WHITE v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WILLIAM Z. WHITE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:18-cv-00969

)

THE CITY OF GREENSBORO, et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

This lawsuit arises out of the arrest and firing of

Plaintiff William White, a former Greensboro Police Department

officer, after he was investigated for illegal activity stemming

from the theft of several commercial-grade lawn mowers. After

the criminal charges against White were dismissed, he brought

this case alleging numerous violations of both federal and North

Carolina law against multiple Defendants across four law

enforcement agencies. The court has resolved several

dispositive motions (Docs. 82, 161, 228, and 251) and as a

result the claims have been substantially narrowed. What remain

are White’s claims alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

North Carolina trespass law against officers of the Greensboro

Police Department (“GPD”) -- Johnny Raines, Jr., William Barham,

and Brian Williamson (“Greensboro Defendants”) -- for a

warrantless search of his home on March 6, 2017; trespass

against Defendant James Stalls for his entry into White’s garage

and view of a mower covered with a tarp on September 3, 2016;

and trespass against Defendant City of Reidsville (“Reidsville”)

for Reidsville Police Department Sergeant Lynwood Hampshire’s

“knock and talk” at White’s house door inside his garage on

November 2, 2016. (Doc. 81.) Before the court are multiple

pre-trial motions in limine filed by the parties in anticipation

of trial. For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be

granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The background of this case is extensively set out most

recently in this court’s prior amended memorandum opinion and

order. White v. City of Greensboro, 532 F. Supp. 3d 277

(M.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2021). Relevant facts will be discussed as

pertinent to these motions.

In short, White was a police officer for the GPD from April

2009 until March 6, 2017. (Doc. 111-1 ¶ 3.)1 On August 22,

2016, the Reidsville Police Department (“RPD”) received a report

that several commercial-grade lawn mowers were stolen from

Scott’s Tractor, an equipment dealer in Reidsville, North

1 All citations to the record are to ECF docket page or paragraph

number except for testimony, which is cited to the deposition

transcript page and line.

Carolina. (Doc. 140-1.) RPD Lieutenant Shannon Coates

responded to the report and assigned RPD Sergeant Lynwood

Hampshire to investigate. (Id.; Doc. 140-2 at 16:16-20.)

Hampshire would serve as the lead investigator for the duration

of the investigation. (Doc. 140-2 at 17:1-3.)

1. September 3, 2016 alleged trespass by Stalls

On September 3, 2016, Defendant James Stalls -- who is

Plaintiff’s step-brother as well as brother-in-law, and a deputy

with the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office (“GCSO”) -- and his

wife, Brittany, went to the Whites’ house to care for the

Whites’ dogs while the Whites were away. (Doc. 128-2 at 23:21-

24:18.) Upon entering the garage where the dog food was kept,

Stalls noticed a John Deere mower with a sheet over the seat.

(Id. at 23:5-11, 25:25-26:5.) He removed the sheet, sat on the

seat, and photographed the mower’s vehicle identification

number, also known as the serial number. (Id. at 26:6-27:8;

Doc. 128-3 at 5.)

Several days later, and suspecting the mower might be

stolen, Stalls checked the mower’s model number against a police

database. (Doc. 128-3 ¶ 7.) Stalls says he did this because

White told him he got it from another police officer, the mower

looked brand new, and the asking price was half the mower’s

value. (Doc. 128-2 at 29:4-23.) Stalls’s research reflected

that the mower had been reported stolen by the RPD. (Id. at

30:3-6.) Stalls then called his stepmother, Anita Holder -- who

is White’s mother and a former GPD police officer, including

interim chief of police -- for guidance. (Id. at 30:8-9; Doc.

111-2 ¶¶ 7-10.) Holder told Stalls to confront White about the

mower, which Stalls did via text message and a phone

conversation on September 19. (Docs. 128-2 at 30:11-31:5; 128-3

¶¶ 7-9.)

2. October 7, 2016 alleged trespass by Hampshire

On October 7, Hampshire received a call from a couple, the

Terrys, who reported they had recently bought a mower from White

and who expressed concern about the possibility it had been

stolen. (Doc. 140-3 at 1.) On November 2, Hampshire went to

the GCSO headquarters to meet GCSO Deputy Homer Wilkins, who had

been directed by his supervisor to assist, so the two of them

could investigate by conducting a “knock and talk” at White’s

house to speak with him informally. (Id. at 2; Doc. 128-7

¶ 12.) Upon arriving at White’s house, Hampshire and Wilkins

knocked on the front door, but no one answered. (Doc. 140-2 at

79:14-18.) Hampshire testified that he noticed cobwebs on the

front door and believed it “[did] not look like the primary way

they go in and out of the house,” so he saw the open garage door

and what he viewed as a “clear path” to another door to the

house that was “well used,” knocked on that door, and again no

one answered. (Id. at 79:18-80:14.) He pushed what he thought

was a doorbell, only to learn it was a garage door button, so he

pushed it again to maintain the open garage door, left his

business card on the door inside the garage, and left. (Id.)

During this time, Wilkins stayed on the driveway and did not

enter the garage. (Id. at 134:18-22.) According to White and

his wife, Christina, the Whites do not ordinarily use the garage

door to enter or exit their home. (Docs. 151-1 at 110:23-24;

151-2 at 77:3-6.)

Prior to conducting a knock and talk at White’s residence,

Hampshire learned that White was a GPD police officer. (Docs.

140-2 at 18:3-9; 140-9 at 27:16-28:22.) Hampshire later spoke

with Lieutenant Coates, his supervisor, who advised him to

contact the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”)

and GPD’s Professional Standards Division. (Doc. 140-2 at 18:3-

9.) The SBI was contacted because it is standard practice for

the SBI to be involved when a police officer is a suspect in an

investigation. (Doc. 140-8 at 170:5-171:3.)

