WHITE v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WILLIAM Z. WHITE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:18-cv-00969

)

THE CITY OF GREENSBORO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

This lawsuit arises out of the arrest and firing of Plaintiff

William White, a former Greensboro Police Department officer,

after he was investigated for illegal activity stemming from the

theft of several commercial-grade lawn mowers. After the criminal

charges against White were eventually dismissed, he brought this

case alleging numerous violations of both federal and North

Carolina law against multiple Defendants across four law

enforcement agencies.

The court previously ruled on motions to dismiss and for

summary judgment, dismissing all claims except those relating to

trespass. A motion for reconsideration of the court’s previous

order denying summary judgment (Doc. 173) was subsequently filed

by officers of the Greensboro Police Department (“GPD”) -- James

Schwochow, Eric Sigmon, Johnny Raines, Jr., William Barham, Brian

Williamson, Jason Lowe, and Lindsay Albert (“Greensboro

Defendants”), on the basis of public official immunity, which the

court granted in part and denied in part (Doc. 228). This led the

court to vacate its prior order (Doc. 82) dismissing the Eighth

Cause of Action against the Greensboro Defendants in their

individual capacities alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

a warrantless search of White’s home (Doc. 228), and the court

reopened discovery for this claim only.

The Greensboro Defendants now move for summary judgment as to

the Eighth Cause of Action on the grounds of qualified immunity

and damages. (Doc. 233 (Raines), Doc. 235 (Barham), Doc. 237

(Williamson), Doc. 239 (Lowe), Doc. 241 (Sigmon), Doc. 243

(Schwochow), Doc. 245 (Albert).) White opposes all motions. (Doc.

247.) For the reasons set forth below, the motions for summary

judgment will be granted on the basis of qualified immunity for

Lowe, Sigmon, Schwochow, and Albert, and granted in part on the

issues of damages for Raines, Barham, and Williamson.

I. BACKGROUND

The background of this case is extensively set out most

recently in this court’s prior amended memorandum opinion and

order. White v. City of Greensboro, 532 F. Supp. 3d 277 (M.D.N.C.

Apr. 5, 2021). Relevant facts will be discussed as pertinent to

these motions.

In short, White was a police officer for the GPD from April

2009 until March 6, 2017. (Doc. 111-1 ¶ 3.)1 On August 22, 2016,

the Reidsville Police Department (“RPD”) received a report that

several commercial-grade lawn mowers were stolen from Scott’s

Tractor, a lawn mower dealer in Reidsville, North Carolina.

(Doc. 140-1.) RPD Lieutenant Shannon Coates responded to the

report and assigned RPD Sergeant Lynwood Hampshire to investigate.

(Id., Doc. 140-2 at 16:16-20.) Hampshire would serve as the lead

investigator for the duration of the investigation. (Doc. 140-2

at 17:1-3.)

On October 7, Hampshire received a call from a couple, the

Terrys, who reported they had recently bought a mower from White

and who expressed concern about the possibility it had been stolen

earlier from Scott’s Tractor. (Doc. 140-3 at 1.) Prior to

conducting a knock and talk at White’s residence, Hampshire learned

that White was a GPD police officer. (Docs. 140-2 at 18:3-9; 140-

9 at 27:16-28:22.) Hampshire later spoke with Coates, his

supervisor, who advised him to contact the North Carolina State

Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) and GPD’s Professional Standards

Division. (Doc. 140-2 at 18:3-9.) The SBI was contacted because

it is standard practice for the SBI to be involved when a police

officer is the suspect in an investigation. (Doc. 140-8 at 170:5-

1 All citations to the record are to ECF docket page or paragraph number

except for testimony, which is cited to the deposition transcript page

and line.

171:3.) Hampshire contacted SBI Agent Destinie Denny, who had

worked with the RPD in the past. (Id. at 21:15-22:10.)

Following an investigation, Hampshire several months later

applied for and obtained a warrant from a state magistrate to

search two of White’s residences on March 5, 2017. (Doc. 140-12.)

Also on March 5, the investigating agencies2 informed GPD Chief

Wayne Scott that they had probable cause to arrest White for felony

possession of stolen property and felony obtaining property by

false pretenses, that the agencies were in the process of obtaining

search warrants for White’s residences, and that they planned to

arrest White on March 6. (Doc. 103-1 ¶ 9.) The investigating

agencies had updated Scott during their investigation, and GPD’s

Professional Standards Division was also investigating White’s

possible involvement in the mower thefts. (Id. ¶ 6.) Scott agreed

that the agencies had probable cause to arrest White and decided

to terminate White’s employment with GPD. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

On the morning of March 6, Hampshire conducted a briefing at

SBI’s Greensboro office prior to executing the search warrants.

Present were members from the SBI, Burlington Police Department

(“BPD”), Guilford County Sheriff’s Office (“GCSO”), and the

Randolph County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 140-13 at 1.) Hampshire

had prepared an operations plan, which was reviewed by his

2 Chief Scott’s declaration did not identify which agencies informed him

that probable cause existed to arrest White.

supervisor, Coates, outlining the execution of the search

warrants. (Docs. 140-2 at 89:19-23; 139.) Also that morning,

White was arrested at work, charged with various crimes, and

terminated from his employment with GPD as a result. (Doc. 103-1

¶¶ 18-19.)

At about 8:00 a.m., the RPD and SBI executed the search

warrant at White’s primary residence. Present at the start of the

search were two agents from the RPD, including Hampshire as the

officer in charge, and two agents from the SBI. (Doc. 139 at 7.)

