect subsequently accruing

rents.”); Murphrey v. Winslow, 318 S.E.2d 849, 852 (N.C. Ct. App.

1984), rev’d on other grounds, 327 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. 1985) (“[A]

conveyance of land, which is subject to a valid and continuing

lease, passes to the purchaser the right to collect the rents

thereafter accruing. . . . [A] separate assignment of the . . .

lease is [not] necessary . . . [as] the rights and liabilities

existing between the grantee and lessee are the same as those

existing between the grantor and the lessee, after the lessee is

given notice of the transfer of the property” (citation omitted));

Lashani v. Hanhan, 612 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)

(unpublished) (“Once defendant became aware that the real estate

had been conveyed, and once he was told to direct all

correspondence relating to the property to plaintiff, it became

his obligation to send his notice of lease renewal [pursuant to

the lease] to plaintiff, rather than to [the previous

landowners].”); Strickland v. Lawrence, 627 S.E.2d 301, 308 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a transfer of land, along with an

assignment of a lease, also included plaintiff’s mining permit for

the land because, “[w]hile the sale of the . . . property did not

include the sale of the Mining Permit, plaintiffs did not make any

reservation of rent or of any other interest in the . . . property

in their conveyance to [defendants]”); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.

Ann. § 42-2 (“Every conveyance of any rent, reversion, or remainder

in lands, tenements or hereditaments, otherwise sufficient, shall

be deemed complete without attornment by the holders of particular

estates in said lands.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-8 (“The grantee

in every conveyance of reversion in lands, tenements or

hereditaments has the like advantages and remedies by action or

entry against the holders of particular estates in such real

property, and their assigns, for nonpayment of rent, and for the

nonperformance of other conditions and agreements contained in the

instruments by the tenants of such particular estates, as the

grantor or lessor or his heirs might have.”). As the North

Carolina Supreme Court stated in Pearce, “When title passes, lessee

ceases to hold under the grantor. He then becomes a tenant of

grantee, and his possession is grantee’s possession. Attornment

is unnecessary, [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 42–2.”

This is consistent as well with the express terms of the lease

in this case, which provides:

(b) If Landlord sells, transfers, or conveys its

interest in the Premises or this Lease, or if the same

is foreclosed judicially or nonjudicially, or otherwise

acquired, by a Landlord mortgagee, upon the request of

Landlord or Landlord’s successor, Tenant shall attorn to

said successor, provided said successor accepts the

Premises subject to this Lease. . . .

(Defendant’s Trial Ex. 4 at 10 (emphasis added).) Here, Williams

deeded the warehouse to Calvin (Defendant’s Trial Ex. 5), and

Williams concedes that Calvin is collecting the lease payments

from the tenant.

Williams’s remaining claim before the court seeks a

declaratory judgment that his assignment of the lease to Calvin,

contained in handwritten notes at the end of the lease, is void

because Calvin’s related promise to care for Williams is

unenforceable as unduly vague. (Defendant’s Trial Ex. 4 at 13.)

Williams does not allege breach of contract. In fact, there was

substantial evidence that Calvin was paying Williams’s living

expenses, although there is a dispute over the scope of what should

be covered. Williams’s declaratory request is not redressable by

a favorable decision. Even if the court were to agree with

Williams that Calvin’s promise to support him is unduly vague, the

rents due under the lease, which Williams seeks, would still be

owed by the tenant to Calvin as a matter of law. See In re Mutual

Funds Investment Litigation, 529 F.3d at 216–17; SAS Institute,

Inc. v. World Programming Limited, 874 F.3d 370, 389-90 (4th Cir.

2017) (vacating as moot the district court’s ruling granting

summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s claim for copyright

infringement where “[Plaintiff] would not receive the [remedy] it

seeks even were it to prevail . . . . Thus, the legal resolution

of the copyright question would have no effect on the relief

afforded the parties”).

Because Williams’s claim fails to satisfy the

“redressability” standing requirement, his claim is moot and thus

fails to satisfy the “controversy” requirement of Article III.

Alternatively, because addressing Williams’s declaratory

claim would not provide him the relief he seeks, the court declines

to exercise its discretion to issue declaratory relief. See Ind-

Com, 139 F.3d at 421 (“[A] district court’s decision to entertain

a claim for declaratory relief is discretionary.”). Even if

Williams’s lease assignment and Calvin’s promise to support were

declared void, Calvin would still be entitled to all the proceeds

under the lease because he owns the deed to the warehouse and the

property on which it is located. Thus, entertaining Williams’s

request for declaratory judgment – rescinding the lease assignment

- will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling

the legal relations in issue nor afford the Plaintiff any relief.

For these reasons, Williams’s request for declaratory

judgment that the lease assignment fails for lack of consideration

is denied.

B. Motion for Reconsideration

Williams also moves for reconsideration of the court’s ruling

(Doc. 58) granting in part Calvin’s motion for summary judgment.

(Docs. 86.) Calvin did not file a response.

District courts have discretion to reconsider interlocutory

orders until a final judgment is entered. Akeva, L.L.C. v. Adidas

America, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also

American Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505,

514–15 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A] district court retains the power to

reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments, including

partial summary judgments, at any time prior to final judgment

when such is warranted.”). “Most courts have adhered to a fairly

narrow set of grounds on which to reconsider their interlocutory

orders and opinions.” Akeva, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 565.

Where an order is not final and does not resolve all claims,

as in the case of entry of partial summary judgment,

reconsideration of the interlocutory order is subject to the

court’s discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),

and not the heightened standards of Rules 59(e) or 60(b). American

Canoe, 326 F.3d at 514–15. However, such standards “have evolved

as a means of guiding that discretion.” Id. at 515. In doing so,

“courts in this Circuit have frequently looked to the standards

under Rule 59(e) for guidance in considering motions for

reconsideration under Rule 54(b).” Hatch v. DeMayo, No. 1:16CV925,

2018 WL 6003548, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2018) (collecting cases).

Generally, courts will only reconsider interlocutory rulings when

(1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law, (2)

new evidence becomes available, or (3) the earlier decision was

based on a clear error of law or would result in a manifest

injustice. Akeva, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 566. Such a motion allows

a district court to correct its own errors, but it does not serve

as a vehicle for a party to raise new arguments or legal theories

that could have been raised before the judgment. See Hatch, No.

1:16cv925, 2018 WL 6003548, at *1 (slip copy) (quoting South

Carolina v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (D.S.C. 2017)).

While the court’s authority to reconsider interlocutory orders

“may be tempered at times by concerns of finality and judicial

economy,” “[t]he ultimate responsibility of the federal

courts . . . is to reach the correct judgment under law.” American

Canoe, 326 F.3d at 515.

Here, Williams “moves the court to re-consider its [partial

summary judgment] decision” in light of the March 21, 2022 bench

trial. (Doc. 86.) Williams does not argue that there has been an

intervening change in controlling law, that new evidence has become

available, or that the earlier decision was based on a clear error

of law or would result in a manifest injustice. See Akeva,

385 F. Supp. 2d at 566. In fact, at the bench trial the court

directly advised the parties it was not permitting them to re-

litigate the deed transfer claim that the court already decided.

Accordingly, the court declines to alter its ruling. (See

generally Doc. 58.)

For these reasons, Williams’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 86)

will be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Williams’s action seeking a declaratory

judgment that the lease assignment is void is DENIED as moot and

that Williams’s declaratory action for void contract on these

grounds (Doc. 19) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams’s motion for

reconsideration (Doc. 86) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any request for costs be filed

within thirty (30) days, pursuant to the requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.

A Judgment in conformance with this Order will be entered

simultaneously.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

May 26, 2022