3. March 6, 2017 GPD search Greensboro Defendants

Several months later on March 5, 2017, following an

investigation, Hampshire applied for and obtained a warrant from

a state magistrate to search two of White’s residences. (Doc.

140-12.) Also on March 5, the investigating agencies2 informed

2 Chief Scott’s declaration did not identify which agencies informed

GPD Chief Wayne Scott that they had probable cause to arrest

White for felony possession of stolen property and felony

obtaining property by false pretenses, that the agencies were in

the process of obtaining search warrants for White’s residences,

and that they planned to arrest White on March 6. (Doc. 103-1

¶ 9.) The investigating agencies had updated Scott during their

investigation, and GPD’s Professional Standards Division was

also investigating White’s possible involvement in the mower

thefts. (Id. ¶ 6.) Scott agreed that the agencies had probable

cause to arrest White and decided to terminate White’s

employment with GPD. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

On the morning of March 6, Hampshire conducted a briefing

at SBI’s Greensboro office prior to executing the search

warrants. Present were members from the SBI, Burlington Police

Department (“BPD”), GCSO, and the Randolph County Sheriff’s

Office. (Doc. 140-13 at 1.) Hampshire had prepared an

operations plan, which was reviewed by his supervisor,

Lieutenant Coates, outlining the execution of the search

warrants. (Docs. 140-2 at 89:19-23; 139.) Also that morning,

White was arrested at work, charged with various crimes, and

terminated from his employment with GPD as a result. (Doc. 103-

1 ¶¶ 18-19.)

him that probable cause existed to arrest White.

At about 8:00 a.m., the RPD and SBI executed the search

warrant at White’s primary residence. Present at the start of

the search were two agents from the RPD, including Hampshire as

the officer in charge, and two agents from the SBI. (Doc. 139

at 7.) When the officers arrived at White’s house, the only

persons present in the home were White’s wife Christina, the

Whites’ daughter, and Holder. (Doc. 137-7 at 7:23-8:10.)

Hampshire allowed Holder to leave with the Whites’ daughter.

(Id.; Doc. 140-2 at 95:22-96:9.) The search officers proceeded

to search the residence. They discovered a John Deere Gator and

trailer in White’s garage. The Gator was reported as stolen

from Wake County, North Carolina, in November 2016. (Doc. 140-

13 at 2, 11.) The officers were unable to find a vehicle

identification number for the trailer, which appeared to have

been scratched off. (Id.) Both the Gator and trailer were

seized and towed to the RPD impound lot. (Id.)

Hampshire’s operations plan directed that, upon discovery

of any GPD equipment or property, Hampshire was to notify RPD

Lieutenant Coates, who would in turn notify the GPD to come to

White’s house to retrieve the property. (Docs. 139 at 11; 140-2

at 87:13-23.) And that is what happened. The investigating

officers discovered GPD equipment at White’s house, Hampshire

notified Lieutenant Coates, and Coates notified the GPD to come

to collect the property. (Docs. 139-1 at 3; 140-2 at 87:13-18.)

At about 10:00 a.m., Defendant Johnny Raines, GPD

Lieutenant, was directed by a superior to go to White’s house to

pick up GPD-issued equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Raines was

a member of Resource Management, the GPD division that keeps

track of GPD equipment. (Doc. 137-11 at 79:3-9.) According to

several GPD Defendants, it is standard practice for GPD to

attempt to collect issued equipment as soon as possible after an

officer leaves the department. (Docs. 137-10 at 15; 137-12 at

3.) Raines directed Defendant William Barham, GPD Sergeant, to

accompany him. (Doc. 137-12 at 3.) When both officers arrived,

Raines looked into an open garage and noticed what appeared to

be GPD equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Officers from the SBI

and RPD escorted Raines and Barham to the master bedroom where

they both observed additional GPD equipment. (Id.; Doc. 137-12

at 4.) Sometime thereafter, Raines went to the living room

where Christina White was sitting and asked her if they could

collect GPD property.3 (Doc. 137-10 at 16.) While Raines says

Christina White “stated that we could collect and remove the

property,” (id.), Christina White testified that she never gave

Raines permission to look for GPD equipment and that he was

3 Barham believes the conversation between Raines and Christina White

may have occurred prior to Raines and Barham entering the master

bedroom. (Doc. 236-2 at 22:13-18, 24:3-6.) That contradicts Raines’s

account. (See Doc. 234-2 at 22:15-21, 23:5-9; Doc. 157-1 ¶ 9.)

already searching for the equipment before he spoke to her (Doc.

152-2 at 17:21-18:3).

Shortly thereafter, Defendant Brian Williamson, GPD

Sergeant, arrived at White’s house. (Docs. 137-10 at 16; 137-14

at 4.) Williamson was the team leader for GPD’s Special

Response Team (“SRT”), of which White was a member prior to his

termination. (Doc. 137-14 at 3.) Because it was unlikely that

a non-SRT member could identify SRT equipment, Williamson

reported to White’s house to identify GPD’s SRT equipment.4 (Id.

at 4.) While looking for White’s uniform, Williamson overheard

that RPD could not open a floor safe in the master bedroom.

(Doc. 238-2 at 19:5-17; Doc. 137-14 ¶ 9.) Williamson asked

Christina White for the combination, but she said she did not

know it. (Doc. 238-2 at 20:9-25.) Williamson then called a

former instructor who was a master locksmith who provided

Williamson with the factory combination to open the safe. (Id.)

During the search, apparently after Raines found a GPD vest

with his wife’s name on it and knowing that his wife had left

the GPD, Raines believed “[t]here was credible evidence that

[White] had GPD property that he should not possess.” (Doc.