Detective Victoria Underwood of the BPD was present as a BPD

liaison officer because the BPD was conducting a simultaneous

arrest of Strickland as a result of its investigation into the

theft at another seller, Quality Equipment. (Docs. 127-14 ¶¶ 5-

6; 140-2 at 140:11-14.) GCSO Deputy Amanda Fleming was present as

a GCSO liaison officer because White’s house was in Guilford

County. (Docs. 139 at 7; 140-2 at 136:12-137:21.) Other officers

arrived during the search, including RPD Chief Robert Hassell.

(Doc. 140-2 at 91:25-92:4.)

When the officers arrived at White’s house, the only persons

present in the home were White’s wife Christina, the Whites’

daughter, and Anita Holder, White’s mother. (Doc. 137-7 at 7:23-

8:10.) Hampshire allowed Holder to leave with the Whites’

daughter. (Id.; Doc. 140-2 at 95:22-96:9.) The search officers

proceeded to search the residence. They discovered a John Deere

Gator and trailer in White’s garage. The Gator was reported as

stolen from Wake County, North Carolina, in November 2016. (Doc.

140-13 at 2, 11.) The officers were unable to find a vehicle

identification number for the trailer, which appeared to have been

scratched off. (Id.) Both the Gator and trailer were seized and

towed to the RPD impound lot. (Id.)

Hampshire’s operations plan directed that, upon discovery of

any GPD equipment or property, Hampshire was to notify RPD

Lieutenant Coates, who would in turn notify the GPD to come to

White’s house to retrieve the property. (Docs. 139 at 11; 140-2

at 87:13-23.) And that is what happened. The investigating

officers discovered GPD equipment at White’s house, Hampshire

notified Coates, and Coates notified the GPD to come to collect

the property. (Docs. 139-1 at 3; 140-2 at 87:13-18.)

At about 10:00 a.m., GPD Lieutenant Johnny Raines was directed

by a superior to go to White’s house to pick up GPD-issued

equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Raines was a member of Resource

Management, the GPD division that keeps track of GPD equipment.

(Doc. 137-11 at 79:3-9.) According to several GPD Defendants, it

is standard practice for GPD to attempt to collect issued equipment

as soon as possible after an officer leaves the department. (Docs.

137-10 at 15; 137-12 at 3.) Raines directed Sergeant William

Barham to accompany him. (Doc. 137-12 at 3.) When both officers

arrived, Raines looked into an open garage and noticed what

appeared to be GPD equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Officers from

the SBI and RPD escorted Raines and Barham to the master bedroom

where they both observed additional GPD equipment. (Id.; Doc.

137-12 at 4.) Sometime thereafter, Raines went to the living room

where Christina White was sitting and asked her if they could

collect GPD property.3 (Doc. 137-10 at 16.) While Raines says

Christina White “stated that we could collect and remove the

property,” (id.), Christina White testified that she never gave

Raines permission to look for GPD equipment and that he was already

searching for the equipment before he spoke to her (Doc. 152-2 at

17:21-18:3).

Shortly thereafter, GPD Sergeant Brian Williamson arrived at

White’s house. (Docs. 137-10 at 16; 137-14 at 4.) Williamson was

the team leader for GPD’s Special Response Team (“SRT”), of which

White was a member prior to his termination. (Doc. 137-14 at 3.)

Because it was unlikely that a non-SRT member could identify SRT

equipment, Williamson reported to White’s house to identify GPD’s

SRT equipment. (Id. at 4.) Williamson subsequently ordered GPD

Detective Jason Lowe, who was the sniper team lead on GPD’s SRT,

to come to White’s house to identify any SRT sniper equipment White

may have had. (Doc. 137-15 at 4.) While looking for White’s

3 Barham believes the conversation between Raines and Christina White

may have occurred prior to Raines and Barham entering the master bedroom.

(Doc. 236-2 at 22:13-18, 24:3-6.) However, that would contradict

Raines’s account. (See Doc. 234-2 at 22:15-21, 23:5-9; Doc. 157-1 ¶ 9.)

uniform, Williamson overheard that RPD could not open a floor safe

in the master bedroom. (Id. at 19:5-17; Doc. 137-14 ¶ 9.)

Williamson asked Christina White for the combination, but she said

she did not know it. (Doc. 238-2 at 20:9-25.) Williamson then

called a former instructor who was a master locksmith who provided

Williamson with the factory combination to open the safe. (Id.)

During the search, apparently after Raines found a GPD vest

with his wife’s name on it and knowing that his wife had left the

GPD, Raines believed “[t]here was credible evidence that [White]

had GPD property that he should not possess.” (Doc. 137-12 at 4.)

Unnamed GPD officers reviewed Hampshire’s search warrant and

concluded it would cover their equipment to permit them to proceed.

(Doc. 140-2 at 124:2-14.)4 Raines informed the SBI and RPD and

contacted his command staff to notify them that he believed White

may have stolen GPD property. (Doc. 137-10 at 17.) In response,

GPD’s Property Crimes division ordered more GPD officers to arrive

throughout the morning. (Docs. 137-18 ¶ 9; 137-20 ¶ 5; 137-21 ¶ 9.)

All told, seven GPD officers responded to the Whites’ house on

March 6: Raines, Barham, Williamson, Lowe, Sigmon, Schwochow, and

Albert, and each entered the house at some point.5

4 This argument is not advanced in the present motions.

5 (Docs. 137-10 at 15 (Raines and Barham); 137-14 ¶ 9 (Williamson); 137-

15 ¶ 9 (Lowe); 137-18 ¶ 9 (Sigmon); 137-19 at 34:15-16 (Schwochow); 137-

21 ¶ 9 (Albert).)

Eventually, all criminal charges against White were

dismissed.

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to a second amended

complaint (Doc. 81) alleging various constitutional and other

claims against multiple law enforcement agencies and individuals.