137-12 at 4.) Unnamed GPD officers reviewed Hampshire’s search

4 Williamson subsequently ordered GPD Detective Jason Lowe, who was the

sniper team lead on GPD’s SRT, to come to White’s house to identify

any SRT sniper equipment White may have had. (Doc. 137-15 at 4.)

warrant and concluded it would cover their equipment to permit

them to proceed. (Doc. 140-2 at 124:2-14.) Raines informed the

SBI and RPD and contacted his command staff to notify them that

he believed White may have stolen GPD property. (Doc. 137-10 at

17.) In response, GPD’s Property Crimes division ordered more

GPD officers to arrive throughout the morning. (Docs. 137-18

¶ 9; 137-20 ¶ 5; 137-21 ¶ 9.)

Eventually, all criminal charges against White, pending in

Alamance and Guilford Counties as well as in this federal court,

were dismissed. (See Doc. 81 ¶ 98.)

B. Procedural History

The case is set for trial in September 2022, and the

parties filed several motions in limine. (See Docs. 182, 185,

192, 197, 199, 201, 203.) The court directed the parties to

meet and confer to resolve or narrow their evidentiary disputes.

(Doc. 252 at 1.) The parties responded, noting resolution of

some motions. (See id. at 2-5.) Additionally, on July 26, the

Greensboro Defendants withdrew their previous motion in limine

(Doc. 197) in order to file a replacement motion in limine (Doc.

255) that advances the same arguments but also includes the

§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claim the court re-instated in the

interim. (Doc. 257.) Because this motion advances the same

arguments as the previous motion, response and reply briefs are

not necessary for decision. See, e.g., Baucom v. Doall Co., No.

317CV00242MOCDSC, 2017 WL 11578197, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. July 5,

2017); Green v. Cafe, No. 4:04CV111H(2), 2008 WL 7871054, at *1

(E.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2008), aff’d sub nom., Green v. Maroules, 328

F. App’x 868 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The court finds that defendants’

response is not necessary to the court’s adjudication of these

motions and, therefore, issues its ruling prior to expiration of

defendants’ response time.”).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motions to Sever

Defendants Stalls and Reidsville separately move for

separate trials pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20,

21, and 42. (Docs. 182, 185.) White has responded to each

motion (Docs. 218, 222), and Defendants have replied (Docs. 229,

231).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) governs permissive

joinder of parties. Rule 20(a)(1) permits persons to be joined

as plaintiffs if “they assert any right to relief jointly,

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out

of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions

or occurrences;” and “any question of law or fact common to all

plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).

Similarly, Rule 20(a)(2) provides that persons may be joined as

defendants in one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted

against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,

or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question

of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “The United States Supreme

Court has articulated that ‘the impulse is toward the broadest

possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the

parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly

encouraged.’” Todd v. Cary’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, 315 F.R.D.

453, 456 (D.S.C. 2016) (quoting United Mine Workers of America

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)). Further, the Fourth

Circuit has explained that “Rule 20 gives courts wide discretion

concerning the permissive joinder of parties.” Aleman v.

Chugach Support Services, Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 218 n.5 (4th Cir.

2007); see Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983)

(explaining that Rule 20 “should be construed in light of its

purpose, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite the

final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple

lawsuits” (citation omitted)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 addresses misjoinder of

parties and provides that the court “may . . . sever any claim

against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Commonly, Rule 21 is

invoked to sever parties improperly joined or where “venue is

improper as to some but not all defendants.” See C.L. Ritter

Lumber Co., Inc. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 283 F.3d 226 (4th

Cir. 2002); Sehler v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, 2013 WL 6145705,

at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2013); see also 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1689 (3d ed. 2022).

“However, even where the parties are appropriately joined and

venue is proper, a court may sever any claim and proceed with it

separately or transfer it to a more convenient forum.” RAI

Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Altria Client Services LLC, No.

1:20-CV-00393-LO, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3,

2020); see Sykes v. Bayer Pharmaceuticals Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d

208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“[A] court may ‘deny joinder if it

determines that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not

foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice,

expense, or delay.’” (quoting Aleman, 485 F.3d at 218 n.5)).

Courts in the Fourth Circuit weigh multiple factors to determine

whether to sever claims under Rule 21:

(1) whether the issues sought to be tried separately

are significantly different from one another; (2)

whether the separable issues require different

witnesses and different documentary proof; (3) whether

the party opposing severance will be prejudiced if it

is granted; and (4) whether the party requesting

severance will be prejudiced if the claims are not

severed.

Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (citing Equal

Rights Center v. Equity Residential, 483 F. Supp. 2d 482, 489

(D. Md. 2007)) (collecting cases). Additionally, courts

consider “(5) fundamental fairness, (6) judicial economy, (7)

undue delay, and (8) the dual threat of duplicative litigation

and inconsistent verdicts.” Moulvi v. Safety Holdings, Inc.,

No. 3:20CV595, 2021 WL 4494191, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2021)

(citation omitted). Because “Supreme Court precedent and

pertinent cases within the Fourth Circuit establish that courts

should favor joinder of parties within a single case[,] . . .

Rule 21 discretion to sever should be exercised sparingly.” Id.

(citations omitted); Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at

*2 (collecting cases); see United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) permits

a court, for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and

economize, to separate issues to be presented at trial. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(b). “[T]he granting of separate trials is within the

sound discretion of the trial judge.” Bowie v. Sorrell, 209

F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1953); see White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d

1379, 1385 (4th Cir. 1974) (“We hold that the district courts

are free to tailor an appropriate procedure to fit the facts and

the pleadings and to select what seems best for a given case.”).

Because “a single trial will be more expedient and efficient,” F

& G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387

(M.D.N.C. 1999), “[i]n civil cases, bifurcation is the

exception, not the rule,” Gonzalez v. SeaWorld Parks &

Entertainment LLC, No. 4:20CV27 (RCY), 2021 WL 3173574, at *1

(E.D. Va. July 27, 2021) (quoting Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Adell

Plastics, Inc., Civ. No. JKB-17-00252, 2019 WL 2360929, at *3

(D. Md. June 4, 2019)); see Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco

Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1976)

(“[S]eparation of issues [under Rule 42(b)] is not the usual

course that should be followed.” (citation omitted)).

Ultimately, the moving party bears the burden of convincing the

court that bifurcation “will (1) promote greater convenience to

the parties, witnesses, jurors, and the court, (2) be conducive

to expedition and economy, and (3) not result in undue prejudice

to any party.” F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387; accord

Toler v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 309 F.R.D. 223, 225

(S.D. W. Va. 2015).

“[B]ifurcation may be appropriate where . . . the

litigation of the first issue might eliminate the need to

litigate the second issue, or where one party will be prejudiced

by evidence presented against another party.” Amato v. City of

Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted); see Saint John’s African Methodist Episcopal Church v.

GuideOne Specialty Mutual Insurance Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 783,

788 (E.D. Va. 2012) (bifurcating insurance coverage and bad

faith claims because “[a]ny reference to [insurer’s] alleged bad

faith in denying [insured’s] insurance claim or failing to pay

[insured] under the insurance policy, as well as any evidence

offered solely to establish such bad faith, would serve only to

prejudice the jury”). “Merely presenting some proof which

supports bifurcation is not enough” to satisfy this burden. F &

G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387. “In addition, at least

one other Circuit has cautioned that a ‘court should not

bifurcate claims unless the issue to be tried separately is so

distinct and separate from the others that a trial of it alone

may be had without injustice.’” Light v. Allstate Insurance

Co., 182 F.R.D. 210, 213 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (quoting McDaniel v.

Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Both Stalls and Reidsville argue that the court should hold

separate trials pursuant to Rules 20, 21, and 42. (See Doc. 183

at 1 (arguing that the court should order separate trials

pursuant to Rules 20(b) and 42(b)); Doc. 186 at 9-21 (arguing

that the “parties are not properly joined” for trial and the

court should sever Reidsville’s trespass claim “pursuant to

Rules 20, 21, and 42”); see Doc. 231 (Defendant Reidsville:

arguing for separate trials without relying on a particular

rule).) However, there is a significant distinction between

severing claims into separate actions under Rule 21 and ordering

separate trials for different claims or issues under Rule 42(b).

See Gaffney v. Riverboat Services of Indiana, Inc., 451 F.3d

424, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2006). Severing claims under Rule 21

“creates two discrete, independent actions, which then proceed

as separate suits for the purpose of finality and

appealability.” Id. at 441; Herklotz v. Parkinson, 848 F.3d

894, 898 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When a claim is severed, it becomes

an entirely new and independent case.”); E.S. v. Independent

School District, No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley, 135 F.3d 566,

568 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. O’Neill, 709 F.2d

361, 368 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). In contrast, ordering separate

or joint trials under Rule 42 has no bearing on whether claims

are severed into separate actions or joined into one action.

See McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304 n.19 (noting that “this

distinction, clear enough in theory, is often obscured in

practice since at times the courts talk of separate trial and

severance interchangeably” (citation omitted)).

Generally, district courts should bifurcate claims under

Rule 42(b), rather than sever them under Rule 21, when they “are

factually interlinked, such that a separate trial may be

appropriate, but final resolution of one claim affects the

resolution of the other.” Gaffney, 451 F.3d at 442. In

contrast, courts sever claims under Rule 21 where the claims are

“discrete and separate” and “one claim must be capable of a

resolution despite the outcome of the other claim.” Id.; see,

e.g., Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 346 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.

2003) (holding that, because the “trials of [the] individual

claims may expose issues of systemic violation that would cause

the district court to reconsider its decision to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims against the State defendants in their

entirety,” severance under Rule 21 was inappropriate; instead

construing the district court’s order as an order for separate

trials under Rule 42(b), such that the individual claims may not

be appealed until “a final judgment has been rendered in the

entire action”).

Stalls and Reidsville each contend that they will suffer

from undue prejudice, jury confusion, and delay without

severance. (Doc. 183 at 3-8; Doc. 186 at 16-21.) Reidsville

further argues that White’s trespass claims against it is

improperly joined because the claims do not arise out of the

same transaction or occurrence as the other claims and the

claims do not involve common questions of law or fact. (Doc.

186 at 9-16.) In response, White argues that severance would

harm judicial economy and be prejudicial. (Doc. 218 at 6-9;

Doc. 222 at 8-11.) Additionally, in response to Reidsville,

White contends that the claims constitute the “same transaction

or occurrence,” and have common questions of law and fact,

because they are all trespass claims related to the criminal

investigation into him. (Doc. 222 at 6-7.) In reply, Stalls

and Reidsville maintain that there is no “evidentiary overlap”

or “cohesive story” tying the remaining claims together, as

White’s conspiracy claims were dismissed and they will be

prejudiced by unrelated damages claims and jury confusion.

(Doc. 229 at 2-7; Doc. 231 at 2-6.)

The court will first address Reidsville’s motion for

severance under Rule 21.

1. Reidsville’s Rule 21 motion for severance

Upon weighing the relevant factors governing severance

under Rule 21, the court will deny Reidsville’s motion to sever

the claims into separate actions.

The first factor, “whether the issues sought to be tried

separately are significantly different from one another,” Altria

Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (citation omitted),

weighs against severance. The present case involves three sets

of Defendants (Stalls, Reidsville, and the Greensboro

Defendants). Although the claims against each arise from

different conduct on different dates from different individuals,

they all relate to alleged trespass on White’s property, and

thus the issues sought to be tried do not “significantly” differ

from one another. For example, Stalls and the Greensboro

Defendants both rely on a defense of consent from the Whites to

enter their home, and Reidsville and the Greensboro Defendants

both present factual questions involving actions by police

officers. In addition, two of these events occurred during the

pendency of a criminal investigation into White. And while the

details of the criminal claims will not be relevant to this

case, the fact that there was a criminal investigation during

the November 2, 2016 and March 6, 2017 incidents is potentially

relevant to the actions of more than one Defendant. For

example, the jury will need to understand in a general way why

Hampshire was interested in conducting a “knock and talk” on

November 2, 2016, and why the SBI and RPD were conducting a

search of White’s home on March 6, 2017, while the GPD officers

were present.5

The next factor, “whether the separable issues require

different witnesses and different documentary proof,” id.,

weighs in favor of severance. While some witnesses, such as the

Whites, and evidence, such as details about their home, overlap

across claims, the claims also involve totally unrelated

evidence and witnesses and cover events that took place on

separate occasions.