As a result of this court’s previous rulings, White’s only

remaining claims against the Greensboro Defendants are for

trespass (under state law) and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

their warrantless entry into and search of his home on March 6,

2017.6 (Doc. 228.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the

pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted show that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A fact is considered “material” if it “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Under this standard, a genuine

dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

6 White also has remaining claims for trespass against Defendant James

Stalls (based on his view of a mower in White’s garage on September 3,

2016) and against Defendant City of Reidsville (based on Hampshire’s

“knock and talk” at White’s house door inside the garage on November 2,

2016).

Id. As a result, the court will only enter summary judgment in

favor of the moving party when the record “shows a right to

judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy”

and clearly demonstrates that the non-moving party “cannot prevail

under any circumstances.” Campbell v. Hewitt, Coleman &

Associates, Inc., 21 F.3d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are [fact-finder] functions . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. On

summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Id. However, “only reasonable inferences from the

evidence . . . in light of the competing inferences to the

contrary” should be considered by the court. Sylvia Development

Corp. v. Calvert County, Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted). In evaluating material submitted in support

of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the court

may reject inadmissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4);

Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962

(4th Cir. 1996).

While the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating

that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, once that

burden has been met, the non-moving party must demonstrate the

existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Bouchat v.

Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 521 (4th Cir.

2003); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence

is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252; Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)

(“[T]he nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory

allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon

another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”); see

also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.

1987) (noting that there is an affirmative duty for “the trial

judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from

proceeding to trial” (citation omitted)). Instead, the nonmoving

party must convince the court that, upon the record taken as a

whole, a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49. Trial is unnecessary if “the facts

are undisputed, or if disputed, the dispute is of no consequence

to the dispositive question.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12

F.3d 1310, 1315–16 (4th Cir. 1993).

B. Fourth Amendment Qualified Immunity

The Greensboro Defendants move for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in their personal capacity for a

warrantless search of White’s home.7 (Docs. 233, 235, 237, 239,

7 White’s second amended complaint alleges that the GPD’s search itself

241, 243, 245.) As discussed in this court’s prior order, there

is evidence that on March 6, 2017, the Greensboro Defendants

wrongfully entered White’s house at the invitation of the RPD and

SBI (who lacked authority to invite third parties inside for

purposes unrelated to the search warrant), without a warrant or

consent (at least not at the outset) from White, in order to search

and seize GPD equipment. (See Doc. 228 at 48-49.) The Greensboro

Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity because

it was not clearly established that “an officer must make an

independent determination that his entry into a house and

participation in an ongoing search by other law enforcement

agencies are authorized” where (1) “the law enforcement agencies

conducting the search have requested the presence of that officer’s

agency” and (2) “that officer has been directed by superiors to go

to that house and collect that agency’s gear identified during the

search.” (See, e.g., Doc. 234 at 7-12.) The Greensboro Defendants

rely on White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam), for

the contention that “no settled Fourth Amendment principle

requires [an] officer to second-guess the earlier steps already

taken by his or her fellow officers.” (Id.) In response, White

argues that the Greensboro Defendants cannot justify their

warrantless search of his home and instead “acknowledge they were

was warrantless and without consent, and thus unconstitutional. (Doc.

81 ¶¶ 175-80; see Doc. 228 at 47.)

merely looking for certain equipment from a separated officer’s

home and entering the home to obtain GPD equipment when the

suspect, Plaintiff White[,] was not on premises.” (Doc. 247 at

9.) In reply, the Greensboro Defendants argue that “a reasonable

officer in [each Greensboro Defendant’s] position would have

believed he [or she] was acting within the confines of the Fourth

Amendment, be it through the [RPD’s search] warrant, the prior

consent of Plaintiff, a mutual aid agreement, or otherwise.” (Doc.

248 at 4-12.)

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from personal liability for civil damages

under § 1983, so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Ridpath v. Board of Governors

Marshall University, 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). Officials are entitled

to immunity unless the § 1983 claim satisfies a two-prong test:

(1) the allegations, if true, substantiate a violation of a federal

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was “clearly

established” such that a reasonable officer would have known his

acts or omissions violated that right. Id. Under the first prong,

a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that an officer’s actions

amount to a violation of a federal statutory or constitutional

right. Id. at 307. Under the second prong, an alleged

constitutional right is clearly established if, according to pre-

existing law, “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). The phrase “clearly established” depends on the “level of

generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”

Id. at 639. Unlawfulness must be apparent, but the test does not

require that “the very action in question ha[ve] previously been

held unlawful.” Wilson 526 U.S. at 615 (quoting Creighton, 483

U.S. at 640). This determination is to be assessed at the time an

action occurred under an objective reasonableness standard.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In other words,

“[a] Government official’s conduct violates clearly established

law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of

a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citation omitted).

The court may consider the prongs in either order, as a plaintiff’s

failure to satisfy either entitles the officer to immunity.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Whether any of the Greensboro Defendants is entitled to public

official immunity depends on the facts relating to each officer’s

role on March 6. Therefore, each officer’s actions will be

addressed in turn.

Raines and Barham

Lieutenant Raines and Sergeant Barham were ordered “to go to

Plaintiff’s residence to pick up the GPD issued equipment,” and

they entered the Whites’ home on the morning of March 6 to collect

GPD property issued to White. (Doc. 137-10 at 15; 137-12 at 3-4;

157-1 at 3-4; Doc. 234-2 at 17:19-23; Doc. 236-2 at 17:25-18:7,

22:3-7.) Both officers were aware that the SBI and RPD were

executing their search warrant and that White had been terminated

earlier that day. (Doc. 234-2 at 18:15-24; Doc. 236-2 at 17:25-

18:7, 24:7-9; Doc. 137-10 at 15.) According to Raines’s report,

SBI and RPD officers “allowed [Raines and Sergeant Barham] to enter

the property to see what items, if any, were present that belonged

to the City of Greensboro.” (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) According to

Raines, they “stood outside until [RPD and SBI] were to the point

where they felt comfortable allowing us to walk through the

property.” (Id.) Then, Raines and Barham were escorted to the

Whites’ master bedroom where they observed items that “appeared to

be City property.” (Id.) Determining there was GPD property they

“would need to examine and potentially collect,” Raines spoke with

Christina White in the living room and, he claims, eventually

obtained permission to “collect and remove the property.” (Id. at

16.) The officers then searched various parts of the house,

collecting what they deemed to be GPD property; but Raines

eventually “came to believe” that White had more GPD property than

had been issued to him, and Raines advised his command staff that

he believe White possessed stolen GPD property. (Id. at 17.) GPD

Criminal Investigations Division officers were then dispatched to

assist with the “investigation.” (Id.)