The third factor, “whether the party opposing severance

will be prejudiced if it is granted,” id., weighs against

severance. Severance would require White to try three separate

cases, forcing him to rehash similar evidence and arguments, and

would impose unnecessary separate timelines for case deadlines.

Relatedly, the fourth factor, “whether the party requesting

severance will be prejudiced if the claims are not severed,”

5 Plaintiff will not be permitted to seek to put before the jury the

details of his conspiracy and other claims the court has dismissed.

id., also weighs against severance. Reidsville has not

demonstrated that it will suffer significant prejudice by trying

its claims with any other Defendant. Further, Reidsville’s

argument regarding the potential for juror confusion is not

persuasive. Courts regularly oversee cases involving far more

numerous parties, more complex facts, and even more dissimilar

issues among the parties. This case involves only one

Plaintiff, five remaining Defendants (including the three

Greensboro Defendants), and four remaining claims (two of which

seek federal and state liability founded on the same conduct)

that present relatively simple questions for the jury.

Finally, the remaining factors do not support severance.

“As a general rule, holding multiple trials when claims could be

consolidated in one trial is not conducive to judicial economy.”

Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *6 (citation

omitted). Separate trials would require different jury

selections and multiple trials spread out over multiple days,

burdening the court’s docket and forcing White to repeatedly

argue many of the same legal concepts, such as North Carolina

trespass law. Thus, the court finds, in light of “Supreme Court

precedent and pertinent cases within the Fourth Circuit [that]

establish that courts should favor joinder of parties within a

single case,” Moulvi, 2021 WL 4494191, at *6, the adjudication

of White’s claims in a single case will best conserve scarce

judicial resources, promote fundamental fairness, and prevent

undue delay.

2. Rule 42 motions for separate trials

Defendants’ motion for separate trials under Rule 42(b)

fail for largely the same reasons. Here, separate trials would

be a judicially inefficient use of the court’s docket

management. As discussed above, separate trials would require

different juries and multiple trials spread out over several

days. Additionally, Defendants’ arguments regarding jury

confusion is unpersuasive, as what remains are relatively simple

claims, and determining whether each Defendant violated North

Carolina trespass law when they entered White’s home on separate

occasions will not be difficult for a jury to assess. Further,

separate trials would cause undue prejudice to White for the

reasons discussed above.

In sum, the court finds that the Defendants have failed to

carry their burden under either Rule 42 or Rule 21 and have not

shown that separate trials or severance of claims is warranted.

What remains in this case for trial are straightforward and

relatively simple questions of trespass and an associated

claimed violation of a constitutional right. This case does not

warrant the transactional and administrative burdens of separate

trials. Therefore, the court will deny Reidsville’s motion to

sever and Defendants’ motions for separate trials, and this

action will proceed in a single trial.

B. Motions to Exclude Evidence of Damages

Stalls, Reidsville, and the Greensboro Defendants each move

to exclude evidence of White’s alleged compensatory and punitive

damages. (See Docs. 192, 203, 255.)

1. Compensatory damages

Each Defendant argues that White should be precluded from

introducing evidence of damages for trespass relating to civil

claims this court has dismissed and criminal charges against him

dismissed by other courts. (Doc. 193 at 2-12, 16-20; Doc. 204

¶¶ 6-10; Doc. 256 at 7-12.) Such evidence includes evidence

related to the criminal investigation into White, his arrest,

the outcome of his criminal charges, criminal defense costs,

child custody litigation expenses, his alleged conspiracy by the

Defendants, emotional distress suffered as a result of his

arrest and termination of his employment, and his lost wages,

backpay, and other benefits from losing his employment. In

response, White argues that the trespasses were the genesis of

the subsequent criminal investigation, which caused the damages

at issue. (Doc. 219 at 7-11; Doc. 220 at 6-8, 10-11; Doc. 221

at 6-8.)

“North Carolina courts have concluded that a trespasser ‘is

liable for all damage proximately resulting from his wrongful

entry and, at least, for nominal damages.’” Food Lion, Inc. v.

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 960 (M.D.N.C. 1997)

(quoting Smith v. VonCannon, 197 S.E.2d 524, 528 (N.C. 1973));

see Owens v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 193 S.E. 219, 223 (N.C. 1937)

(measuring the “actual loss” of a trespass claim as “[t]he

decreased value of the property” (citation omitted)); Bishop v.

Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 302-03 (N.C. App. Ct. 1984) (measuring

trespass damages as the difference in fair market value before

and after the trespass or the rental value of the trespassed

property). North Carolina courts have defined proximate cause

as

a cause which in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced

the plaintiff’s injuries, and without which the

injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a

person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably

foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a

generally injurious nature, was probable under all the

facts as they existed.

Hampton v. Hearn, 838 S.E.2d 650, 655 (N.C. Ct. App.), review

denied, 840 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2020) (citation omitted); see Adams

v. Mills, 322 S.E.2d 164, 173 (N.C. 1984) (“An efficient

intervening cause is a new proximate cause. It must be an

independent force which entirely supersedes the original action

and renders its effect in the chain of causation remote.”).

Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury,

Hampton, 838 S.E.2d at 655 (“It is to be determined as a fact,

in view of the circumstances of fact attending it.” (quoting

Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 29 S.E.2d 740, 742 (N.C.

1944))), however “[i]f the evidence be so slight as not

reasonably to warrant the inference [of causation], the court

will not leave the matter to the speculation of the jury,” id.

(quoting Conley, 29 S.E.2d at 742); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics

and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 365 S.E.2d 909, 915 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1988), aff’d, 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990) (recognizing that

“where it is contended that plaintiff’s injuries are too remote

as a matter of law, the trial court may be required to decide

whether the tortfeasor was legally exempt from foreseeing

plaintiff’s injuries in the first place”); People’s Center, Inc.

v. Anderson, 233 S.E.2d 694, 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“It is an

elementary principle that all damages must flow directly and

naturally from the wrong, and that they must be certain both in

their nature and in respect to the cause from which they

proceed.” (quoting Johnson v. Railroad, 113 S.E. 606, 608 (N.C.

1922))). In other words, “no recovery is allowed when resort to

speculation or conjecture is necessary to determine whether the

damage resulted from the unlawful act of which complaint is made

or from some other source.” Anderson, 233 S.E.2d at 696

(citation omitted).

Similarly, as to the § 1983 claim against the Greensboro

Defendants, the court has already addressed the scope of damages

available. (Doc. 251 at 29-37.) As the court noted there,

§ 1983 creates tort liability “in favor of persons who are

deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to them by

the Constitution.” Memphis Community School District v.

Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)). Section 1983 damages are intended to

compensate an individual for the injuries suffered as a result

of a constitutional violation. Id. at 306. “Where no injury

[is] present, no ‘compensatory’ damages [can] be awarded.” Id.

at 308.

“The goal of the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has been to

tailor liability to fit the interests protected by the

particular constitutional right in question.” Townes v. City of

New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Carey, 435

U.S. at 258-59). There is a “gross disconnect” between a

claimed constitutional violation involving an unreasonable

search and seizure and alleged damages related to post-

indictment proceedings. Id. Indeed, “[t]he evil of an

unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not

that it uncovers crime, which is no evil at all.” Id. Where

there are intervening and superseding events, such as a

prosecutor’s decision to charge or inculpatory acts that support

a finding of probable cause, they break any alleged causal chain

of proximate cause. (Doc. 251 at 30, 35-37.) Further, as this

court has already held, “it is clear that the exclusionary rule

and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine simply do not apply

in civil cases.” (Doc. 82 at 21-22.) Thus, as a victim of an

unreasonable search or seizure, White “may recover damages . . .

for physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation,

etc.” but he “cannot be compensated for injuries that result

from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent

criminal prosecution.” Townes, 176 F.3d at 148.

Here, there is no evidence in the record that the alleged

trespasses proximately caused the compensatory damages related

to White’s criminal charges. Rather, the court has held that

the alleged trespass by Stalls, who is White’s brother-in-law as

well as step-brother, occurred in his personal capacity,

disconnected from any criminal investigation. While the

trespasses by Reidsville and the Greensboro Defendants occurred

in relation to the investigation into White, the costs related

to White’s criminal defense and the termination from his job do

not flow “directly and naturally from the wrong” of trespass.

See id. Instead, the alleged damages at issue were the result

of “[a]n efficient intervening cause,” the criminal

investigation itself, including the decisions to fire White and

charge him with criminal conduct, “which entirely supersedes”

each Defendant’s trespass and “renders its effect in the chain

of causation remote.” See Adams, 322 S.E.2d at 173. Even if

the Defendants could have reasonably foreseen the ultimate

consequences of trespassing in relation to a potential criminal

matter, “the rest of the evidence generally shows that the

investigation into White was proceeding upon an independent

basis separate from any [trespassory] actions Stalls [and the

other Defendants] may have taken.” (Cf. Doc. 161 at 52.) The

court will therefore grant Defendants’ motions to exclude

evidence as to previously dismissed claims, and all counsel and

witnesses are precluded from referring to these alleged damages.

2. Punitive damages

Defendants also move to preclude White from introducing

evidence or arguments relating to an award of punitive damages.

(See Doc. 193 at 12-16; Doc. 204 ¶ 8 (motion to exclude evidence

of Judge Biggs’s written opinion in White’s criminal matter);

Doc. 256 at 12-15.) In response, White argues that the jury

could find that the Defendants “acted willfully and wantonly

when they intentionally trespassed on Plaintiff’s property.”

(Doc. 220 at 9-11; Doc. 219 at 8-9; Doc. 221 at 8-9.)

To recover punitive damages under North Carolina law, the

claimant bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing

evidence that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages

and that “one of the following aggravating factors was present

and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages

were awarded: (1) Fraud. (2) Malice. (3) Willful or wanton

conduct.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D–15(a). Willful or wanton

conduct “means more than gross negligence” and entails “the

conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the

rights and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should

know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other

harm.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-5(7). The North Carolina Court of

Appeals has further defined conduct as “willful” where there

exists a “deliberate purpose not to discharge a duty . . .

necessary for the safety of the person or property of another”

and conduct as “wanton” when “done needlessly, manifesting a

reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Cockerham–

Ellerbee v. Town of Jonesville, 660 S.E.2d 178, 180 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2008) (citations omitted).

As to the federal claim, punitive damages may be awarded in

a § 1983 action against an official in his individual capacity.

However, there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant’s

conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or . . .

involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally

protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56

(1983); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987). “The

callous indifference required for punitive damages is

essentially the same as the deliberate indifference required for

a finding of liability on [a] § 1983 claim.” Cooper, 814 F.2d

at 948.