On this record, Raines and Barham’s reliance on Pauly is

misplaced. In Pauly, two officers responded to Pauly’s house late

one evening following a report that Pauly’s brother had been

engaged in a road rage incident and was intoxicated. 137 S. Ct.

at 549. The officers demanded that Pauly and his brother exit the

house, but only one officer identified himself as “State Police,”

and the Pauly brothers did not hear any identification. Id. at

550. Instead, the brothers shouted “[w]e have guns.” Id. Officer

White, who was not aware that the officers failed to identify

themselves, arrived at the moment one of the brothers yelled that

they had guns, and White took shelter behind a stone wall. Id. A

few seconds later, Pauly’s brother stepped out of the back door of

the house, screamed, and fired two shotgun blasts, followed by

Pauly, who opened a front window and pointed a handgun in the

direction of Officer White. Id. An officer shot at Pauly but

missed, and Officer White shot and killed Pauly. Id. Though the

district court denied Officer White qualified immunity, the Court

reversed. It held that Officer White did not violate clearly

established law, despite his failure to shout a warning before

using deadly force, in light of the “unique” circumstances

surrounding his late arrival on the scene. Id. at 552. The Court

concluded:

Clearly established federal law does not prohibit a

reasonable officer who arrives late to an ongoing police

action in circumstances like this from assuming that

proper procedures, such as officer identification, have

already been followed. No settled Fourth Amendment

principle requires that officer to second-guess the

earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers

in instances like the one White confronted here.

Id.

In the present case, a reasonable officer in Raines and

Barham’s position would have understood that entering White’s home

without a warrant or proper permission violated his Fourth

Amendment right to privacy. Unlike the officer in Pauly, Raines

and Barham were not actively responding to an ongoing crime.

Rather, they understood that – separate from the search warrant

being executed by other agencies – they “were there to collect Mr.

White’s GPD property . . . since he was no longer employed” (Doc.

234-2 at 22:7-9, 18:17-21; see Doc. 236-2 at 18-4:7, 21:25-22:7.)

They do not claim that the warrant granted them authority to enter

the home. (See Doc. 234-2 at 20:7-11, 20:21-21:1.) Rather, they

rely on the fact that they were responding to the SBI and RPD’s

call to collect White’s GPD gear they had observed during the

search.

It was clearly established at the time “that the Fourth

Amendment prohibits government agents from allowing a search

warrant to be used to facilitate a[n] . . . independent search of

another’s home for items unrelated to those specified in the

warrant.” Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995).

Indeed, Raines claims he spoke with Christina White in the living

room and eventually obtained permission to “collect and remove the

property” – authorization which otherwise would have been

unnecessary unless he understood their presence and purpose was

outside the scope of the search warrant and its investigation.

(Doc. 137-10 at 15.) In fact, while Raines and Barham were

unfamiliar with the particulars of the warrant being executed,

they acknowledge they knew their purpose at the outset was not

related to a “criminal matter”; which remained the case at least

until they believed “Mr. White had come into possession of that

property outside of our normal procedures.” (Doc. 234-2 at 30:7-

13, 31:3-18; see Doc. 236-2 at 30:20-31:7, 31:22-32:11, 33:10-20.)

To put it simply, in the words of Williamson, there is evidence

Raines and Barham understood they “[were]n’t [t]here to help

execute [the] search warrant . . . . [They] [were] there to collect

his gear.” (Doc. 238-2 at 24:13-19.) It was also clearly

established at the time that GPD could not rely on the RPD and SBI

to provide consent to enter a home for the purpose of collecting

employment-related equipment that was wholly unrelated to the

search warrant. Buonocore, 65 F.3d at 356 (holding “that the

Fourth Amendment prohibits government agents from allowing a

search warrant to be used to facilitate a private individual’s

independent search of another’s home for items unrelated to those

specified in the warrant” as it “is not ‘reasonable’” and

“obviously exceeds the scope of the required specific warrant and

furthermore violates the ‘sanctity of private dwellings’”)

(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561

(1976)); Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 117 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998)

(en banc), aff’d, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (“Buonocore, therefore,

addressed the question of whether a third party, who is not

authorized by the warrant to conduct a search, may accompany law

enforcement officers in executing a warrant and undertake an

independent search for items not described in the warrant.”)

Because it was clearly established on March 6, 2017 that an

officer cannot enter a home without a proper warrant (which Raines

and Barham acknowledge they were not acting under) or consent

(which the RPD and SBI were not allowed to give to a third person

for a purpose unrelated to their warrant), White has stated a claim

for personal liability against Raines and Barham to overcome

qualified immunity. And because Christina White denies she ever

gave GPD officers her consent to search for GPD equipment, there

is a genuine dispute whether the officers’ actions following the

alleged consent were lawful. Therefore, Raines’s and Barham’s

motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity

will be denied.

Williamson

Sergeant Williamson received a call from the GPD’s SRT team

leader informing him of a search at the Whites’ home. (Doc. 137-

14 ¶ 9.) Williamson called Raines “to understand the situation.”