Whether White can establish that Defendants “acted

willfully and wantonly when they intentionally trespassed on

Plaintiff’s property” or, in the case of the federal claim -

with reckless or callous disregard, is generally a question of

fact for the jury. As discussed in this court’s prior order,

there is evidence that Stalls was aware he was not welcome in

the Whites’ home or garage to take care of their dogs but

nevertheless entered. (See Doc. 161 at 45-46.) Moreover, even

if he were permitted access, a jury could find that Stalls

exceeded that scope by purposefully peering under a sheet

covering a commercial mower to gain access to the serial number.

Additionally, as to Reidsville, the court previously held that

“there is at least a genuine dispute, on the facts of this case,

as to whether a reasonable officer would believe it appropriate

to knock on the door inside White’s garage.” (Id. at 105; see

id. at 103-105.) Further, the court has previously denied the

Greensboro Defendants’ summary judgment motions on the basis of

qualified immunity and public official immunity, as there is

evidence that their conduct “violated White’s clearly

established Fourth Amendment right to privacy.” (See Doc. 253

at 19, 23; Doc. 228 at 36-39.) Given this, the court will defer

ruling on the motion in limine to exclude evidence of punitive

damages as premature pending the presentation of evidence. It

will be up to White to produce sufficient evidence to meet the

standard for seeking punitive damages. Until then, the parties

shall not mention punitive damages to the jury in argument or

otherwise.

In his response, White argues that Judge Biggs’s judicial

opinion (granting a motion to suppress in White’s prior federal

criminal case) is relevant to whether the jury should award

punitive damages related to Hampshire’s conduct during the

criminal investigation. (Doc. 219 at 8-9.) White does not

argue that this opinion is evidence of malice or willful or

wanton conduct in relation to his trespass claim against

Reidsville. Moreover, a judicial opinion is generally

inadmissible. See, e.g., Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 265 (4th

Cir. 1994) (affirming the exclusion of a judicial opinion

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it “decided the

precise issue before the jury” and its probative value was

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, noting

“[j]udicial findings of fact ‘present a rare case where, by

virtue of their having been made by a judge, they would likely

be given undue weight by the jury.’” (quoting Nipper v. Snipes,

7 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1993))); Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d

1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting the admission of prior

judgments or findings of fact under Federal Rule of Evidence

803(8) is questionable because “[j]uries are likely to give

disproportionate weight to such findings of fact because of the

imprimatur that has been stamped on them by the judicial

system”); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1566–70

(Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming exclusion of evidence of prior

decision in subsequent related litigation pursuant to Rule 403).

Therefore, Reidsville’s motion to exclude evidence of Judge

Biggs’s written judicial decision on White’s criminal charges

will be granted.

C. Motion to Exclude Evidence of Text Messages

Stalls challenges the admissibility of evidence of “emails

and text messages allegedly exchanged between Brittany Stalls

and Christina White or their mother Mrs. Ross.” (Doc. 193 at

21-22.) Stalls argues that the “messages are hearsay and that

some lack authentication.” (Id.) He also argues that the

messages are not relevant to the trespass claim, or whether

Stalls had authorization to enter White’s home, and would cause

prejudice and confuse the jury as they post-date the date of the

alleged trespass. (Id.) In a short response, White contends

the messages demonstrate malice and “a lack of permission for

Defendant Stalls” to be on his property. (Doc. 220 at 11.) He

also argues that the messages “can be authenticated” and may be

used for purposes such as impeachment. (Id.)

The text and email messages are hearsay that fail to meet a

readily apparent exception. “Out-of-court statements constitute

hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted. A statement that would otherwise be hearsay

may nevertheless be admissible if it is offered to prove

something other than its truth, and this includes statements

used to charge a party with knowledge of certain information.”

In re C.R. Bard, Inc., MDL. No. 2187, Pelvic Repair System

Products Liability Litigation, 810 F.3d 913, 925–26 (4th Cir.

2016) (citation omitted). White does not dispute that the

messages are hearsay or explain how the messages “show malice.”

While such evidence could be admissible for proof of a

declarant’s state of mind under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),

Stalls correctly points out that the messages on their face

post-date the alleged trespass on September 3, 2016, and are

thus are not evidence of state of mind at the time of the

trespass. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) (granting a hearsay

exception for “then-existing state of mind . . . but not

including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact

remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or

terms of the declarant’s will”); United States v. Lentz, 282 F.

Supp. 2d 399, 411 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d, 58 F. App’x 961 (4th

Cir. 2003) (“The statement should not look backward or describe

a declarant’s past memory or belief about another’s conduct.”

(citing United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir.

2000))).

As a result, it is not entirely clear how White intends to

use this evidence for impeachment. Thus, the court will reserve

ruling on the question whether White may be permitted to use the

messages for that purpose. See Fed. R. Evid. 613(b). “For a

statement to qualify as a witness’[s] prior inconsistent

statement under Rule 613(b), the statement must be one that the

witness has made or adopted, or to which the witness otherwise

has subscribed.” Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville

Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 745 F.3d 703, 718-19 (4th

Cir. 2014). Whether the evidence is admissible at trial will

also depend on if it satisfies Rule 403. See id. at 719-21.

For these reasons, the motion to exclude evidence of text

messages between Brittany Stalls and Christina White or their

mother, Mrs. Ross, will be granted to the extent they were

offered as direct evidence, and the court reserves as to whether

they may be admitted for impeachment purposes.

D. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Anita Holder

Defendant Reidsville moves to exclude expert testimony of

Anita Holder.6 (Doc. 203 at 2.) Reidsville argues her testimony

should be excluded for the reasons stated in Defendants’ joint

motion to exclude her testimony (Doc. 166). (Doc. 204 ¶ 12.)

The court previously ruled on Defendants’ motion to exclude

expert testimony or evidence from Holder. (Doc. 161 at 25-36;

6 Defendant Stalls also moved to exclude expert testimony from Anita

Holder (Doc. 192 at 2), but the parties have agreed that motion should

be granted (Doc. 252 at 3).