(Id.) After learning from Raines that White had been terminated

and the SBI and RPD were executing a search warrant, Williamson

responded to the scene. (Id.) Williamson, a member of the GPD

SRT Team, sought to identify SRT gear issued by GPD. (Id.)

Williamson met Raines in the driveway, and Raines “broke away from

[his] presence” before returning and telling Williamson they could

enter the home. (Doc. 238-2 at 14:8-22.) He did not ask Raines

about the basis for his statement. (Id. at 14:23-16:2.)

Williamson entered the garage to observe SRT gear that he was told

was identified as stolen. (Doc. 137-14 ¶ 9.) Williamson then

went into the Whites’ master bedroom to observe more GPD gear,

after which he says he met with Christina White and asked her to

direct him to where more gear might be. (Id.) Williamson engaged

in a search of the home, looking for GPD gear. (Id.) He directed

Officer Lowe to the scene to assist in the identification of GPD

equipment. (Id.) Williamson understood his purpose was unrelated

to the search warrant, as the Greensboro Defendants “[were]n’t

[t]here to help execute [the] search warrant . . . . [They] [were]

there to collect [White’s] gear.” (Doc. 238-2 at 24:13-19.)

While looking for White’s uniform, Williamson overheard that

RPD officers could not open a safe in the master bedroom. (Id. at

19:5-17; Doc. 137-14 ¶ 9.) Williamson became “a little upset”

because White “was one of the guys . . . on [his] team,” and he

believed the other agencies executing the search warrant were

“getting ready to tear [White’s] safe up.” (Doc. 238-2 at 19:5-

20:7.) Williamson did not want to see White’s “nice stand-up

[floor] safe” destroyed and, although it would be unusual, he

believed a missing uniform might be in it. (Id.) Williamson asked

Christina White for the combination, but she told him she did not

know it. (Id. at 20:9-25.) So, on his own initiative and not at

the request of RPD or the SBI, Williamson called one of his former

instructors, who was a master locksmith, who provided the factory

combination to open the safe. (Id.) Williamson opened the safe

himself, but he does not claim Christina White gave him permission

or consent beforehand to do so. (Id.; see id. at 26:23-25).

Rather, he “just didn’t want [the other agencies] tearing [White’s]

stuff up, and [he] was still looking for [the] uniform.” (Id. at

20:24-25.)8

While Williamson admits he was aware that the search warrant

did not authorize him to enter the Whites’ house, there is evidence

8 Williamson does not purport to rely on the authority of the warrant or

a mutual aid agreement with RPD for authority to open the safe. (See

Doc. 238-2 at 18:23-19:4, 20:1-25, 21:7-13). Rather, the record reflects

he took it upon himself to open the safe for the purpose of examining

it for the missing GPD uniform and perhaps to prevent it from being

destroyed by RPD and the SBI.

he reasonably believed there was lawful authority to enter the

home to retrieve GPD gear when Raines left his presence and

returned telling him they could enter. (See Doc. 238-2 at 14:8-

22.); see, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990)

(voluntary consent of an occupant who has, or is reasonably

believed to have, authority over the property constitutes an

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). As

Williamson correctly points out (Doc. 238 at 9), “no settled Fourth

Amendment principle requires [an] officer to second-guess the

earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers.” Pauly,

137 S. Ct. at 552. Williamson reasonably trusted Raines when he

told him they had the authority to enter.

However, there is evidence that Williamson exceeded the scope

of this authority when he opened White’s safe. While Williamson

claims he did so to prevent the destruction of his friend’s

property (see Doc. 238 at 10 n.1 (characterizing Williamson’s

actions as “sav[ing] Plaintiff, his team member, from having his

safe destroyed by the other law enforcement agencies present”)),

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to White, would

permit a jury to reasonably conclude that Williamson exceeded that

authority. Williamson understood his task to collect GPD equipment

was separate from that of the SBI and RPD executing the search

warrant and that, even if he reasonably believed he did not need

further permission or consent to search for uniform items, “it

would not make sense” for the missing uniform to be in the safe.

(Doc. 238-2 at 21:4-6.) Whether Christina White consented at some

point in time, or whether Williamson reasonably believed there was

consent, is not apparent on this record. Thus, while Williamson

may have reasonably believed he had the constitutional authority

to enter White’s home to collect his uniform, there is evidence

that breaking into White’s combination-locked safe violated

White’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (“When the Government

obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses,

papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the

Fourth Amendment has undoubtedly occurred.” (citation omitted));

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person

knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,

is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks

to preserve as private . . . may be constitutionally protected.);

United States v. Coleman, 588 F.3d 816, 819 (4th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that questions regarding the scope of consent are

governed by an “objectively reasonable” standard based on the

information available to officers at that time (citing Florida v.

Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)); United States v. Jones, 356

F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that even “general, blanket

consent to search a given area or item, by itself, would not likely

permit officers to break into a locked container located within

the area being searched” (emphasis in original)). Therefore,

Williamson’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity is granted in part as to Williamson’s entry into the

Whites’ house and denied as to the search of the safe.

Lowe

Lowe, the GPD sniper team lead, was ordered to the Whites’

residence by Williamson, his commanding officer, to identify GPD

marksman gear. (Doc. 137-15 ¶ 9.) By the time of Lowe’s arrival,

other GPD officers, as well as the SBI and RPD, were already there.

Lowe “knew there was a search warrant going on” and understood he

“wasn’t there to search” but instead to identify SRT equipment.

(Doc. 240-2 at 13:5-19.) Lowe was directed by Williamson to

White’s bedroom, where he proceeded to identify GPD sniper gear.

(Id. at 13:20-24, 17:5-15; Doc. 137-15 ¶ 9.) He also identified

ammunition in a bedroom closet and brought some of the gear out to

the driveway. (Doc. 137-15 ¶ 9.)

White has adduced no evidence that Lowe, who was acting at

his superiors’ command, either knew or reasonably should have known

of a lack of proper consent. As Lowe correctly points out (Doc.

240 at 7-8), “no settled Fourth Amendment principle requires [an]

officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or

her fellow officers.” Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552. On these facts,

Lowe reasonably trusted Williamson when he directed him to enter

the home. Thus, there is an insufficient basis to conclude that

he violated a clearly established right to overcome qualified

immunity, and Lowe’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Sigmon

Sergeant Sigmon is a property crimes supervisor who was

ordered by his supervisor, Lieutenant Schultheis, to find the next

available GPD detective and report to the White residence. (Doc.

137-18 ¶ 9.) Sigmon understood that in the course of the RPD and

SBI’s execution of a search warrant they discovered GPD equipment

in excess of what had been properly issued to White. As a result,

“the investigation of Plaintiff by SBI and [RPD] expanded,” and

GPD’s role of collecting equipment was “transformed” into

“assisting in the SBI and [RPD] investigation of Plaintiff” for

possible criminal acts against GPD. (Id.) Once Sigmon arrived,

he spoke with Raines, who told him he received consent from

Christina White to enter the home and retrieve the GPD property.

(Doc. 242-2 at 14:18-23.) Sigmon remained outside the residence

for “the majority of the time.” (Doc. 137-18 ¶ 9.) There was

eventually a discussion about how SBI and RPD could take control

of the GPD property and turn it over to GPD. (Id.) At some point,

Sigmon was directed to go inside and assist in carrying out

ammunition. He entered the house once for that purpose and

otherwise remained on the driveway until he left shortly

thereafter. (Id.)

Based on the record, White has failed to provide sufficient

facts to indicate that Sigmon either knew or reasonably should

have known of a lack of constitutional authority to enter the home.

As Sigmon correctly points out (Doc. 242 at 8-9), “no settled

Fourth Amendment principle requires [an] officer to second-guess

the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers.”

Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552. On this record, Sigmon was permitted to

reasonably rely on Raines, who said he had consent to enter. Thus,

there is an insufficient basis to conclude that he violated a

clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, and

Sigmon’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Schwochow

Officer Schwochow was ordered by his supervisor, Sergeant

Sigmon, to join him to drive to White’s residence because White

had been terminated and “an excessive amount of GPD equipment” had

been discovered at his house. (Doc. 137-20 ¶ 5.) Schwochow

understood that the SBI was conducting an investigation of White

and that GPD was present to assist in identifying “the excessive

amount of GPD property that had been found at White’s residence”

during the SBI search. (Id. ¶ 6; Doc. 247-3 at 36:21-37:3.)

Schwochow remained on the Whites’ driveway where the GPD items

were collected, and he completed an inventory of all of the items

thought to belong to the GPD. (Doc. 137-10 at 17.) Once, he

entered the garage, as the door was open, to record items that had

been stored there. (Doc. 137-19 at 34:11-19, 137:10 at 15.)

Schwochow testified that he had no input into the operation plan

for the search warrant, knew nothing about GPD’s presence during

the search, and had no knowledge of GPD’s role, if any, in the

execution of the search warrant. (Id. at 31:4-20.) He observed

GPD officials have a discussion with SBI agents from about 75 to

80 feet away but was unaware of the substance of the discussion.

(Id. at 33:19-34:5.) Thereafter, he was directed by Sgt. Sigmon

to inventory the items found; he made no independent determination

of whether it was appropriate to carry out his order. (Id. at

37:2-13.)

Based on this record, White has failed to provide sufficient

facts to indicate that Schwochow either knew or reasonably should

have known of a lack of unconstitutional authority to conduct his

activities. He reasonably trusted Sigmon (who had trusted Raines)

that GPD had the proper authority to enter White’s residence to

collect GPD equipment, and he merely did his duty as ordered. He

had no reason on this record to second-guess the earlier steps

already taken by his fellow officers. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552.

Thus, there is an insufficient basis to conclude that he violated

a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, and

Schwochow’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Albert

Detective Lindsay Albert was ordered to the Whites’ residence

by her supervisor, Sergeant Atkins. (Doc. 137-21 ¶ 9.) While

Albert was on her way, Sgt. Atkins told her they were “looking

into GPD property at the residence.” (Id.; Doc. 246-2 at 13:4-

7.) Albert was told RPD had a search warrant and had requested

GPD assistance. (Doc. 246-2 at 14:9-13.) By the time the two

arrived, the “majority of the equipment was already in the garage

and in the concrete area just outside the garage.” (Doc. 137-21

¶ 9.) Albert stayed on the driveway, but she later entered the

“back bedroom” and observed “police vests with people’s names” on

them, and she saw weapons in a separate bedroom. (Id.) At the

request of the SBI and RPD, she wrote down the make and model of

the weapons. (Id.) In the garage she observed a bicycle that

looked like what she and White used on the GPD bicycle squad. She

photographed the bicycle, forwarded the image to the officer

responsible for tracking such equipment, and inventoried the

items. (Id.)

On this record, White has failed to provide sufficient facts

to indicate that Albert either knew or reasonably should have known

of a constitutional basis to enter the home. By the time Albert

arrived, the vast majority of the GPD equipment had already been

collected, and Albert was following orders under circumstances

where she could reasonably assume her presence was lawful. She

reasonably trusted Atkins that the GPD had the proper authority to

enter the Whites’ residence to collect GPD equipment and had no

basis to second-guess her superiors. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552.