Doc. 228 at 12-20 (finding that “Holder’s expert testimony would

not assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue

relevant to the claim against Reidsville as to Hampshire’s knock

and talk”).) Thus, for the reasons discussed at length already,

Reidsville’s motion to exclude Holder’s expert testimony is

granted in part and denied to the limited extent noted

previously; namely, whether she would be permitted to testify

will depend on whether Raines, Barham, and/or Williamson

contends they did not know they could not enter White’s home

without a warrant, consent, or exigency. (See Doc. 228 at 20.)

If any of them makes that contention, then the court will

consider permitting her to testify as to an officer’s

expectation, based on training, in that regard.

E. Undisputed Matters

On July 5, 2022, the parties filed a joint notice of status

of the pending motions in limine. (Doc. 252.) Based on the

filing, the parties have agreed not to mention or ask about the

following:

1) Evidence of the court’s denial of Stalls’s motion for

summary judgment on the trespass claim (Doc. 192 at

2);

2) Evidence of the GCSO’s internal investigation into

Stalls (id.);

3) Evidence of expert testimony by Anita Holder as to

Stalls (id.);

4) Evidence of an alleged extra-marital affair between

Stalls and GCSO Deputy Buskirk (id.);

5) Evidence of the sheriff’s surety bond (id.);

6) The existence of liability insurance (Doc. 203 at 1);

7) Reidsville’s ability to pay any judgment rendered

(id.);

8) Other claims or lawsuits involving Reidsville and its

employees (id.);

9) Personnel matters involving RPD Sergeant Lynwood

Hampshire (id.);

10) Evidence related to any settlement offers (id.);

11) Evidence of the court’s ruling on Reidsville’s motion

for summary judgment (id. at 2.);

12) Evidence that the city of Greensboro is paying defense

costs for the Greensboro Officers and has a qualified

duty to indemnify them for any judgment against them

in this matter (Doc. 201);

Additionally, the court will deny as moot the motion to

exclude evidence of malice towards White by Officer Schwochow

(Doc. 199) who is no longer a Defendant in the case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Stalls’s motion for a separate trial (Doc. 182) and

Reidsville’s motion to sever (Doc. 185) are DENIED.

2. Stalls’s motion in limine (Doc. 192) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as follows:

a. The motion to exclude evidence of compensatory

damages related to White’s criminal defense

costs, lost income and benefits, Christina

White’s lost income, child custody litigation

expenses, miscellaneous personal property items,

tuition expenses, and pain and suffering or

emotional distress related to his arrest or

termination of his employment is GRANTED.

b. The motion to exclude evidence of punitive

damages is DENIED as premature.

c. The motion to exclude evidence of the criminal

investigation as related to Stalls, Stalls’s

participation in an alleged conspiracy, and the

outcome of White’s criminal charges is GRANTED.

d. The motion to exclude evidence of the court’s

denial of Stalls’s motion for summary judgment on

the trespass claim is GRANTED.

e. The motion to exclude evidence of the GCSO’s

internal investigation into Stalls is GRANTED.

f. The motion to exclude evidence of expert

testimony by Anita Holder as to Stalls is

GRANTED.

g. The motion to exclude evidence of an alleged

extra-marital affair between Stalls and GCSO

Deputy Buskirk is GRANTED.

h. The motion to exclude evidence of the sheriff’s

surety bond is GRANTED.

i. The motion to exclude evidence of emails and text

messages allegedly exchanged between Brittany

Stalls and Christina White or their mother, Mrs.

Ross, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

noted above.

3. The motion to exclude evidence of malice toward White

by Officer Schwochow (Doc. 199) is DENIED as moot.

4. The motion to exclude evidence that the city of

Greensboro is paying defense costs for the Greensboro

Defendants and has a qualified duty to indemnify them

for any judgment against them in this matter (Doc.

201) is GRANTED.

5. Reidsville’s motion in limine (Doc. 203) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as follows:

a. The motion to exclude the existence of liability

insurance is GRANTED.

b. The motion to exclude evidence of Reidsville’s

ability to pay is GRANTED.

c. The motion to exclude evidence of other claims or

lawsuits involving Reidsville and its employees

is GRANTED.

d. The motion to exclude evidence of personnel

matters involving RPD Sergeant Lynwood Hampshire

is GRANTED.

e. The motion to exclude evidence related to any

settlement offers is GRANTED.

f. The motion to exclude evidence of previously

dismissed claims including the criminal

investigation against White, White’s subsequent

arrest and the outcome of his criminal charges,

White’s employment termination, White’s alleged

conspiracy between the Defendants, emotional

distress related to his arrest or termination of

his employment, lost wages, backpay, or other

damages associated with his employment

termination from the City of Greensboro, and

damages related to the criminal charges brought

against White is GRANTED.

g. The motion to exclude evidence of Hampshire’s

criminal investigation into White is GRANTED;

provided that the jury may be informed of the

fact that Hampshire was present for the “knock

and talk” for a lawful purpose related to an

ongoing investigation.

h. The motion to exclude evidence of Judge Biggs’s

written judicial opinion on White’s motion to

suppress related to his federal criminal charges

is GRANTED.

i. The motion to exclude evidence of damages arising

from White’s arrest and criminal charges is

GRANTED.

j. The motion to exclude evidence of damages related

to the termination of White’s employment is

GRANTED.

k. The motion to exclude evidence of the court’s

ruling on Reidsville’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.

l. The motion to exclude expert testimony of Anita

Holder GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

noted herein.

6. The Greensboro Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence

of compensatory and punitive damages (Doc. 255) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as noted above;

provided that the jury may be informed of the fact

that the Greensboro Defendants were present during the

lawful search of White’s home by other agencies

related to an ongoing investigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall instruct all

witnesses of these rulings, and neither counsel nor witnesses

shall mention these subjects to the jury without prior court

approval.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

August 5, 2022 United States District Judge