Thus, there is an insufficient basis to conclude that she violated

a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, and

Albert’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

C. Fourth Amendment Section 1983 Claim Damages

The Greensboro Defendants also argue they are entitled to

partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment damages

claims on the ground that White has not alleged recoverable

damages. (See, e.g., Doc. 233 ¶ 3.) They rely on Townes v. City

of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999), for the contention that

“injuries derivative of [an invasion of privacy] — [an] arrest,

conviction, and incarceration” -- are “not fairly traceable to the

actual violations of plaintiff’s civil rights.” (See Doc. 234 at

13 (quoting Townes, 176 F.3d at 141).) As such, they argue White’s

Section 1983 claim should be limited to nominal damages, which

they contend are unrecoverable as a matter of law. (Doc. 234 at

12-15, 14 n.4.) In response, White argues that the warrantless

search of his residence by the Greensboro Defendants violated his

constitutional rights under § 1983 and “led directly to false

accusations” that he was “in possession of stolen Greensboro

property, which turned into criminal charges against him.” (Doc.

247 at 9-10.) He thus contends that “there is a clear, unbroken

causal chain” between the actions of the Greensboro Defendants and

his damages arising from his criminal charges that presents an

issue for the jury. (Id.) He does not dispute that his claims

would otherwise be limited to nominal damages. (See id.) In

reply, the Greensboro Defendants note that this court has already

relied on Townes and contend the court rejected White’s damages

argument when it held that “the exclusionary rule and the fruit of

the poisonous tree doctrine simply do not apply in civil cases.”

(Doc. 248 at 13 (quoting Doc. 82 at 21-22).) They further contend

that, even if the court were to accept White’s proximate cause

argument for damages related to his subsequent arrest, “at least

two intervening and superseding causes break the causal chain

between the alleged illegal search and Plaintiff’s alleged

damages: (1) SBI’s independent decision to charge White, and (2)

White’s inculpatory acts that led to probable cause for those

charges.” (Id. at 14 n.3 (citing Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636,

647 (4th Cir. 2012)).)

Section 1983 creates tort liability “in favor of persons who

are deprived of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to

them by the Constitution.” Memphis Community School District v.

Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)). Section 1983 damages are intended to

compensate an individual for the injuries suffered as a result of

a constitutional violation. Id. at 306. “Where no injury [is]

present, no ‘compensatory’ damages [can] be awarded.” Id. at 308.

White’s present Fourth Amendment damage claim is predicated

on the use of incriminating evidence gained from an allegedly

unconstitutional search. To be sure, the “use of fruits of a past

unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong.”

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quotations and

alteration omitted); see Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 960

(9th Cir. 2016) (“[N]othing within the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree

doctrine suggests that an officer must ignore facts that would

give him probable cause to arrest a person merely because those

facts were procured through an unlawful search.”). White fails to

identify, and the court is unaware of, any Fourth Circuit decision

that has held that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies

in a § 1983 claim. On the contrary, the Fourth Circuit has

affirmed district court opinions that have held otherwise. See,

e.g., Ware v. James City County, Virginia, 652 F. Supp. 2d 693,

705 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d sub. nom., Ware v. James City County,

Virginia, 380 F. App’x 274 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); White v.

Smereka, No. 3:09-CV-00257-W, 2010 WL 2465552, at *4 (W.D.N.C.

June 14, 2010), aff’d, 410 F. App’x 714 (4th Cir. 2011)

(unpublished) (same, citing Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.

2000)).9 Thus, as this court has already held, “it is clear that

the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine

simply do not apply in civil cases.” (Doc. 82 at 21-22.) See

9 While the Fourth Circuit does not accord precedential value to its

unpublished opinions, it has noted that “they are entitled only to the

weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning.” See

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted).

also Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he

fact that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal detention does

not make it any less relevant to establishing probable cause for

the arrest because the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil

suit under § 1983 against police officer.”); Lingo v. City of

Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (joining other circuits

in “rejecting [§ 1983 plaintiff]’s suggestion that probable cause

to arrest may be supported only by information that was obtained

in accordance with the Fourth Amendment”); Machado v. Weare Police

Department, 494 Fed. App’x 102, 106 (1st Cir. 2012) (unpublished)

(per curiam) (noting that evidence arguably seized in violation of

the Fourth Amendment “is not subject to the exclusionary rule” in

civil proceedings “and amply provides probable cause to justify

[plaintiff's] arrest” (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

338, 348 (1974) (“[S]tanding to invoke the exclusionary rule has

been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such

evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search.”)); Ali

v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court

has never applied the exclusionary rule to civil cases, state or

federal.” (citation omitted)).

White also relies on Train v. City of Albuquerque, 629 F.

Supp. 2d 1243 (D.N.M. 2009), to argue that he can recover damages

resulting from his later criminal charges arising from the evidence

seized during the March 6 search. (Doc. 247 at 10-11.) In Train,

the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion in limine,

holding that a plaintiff raising a constitutional claim based on

an illegal search may be permitted to introduce evidence and

recover damages for post-indictment proceedings if the

constitutional deprivation proximately caused the damages. Judge

Browning concluded that, in addition to protecting privacy, the

Fourth Amendment had been described in the Tenth Circuit as

protecting “‘liberty, property, and privacy interests — a person’s

sense of security and individual dignity.’” Id. at 1252 (quoting

Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th

Cir. 2001)). Judge Browning opined that the Tenth Circuit did not

“take such a narrow view of the Fourth Amendment” as the Second

Circuit in Townes and concluded that “criminal charges, federal

detention, and all of the negative consequences of those charges

and attendant to federal custody” implicated those broader

interests of the Fourth Amendment. Id. As “[federal] imprisonment

occasioned economic losses,” the court reasoned, “[s]uch losses

should be compensable, given that they implicate the interests

that the Tenth Circuit has explained the Fourth Amendment

protects.” Id.

The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed whether

wrongful arrest damages can be recovered for a Fourth Amendment

violation predicated on a trespass violation, applying a proximate

cause analysis. However, Townes is persuasive, as “[t]he goal of

the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has been to tailor liability to

fit the interests protected by the particular constitutional right

in question.” 176 F.3d at 148 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 258).

Here, like the plaintiff in Townes, there is a “gross disconnect”

between White’s claimed constitutional violation (to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures) and his alleged damages (the

cost of post-indictment proceedings). Id. Indeed, “[t]he evil of

an unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not

that it uncovers crime, which is no evil at all.” Id.

The Fourth Circuit’s favorable citation to Townes, moreover,

certainly suggests that the court is not disapproving of the

analysis. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)

(citing Townes and noting that “constitutional torts, like their

common law brethren, require a demonstration of both but-for and

proximate causation”). In addition, the rationale in Townes has

been adopted by at least two other circuits. See Martin, 934 F.3d

at 605-06; Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000), as amended

(Jan. 26, 2001) (holding that victims of unreasonable searches or

seizures may not seek recovery from injuries that result from the

discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal

prosecution). Townes has also been cited repeatedly by district

courts within the circuit when assessing civil damages for Fourth

Amendment violations. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Whitfield, No. 8:12-

CV-2405-RMG, 2013 WL 5144751, at *20 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2013)

(dismissing plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable search and seizure

under § 1983 on summary judgment “as Plaintiff has not pled or

proven any actionable injury based on either alleged unlawful

search”); Cullins v. Sumter City Police Department, No. CIV.A.

8:10-264, 2011 WL 291252, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2011), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Cullins v. Sumter Police

Department, No. 8:10-CV-264-RMG, 2011 WL 291249 (D.S.C. Jan. 27,

2011) (same); Tinsley v. Singleton, No. CIV.A.8:08CV532SB, 2009 WL

764877, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2009), on reconsideration, No.

8:08-CV-532-SB, 2010 WL 3282973 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2010). As

discussed above, this court has also relied on Townes in a previous

order. (See Doc. 82 at 21-22.) Thus, as a victim of an

unreasonable search or seizure, White “may recover damages for

physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation, etc.” but

he “cannot be compensated for injuries that result from the

discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal

prosecution.” Townes, 176 F.3d at 148.

The Greensboro Defendants’ motions for summary judgment

contend that White has not pleaded any compensable damages. (See,

e.g., Doc. 234 at 12-15, 14 n.4.) To the extent that White’s

second amended complaint alleges damages which “include but are

not limited to” deprivation of his belongings and his child, and

monies spent to regain custody of his child, to defend false

charges, and to compensate for the loss of health insurance -- all

arising out of his criminal charges, the Greensboro Defendants are

correct. (Doc. 81 ¶ 182.) However, White seeks damages “in excess

of $25,000,” and his prayer for relief is not limited to the

specific damages mentioned. The Greensboro Defendants contend

that even nominal damages are unrecoverable as a matter of law.

(Doc. 234 at 12-15, 14 n.4.) See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

487 n.7 (1994) (“In order to recover compensatory damages, however,

the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was

unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury.”).

However, the Supreme Court recently explained that “a request for

nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of standing

where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a

legal right” where “nominal damages were available at common law

in analogous circumstances.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct.

792, 801-02 (2021). This is consistent with this court’s previous

holding as to the § 1983 claim against Defendant James Stalls,

that “even if Defendants are correct that White cannot show any

compensatory damage . . . Defendants [Guilford County Sheriff’s

Office] acknowledge that he would nevertheless be entitled to

nominal damages.” (Doc. 82 at 18 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435

U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding that students suing school

officials under Section 1983 were, absent proof of actual injury,

entitled to recover nominal damages for violations of their

procedural due process)).) See Snider v. Skarban, No. 22-C-25,

2022 WL 684848, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2022) (holding that

“plaintiffs may proceed in this lawsuit [for Fourth Amendment

violation claims] for nominal and punitive damages only” (citing

Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 801); Roberts v. Carroll, No. 4:18-CV-

04-SKL, 2021 WL 5139505, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2021) (“The

Court concludes Plaintiff is entitled to seek and receive nominal

damages if he establishes Defendant Liles used excessive force but

fails to establish actual damages.” (citing Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct.

at 800, 802)); Nouri v. Manzella, No. 17-12322, 2019 WL 4278168,

at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2019) (“[P]laintiffs may recover

nominal damages for claims asserting [Fourth Amendment]

constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even where

they fail to prove actual damages.”).

Thus, the court need not now decide the scope of White’s

recoverable damages, as it is sufficient to conclude that the

Greensboro Defendants’ argument that White is entitled to no

damages is incorrect. Accordingly, the Greensboro Defendants’

motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages for

the § 1983 claim will be granted to the extent White seeks damages

flowing from his alleged wrongful arrest and filing of criminal

charges for theft of GPD property but will otherwise be denied.10

10 To state the obvious, White cannot seek damages against the Greensboro

Defendants for criminal charges unrelated to the Greensboro Defendants’

March 6 search.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment

as to White’s § 1983 claim (Eighth Cause of Action) by Greensboro

Defendants Raines (Doc. 233) and Barham (Doc. 235) on the basis of

qualified immunity are DENIED, that the motion for summary judgment

as to Greensboro Defendant Williamson (Doc. 237) on the basis of

qualified immunity is GRANTED as to his initial entry into White’s

home but DENIED as to the entry into White’s safe, and that the

motions for summary judgment as to Greensboro Defendants Lowe (Doc.

239), Sigmon (Doc. 241), Schwochow (Doc. 243), and Albert (Doc.

245) on the basis of qualified immunity are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Greensboro Defendants’ motions

for summary judgment as to damages for White’s § 1983 claim (Eighth

Cause of Action) by Greensboro Defendants Raines (Doc. 233), Barham

(Doc. 235), and Williamson (Doc. 237) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART as set forth herein.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

June 22, 2022